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In the aftermath of the litany of corporate scandals, few subjects have aroused so much 
passion in the world of accountancy as that of auditor’s liability. Now the study and 
understanding auditors’ liability to third parties cross nationally is not only fashionable 
but also a business imperative given the globalization of capital, corporations, and audit 
practice.  This study explores the doctrinal differences in third party liability claims by 
comparing the status of auditors’ liability to third parties under the common laws of the 
United States and the civil law of Spain. It will examine how the common and civil law 
courts faced with auditor liability claims, had to strike a   balance between two 
potentially conflicting interests: the public’s interest in having an independent and 
competent review of financial statements and the interest the auditing profession has in 
carrying out its duties without the fear of a potentially overwhelming liability. 
Specifically, it looks at the efforts of both courts to fashion out an appropriate doctrine 
of liability in their respective systems. Moreover, in response these scandals, the US had 
quickly promulgated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to impose some restrictions on the auditor. 
The EU, on the other hand, in a clear response to the financial crisis has just published 
Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated 
accounts and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit of public 
interest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC, to reinforce auditor 
independence and improve the public supervision of audit. If anything, these scandals 
have taught us that even in free markets controls are necessary.  Spain had from the 
onset embraced public supervision of auditors exercised by the Instituto de 
Contabilidad y Auditoria de Cuentas (ICAC), albeit, in collaboration with auditing 
professional organizations. In playing its supervision role, the ICAC was widely 
criticized by the members of the audit profession who then preferred the Anglo-Saxon 
model of self-regulation.  Now the Spanish model has been vindicated and independent 
public oversight function is generally being embraced as the most reliable system for 









Después de los numerosos escándalos corporativos que hemos visto pocos temas 
han suscitado tanto pasión en el mundo de contabilidad como la responsabilidad 
civil del auditor. Hoy en día, el estudio y conocimiento transfronterizo de la 
responsabilidad civil de los auditores de cuentas frente al tercero no es cuestión 
de gustos sino una exigencia para los negocios dado la globalización de capital, 
corporaciones y la práctica de la auditoría. Este estudio explora las diferencias 
doctrinales que existen en casos de responsabilidad civil extra-contractual 
haciendo una comparación del estatus de la responsabilidad civil de los auditores 
de cuentas frente a terceros entre EE.UU y España, y hará una indagación de 
cómo los tribunales de “civil law” y los de “common law” que hacen frente a las 
reclamaciones de la responsabilidad civil extra-contractual contra los auditores, 
tienen que luchar entre dos intereses opuestos: el interés del público a la revisión 
independiente y competente de informaciones financieras y el interés de la 
profesión de la auditoría en realizar su función sin tener que preocuparse de la 
carga de una responsabilidad potencialmente aplastante. Examinará, por ello, los 
esfuerzos de los tribunales para crear una apropiada doctrina de la 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Societal changes have affected auditor’s liability through time, and third party liability 
in particular has undergone significant changes in the course of the last century. The 
new method of raising capital through the financial markets has elevated the importance 
of audit functions in the global market. The auditing industry has also developed into a 
sophisticated global network of firms, with auditors providing a wide range of both 
audit and non-audit services. A diversity that has also exposed them to a greater risk of 
liability: 
 
The increasing growth and changing role of corporations in modern society has 
been attended by a new perception of the societal role of the profession of 
accounting. The day when the accountant served only the owner-manager of a 
company and was answerable to him alone has passed. The complexities of 
modern industry combined with the effects of specialization, the impact of 
taxation, urbanization, the separation of ownership from management, the rise of 
professional corporate managers, and a host of other factors, have led to marked 
changes in the role and responsibilities of the accountant, and in the reliance 
which the public must place upon his work. The financial statements of the 
corporations upon which he reports can affect the economic interests of the 




Over time, audit reports had become invaluable instruments to measure stability and to 
provide assurance. Shareholders rely largely on the audited or verified reports of 
companies for reliable financial information on the state of affairs of their investment. 
Investors and creditors likewise are attracted to the company based on its financial 
stability, which is certified by the audit. Indeed, third parties confronted with insolvency 
of the company in which they have invested, increasingly seek to recover their 
economic loss from auditors who were negligent in auditing the company in question. 
Accordingly, the study of the liability of auditors towards third parties has grown in 
importance,
2
 and has attracted enormous scholarship in the field of comparative law. 
                                                     
1
 See the dictum of Mr. Justice Dickson in Haig v. Bamford (1977) 1 S.C.R. 466 at 475-76, 72 D.L.R. 
(3d), 68 at 74. 
2
  KHOURY, L., “The liability of auditors beyond their clients: A comparative study”, McGill Law 




Moreover, the response to the current unceasing economic crisis provoked by numerous 
corporate failures, partly blamed on the audit profession, has ushered in a new 
regulatory era globally as countries revise their legislation, regulation and case law to 
increase auditors’ liability to third parties.
3
 The amount of these new regulations creates 
a challenge to keep track of this development and a business imperative to understand 
the legal climate beyond the traditional state boundaries.   
 
Chapter I has served to give a general outlook at auditing in the wider context of 
corporate governance. It starts with historical background to the rise of modern 
companies and the figure of a director, to modernization of corporate law across the 
member states of the European Union, like Spain. It analysis how the emergence of 
directors gave birth to position auditor as a neutral third party who certifies the accounts 
prepared by the director. This chapter will outline the role of the director as first bastion 
of corporate security and how the auditor compliments that by giving the outside 
investor the necessary assurance as to veracity and fairness of those accounts. This is 
achieved by means of clear cut rules and standards that the auditor is bound to follow in 
order to avoid complicity and liability. These duties are examined in accordance with 
Spanish and United States laws. 
 
Chapter II will attempt to provide an insight into the phenomenon of audit expectation 
gap, an apparent misconception between auditors and the public about the role and 
function of auditors in the message conveyed by the audit report. How the auditing 
profession viewed the problem of audit expectation gap? This misconception has been 
inextricably linked with the rise of liability litigation against auditors. This chapter 
reviews the literature on the audit expectation gap by examining its definition, nature 
and structure as well as factors responsible for its rise. The chapter goes on to look at 
the practical ways to reduce the expectation gap.  
 
Chapter III is divided into two parts. The first part examines notion of economic loss 
as the precursor to the auditor’s third party liability. It looks at the economic loss 
problem under the law of tort. How it relates with contract. Why physical loss does 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
3
 TODA, M., & MCCARTY, W. (2005) cited in CHUNG, J., FARRAR, J. PURI, P & THORNE, L., “Auditor 
liability to third parties after Sarbanes-Oxley: An international comparison of regulatory and legal 
reforms”, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 19, 2010, p. 66. 
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enjoy more protection than economic loss? Why was there divergence of treatment for 
economic loss within and across systems? The courts’ reluctance to allow recovery not 
linked with physical loss or injury for the fear that such admission would open the door 
to a mass of litigation which might very well overwhelm the courts. The mutual 
concerns of both common and civil law courts to keep liability exposure on check and 
their use of duty in case of common law and causation for civil law to achieve that. 
Attention is also given to the uncertainty regarding the prerequisites for compensation 
of economic loss and the lack of consistent framework in determining recoverability. 
The chapter concludes with an opinion on the ongoing debate over the propriety of 
recovery expansion or otherwise. 
 
The second part provides a detailed look at auditor’s liability towards third parties. It 
examines the evolution of third party liability in the United States common law and the 
legal reasoning and the social jurisprudence the courts had employed to bring it about.  
As audit liability under the common law is a matter of state law in the United States, 
and a split exists among the states as to the individuals to whom the auditor owes a duty 
of care, a review of the legal doctrines that underpin auditor liability to third parties and 
the intellectual framework the courts have established to determine liability one way or 
the other, would also be undertaken. The remainder of this chapter discusses Spanish 
civil law approach to the auditor liability to third parties. Although audit liability is 
compensated under the general principle of liability, as long as it meets the conditions 
of directness, legitimacy, and certainty set out in the codes, recovery is however, 
restricted by the courts through the use of causation. The concern of indeterminate 
liability the civil law shares with the common law will also be highlighted. Ultimately, a 
cursory look at the similarity of roles duty and causation play to limit liability. 
 
Chapter IV highlights the change in audit regulatory framework of United States and 
the European Union provoked by the chain of corporate scandals across the Atlantic, 
epitomized by the Enron. It starts with history of corporations together with rise of the 
financial markets. It goes on to examine the earlier debates regarding the adequacy of 
peer review and self-regulation of the auditing profession together with the atmosphere 
of greed that failed to foresee or prevent the corporate scandals. These scandals were the 
final straw that moved authorities in the United States and Europe to act. That was the 





Chapter V will appraise the judicial changes in tort rules in the US and how the 
expansion in third party liability was received by the accounting profession. Indeed 
some tort liability judgments have rendered some firms insolvent. The audit industry in 
the US perceiving themselves as beleaguered victims of a capricious and irrational tort 
system, called for tort reform.
4
 But can the same be said of Spain? Where despite the 
system of general responsibility it maintains, third party liability against auditors is of 
rare occurrence until recently. The chapter also examines the global reach of the 
litigation liability campaign of auditors, their successes as well as their challenges. 
 
Finally, this study contributes to the auditor liability debate. It is hoped that it enhances 
understanding of the cultural and legal environment that underpin the differences 





















                                                     
4
 SILICIANO, A. J., “Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform” Michigan Law 
Review 86, 1988, p. 339.  
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CHAPTER I  
 




This chapter is intended as a foundation for understanding auditor’s
5
 liability to 
third parties,
6
 but audit can hardly be discussed in the absence of an annual report 
which will in turn lead to corporate governance.
7
 The chapter therefore looks at a 
number of contextual issues regarding corporate governance. It analyzes the position 
of the company director as the first reference of responsibility under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as well as Spanish corporate law.
8
 It also looks at the function of an audit 
and outlines the general role and responsibilities of auditors. It is however, difficult 
and even dangerous to analyze auditor’s responsibility outside the context of 
auditor’s wider role in the corporate governance system. That being the case, 
perhaps, the logical starting point is to appraise the phenomenal evolution of the 
audit accounting profession from a mere bookkeeping to a major player in the 
modern day corporations.
9
 This without a doubt is owed to the growth in importance 
of the financial statement which has become a veritable instrument used by 
corporations to attract capital.
10
 As the use of financial statements became 
widespread among companies not run by their owners, audit became an instrument 
of reassurance to persons who have a financial interest in companies, aside from the 
company’s directors. Thus in ensuring company’s viability and investor protection, 
there is no better method than accountability in the companies through open 
disclosure by the board of directors followed by a thorough audit carried out in 
accordance with strict accounting standards. 
 
                                                     
5
 Auditor, “Auditor de Cuentas”, accountant, public accountant, and Certified Public Accountant as used 
in this treatise will refer to a Certified Public Accountant in public practice. 
6
 Third parties as used herein refer to any investors who rely on the financial statements and any creditors 
of the business entity. 
7
 Corporate governance is simply, a role assigned to person of directing and control of a corporation. 
8
 Director, board of directors and management will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
9
 KHOURY, L., Liability of Auditors…, op. cit., p. 416. 
10
 COOKSON, C. R., “The Delictual Liability of Auditors to Third Parties for Negligent Misstatements”, 




2. THE BIRTH OF AUDIT IN THE UNITED STATES        
For many centuries, most business organizations were small in size and run by their 
owners.
11
 These small and mostly family owned business organizations in Europe were 
known to maintain some system of bookkeeping. According to RAMAMOORTI, “within a 
span of a couple of centuries” the system of bookkeeping used by these European 
businesses found their way into the United States.
12
 Because the businesses were run by 
their owners, there was no necessity to give accounts to outside parties. The industrial 
revolutions however paved the way for the growth and expansion of these once small 
business enterprises into large corporations.
13
 As these corporations grew in size and 
needed to expand to new markets or finance expensive project, there arose the need to 
raise capital in order to fund this expansion.
14
 With their expansion and increase in 
complexity the need for professional directors
15
 also became necessary, which gave rise 
to separation of management and ownership.
16
 This development was brilliantly 
described by QUEENAN as follows: 
              
The economic system, after having progressed at a relatively slow pace for 
centuries has been revolutionized by the advancement in technology and by 
changes in the industrial organizations and government activities. Many 
enterprises have come to rely on external capital and credit which has separated 
ownership from management. These developments have had a vital impact on 
the economy of the free world and on the progress of our profession. Accounting 
has become increasingly important for internal administration and control and 
for external financial reporting. In countries with a highly developed industry . . . 
the accounting profession has progressed from a small group of practitioners 
                                                     
11
 RAMAMOORTI, S., Internal Auditing: History, Evolution, and Prospects, The Institute of Internal 






 BAXT, R., “The Liability of Accountants and Auditors for Negligent Statements in Company 
Accounts”, Modern Law Review 36, 1973, p. 42, accessed June 15, 2013 at 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za/webx/access/journal_archive/00104051/1043.pdf.  
14
 RAMAMOORTI, S., Internal Auditing..., op. cit., p. 3. 
15
 The term “director” has been defined by section 3 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 
(hereinafter “SEC”) to mean “any director of a corporation or any person performing similar functions 
with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated.” 
16
 COOKSON, C. R., Delictual Liability…, op. cit., p. 5. 
19 
 
concentrated in a few centers of population and unrecognized publicly, to a well 




Thus, the growth of the modern corporation does not only give birth to the separation 
between ownership and management but also the prevalence of owners who do not 
directly run their businesses.
18
 These diverse groups of owners usually hire professional 
directors for the day to day running of the business, which gave rise to the concept of 
corporate governance, the way companies are organized and controlled. Although 
corporate governance is as old as company itself, the concept became popularized in the 






3. MODERNIZATION OF CORPORATE LAWS IN SPAIN 
It is trite that the evolution of financial accounting and auditing in any society is closely 
linked with the economic activities undertaken by such a society. Spain is not an 
exception. Corporate law in Spain can be traced back to the Commercial Code of 1885, 
where the drafters of the code under article 32 contemplated some accounting 
procedures among the then small business enterprises without making it obligatory.
20
 
Other Spanish laws like “Ley de 17 de junio de 1951”,
21
”Decreto Ley 7/64, de 30 abril 
de 1964”,
22
 also made mention of accounting or audit. However, obligatory audit was 
not contemplated in Spain until 1973 when the Commercial Code was modified by Ley 




This law was significant in the transformation of Spain’s accounting profession because 
it did not only recognize the need for expertise in audit but it also symbolized the 
                                                     
17
 QUEENAN, J. W., in an address to the Third Congress of Chartered Accountants of South Africa on 
April 25, 1966 quoted from ANDERSON, A. P., “Accountants' Liability to Third Parties for an Audit”, 
Marquette Law Review, 52, 1968, p. 162. 
18
 The growing need for external funding by businesses gave way for diverse group of persons interested 
in the business, these according to KHOURY, included “prospective purchasers of shares, potential 
investors, banks, suppliers, sureties, lenders, and public authorities…”  KHOURY, L., Liability of 
Auditors…, op. cit., p. 418. 
19
 MONGALO, T., “The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
Africa”, South African Law Journal, 2003, p. 185. 
20
 Article 25 “Real Decreto de 22 de agosto de 1885, por el que se publica el Código de Comercio” 
(hereinafter ‘CCOM’). 
21
 Ley de 17 de junio de 1951 de régimen Jurídico de las Sociedades Anónimas (hereinafter “LSA”).  
22
 This law was on housing and capital markets. 
23
 Other laws in this category included: Ley 46/1984, Real Decreto Ley 710/1986 de 4 de abril and Ley 
3/1987, de 2 de abril, Ley 22/87, de 11 de noviembre, among others. Generally, see PACHECO CAÑETE, 




subsequent transition from internal to external audit. However, the most important leap 
yet on audit accounting in Spain came by way of a Directive from the European Union 




The European Union, on the other hand, pursuant to its single financial market goal, has 
been transforming company laws of member states to bring them into harmony in an 
effort to create a regional legal framework for auditors as outlined in the Financial 
Services Action Plan.
25
 This is done through the medium of directives. Accordingly, 
audit and company laws in member states are based on the Directives coming from the 
European Council, particularly, Directive 2006/43/EC on the Statutory Audits of 
Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, also known as The 8th Company Law 
Directive.  The Directive which came into force on 29 June 2006 was implemented by 
member states by the end of June 2008. The Directive amended and expanded the 8th 
Council Directive of the 10
th
 April 1984 on the approval of statutory auditors in EU 
member states. Principally, “the Directive sets out the duties of statutory auditors and 
audit firms and introduced a requirement for public oversight of the audit profession and 
co-operation between regulatory authorities in the EU” member states.
26
 Other notable 
legal texts accompanying this Directive are the Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU, the 
Transparency Directive 2004/109/EC and the Solvency II Directive 2009/138/EC. 
These legal instruments have, among other things, made audit of certain companies 
obligatory and addressed the specific needs of public-interest entities, as defined by the 
Accounting Directive, i.e. financial institutions or listed companies. 
 
The above framework has just been further revised by two enabling legal instruments, 
to wit, “Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 amending Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts and 
consolidated accounts and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on specific requirements regarding statutory audit 
of public interest entities and repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC.” The 
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 Accession into the European came as a result of several years of intense negotiations and fulfillment of 
some principal legal, democratic and human rights conditions. The Spanish corporate law was a 
beneficiary of this requirement.  
25
 Financial Services: Implementing The Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, adopted by the 
European Commission on May 11, 1999, COM (1999) 232, 11.05.99, accessed June 5, 2010 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/forumgroups/manipulation1_en.pdf.  
26
 Directive 2006/43/EC. 
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overall objective of this reform is to provide stricter rules of engagement for audit of 
public-interest entities, strengthen the powers of public authorities responsible for audit 
oversight as well as restoring public confidence in the financial markets after the recent 
financial crisis. Member states must implement the Directive on or before the deadline 
of 16 June 2016, which is also the date of direct application of the Regulation, the first 
of its kind to apply to statutory audit. Spain has already implemented this Directive by 





Most of Spanish commercial and company laws are shaped by the requirements of these 
Directives including the Audit Law. Accordingly, modern Spanish corporate law is 
founded on a number of important legislations which were adapted from the European 
Union Directives. Chief among these are the Commercial Code, Company Law, 
Securities Markets Law and the Audit Law together with rules and regulations made 
under them. 
 
Evidently, the immediate essence of corporate governance is to benefit the shareholders 
of the company but its ultimate objective is to efficiently allocate capital for its most 
productive use. This responsibility is principally entrusted with the director. 
Consequently, directors are responsible for the company’s financial statement as well as 
its internal control structure. In other words, they are the first bastion of corporate 
governance. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to imagine any effective check or a 
proper audit, for that matter, without the director’s close collaboration.  
 
4. THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The position of director is a sine qua non requirement under all company laws. Since 
company law is traditionally under states, not federal jurisdiction in the United States, 
this provision is found under various States’ statutes.
28
 Incidentally, many of these 
statutes are modeled after the Model Business Corporation Act.
29
Accordingly, 
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 “Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2011, de 1 de julio, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de 
Auditoría de Cuentas” is still the law in force in Spain. The 2015 Audit Law, which derogates this law, 
will enter into force on 17 June 2016. All reference to Spanish audit law in this thesis shall be to the 2015 
Audit Law, “Ley 22/2015, de 20 de julio, de Auditoría de Cuentas” (hereinafter called “LAC”). 
28
 The federal government does not have a statute under which a company can be validly incorporated. 
29
 The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), according to Wikipedia, is a model set of law prepared 
by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association 
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following the MBCA many states statutes required for director’s appointment by 
providing that the business and affairs of corporations shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors.
30
 A similar provision is found under article 209 of the 
Spanish company law where management and control of company affairs are assigned 




4.1 THE STANDARD OF DIRECTOR’S CONDUCT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Directors are appointed under contract by the shareholders at a general meeting. By 
accepting their appointment, directors are obliged to perform their duties to a certain 
standard, which is held at common law to be fiduciary.
32
 It follows that in the United 
States the concepts that underlie the fiduciary duties of corporate directors have their 
origins in English common law of both trusts and agency from over two hundred years 
ago.
33
 A concept that never stops evolving. It is trite that at common law the frontier of 
duty is never closed. Nonetheless, fiduciary duties of directors are also statutorily 
provided for under state laws. For example under section 8.30 of the MBCA, fiduciary 
duty of directors has been characterized as including duties of good faith, due care and 
                                                                                                                                                           
and is now followed by majority of states in the United States. Please see Wikipedia, accessed August 7, 
2013 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_Business_Corporation_Act. 
30
 See MBCA Section 8.01 (2002). 
31
 ”Real Decreto Legislativo 1/2010, de 2 de julio, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital” as amended by “Ley 31/2014, de 3 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital para la mejora del gobierno corporativo” (hereinafter “LSC”). The said article 209 
provides “es competencia de los administradores la gestión y la representación de la sociedad en los 
términos establecidos en esta ley.” Article 210 LSC, on the other hand, provides for the manner in which 
to organize company management, thus “la administración de la sociedad se podrá confiar a un 
administrador único, a varios administradores que actúen de forma solidaria o de forma conjunta o a un 
consejo de administración.”   
32
 It is a settled law that relationship between directors and a company is that of fiduciary. A fiduciary 
duty, on the other hand, is considered by law to be the highest degree of care and loyalty, meaning that 
the director must act with utmost good faith and always in the best interest of the company. Fiduciary 
duty is generally owed to the company and its shareholders, but when a company is on a brink of 
bankruptcy this may extend to creditors as well. EGAN, B. F., Director Fiduciary Duties under Delaware 
and Texas Law, paper presented at the 31
st
 Annual Conference on Securities Regulation and Business 
Law, Dallas, Texas, February 13, 2009, p. 1, accessed November 7, 2013 at 
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/1106.pdf.  Please see also Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 
N.E. 545, where JUSTICE CARDOZO held that fiduciary relationship requires “not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Pursuant to the independence required between accountants 
employed to audit a financial statement and a client, there cannot be a fiduciary relationship between the 
accountant and his client. In Resolution Trust Co. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 844 F. Supp. 431 at 436 it was 
held that the level of independence required of accountants in the audit process is fundamentally 
inconsistent with a status of a fiduciary.  
33
 EGAN, B. F., Director Fiduciary Duty…, op. cit., p. 2.  
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loyalty to the company, albeit, these duties are interpreted and applied in the same way 




Company’s board of directors has been “granted plenary authority over the affairs of the 
company, the manner in which it exercises that authority largely is left to the discretion 
of directors. For the most part, corporate statutes do not specify what directors are to do 
in directing the company affairs, or how they are to do it.”
35
 But what the law 
emphasizes is that such authority must be exercised in accord with director’s standards 
of conduct as enshrined in the MBCA and the general principles of duty under common 
law.
36
 However, “these duties are not generally framed as precise rules, but instead are 
expressed as general duties or standards,” and while they may be distinctly analyzed 
sometimes they are component of unit called corporate governance and complement 
each other.
37
 These duties are discussed below. 
 
4.1.1 DIRECTOR’S DUTY OF CARE 
The duty of care requires the director to handle the affairs of the company with such 
care as a prudent man of his standing would do under similar circumstances. The duty 
of due care requirement mainly focuses on decision-making process of the director. 
However, this duty only specifies the manner in which directors must discharge their 
legal responsibilities, not the substance of director decisions. Accordingly, in carrying 
out this function, the director is under obligation to be ‘diligent and informed and 
exercise honest and unbiased business judgment in pursuit of the company’s interests.’
38
 
Pursuant to their ‘statutory responsibilities to direct the business and affairs of the 
company, directors also have a duty to properly monitor and oversee the business affairs 
of a company.’
39
 This includes the responsibility to see that in working to achieve its 
                                                     
34
 Fiduciary duties of corporate officers including directors are still largely creatures of states’ common 
law. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949). 
35
 JOHNSON, L. P. Q., “The Audit Committee’s Ethical and Legal Responsibilities: The State Law 
Perspective”, S. Tex. L. Rev. 47 2005-2006, p. 30, accessed June 6, 2013 at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1072&context=wlufac.  
36
 See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. and MBCA Section 8.30 (2002). 
37
 JOHNSON, L. P. Q., State Law Perspective…, op. cit., p. 34. For example, the application of the duties of 
care, loyalty and good faith by courts has given rise to the duty of disclosure, which is not a separate duty 
on its own right but rather an extension of duties of care and loyalty. As demonstrated in the case of 
Arnold v. Society for Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994), where it was held that 
“Once [directors] traveled down the road of partial disclosure … an obligation to provide the stockholders 
with an accurate, full, and fair characterization” is implied. 
38
EGAN, B. F., Director Fiduciary Duty…, op. cit., p. 8.  
39
 JOHNSON, L. P. Q., State Law Perspective…, op. cit., p. 35. 
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purpose the company functions within the law.
40
 Failure by the directors to properly 
handle this obligation may constitute a breach of the fiduciary duty of care.
41
 As 
judicially sanctioned in the seminal case of In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative 
Litigation by the Delaware Court of Chancery: 
 
A director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that 
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is 
adequate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in 





Moreover with the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
43
 directors cannot feign ignorance 
of what is happening under their watch. They have an obligation to take reasonable 
steps to detect and prevent violations of the law by their companies. This includes 
ensuring that the company has in place an appropriate internal “information and 
reporting system” designed to enable adequate oversight by directors of the company’s 
compliance with the law and business performance.
44
 As stated above these standards 
were required by various state statutes and imposed by courts under common law. That 
notwithstanding, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 was also enacted at federal level to 
reinforce the importance of corporate governance. According to Chancellor ALLEN, the 
relevance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to “infuse new meaning into state law notions of 
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 Id. He must ensure that the company acts within its powers and does not go ultra vires i.e., acts beyond 
the scope of the authority of the corporation as defined by its articles of incorporation or the laws of the 
state of incorporation. 
41
 With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC, pursuant to its rulemaking authority under 
section 404 requires internal control certification of companies to further enhance the accountability of 
the management. As stated by SEC Chairman William Donaldson, “…By requiring a report stating 
management’s responsibility for internal control over financial reporting and management’s assessment 
regarding the effectiveness of such control, investors will be better able to evaluate management’s 
stewardship responsibilities and the reliability of a company’s disclosure.” See William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Testimony Concerning Implementation of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
(Sept. 9, 2003), accessed July 1 2012 at http://www.senate.gov/~banking/_files/ donaldsn.pdf. 
42
 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
43
 This legislation came into force in 2002 and was hailed as the most important securities legislation 
since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. The Act, named after Senator Paul Sarbanes and 
Representative Michael Oxley, introduced major changes to regulation of financial practice and corporate 
government in the United States 
44
 Section 404 Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires the company to establish and maintain an adequate internal 
control structure. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003) it was held 
that failure to exercise proper oversight function through inaction is a breach of fiduciary duty. 
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“reasonable” oversight in a way that leads courts to demand greater director and 




4.1.2 DIRECTOR’S DUTY OF LOYALTY 
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act in the best interests of the corporation. What 
this means is that directors must not place themselves in a position in which their duties 
to the company will be in conflict with their personal interests. Accordingly, a director 
must refrain from usurping the powers of the company to engage in an unfair self-
dealing transaction or use the company assets or confidential information for personal 
gain. The duty of loyalty may be both “affirmative and harm-avoidance.” As reiterated 
by Chancellor CHANDLER: “[T]he ‘duty of loyalty.., imposes an affirmative obligation 
to protect and advance the interests of the corporation and mandates that [a director] 




4.1.3 DIRECTOR’S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH  
The good faith requirement has long been important to fiduciary analysis in corporate 
law, but its meaning has been somewhat nebulous.
47
Good faith is said to relate to the 
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JOHNSON, L. P. Q., State Law Perspective…, op. cit., p. 36 
46
 Id at p. 37 (quoting the dictum of Chancellor William CHANDLER In re Walt Disney Co. 825 A.2d 275at 
289 (Del. Ch. 2003)). 
47
 Good faith sometimes has been held to be an element of the duty of loyalty and it is in fiduciary 
relationship that good faith is mostly understood in common law. See Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith 
Intern., Inc., 741 F.2d. (5th Cir. 1984). Unlike many civil law jurisdictions of the Continental Europe, 
common law, generally, does not imply an obligation of good faith on contractual parties. Common law 
courts take the view that parties should have the freedom to contract for what they wish and should be 
able to retract anytime before agreement. The common law position is based on the premise that parties to 
a contract are on opposite sides of the negotiating table, and the Latin maxim is caveat emptor, let the 
buyer beware. Generally, when a contract has been entered into there is no duty to act in good faith. 
However, common law has tended to operate on a case-by-case basis whereby the courts have under 
certain circumstance developed solutions in response to certain problems of unfairness, like in cases of 
contract of employment, agency, insurance and partnership. 
It is noteworthy that in other common law jurisdiction like the United States, the principle of good faith is 
making headway, as seen in the US Commercial Code “every contract or duty within this Act imposes an 
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement” U.C.C. ss. 1-203. Similar provisions are 
found in Canada and Australia. It is only English law that had resisted this intrusion and that may be 
changing soon. 
For a long time now, it is believed that the concept of good faith may creep into English law through the 
influence of European law. EU member states are required to implement and transpose some legal 
principles like the Common European Sales Law where it was provided that each party has a duty to act 
in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. The change is closer to home than earlier imagined as held 
by Leggard J in a recent locus classicus of Yam Seng Pte Ltd v. International Trade Corporation Ltd 
[2013] EWHC 111 that a contractual duty of good faith could be implied under the English law. The 
Judge went on to boldly argue that “I respectfully suggest that the traditional English hostility towards a 
doctrine of good faith in the performance of contracts, to the extent it still persist, is misplaced.” Id. 
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director`s conduct at a given point in time. Thus “directors consciously and intentionally 
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude 
concerning a material corporate decision” has been held to constitute a breach of good 
faith.
48
 Chief Justice VEASEY, on the other hand, puts it this way: 
 
In my opinion, good faith requires an honesty of purpose and eschews a 
disingenuous mindset of appearing or claiming to act for the corporate good, but 
not caring for the wellbeing of the constituents of the fiduciary. Although the 
concept of good faith is not fully developed in the case law, and factual 
scenarios are difficult to formulate, an argument could be made that reckless, 
disingenuous, irresponsible, or irrational conduct-but not necessarily self-dealing 
or larcenous conduct-could implicate concepts of good faith. If the board’s 
decision or conduct is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director 





The key issue in the above authorities seems to point to a question of motive of the 
director to be inferred from the circumstances of his decision. Thus in analyzing good 





4.2 STANDARD OF “LOS ADMINISTRADORES” IN SPAIN 
Spanish law, in line with its civil law tradition, has codified director’s duties and 
specified them under chapter III articles 225 to 230 of the company law “LSC” as 
revised by “Ley 31/2014, de 3 de diciembre, por la que se modifica la Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital para la mejora del gobierno corporativo.” These duties in their 
significance mirror the American position and are, inter alia, duty of reasonable care, 
skill and diligence, and loyalty to the company in carrying out the functions conferred 
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 See the dictum of CHANCELLOR WILLIAM CHANDLER In re Walt Disney Co. 825 A.2d 275at 289 (Del. 
Ch. 2003). 
49
 VEASEY, E. N., “State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities 
of Advisors”, J. Corp. L. 28, 2003 at p. 447, accessed June 7 2013 at  
http://www.citeulike.org/user/COKSarbox/article/380907.  
50
 JOHNSON affirms here that “deliberate indifference to the director duties of care and loyalty, or 
consciously disregarding those duties, is conduct sufficiently faulty to indicate a lack of the required 
motive- i.e., good faith-of advancing the best interests of the company,” see JOHNSON, L. P. Q., State Law 
Perspective…, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 
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on him by the company’s statutes. The director must also avoid conflict of interest and 
competition with the company.  
 
4.2.1 DUTY OF DILIGENCE OF “EL ADMINISTRADOR” 
The Spanish company law “LSC”, under its article 225 requires company directors to 
exercise their functions with due diligence and in accordance with the statutes and 
articles of the company. The article used the phrase “un ordenado empresario” a skilled 
businessman to refer to the standard required of a director. This signifies that the 
director is expected to use his or her particular skills, experience and knowledge for the 
benefit of the company. The court summarized this standard as “conducta socialmente 
esperable en el tráfico, integrando en gran medida los usos del comercio y las buenas 
prácticas de la gestión empresarial.”
51
 The director must take all necessary measures to 
ensure the good control and proper working of the company. He or she also has an 
obligation to seek and obtain all necessary information required to carry out his or her 
obligations.
52
 It has been held that denying directors’ access to company’s incorporation 
documents is inconsistent with this function. The relevant arbitral decision reads:  
 
La combinación de las normas que regulan las facultades y deberes de los 
administradores sociales con las que determinan su responsabilidad en el 
ejercicio del cargo parecen excluir la posibilidad de una restricción como la que 
se contempla. Aparte de la representación corresponden al órgano de 
administración las facultades de gestión o administración que tienen diversas 
manifestaciones, en la mayoría de las cuales la consulta de la documentación 
social ha de considerarse como esencial a la hora de adoptar las oportunas 
decisiones o de ejecutar las ya adoptadas. (...) Si en relación con todas esas 
actuaciones los administradores han de actuar con la diligencia de un ordenado 
empresario (…) difícilmente puede exigírseles que se atengan a ese mandato 
legal si se les hurta la posibilidad de consultar la documentación social y tomar, 




                                                     
51
 SAP Navarra de 15 de febrero de 1995 (AC 1995\294). 
52
 Article 225.3 LSC. The amended article 226 incorporated the common law-derived doctrine of business 
judgment rule where directors are accorded the presumption of acting in bona fide and in the best interest 
of the company. 
53
 RESOLUCIÓN de 4 de mayo de 2005, de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado. 
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4.2.2 DUTY OF LOYALTY OF “EL ADMINISTRADOR” 
On loyalty of directors, on the other hand, article 227 of the Spanish company law 
“LSC” stipulates that “los administradores deberán desempeñar el cargo con la lealtad 
de un fiel representante, obrando de buena fe y en el mejor interés de la sociedad.”  This 
implies that directors must carry out their function with loyalty must faithfully represent 
the company. Directors must act within the powers conferred on them by the company’s 
statutes and in accordance with the law.
54
 Directors are obliged to keep all company 
secrets at their disposition even after ceasing to be so except where permitted by law. 
They should also abstain from any deliberation or voting on agreements where their 
interest or interest of someone close to them may conflict with that of the company.
55
 
This presupposes that the directors must put the interest of the company ahead of their 
own interest, and this duty should be to the company as a whole, and not to any 
individual, or group of shareholders. As held in the decision of SAP of Guipúzcoa of 
June 4, 1999 where the court denounced an action calculated to benefit a group of 
shareholders:     
 
…todo parece indicar que esta actuación (…) obedece a la defensa de intereses 
particulares de un grupo de socios que tiene como finalidad la venta de la 
Sociedad, por lo que se trata de una operación en la que quedan postergados los 
intereses de la Empresa (…). Los accionistas tienen libertad para disponer de los 
títulos de su propiedad, pero lo que no resulta admisible es que un Consejero 
Delegado forme grupo de accionistas para una venta de acciones con finalidad 





4.2.3 PROHIBITION OF CONFLICT OF INTEREST OF “EL 
ADMININTRADOR” 
One of the fundamental duties of a director under article 229 of the Spanish company 
law is to avoid any possible conflict of interests with the company. The law prohibits a 
director from using his or her position, or any information obtained while acting in that 
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 Article 228 LSC. Infraction to the duty of loyalty would lead to liability not only for the loss caused to 
the company’s assets but also returning any benefit obtained by the directors. See article 227.2. 
55
 Article 228 LSC. 
56
 SAP Guipúzcoa de 4 junio de 1999 (AC 1999\1446). 
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capacity for personal gain.
57
 Directors must not engage in any activity by themselves or 
through third parties that might compete with or affect the interest of the company and 
must communicate any prior personal interest or of any person related to the company.
58
 
The director is also bound not to compete with the company, or use its assets or 
confidential information for personal benefit.
59
 In addition, the provisions on duty of 
loyalty are absolute and cannot be limited or impaired by any contrary statute except in 
circumstances contemplated under article 230 LSC.  
 
It is an accepted principle of Spanish law that when a director involves in an activity or 
a transaction similar with that of the company competition may be presumed. This 
principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Spain in its judgment STS de 7 de 
noviembre 1986. The learned Justices elucidated the position of the law as follows:      
  
…resulta acreditado que el actor -recurrente- realizó una actividad comercial 
desleal y competitiva análoga a que constituía el objeto social de la compañía 
mercantil de la que era administrador (...) aquél incurrió en actividades 
comerciales del mismo género que las de la compañía mercantil citada, que le 
estaban prohibidas, por su condición de administrador de ésta, tanto por el Art. 
12, de los Estatutos como por el también Art. 12, párrafo segundo, de la Ley de 
Sociedades de Responsabilidad Limitada (de 1953), con la consiguiente sanción 




By these duties, the Spanish legislature seems to encourage the board of directors to act 
honestly and to promote the success of the company in the collective interest of 
shareholders. They are also meant to set a standard for directors in conducting the 
company’s affairs. However, it is worthy of note that the standard applies to all 
directors as well as officers of the company, and no distinction is made between 
executive and non-executive directors. Where the company suffers a loss or damage as a 
result of the director’s failure to comply with the above prescribed duties, the director 
will be personally liable under article 236 LSC. 
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 Article 229 LSC. 
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 STS de 7 de noviembre de 1986 (RJ 1986\6215). 
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5. THE AUDITING CONTEXT 
As seen above, company directors owe several fiduciary duties to the company as well 
as its shareholders. Part of such duties is to maintain and prepare annual accounts of the 
company. Chancellor William ALLEN once noted that the monitoring and oversight 
obligation of directors “includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a 
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is adequate, 
exists...”
61
 This inevitably is the information that goes into the company’s financial 
statements. 
 
5.1 THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Financial information is an important fabric of modern corporate governance. It is a sine 
qua non requirement in all companies. In the United States, for example, apart from the 
provisions found under various states statutes with regards to annual reports, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in section 13 also required companies to file annual 
reports. This provision is to be found in the General Rules and Regulations promulgated 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 15 (d) (1) thereof provides that unless 
exempted by the law, a company “shall file an annual report, on the appropriate form 
authorized or prescribed therefor, for the fiscal year in which the registration statement 
under the Securities Act of 1933 became effective and for each fiscal year thereafter…” 
 
Companies in Spain are also required to prepare and maintain account statements in 
accordance with the nature of business activities they undertake. Article 253 of the 
Spanish company law provides: 
 
Los administradores de la sociedad están obligados a formular, en el plazo 
máximo de tres meses contados a partir del cierre del ejercicio social, las cuentas 
anuales, el informe de gestión y la propuesta de aplicación del resultado, así 




The accounts statements must be comprised of a profit and loss and a balance sheet of 
the company as at the last day of the financial year. These documents are to be prepared 
with clarity and must give the true and fair view of the company’s net assets as well as 
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5.2 PUBLICITY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
For obvious reasons, managers of the company are charged with the responsibility of 
preparing the annual returns. Generally, managers are more informed about the true 
financial position and results of operations of the entity than the shareholders. Although 
the law requires utmost good faith from the manager, sometimes the interests of the 
management do not coincide with that of the shareholders. For instance, we have seen 
how greed by managers of renowned companies around the world had led their 
companies into financial catastrophes. These catastrophes have forever changed the 
lives of many for worse, leaving them in financial ruin with their life-savings 
disappearing into the thin air. Others are forced out of their homes through sale or 
foreclosure by their banks. Unfortunately, this is an experience shared in Spain as well 
as in the United States. 
 
Be that as it may, given that shareholders are not directly involved in running the 
businesses they own; the financial statements are the means by which directors inform 
the shareholders of their stewardship. Although financial statements are primarily 
designed to keep shareholders informed on the economic and financial situation of the 
company, they also serve as a source of information to the general public.
64
 In fact, the 
law requires that financial statements be distributed to all shareholders and must also be 
made public by filing it at the corporate registry. Once filed at the registry it becomes a 
public document and general public as well as third parties who deal with companies are 
presumed to avail themselves of the contents these documents. In other words, they are 
presumed to have constructive notice of all public documents which are open to public 
inspection.
65
Publicity of financial statements is also required under Spanish Securities   
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 Article 254 LSC. 
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 PANTTAJA, R. S., “Accountants’ Duty to Third Parties: A Search for a Fair Doctrine of Liability”, 









 Article 241 of the LMV requires that audit report together with financial 




These documents are often the only means persons dealing with the company have in 
knowing finances of the company.
68
 As BAXT observed, a person who is about to extend 
a small amount of credit is not likely to ask for either the audited balance sheet, profit 
and loss statement, or a current set of draft accounts. In fact, the main reason for 
requiring companies to file these documents at the registry is to enable these persons 
and the general public have access to them in good time when the need to ascertain the 




This situation is succinctly described by GOWER as follows: 
 
In these ... ways ... members and the public (which, for practical purposes, 
means creditors and others who may subsequently have dealings with the 
company and become its members or creditors) are supposed to be able to obtain 
the information which they need to make an intelligent appraisal of their risks, 
and to decide intelligently when and how to exercise the rights and remedies 




A similar opinion is pronounced by FERRÁNDIZ GABRIEL as follows: 
 
La publicidad constituye un instrumento jurídico por medio del que se traduce 
un interés general difuso –no ajeno a la conveniencia de aumentar de modo 
efectivo la calidad de la información financiera-, en el concreto de cada uno de 
los terceros que entren en relación con la sociedad auditada, confiados en la 
                                                     
66
 “Real Decreto Legislativo 4/2015, de 23 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el texto refundido de la Ley 
del Mercado de Valores” [hereinafter “LMV”]. 
67
 The Spanish Stock Exchange is required to maintain an open registry as provided under article 238 
LMV as follows: “La Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores mantendrá, con el carácter de registros 
oficiales, a los que el público tendrá libre acceso.” 
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 KHOURY, L., Liability of Auditors…, op. cit., P. 418.  
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 The aim of the publicity of the financial statement is to give the investing public, as much as it feasible, 
“the fullest practicable disclosure of information concerning the activities of companies…” see Report of 
the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cohen Report) 1945 Cmd. 6659, par. 5. 
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 GOWER, L. C. B. (1969) in COOKSON, C. R., Delictual Liability…, op. cit., p. 5. 
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Although financial statements are required to be made public, members of public who 
are strangers to the internal control of the company, do not have means of verifying the 
reliability of the financial statements distributed by management. Moreover, the 
managers are reporting on the results of their own actions, which they are in a position 
to manipulate. It is only fare, therefore, to have a third party assess the veracity of their 
assertions. In a legal parlance, this is referred to in the Latin maxim nemo judex in causa 
sua, one cannot be a judge in his own cause.   
 
ZUBIAURRE, on the other hand, argues as follows: 
 
Todo aquel que pretende relacionarse con la sociedad no puede fiarse 
ciegamente de las cuentas presentadas por los administradores por lo que su 





Therefore, it is only reasonable that there should be some form of independent 
verification to ensure the objectivity, reliability and relevance of such financial 
information.
73
 So for the sake of transparency and credibility, an independent check on 
the work of the management was established through audit. The Securities Act of 1934 
enshrined this under section 13(a) (2) by requiring that financial statements be 
accompanied by an auditor’s report.
74
 The Spanish legislator in obtaining credible 
accounts statements has also opted for a competent and independent person. This 
provision is found under section 1.3 LAC which reads thus: 
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 STS de 9 de octubre de 2008 (RJ 2008/6042). 
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La auditoría de cuentas tendrá necesariamente que ser realizada por un auditor 
de cuentas o una sociedad de auditoría, mediante la emisión del correspondiente 





All companies required to prepare financial statements are therefore obligated to submit 
same to an audit. LEE argues that the intention here is “that, because the information is 
supported by an expert and independent opinion, it will be accepted and used with 
complete confidence. The structure of the company, with ownership often divorced 




These comments drive home the pivotal role the audit plays in keeping proper legal 
check on the management. Today the concept of the “independent” public accountant is 
recognized in all company laws, and auditors have already consolidated their position in 
corporate governance. Accordingly, the auditing industry has grown into a sophisticated 
global network of audit firms, providing services that range from audit to non-audit 
services. 
 
6. AUDITING IN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
6.1 COMPANY LAW AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE  
In the United States mandatory financial statements are found under both federal and 
state laws. Audit in the United States is, therefore, regulated by federal as well as state 
legislations.
77
 One of the most fundamental aspects of the United States government is 
not only the traditional separation of powers but also the vertical separation between the 
federal government and the states.
78
 The United States congress has power under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate commerce amongst the states,
79
 but the residual 
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legislative powers are granted to the states.
80
 Accordingly, congress is prohibited from 
encroaching on the powers of the states to legislate on their internal affairs. The states 
therefore maintain their sovereignty and control over many aspects of everyday life and 
conduct of business within their jurisdiction like contracts, property and personal status 
rights, among others.
81
 The federal government is only granted those powers that the 




Companies in the United States are therefore creatures of state legislation and are 
subject to the laws of states in which they are incorporated. Consequently, the 
regulation of the internal affairs of the company like its constitution, memorandum and 
articles of association, directors, auditors’ duties and rights as well as their liabilities 
have developed at state levels.
83
 Nonetheless, auditor’s duties to investors who may buy 
or sell shares have developed through federal securities legislations. Securities 
legislations are set out at federal level but company law operates at state level with the 




7. THE SPANISH LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
7.1 THE EUROPEAN SINGLE MARKET EXPERIENCE  
Spain’s constitutional framework may perhaps be better compared with that of the 
United States as a constituent member of Single European Market. Given that since its 
inception, the European Union common market experiment has been compared with the 
economic constitution of the United States.
85
 The EU member states, like individual 
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Unlike in the United States where company law evolved within an established federal 
constitutional setting, the Spanish company law like other European countries is 
fundamentally defined by national constitution and tradition. It was the Treaty of Rome 
and presently the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that formed a new 
regional constitutional framework for company law,
87
 albeit, alongside their national 
constitution. As in the United States, there is a division of power between the 
institutions of the European Union and the national governments. For instance, the 
competence to regulate the correct functioning of the common market rests with the 
legislative organ of the European Union as provided by article 114 TFEU as follows: 
 
The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have 
as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.   
 
The power ceded by the member states to the European Union is for the attainment of 
the objective of the common market. Apart from this power, all other legislative powers 
remain with member states. The EU treaty is very explicit on this, as it provides that 
“the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the 
member states in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not 




Member states maintain the inherent right to determine their internal affairs and 
legislate in matters that relates to contracts, laws of personal status as well as 
commerce.
89
 Member states shall however not make laws or rules to restrict or 
discriminate against the right of establishment,
90
 as elucidated by the European Court of 
Justice in the case of GEBHARD as follows: 
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 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Sept. 5, 2008 O.J. (C 
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88
 Article 5 (2) of the EU Treaty 
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National measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfill four conditions: 
they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for 
securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go 




8. THE POSITION OF AUDITORS 
Pursuant to section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the auditor in the United States is to be 
appointed, retained and compensated by the audit committee. Only qualified person 
possessing the requisite knowledge and technical skill can be appointed as auditor 
statutorily referred to as Certified Public Accountant
.92
 Under various states legislations 
there are qualification requirement for the position of certified public accountant. In 
New York State,
93
 for instance, this requirement is enumerated under article 149, 
section 7407 as follows: 
 
1. To qualify for a license as a certified public accountant, an applicant shall fulfill 
the following requirements:  
 
(1) Apply for license;  
 
(2) Have the requisite education as prescribed by the state regulations;  
 
(3) Have the relevant experience satisfactory to the board of regents;  
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(4) Pass the necessary examination;  
 
(5) Be at least twenty-one years of age;  
 
(6) Be of good moral character as determined by the department; and  
 
(7) Pay the requisite practicing fee. 
 
 
Sub-section (2) of this law provides for recognition of certain persons who although 
have not met requirements specified in paragraphs two and three of this section, but 
have had fifteen years experience in the practice of public accountancy to be sufficiently 
qualified for a certified public accountant license. Thus the right to audit accounts 
statements is only reserved to a duly qualified accountant, statutorily referred to as 
Certified Public Accountant who has passed the relevant examination and have met the 
additional practical experience required.
94
 In addition, he or she is also required to 
constantly strive to maintain his or her competence through personal commitment to 
learning and professional improvement. She must also seek for the aforementioned 
license to practice in the state concerned.
95
 Certified Public Accountants must have 
professional insurance and can practice individually, in partnership as well as by 
forming a body corporate. 
 
The practice of accounting or auditing in Spain, like in the United States, also requires 
specialization. As such, only “auditor de cuentas” registered in the Official Registry of 
Auditors “Registro Oficial de Auditores de Cuentas” (ROAC) of the “Instituto de 
Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas” (ICAC) is entitled to practice auditing through the 
professional associations recognized by law.
96
 To be so qualified the person must satisfy 
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the requirements outlined under articles 9 to 11 of the new Audit law before he or she 
can be admitted to practice auditing in Spain.
97
 Auditors in Spain have an obligation to 
hold professional insurance or a similar guarantee as required under article 27 LAC,
98
 




Precisely, on independence, the new measures reinforcing auditors’ independence 
contemplated under article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 has been incorporated 
into the “Ley 22/2015, de 20 de julio, de Auditoría de Cuentas.” Under article 14 
thereof, auditors are prohibited from being involved in management activities, tax 
services and must abstain themselves where their independent is in doubt. Above all, the 
ICAC must make sure that these requirements are complied with, “El Instituto de 
Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas es el organismo encargado de velar por el 
adecuado cumplimiento del deber de independencia, así como de valorar en cada trabajo 





 Auditors who are found to be in violation of these standards would be duly 
sanctioned.
101
 They may practice in sole proprietorship or in a “sociedad de auditoria de 
cuentas” as provided under articles 3 and 8.1 of LAC respectively. The “sociedad” 
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8.1 THE FUNCTION OF AUDITORS  
Auditors by law do not have direct responsibility in corporate governance yet they play 
an important role in it. This is because the modern company usually depends on its 
public image to attract capital to fund its activities. In transmitting this image the 
company inevitably will require the independent evaluation of its accounts by auditors, 
which in turn will give that confidence and add value to the company’s accounts 
statements. Moreover, to meet their obligation to shareholders company directors need 
relevant and reliable information. Auditors help them achieve that goal.  
 
The content of auditor’s duties and accounting services offered to clients may vary from 
Spain to the United States. However, the core function of auditors common to both 
systems is to perform an audit and express an opinion on the “fairness” of a company’s 
financial statements.
103
 Although these duties are generally spelt out by law, auditor’s 
relationship with the client is essentially contractual.
104
 Their certificate is primarily 
prepared in the shareholders’ interest. Auditors must verify and report to the 
shareholders if the books of accounts required by law have been maintained and the 
provisions of the law has been complied with by the company. If those books of 
accounts are kept, it is their duty to examine them together with the financial statements 
with a view to informing the shareholders of whether the accounts are a fair 
representation of the financial position of the company.  
 
An audit can, therefore, be defined as a systematic and objective examination of a 
company’s financial statements which results in an opinion expressed by the auditor.
105
 
HAGEN, on the other hand, defined audit as an independent inquiry made by accountant 
into how fairly entity’s financial statements reflect its actual financial position.
106
 It 
follows that the responsibility for preparing financial statements rests wholly on the 
management. The auditor however has the duty to express an opinion on whether the 
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financial statements fairly present the economic position of the company and results of 




The Spanish legislator also embraces the role of auditors in the protection of the 
company as a going concern. Not because auditing is a guarantee and it is without flaws 
but as another wall of protection and for that matter an independent one. Therefore, in 
carrying out this function, the auditor must not only be conversant with the provisions 
of the Audit Law but also strictly comply with them. Article 1.2 LAC defines auditing 
as follows:  
 
Se entenderá por auditoría de cuentas la actividad consistente en la revisión y 
verificación de las cuentas anuales, así como de otros estados financieros o 
documentos contables, elaborados con arreglo al marco normativo de 
información financiera que resulte de aplicación, siempre que dicha actividad 
tenga por objeto la emisión de un informe sobre la fiabilidad de dichos 




An auditor is to examine annual accounts and other financial documents prepared in 
accordance with relevant financial reporting framework and applicable law to form an 
opinion on the reliability of such accounts.
109
The main objective of the auditor is to 





In carrying out this responsibility, auditors have a duty growing out of contract to do it 
with due diligence and care proper of their calling and a duty imposed by law to make it 
objectively, independently and without fraud.
111
 The auditor’s duty is however confined 
to expressing opinion based on sound accounting principles applied and does not in any 
way guarantee the financial statements.  In understanding the proper function of an 
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 Article 4.2 LAC. 
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 In the performance of financial audit the auditor has a responsibility to plan the audits in order to 
obtain “reasonable assurance” about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud. AU Section 110.02. 
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auditor, the dictum of Lord DENNING in Fomento (Sterling Area) Ltd v. Selsdom 
Fountain Pen Co. Ltd is instructive. His Lordship states as follows: 
 
It is said that he is bound only to verify the sum, the arithmetical conclusion; by 
reference to the books and all necessary vouching material and oral 
explanations…I think this is too narrow a view. An auditor is not to be confined 
to the mechanics of checking vouchers and making arithmetical computations. 
He is not to be written off as a professional adder-upper or a subtractor. His vital 
task is to take care to see that errors are not made, be the errors of computation 
or errors of omission or commission or downright untruths. To perform this task, 
he must come to it with an inquiring mind —not suspicious of dishonesty — but 
suspecting that someone may have made a mistake somewhere and that a check 




This judicial opinion has been reechoed in Spain by Justice MARTINEZ-CALCERRADA in 
the dictum quoted below:   
 
La auditoría de cuentas se configura en esta Ley como la actividad que, 
mediante la utilización de determinadas técnicas de revisión, tiene por objeto la 
emisión de un informe acerca de la fiabilidad de los documentos contables 
auditados; no limitándose, pues, a la mera comprobación de que los saldos que 
figuran en sus anotaciones contables concuerdan con los ofrecidos en el balance 
y en la cuenta de resultados, ya que las técnicas de revisión y verificación 
aplicadas permiten, con un alto grado de certeza y sin la necesidad de rehacer el 
proceso contable en su totalidad, dar una opinión responsable sobre la 
contabilidad en su conjunto y, además, sobre otras circunstancias que, afectando 
a la vida de la empresa, no estuvieran recogidas en dicho proceso. (…) Las 
cualidades de transparencia, fiabilidad y fidelidad son los exponentes a 
considerar por el auditor al verificar su informe tras la correspondiente actividad 
auditora: Transparencia, esto es, para que a través de esta cualidad ínsita en el 
informe se vea y se conozca, por no existir ningún obstáculo imperativo, cuál es 
esa realidad económica empresarial. Fiabilidad, es un instrumento medial, esto 
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es, que dicho informe por haber sido verificado por un profesional que goza de 
las correspondientes pericias, saberes o conocimientos, emite algo que ‘per se’ 
se cuenta con una general credibilidad análoga a una especie de fe pública 
contable-económica. Fidelidad, que dicho informe es exacto y seguro, porque los 
datos y conclusiones a que se contraen, responden a una verdad, esto es, que si el 
informe dice que el resultado económico de la empresa es ‘uno determinado’, se 
corresponda realmente o adecue en exactitud, a lo que se recoge en el mundo 
instrumental de los elementos que integran el activo de la empresa, porque sean 




The Spanish legislator, although, conscious of the fact that audit is borne out of a 
contractual relationship between an auditor and his client, had nonetheless made it clear 
that auditing is a public function as well.
114 
This is evident in the provision of article 19 
RAC, which provides  
 
La responsabilidad y actuación de los auditores de cuentas debe estar presidida 
por el principio de interés público que conlleva la actividad de auditoría de 
cuentas. En este sentido, los auditores de cuentas en el ejercicio de su actividad 
han de tener en consideración y actuar en todo caso con sujeción a los siguientes 
principios éticos: competencia profesional, diligencia debida, integridad y 
objetividad. 
 
Under Spanish legal tradition, auditing is not seen as an end in itself but a means to an 
end. As such the “auditor de cuentas” is viewed as a professional whose work entails a 
responsibility towards his client as well as protecting shareholders and third parties 
interests.
115
 Auditors have a statutory duty to act not only in the interest of their clients, 
but rather for public good.
116
 Thus, apart from their contractual and professional duties, 
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auditors are also responsible to the public and society in general. Accordingly, they 
have an obligation to be honest and impartial in their activity. They must maintain their 
professional integrity and ensure that financial reports they emit are accurate and 
reliable. Essentially, their function is seen not only in the service they render their 
clients but also in the effect their service would have on third parties, to whom they owe 
a duty of care as well.
117
 As enunciated in the dictum of Judge SOLDEVILA FRAGOSO 
below: 
 
De lo expuesto se deduce, de forma inequívoca, que con el ejercicio de esta 
actividad se persigue proteger un interés público identificado con la garantía de 
la máxima transparencia en el análisis de la información económico-contable de 
las empresas, cuyo respeto será el parámetro desde el que debe juzgarse el ajuste 




8.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF AUDIT 
It is submitted that the substance of auditing lies in the fact that an enterprise seeking 
financing through loans, stock offerings, and other forms of credit enhancement 
invariably, looks to investors and creditors.
119
 Creditors and investors, in turn, look to 
the enterprise’s financial audit in making lending and investing decisions.
120
 Auditors, 
therefore, provide the third parties (such as lenders and creditors) with assurances and 
the external and objective check on the way financial statements are prepared and 
presented.
121
 BEVIS highlighted this position as follows: 
 
The statements of large corporations are readily accessible and widely 
disseminated; they provide the average investor with his most significant, at 
times his only, basis for decision. A notation on such a statement that it has been 
certified by an “independent” public accountant and that it reflects his opinion as 
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 SCHERL, J. B., “Evolution of Auditor Liability to Non Contractual Third Parties: Balancing the 
Equities and Weighing the Consequences”, American University Law Review, 44, 1994, p. 256, accessed 




 For further reading on the role of auditors, please refer to Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (The Cadbury Report), 1992, par 5.1, accessed June 7 2011 at 
Available at: http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf . 
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to the financial position of the company cannot but create in the investor a sense 
of security as to the accuracy of the report he is reading. He cannot, except 
naively, expect total accuracy. But he can, and generally does, expect that the 





Auditors frequently point out in debates about liability, that it is the company, not the 
accountant, that prepares the financial statements.
123
 Nonetheless, it is their function to 
evaluate the assertions made by the management, validate and give credibility to those 
assertions. If they “issue a clean audit, indicating a healthy enterprise, investors and 
creditors are often willing to provide credit or needed capital.
124
 In essence, investors 
and creditors are attracted to an enterprise based on its financial stability, which is 
certified by the audit.”
125
 As noted by IMPASTATO, “this validation [by the auditor] is 




Accordingly, auditor’s certification lends credibility to the presentation by managers of 
the financial position of the company which in turn increases reliance on them. This 
good will is earned by auditors thanks to their reputation for objectivity and 
professionalism, a virtue that makes companies hire their services. The mere fact that 
sellers of stocks will seek for auditors to audit their finances demonstrates the 
importance of auditors’ reputation of independence and objectivity to the investing 
public. The same good reputation has been instrumental to global dominance of the 
audit market by the so called BIG FOUR.
127
 These firms attract large companies 
because of their reputation which is recognized worldwide. Entities that contract their 
services have the benefit of the fact that potential investors and creditors recognize their 
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Florida State University Law Review, 31, 2003, p. 21, accessed October 12 2010 
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 GRUBBS, J. K. & ETHRIDGE J. R., Auditor Negligence…, op. cit., p. 76. 
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(Deloitte), KPMG and Ernst & Young, the four largest international audit firms. They are credited to 
handle the vast majority of audits for private as well as publicly traded companies. 
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reputation and are assured of the reliability of their audit.
128
 BEVIS highlighted the status 
of auditors as follows: 
 
…as a trained observer of economic activities, relationships and status is the 
most appropriate agent to [certify the financial statements]. His competence has 
been identified by state authority. His position as independent auditor, which 





8.3 AUDITOR’S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION  
As seen above, in carrying out their function auditors have duties imposed on them by 
the law which are conditions precedent in any proper audit. To facilitate their ability to 
accomplish their laid down statutory task, auditors have also been conveyed a series of 
rights. Among these rights are right of access to books of accounts and right to require 
information or explanation from the officers of the company. Company officers have an 
obligation to furnish the relevant information to the auditor without any concealment. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits company officers or anyone under their direction 
from engaging in an attempt to mislead the auditor or misstate financial statements. 
They must also desist from acts that may improperly influence the audit process and the 
accuracy of the financial statements.
130
  Section 303 of the Act provides: 
 
It shall be unlawful,…for any officer or director of an issuer, or any other person 
acting under the direction thereof, to take any action to fraudulently influence, 
coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant 
engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that issuer 
for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading. 
Rule 13b2-2 made under section 303 made it much clearer by providing that directors 
and officers of the company are prohibited from either directly or indirectly: 
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a. Making or causing to be made a materially false or misleading statement to an 
accountant; or  
 
b. Omitting to state to an accountant, or causing another person to omit to state to 
an accountant, any material fact necessary to make statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 
 
 
A director or any officer who willfully violates the above prohibitions may be 
criminally penalized under section 32(a) of the Act.
131
 The director may as well be 
liable under state law for breach of fiduciary duty. 
 
According to SEC, Rule 13b2-2 is meant to “supplement the rules currently in 
Regulation 13B-2, which address the falsification of books, records, and accounts, and 
false or misleading statements, or omissions to make certain statements, to 
accountants.”
132
 By this Rule SEC was provided with “an additional means of 
addressing efforts by persons acting under the direction of an officer or director to 





Since auditors do not control the company’s internal affairs, they depend on the 
directors of the company in order to prepare their report. Therefore, the veracity of the 
auditors’ report depends on the directors’ collaboration in providing the auditor with 
accurate and truthful information. It is submitted that the importance of section 303 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to hold the directors and officers of the company responsible if 




Under Spanish law, auditors’ right to information is to be found under the LAC where 
article 6 of the law provides that: 
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 The law here subjects the officers to individual criminal charges and perhaps civil liability in order to 
motivate them to become actively involved in financial reporting processes. 
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Las entidades auditadas estarán obligadas a facilitar cuanta información fuera 
necesaria para realizar los trabajos de auditoría de cuentas; asimismo, quien o 
quienes realicen dichos trabajos de auditoría estarán obligados a requerir cuanta 
información precisen para la emisión del informe de auditoría.
135
 
Auditors shall have a right of access to the company’s accounting records and shall be 
entitled to require from the company’s officers such information and explanations they 
deem necessary for the performance of the audit.
136
 Where for any reason the company 
would not avail auditors of the required information, the auditors shall document that in 
their working papers. In the case of Spain, it is the Penal Code, under article 290 that 
penalizes company officers who falsified accounts, withheld documents or information 
that had jeopardized the interest of the company or third party. 
 
Finally, like any other member of the company, the law has accorded the auditor with 
the right to attend general meetings of the company and to receive notice and any 
communication related therewith. 
 
8.4 AUDITOR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
Over the years auditors have assumed a critical position in corporate governance as well 
as in modern commerce. Their role in providing free flow of reliable information does 
not only sustain modern capital-market economy but also helps to maintain an orderly 
functioning of commerce.
137
 They are entrusted with this responsibility by the law 
because of their competence, objectivity and their concern for public interest. Consistent 
with this status, they are required to assume ‘an obligation of self-discipline above and 
beyond the requirements of laws and regulations.’
138
 In other words, mere compliance 
with the letter of the law may not be enough; auditors must strive to act in the spirit of 
the law, which requires complete honesty on their part.
139
 Accordingly, users of 
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financial statements as well as the general public have reasons to believe that auditors 
will act with honor and integrity placed on them by the society in performing their 
function. As SUNDEM points out: 
 
After all, even though financial statements are the responsibility of management, 
shareholders hire auditors to protect their interests and to add credibility to the 
financial information disclosed by firms. To add this credibility, auditors need 
both expertise and integrity. Expertise assures us that if there is a financial 
reporting irregularity, the auditor will discover it. Integrity assures us that 
auditors will disclose any irregularity they find. These two qualities are 




To ensure quality control in the conduct of the audit, auditors are required to follow 
certain authoritative auditing standards to provide them with a measure of audit quality 
and help them achieve the objectives of the audit. These are Generally Accepted 
Auditing Principles (GAAP)
141
 as adopted from time to time by the American Institute 
for Certified Public Accountants (AICPA),
142
 the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
143
 Pursuant to 
                                                                                                                                                           
good faith.  In a similar vein, article 19.2 RAC provided that “Los auditores de cuentas han de actuar de 
acuerdo con las normas que regulen la actividad de auditoría de cuentas atendiendo no solo a la letra, sino 
también al espíritu en que aquellas se inspiran.” 
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its power under section 103 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB has adopted as 
interim standards, on an initial transitional basis, the generally accepted auditing 
standards by the AICPA in existence since April 16, 2003. These standards known as 
the 10 reporting standards are listed below: 
 
1. The auditor must have adequate technical training and proficiency to perform the 
audit. 
 
2. The auditor must maintain independence in mental attitude in all matters relating 
to the audit. 
 
3. The auditor must exercise due professional care in the performance of the audit 
and the preparation of the report. 
 
4. The auditor must adequately plan the work and must properly supervise any 
assistants. 
 
5. The auditor must obtain a sufficient understanding of the entity and its 
environment, including its internal control, to assess the risk of material 
misstatement of the financial statements whether due to error or fraud, and to 
design the nature, timing, and extent of further audit procedures. 
 
6. The auditor must obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence by performing 
audit procedures to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the 
financial statements under audit. 
 
7. The auditor must state in the auditor’s report whether the financial statements 
are presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
 
8. The auditor must identify in the auditor’s report those circumstances in which 
such principles have not been consistently observed in the current period in 
relation to the preceding period. 
                                                                                                                                                           
“Auditor Responsibility under the Federal Securities Laws: A Note from the WorldCom Securities 
Litigation” American Journal of Trial Advocacy, 29, 2005, p. 4 fn. 12.  
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9. When the auditor determines that informative disclosures are not reasonably 
adequate, the auditor must so state in the auditor’s report. 
 
10. The auditor must either express an opinion regarding the financial statements, 
taken as a whole, or state that an opinion cannot be expressed, in the auditor’s 
report. When the auditor cannot express an overall opinion, the auditor should 
state the reasons there for in the auditor’s report. In all cases where an auditor’s 
name is associated with financial statements, the auditor should clearly indicate 
the character of the auditor’s work, if any, and the degree of responsibility the 
auditor is taking, in the auditor’s report. 
 
Auditors in Spain are also obliged to adhere to professional standards and any other 
rules and regulations as well as guidelines that may be issued from time to time under 
the Audit Law.
144
 These standards are referred to under article 17.1 RAC, which states: 
 
Las normas de auditoría a que se refiere el artículo 6.2 del texto refundido de la 
Ley de Auditoría de Cuentas constituyen los principios y requisitos que deben 
observar los auditores de cuentas en la realización del trabajo de auditoría de 
cuentas y sobre las que deben basarse las actuaciones necesarias para expresar 
una opinión técnica responsable e independiente. 
 
The standards are to be in accordance with the general principles and practice allowed 
in the member states of the EU as developed and adapted by the relevant professional 
bodies and approved by the ICAC.
145 
Apart from this, auditor is enjoined to adhere to 
the highest ethical standards, as outlined in article 19 RAC as follows: 
 
La responsabilidad y actuación de los auditores de cuentas debe estar presidida 
por el principio de interés público que conlleva la actividad de auditoría de 
cuentas. En este sentido, los auditores de cuentas en el ejercicio de su actividad 
han de tener en consideración y actuar en todo caso con sujeción a los siguientes 
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principios éticos: competencia profesional, diligencia debida, integridad y 
objetividad. 
 
Incidentally, professional ethics code outlined under article 19 RAC are, mutatis 
mutandis, similar with the provision of the AICPA code sections 51 to 56 that outlined 




Integrity, according to the AICPA code, more than following ‘specific rules, standards, 
or guidance, or in the face of conflicting opinions,’ requires the auditor to search for his 
inner conscience and be convinced of whether or not he or she is doing the right thing. 
Objectivity is said to be the hallmark of a professional. An auditor therefore must and 
exhibit objectivity, honesty and impartiality as a true professional. The auditor is also 
required to discharge his or her responsibilities with diligence and competence.
147
 The 
auditor by his or her calling is obliged to carry his or her duties with due care and also 
endeavor to abide by the professional ethics of integrity and objectivity always bearing 
in mind the public function he or she serves. 
 
9. THE CONDUCT OF AUDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
9.1 THE HUMBLE BEGINNING 
According to SEPTIMUS, an accounting function may be divided into the three major 
categories of the audit, tax practice, and management advisory services.
148
 However, the 
great majority of reported cases of third party liability concern accountants in the 




The audit process, HAWKINS argues, consists of the examination of the financial records 
of a business entity that leads to a collection of data, the formulation of a conclusion 
based upon that data, and the presentation of that conclusion in a report on the financial 
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 This process may vary according to the terms of engagement. Clients may 
sometimes seek a “complete audit,” i.e. a reconstruction of all their financial 
transactions for a certain period of time.
151
 Otherwise the client may only need a 
formulation of conclusions from a sample of financial transactions, what is known in 
accounting parlance as “test audit.” Irrespective of the type of audit required, the audit 




Upon his engagement, the first step taken by the auditor in the audit process is to 
familiarize with the nature of the client’s business, usually focusing primarily on 
planning the audit to conform to the terms of his engagement.
153
 This includes a study 
of client’s industry conditions, its management characteristics, and possibly its financial 
reporting methods.
154
 The preliminary study provides the accountant with knowledge of 
the prior financial statements as well as basic accounting procedures of the client. 
Armed with this information, the accountant then goes on to make an evaluation of the 




The importance of the evaluation of the client’s internal control structure is that it 
determines the nature, timing and extent of the tests to be performed by the auditor.
156
 
This, of course, goes without saying that financial statements prepared under a strong 
and effective internal control structure are more likely to give a fair presentation of the 
company’s financial position and its results of operations. Even as such; EPSTEIN & 
PERSSICO argue that “an auditor is required to corroborate the assertions provided by 
management. Specifically, she must gather appropriate audit evidence sufficient to 
opine on the financial statements taken as a whole, and thus implicitly on every material 
assertion implicit in those financial statements. The accumulation of enough audit 
evidence to reasonably support the assertions in the financial statements, as well as 
those provided in the management representation letter is required; representations from 
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 PASCHALL, S. S., “Liability to Non-Clients: The Accountant’s Role and Responsibility”, Mo. L. Rev., 
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At the completion of the preliminary plans, the auditor makes a skeleton audit that is 
based on the trial balance that he will review after he makes tests upon internal control. 
The more an auditor can rely on the client’s internal control function, the fewer auditing 
procedures he will need to formulate an opinion on the financial statements.
158
 
However, it is necessary to point out that no matter how good and reliable internal 
control structure of a client might be; some audit procedures might still be needed.
159
As 
clearly illustrated by SEC in the following words: 
 
An independent examination is a check on representations of management 
however honest and competent that management may be, and reliance on 




The auditor will then revise the audit program to determine which other remaining audit 
procedures need to be applied in the final audit. The auditor must always be aware of 
the possibility of deliberate misrepresentation by management.
161
 He may need to 
expand the revised audit program where he suspects that assertions in the account 
balances are likely to be misstated. Likewise, if certain evidence arises in the course of 
the audit indicating the possibility of fraud, he should also revise his audit program to 
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The auditor’s duty does not permit him to wait for an alarm bell to arouse him to investigation. 
He has a duty in the first instance to focus a skeptical eye on the accounts. That is the purpose of 
an audit - it is not merely an arithmetical check and a determination of compliance with form. 
One of the things GAAS specifically includes is a duty to look for the suspicious circumstances 




highlight the fraudulent act. Once the audit program is set, the auditor applies the 
specified auditing procedures to the financial statements of the client. Each of the 




The final phase in the audit process is the discussion of any outstanding questions with 
management and the completion of field work. The auditor then evaluates the results 
and chooses the appropriate audit report to issue depending on his findings. The 
auditor’s report will state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles, consistently observed in the current 
period in relation to the preceding period, and expresses an opinion regarding the 




9.2 THE AUDIT REPORT 
The audit report is the culmination of the audit process and may be one of the following 
types; (1) An unqualified opinion,
164
 (2) A qualified opinion, (3) An adverse opinion 
and (4) A disclaimer of opinion: 
1. An unqualified opinion states that the accountant followed Generally 
Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAS) and that the financial statements 
fairly present the financial condition of the company in accordance with 
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AUDITS AND THE AUDITOR’S REPORT 16 (1989), recommends  the following language: 
 
We have audited the . . . [financial statements of XYZ Company] . . . . These financial statements 
are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion 
on these financial statements based on our audits.  
 
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about 
whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, 
on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An 
audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by 
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that 
our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
 
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, 
the financial position of [XYZ] Company as of [dates], and the results of its operations and its 




Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). An unqualified opinion 
may sometimes contain explanatory language, as when the company has 
changed its accounting practice or when there is an unresolved uncertainty, 
such as significant pending litigation. As a practical matter, an unqualified 
opinion is almost a necessary result of an audit of large, publicly-held 
companies, and of smaller companies when the audit is needed to satisfy 
lenders or investors. If the auditor discovers discrepancies that may require a 
qualified report, the auditor and the client often will discuss, negotiate, and 
attempt to remedy the difficulties. 
 
2. A qualified opinion states exceptions to the observance of GAAS, where the 
scope of the audit is limited or the auditor is unable to obtain necessary 
information, or to the fairness of the statements in accordance with GAAP, 
when the principles have not been observed or when not all necessary 
disclosures have been made. 
 
3. An adverse opinion states that the financial statements are not fairly stated in 
conformity with GAAP. 
 
4. A disclaimer of opinion is not an opinion at all; rather, the accountant states 





At the end of each financial year, company’s financial statements accompanied by 
auditor’s certificate as approved by the shareholders at a general meeting must be filed 
at the SEC. Auditors are now required to not only certify the integrity of their client’s 
financial statements, but also assess the mechanisms that their clients have adopted to 




Every shareholder has a right to receive a copy of the financial statements and to make 
extracts from them before an annual general meeting. However, when a company 
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publishes its account with the aim of inviting the general public or any class thereof to 
read the financial statements, such must be accompanied by an auditor’s report. In 






10. THE CERTIFICATE OF “AUDITOR DE CUENTAS” 
The auditor in Spain, after a thorough investigation, will prepare a report and state 
whether the financial statements give a “true and fair view” as well as a representation 
of the company’s asset in accordance with the law and accounting principles applied.
168
 
Where director’s report is required, the auditor must also state whether in her opinion 
the information given in the director’s report for the financial year for which the annual 
accounts are prepared is consistent with those accounts.
169
 Finally, the auditor has to 
state that she is satisfied that the financial statement is a fair representation of the 
financial position of the company and that they are prepared in accordance with the 
audit law and applicable auditing standards.
170
 However, the auditor does not pass on 
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 Article 5 LAC. A typical example of an audit report that fulfills the requirements of article 5 LAC, 
according to Norma Internacional De Auditoría 700 (adaptada para su aplicación en España mediante 
Resolución del Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas, de 15 de octubre de 2013) is as follows:  
 
INFORME DE AUDITORÍA INDEPENDIENTE DE CUENTAS ANUALES A los accionistas de ABC, 
S.A. [por encargo de…..][Destinatario correspondiente]: 
 
Informe sobre las cuentas anuales   
Hemos auditado las cuentas anuales adjuntas de la sociedad ABC, S.A., que comprenden el balance a 31 
de diciembre de 20X1, la cuenta de pérdidas y ganancias, el estado de cambios en el patrimonio neto, el 
estado de flujos de efectivo y la memoria correspondientes al ejercicio terminado en dicha fecha.  
 
Responsabilidad de los administradores en relación con las cuentas anuales  
Los administradores son responsables de formular las cuentas anuales adjuntas, de forma que expresen la 
imagen fiel del patrimonio, de la situación financiera y de los resultados de ABC, S.A., de conformidad 
con el marco normativo de información financiera aplicable a la entidad en España, que se identifica en la 
nota X de la memoria adjunta, y del control interno que consideren necesario para permitir la preparación 
de cuentas anuales libres de incorrección material, debida a fraude o error.  
 
Responsabilidad del auditor  
Nuestra responsabilidad es expresar una opinión sobre las cuentas anuales adjuntas basada en nuestra 
auditoría. Hemos llevado a cabo nuestra auditoría de conformidad con la normativa reguladora de la 
auditoría de cuentas vigente en España. Dicha normativa exige que cumplamos los requerimientos de 
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the quality of the investment but rather the quality of the information respecting the 
investment; hence the auditor cannot guarantee these accounts. Since his or her 
obligation is to comply with the professional requirements of prudence, competence and 
due diligence, once those are fulfilled the auditor is deemed to have discharged his or 
her duty. 
 
As in the case of the United States, in Spain as well financial statements together with 
auditor’s certificate are to be presented before the shareholders at an annual general 
meeting
171
and must be deposited at the Mercantile Registry within the same month of 
its approval.
172
 Moreover, once filed at the registry it becomes a public document and 
third parties can access it.
173
 These documents are usually revealed to third parties by 
the companies for business ends. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
ética, así como que planifiquemos y ejecutemos la auditoría con el fin de obtener una seguridad razonable 
de que las cuentas anuales están libres de incorrecciones materiales.  
 
Una auditoría requiere la aplicación de procedimientos para obtener evidencia de auditoría sobre los 
importes y la información revelada en las cuentas anuales. Los procedimientos seleccionados dependen 
del juicio del auditor, incluida la valoración de los riesgos de incorrección material en las cuentas anuales, 
debida a fraude o error. Al efectuar dichas valoraciones del riesgo, el auditor tiene en cuenta el control 
interno relevante para la formulación por parte de la entidad de las cuentas anuales, con el fin de diseñar 
los procedimientos de auditoría que sean adecuados en función de las circunstancias, y no con la finalidad 
de expresar una opinión sobre la eficacia del control interno de la entidad. Una auditoría también incluye 
la evaluación de la adecuación de las políticas contables aplicadas y de la razonabilidad de las 
estimaciones contables realizadas por la dirección, así como la evaluación de la presentación de las 
cuentas anuales tomadas en su conjunto.  
 
Consideramos que la evidencia de auditoría que hemos obtenido proporciona una base suficiente y 
adecuada para nuestra opinión de auditoría. 
 
Opinión  
En nuestra opinión, las cuentas anuales adjuntas expresan, en todos los aspectos significativos, la imagen 
fiel del patrimonio y de la situación financiera de la sociedad ABC, S.A. a 31 de diciembre de 20X1, así 
como de sus resultados y flujos de efectivo correspondientes al ejercicio anual terminado en dicha fecha, 
de conformidad con el marco normativo de información financiera que resulta de aplicación y, en 
particular, con los principios y criterios contables contenidos en el mismo. 
 
Informe sobre otros requerimientos legales y reglamentarios  
El informe de gestión adjunto del ejercicio 20X1 contiene las explicaciones que los administradores 
consideran oportunas sobre la situación de la sociedad, la evolución de sus negocios y sobre otros asuntos 
y no forma parte integrante de las cuentas anuales. Hemos verificado que la información contable que 
contiene el citado informe de gestión concuerda con la de las cuentas anuales del ejercicio 20X1. Nuestro 
trabajo como auditores se limita a la verificación del informe de gestión con el alcance mencionado en 
este mismo párrafo y no incluye la revisión de información distinta de la obtenida a partir de los registros 
contables de la sociedad. [Firma del auditor] [Fecha del informe de auditoría] [Dirección del auditor y 
número de Registro Oficial de Auditores de Cuentas] 
171
 Article 272 LSC. 
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Apart from the useful information it provides to the management of a company about 
the effectiveness of its internal accounting system and the accuracy of information the 
system produces, audit also avails third parties with an independent evaluation of the 
company’s financial statements and the process that produced them. As such an audit 
can be said to serve two purposes: first, it provides the directors and officers of the 
company with reasonable assurance in taking managerial decisions.
174
Second and 
critically, the auditor’s validation is essential to third parties who might rely on the 
company’s financial reports in making financial decisions. Invariably, prospective 
shareholders, investors, lenders, sureties and public authorities have a substantial 
interest in the auditor’s work, often being the only independent and objective source of 
information available to them.
175
 So to protect these investors and promote fair 
information exchange in the financial sector, the mainstay of modern information 
economies, regulations were established. However, more than compliance with rules 
and audit standards, auditors must be sensitive to the needs of investors and general 
public. Anything short of a reasonably accurate audit may lead to audit expectation gap, 
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THE AUDIT EXPECTATION GAP QUESTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The expectation gap question has recently assumed important position in the audit 
literature because of the direct relation it has with auditor liability. This is all linked to 
the essence of audit itself. An audit is a well known instrument employed by companies 
to provide assurance and transmit confidence to users of financial statements. In 
addition, audit also plays a critical role in facilitating the flow of commerce through the 
financial markets. The industrial economy is predicated on capitalism, a system that 
prides itself with best allocation of resources through market mechanism.
176
 To 
efficiently allocate their resources in the highly volatile financial market of today, 
investors need credible and reliable financial report to make informed investment 
decisions. This information inevitably comes from the management through the 
financial report. As seen in chapter I, financial report is, ipso facto, the responsibility of 
management. Management has the authority to determine its nature and contents. Audit 
functions as a mechanism to attest to the accountability and stewardship of company 
management and reinforce trust and confidence in the financial reporting. Thus, it 
authenticates the appropriateness of the information to users through compliance with 
relevant laws, regulations and professional code of ethics.
177
 As such, users should be 
able to rely on the information in the audit reports in making investment decisions. 
However, when a company fails, especially immediately after its public issue of shares, 
like the case of Enron in the United States or Bankia in Spain, much is left to be desired 
and undermines the credibility of audit practice. Consequently, the auditing profession 
that was once highly regarded is now faced with credibility crises and a growing 
mistrust of its function by the public, widely known as the audit expectation gap.
178
 As 
pointed out by LIMPERG, “audit function is rooted in the confidence that society places 
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in the effectiveness of the audit and in the opinion of the accountant…if the confidence 





2. EXPECTATION GAP AND AUDITOR LIABILITY 
Auditor’s position as an intermediary in an accountability relationship is more 
frequently being called into question around the world. As HUMPHREY et al. argued, 
auditor’s review of financial statements of companies “has been characterized by a 
seemingly ever present uncertainty over its purpose, content and effect.”
180
 In the 
twilight of the last century the uncertainty led to dissatisfaction among financial 
statements users and for similar reasons the auditing profession was forced to endure 
high levels of litigations and accusations. That being the case, it is reasonable to argue 
that auditor’s liability is inextricably related to the way the society view the role of the 
auditor. The less understandable the role of the auditor is, the greater the possibility that 




The criticism of auditors, it is argued, is owed to the fact that many users of financial 
statements do not seem to understand the nature of audit function.
182
 Users take an audit 
opinion, especially an unqualified opinion, for foolproof financial reporting.
183
 There is 
also a sense among users of financial statements that auditors apart from giving an 
opinion should go further and interpret the financial statements to enable users properly 
evaluate the situation of the company to decide whether or not to invest in the company. 
There are also users who expect auditors to perform some of the audit procedures while 
performing the attest function like penetrating into company affairs, engaging in 
management surveillance and detecting illegal acts and fraud on the part of 
management.
184
 It is these high expectations on the part of users of financial statements 
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that create a gap between auditors and users on the audit function.
185
 In addition, as long 
as users of financial statements place the responsibility for audit expectation gap on the 
shoulders of auditors, the burden of narrowing this gap must fall primarily on auditors 





A study of the professional literature reveals that members of the auditing profession 
have two main points of view regarding the expectation gap.
187
 One is that of audit 
function, they believe most users have poor understanding of the nature of audit and the 
audit function and, that the expectation users place on them is beyond what is required 
of them by professional regulations and standards.
188
 Some segment of users expects 
auditors to delve into the company affairs or supervise the management, which is not 
part of their work.
189
 They argue further that several investors expect them to go on and 
interpret the financial statements to enable them judge whether the company is good for 
investment. Moreover, even “clean” opinion on the part of auditor does not necessarily 
mean, per se, that the company is financially sound. 
 
The other point of view regards expectation gap as a natural evolutionary symptom in 
the development of audit, so long as it serves as a reason for identifying and responding 
to continually changing and expanding public expectations. The public as the real agent 
of change, in their disquiet at any abuse, will demand accountability which in turn will 
force the hands of auditors to change their standards and practice. That is why periods 




It can be seen from both approaches that expectation gap exists. Therefore, in an effort 
to improve its image, the controlling bodies of auditors embarked on an intensified 
advertising campaign directed at explaining the limitations of an audit to the public and 
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conveying the message that the public has to acknowledge the actual responsibilities of 
auditors. These are contained in the professions’ statements on generally accepted 
auditing standards. Since the end of the 1980s research projects and research reports 
have at regular intervals expanded on the subject in the literature.
191
 But what is clear is 
that the concept of expectation gap rests to a large degree on public perceptions of the 
role and function of auditors.  
 
To quote the words of a chartered accountant GASTON: 
 
When it comes to credibility, it is the public’s perception that matters. It isn’t 
good enough to claim the public’s expectations are unrealistic or its criticisms 




The expectation gap factor is probably the most conspicuous cause of the growing 
number of court cases against auditors. According to LEE & AZHAM, the “problem 
reached an unprecedented level as a result of the spectacular fall of well publicized 
corporations like Enron and WorldCom.”
193
 PORTER & GOWTHORPE stress that the 
recent increase in criticism of and litigations against auditors is due to the failure of 
auditors to meet society’s expectations.
194
 Thus, auditors’ failure to live up to societal 
expectations has implicated the notion of audit expectation gap and the attendant auditor 
liability crises. This fact is reflected by AMHOWITZ in the following words: 
 
In recent years one reads with increasing frequency of a crisis in the accounting 
profession. Depending on the context, the crisis is characterized as one of 
professional competence, one of public confidence in the accounting profession 
or one of the profession’s fears about its own vulnerability. Although the 
emphasis of these three characterizations differs somewhat, they all reflect a 
single underlying notion – that the public accounting profession is somehow 
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failing adequately to fulfill the role that society has come to expect it. Thus 





3. EVOLUTION OF AUDIT IN SPAIN 
In Spain, the history of auditing is relatively short compared to the United States and 
Britain. The recent past history of Spain is not unconnected for some of the reasons 
responsible for this difference, uncharacteristic of a great empire or better said 
reminiscent of a fall from grace of a great empire trying to find its bearing in the 20
th
 
century. Spain has had its fair share of turbulent past that hindered its socio-political and 
economic progress: prominent ones being coup d’état, civil war and a long dictatorship. 
In short, judged by these standards, Spain has propelled itself, within a single 
generation, from ruins of war and poverty to the doorstep of modern democracy.  
 
The economic and political environment in Spain during the dictatorship may perhaps 
help to explain the limited scope of audits. As was widely advertised by the propaganda 
machine of the regime, General Franco held himself accountable only ‘before God and 
history’. Therefore, practices of accountability did not fit with the wider societal values 
enforced by the dictatorship, on the contrary, were perceived as an attempt to erode one 




Moreover, lack of transparency in the financial market with constant state intervention 
and poor quality firms were all but a symbol of unreliable market for foreign 
investment, and knowingly, the foreign investor is a coward who only goes to where his 
investment is safe. The stock exchange market, thus, had a domestic focus and had 
become a mere extension of the system of economic autarchy that governed Spain. In 
such a parochial context, stock market practices – such as audits – simply mimicked the 
wider societal values of non-accountability.
197
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Despite some pieces of legislation implemented in the 1960’s towards encouraging 
audit practice in Spain, auditing remained insignificant in the kingdom due to 
lackadaisical enforcement. Major organizations like security investment companies, 
banks, savings banks and credit co-operatives, listed companies and some public 
organizations like the national railway company are required to audit their annual 
accounts. However, these regulations were not followed due to poor implementation 




The importance of audit function in Spain of those years can, perhaps, be measured 
through the size of the “Instituto de Censores Jurados de Cuentas” (ICJCE), the main 
Spanish accounting professional body. Established in 1943, its membership stood at 
only 346 by the mid-1960s.
199
The promise of a more broad-based system of financial 
reporting to cater for the increased user needs was briefly signaled by the revisions to 
the Spanish Commercial Code “Código de Comercio” (Ccom) and National Chart of 
Accounts in 1973.
200
 However, acknowledged vague legal constructions and the 
continuing absence of public filing requirements for corporate financial statements 




Increased economic activities and the influx of foreign capital in the 1960’s brought 
about by the favorable investment conditions in Spain helped to drive the role and 
expansion of auditing. Invariably this led to more demand for audit services. So by the 
beginning of the 1980s all the major Big Six (now Big Four) accountancy firms had 
established presence in Spain and predictably dominated the market. The significance of 
the multinational audit firms’ dominance in Spain was revealed by the report which 
showed that, in 1990, five of the Big Six firms accounted for nearly 75 per cent of the 
total audit billings in Spain.
202
 The auditing services market is also of a distinctly two-
tiered nature. A reflection of this can be seen in the audit appointments to the top 250 
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Spanish companies (excluding banks). No local Spanish audit firm that is independent 
of the multinational firms has more than one audit brief among this list of companies.
203
 
Successive years of economic growth and unprecedented influx of foreign investment 
transformed the Spanish financial market and indeed auditing. According to SALMON, 
“the most important structural change in the Spanish economy during the 1980’s was 
the further opening up of the economy to international trade and the avalanche of 
foreign inward investment occasioned by new legislation and membership of the 
European Community”.
204
 These years represented the most rapid and pervasive 
transformation in the Spanish society, affecting all aspects of life, socio-economic as 
well as political. For the Spanish people the goal was clear, to seize the most opportune 
period in their history and gravitationally drive their economic development to the level 
comparable with their leading European economic partners, and thereby transform the 
life of their people. Membership of the European Union symbolized for Spain a new era 
of democracy, good governance and rule of law and above all an acceptance into the 
fold of the “developed” nations. As JACQUES DELORS, the then EC Commission 
President noted “in Spain, the idea of the European Community is associated with 




The impulse into the European Union was helped by the overwhelming electoral victory 
of the socialist party, “Partido Socialista Obrero Español” (PSOE) in the 1982 general 
elections, the first parliamentary majority on Spain’s return to democracy. The socialists 
were committed to Spain entering into the European Economic Community; a feat duly 
achieved in January 1986 when Spain was finally admitted into the EU. The 
implications of Spain’s accession to the EU were very significant for its auditing and 
company laws because the membership of the European Union required, as a condition 
precedent, the implementation of various Community regulations, including the 
company law directives. Work began on a new auditing law in Spain in 1983 and the 
draft law was passed for debate in Parliament in October 1987.
206
 The Audit Law, based 
on requirements of the EC’s Eighth Directive was finally passed in July, 1988, 
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representing the single most important piece of legislation on auditing and financial 
regulation in Spain.  
The new law together with the prospect of belonging to “a league of developed nations” 
signified by the pending accession to the European Union evoked a sense of revival in 
Spain. In this environment, audit expectation gap has no significance. Unlike the rather 
negative image associated with the ‘audit expectations gap’ in countries such as Britain 
and America in the early 1990’s, Spain in contrast showed a more positive image of 
auditors as it sought to develop a corporate external audit function.
207
 This sense of 
optimism was however not meant to last very long. A few years after the Audit Law 
came into force Spain was hit by a number of financial scandals that will significantly 
change public’s attitude towards the role of auditors. The promise and optimism 





4. GENESIS OF THE AUDIT EXPECTATION GAP CONCEPT 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Auditing in its formative years was almost an absolute assurance against 
mismanagement and fraud. The simple explanation for this is that businesses then were 
small in size and had only a handful of employees.
209
 But as these businesses witness a 
paradigm shift in their organizational structure and transformed into vast corporations, 
auditing drifted from verifying all transactions for purposes of fraud detection to 




This shift, according to IJEOMA, was partly a response to the “growth in volume of 
business activity (making fraud detection less feasible) and the appearance and 
increased importance of a new business player in person of the shareholder.”
211
 
Corporate shareholders and other outside parties increasingly relied on auditors to 
                                                     
207
 See GARCÍA BENAU, M. A. & HUMPHREY, C., Beyond the Audit Expectations Gap…, op. cit., p. 312. 
208
 GARCIA BENAU, M. A., RUIZ-BARBADILLO, E., HUMPHREY, C. & HUSAINI, W. A., “Success in Failure? 
Reflections on the Changing Spanish Audit Environment”, European Accounting Review, 8, 1999, p. 701. 
209
 SALEHI, M., Audit Expectation Gap: Concept…, op. cit., p. 8376. 
210
 IJEOMA, N. B., “Bridging the Expectation Gap in Auditing: The Role of the Accounting Profession in 
Nigeria”, International Journal of Technology Enhancements and Emerging Engineering Research, 2, 





attest and provide assurance on the information prepared by the management.
212
 Hence, 
audit came to assume essential place in the corporate and financial enterprise. This 
importance has been underscored by the COHEN Commission thus: 
 
The accounting system and the controls over it are designed to produce proper 
recording of performance and accountability for the assets entrusted to the 
entity. Users of financial statements need assurance that management has 
fulfilled its stewardship responsibility by establishing and supervising a system 
that adequately protects corporate assets. An audit provides reasonable assurance 




A similar sentiment is repeated by the CADBURY Committee as follows: 
 
The annual audit is one of the cornerstone of corporate governance…the audit 
provides an external and objective check on the way in which financial 
statements have been prepared and presented, and it is an essential part of the 
checks and balances required. The question is not whether there should be an 




Auditing became a condition sine qua non in corporate financing. However, the increase 
in size and volume of company’s transactions made it difficult for auditors to examine 
every transaction. Therefore the earlier straightforward recognized objective of audit as 
an instrument for “fraud detection” changed to “verification” of accounts.
215
 Arguably, 
expectation gap is owed to the fact that users of financial statements have not yet fully 
adjusted to the change in the objective of audit from ‘fraud detection’ to ‘verification’ of 
account statements.  
 
Complaints about the auditor, his functions in the community, and his responsibilities 
have been traced as far back as that period.
216
 But the concept “expectation gap” 
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emerged in the 1970’s with the first use of the phrase being accredited to LIGGIO, who 
described it as follows: 
 
The expectation gap stems from differing expectation levels as to both quality 





The phrase was repeated in Cohen Commission, set up in 1974 by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).
218
 Its history however can be traced 
back to the 1930’s cases of Ultramares v. Touch Niven & Co.,
219
 and McKesson and 
Robbins.
220
 The issues canvassed and debated in those cases incorporate audit 
performance gap with both cases highlighting auditors’ failures. Although Ultramares 
was popularly known for third party liability, it is also true that the court did criticize 
the defendants for failing to distinguish their statement of audit’s scope from statement 
of opinion.
221
 As a result the accounting profession removed and replaced the word 
“certify” with “opinion” in audit reports to indicate that audit is just an opinion, not a 
guarantee. The impressive reflection of CHATFIELD summarizes this position: 
 
His examination of the books was not intended to prove anything, but simply to 
put his mind in contact with the company’s affairs. His knowledge and his skill 
in applying audit techniques then allowed him to express a professional opinion 




In an investigation by the SEC committee on the case of McKesson and Robbins to 
comprehensively overhaul audit priorities, it was concluded that audit standards were 
inadequate and that the type of audit being performed was not serving even its 
ostensible purpose.
223
 A situation which led to the following observation by the then 
AICPA secretary: 
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We find that the public has believed that the certified public accountant was an 
infallible superman; that the signature of a CPA invariably meant that everything 
was perfect; that it was unnecessary to read the accountant’s certificate or the 
financial statements to which it was appended as long as the three major letters 
were in evidence... Whether through its own fault or not, the accounting 
profession seems to have been oversold. Its limitations have been overlooked, 
whilst its abilities have been emphasized. Now the public has been somewhat 




A similar concern was expressed by a distinguished professional accountant Carman 
BLOUGH when he asserted that: 
 
If there occurs any event which tends to shake the public confidence, and if it 
gains sufficient attention, sooner or later the Government is likely to turn its 
attention to the problem. Such an unfortunate event occurred during the past year 
which has resulted in some critical comment regarding auditing procedures. 
Financial writers, congressmen, reformers, and others, some informed, and some 
uninformed, some friendly to accountants some unfriendly, have been free with 
their suggestions and with their criticisms of the public accountants ... The best 
way that I can imagine to prevent unwise public action is for us to work more 
energetically in the public interest and at the same time to educate the public to 





The expectations gap debate is not free from controversy even when it comes to 
definition. This is due to different meanings attributed to audit by the public and the 
audit profession.
226
 Nonetheless, there are a number of attempts to define the audit 
expectation gap. In the following paragraphs some of the most relevant definitions will 
be highlighted. A convenient starting point will be with LIGGIO, who defined audit 
expectation gap as the difference between the levels of both quality and expected 
performance ‘as envisioned by the independent accountant and by the user of financial 
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 LIGGIO’s definition of the expectation gap presupposes the difference 
between the levels of expected performance from the point of view of auditors and the 




The Cohen Commission extended the definition of the audit expectation gap mean the 
difference between the perception of users of financial statements of auditor’s duties 
and what auditors believe are their real responsibilities.
229
 SALEHI envisions the audit 
expectation as “the gap between the auditor’s actual standard of performance and the 
various public expectations of auditor performance.”
230
 PIERCE & KILCOMMINS,
231
on the 
other hand, are of the opinion that the audit expectations gap is when external auditors’ 
understanding of their role and duties differ in comparison with the expectations of user 
groups and the general public. OJO defines audit expectation gap as “the difference 
between what users of financial statements, the general public perceive an audit to be 
and what the audit profession claim is expected of them in conducting an audit.” She 
accordingly emphasized the need “to distinguish between the audit profession’s 





PORTER, however, noticed that many definitions have failed to take cognizance of the 
possibility of sub-standard performance by auditors.
233
 She therefore argued that the 
concept of auditor’s expected performance from LIGGIO‘s definition was too vague and 
that it ignores the fact that auditors, as human beings, do not always behave as 
prescribed by the professional standards. Consequently, she defined expectation gap as 
“the gap between society’s expectations of auditors and auditors’ performance, as 
perceived by society.”
234
 She went on and proposed that the gap comprises two major 
components, namely (a) reasonableness gap (i.e. the gap between what society expects 
auditors to achieve and what the auditors can reasonably be expected to accomplish); 
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and (b) performance gap (i.e. the gap between what society can reasonably expect 
auditors to accomplish and what auditors are perceived to achieve).
235
       
In line with PORTER‘s arguments, HUMPHREY, et al, suggest that a common factor 
running across various of these definitions is that auditors do not carry out their duties 
in a manner consistent with the aspirations and desires of the public who also have 
interest in the audit.
236
   
 
4.3 NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF THE EXPECTATION GAP 
Several studies have been carried out to gauge the nature of audit expectation gap 
prevailing in different countries of the world.
237
 These studies have also looked at 
differences in perceptions across the different strata of the society. In the case of US, for 
example, several governmental and professional investigations have commented on 
aspects of audit expectations. Prominent among these commissions was the Cohen 
Commission, a commission set up with the specific task of making recommendations on 
the appropriate responsibilities of auditors.  
 
BARON et al, on the other hand, conducted a research to determine the extent auditors 
can go in carrying out their responsibilities of detecting material errors, irregularities 
and illegality in audit. They tried to establish whether auditors and users of financial 
statements differ in their perceptions with regards to auditors’ duties of detection and 
disclosure. They found that auditors and users of financial statements have significantly 
different views and preferences on the extent of auditors’ responsibilities for detecting 
and disclosing irregularities and illegal acts. In particular, users held auditors to be more 
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JENNINGS et al, in their study on auditors’ liability contended that auditor liability 
invariably depends on the way litigants perceive and feel about the auditing 
profession.
239
 In the same vein, LOWE compared the expectations of litigants against 
that of auditors on the auditing profession. It was found that they have different beliefs 
on what auditors could achieve in audit, and judges have systematically sided with 





EPSTEIN & GEIGER took a survey of investors to gather information on various aspects 
of financial reporting, especially, on the level of assurance required of auditors with 
regards to error and fraud. The data for the study were collected from all the 50 states of 
the United States through a national survey conducted among the investors representing 
individuals (not companies). Investors were asked on the level of assurance they 
believed auditors should provide to detect material misstatements and errors in the 
financial statements. The researchers initially anticipated a typical response of 
reasonable assurance. The results however, suggested otherwise with investors seeking 
very high levels of financial statement assurance, which reveal the existence of 




A feature common to all of these studies was the findings that a gap between 
performance and expectation did exist, and that this was not just due to ignorance on the 
part of users of accounting information. Admittedly, the expectation gap may be 
attributed to difference of perception on what is reasonably expected from an audit, and 
of the actual quality of the audit work. Cohen Commission, for example, concluded that 
generally users had reasonable expectations of auditor’s abilities and of the assurances 
they can give. It attributed the expectation gap more to the public accounting 
profession’s failure to react and evolve rapidly enough to keep pace with changing 
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Although a number of explanations for the existence and persistence of the audit 
expectation gap appear in the literature, references to users’ misunderstandings of the 
role, objectives and limitations of an audit, inadequate audit standards and deficient 
auditor performance capture the main essence of its causes. This results in users’ 
dissatisfaction with auditor’s performance and undermines confidence in the auditing 
profession and the external audit function.
243
 These factors will be further discussed in 
the course of this chapter. 
 
 
5. MODERNIZATION OF AUDIT PRACTICE IN SPAIN 
 
5.1 THE 1988 AUDIT LAW 
In Spain, the audit law enacted in July 1988 marked the foundation of statutory audit as 




 The law heralded a new era of transparency and optimism in the 
Spanish financial accounting industry.
245
 It provided, for the first time, a greater security 
for those who deal with companies as well as gave assurance to shareholders and 
investors. In addition to satisfying the urgent need for credible financial information, the 
Spanish legislator sought to institutionalize audit practice through the audit law by 
giving Spanish auditors the competence and recognition enjoyed by their counterparts in 




The 1988 audit law contained a number of provisions regarding status and 
independence of auditors as well as the means of access to the profession. Above all, the 
law created the ICAC, the equivalent of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the US, as a final authority on audit regulation in Spain. However, the real 
impetus behind audit expansion and growth in Spain did not come from legislation but 
rather from economic expansion taking place in Spain at that time.
247
 The audit law only 
served to provide Spain with a more orderly and enabling business environment. 
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Perhaps, most importantly, it ushered in a new atmosphere of hope and optimism in 
Spain, a far cry from the gloomy years of obsolete auditing and accounting framework 




The law duly established a statutory audit obligation for medium and large limited 
companies. It also laid down a model stipulating the responsibilities of the audit 
profession and the way in which it was to be regulated.
249
 The 1988 Audit Law has far 
more practical significance, it ‘. . . opened the way to the commercial and accounting 
law revolution’,
250
 which subsequently followed, as Spain adapted its national financial 
reporting practices to the EC’s Fourth and Seventh Directives. The ever present 
revolutionary nature of the proposed law was also echoed during the parliamentary 
debates: 
 
The recent integration of Spain within the EEC also advises the development of 
this transparency in information. Therefore, this law is not only going to fill a 
gap in our legal system, but will also facilitate better performance by Spanish 
firms, since it depends on an exact knowledge of their economic and financial 
situation, and will make possible comparisons with other EEC firms, meaning, 




The spirit of the moment was well captured by IAN GIBSON in the following words:  
 
What most strikes one about Spain, indeed, is its new-found optimism, the 
growing conviction that at last, after centuries of instability, isolation, coups 
d’état and civil wars, there is now a good chance that sustained progress may be 
possible within the stable framework of the EC. That a great deal remains to be 
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For the Spanish economy, the new legal environment represents a bridge to a future of 
stability and prosperity. As noted by RUIZ-BARBADILO et al. “the new legal 
establishment of auditing in Spain was accepted by society in general with much 
enthusiasm, as auditing was considered to satisfy an urgent need in the modernization of 
the national economy.”
253
 This was followed by the commercial law of 1989, which 
requires the public filing of company financial statements. The Spanish business 
environment had never been better. The frequently expressed view then was that the 
EC-inspired legislations were set to provide Spain with a more orderly and equitable 
business environment, with less corruption and more reliable financial information. 
Empirical surveys of the time show only limited evidence of the type of expectations 
gaps that have traditionally characterized the statutory audit function in countries like 
the United Kingdom and the United States,
254
 notwithstanding the fact that auditing 
services market is dominated by the very same firms whose performance has been the 
focal point of debate in the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries. In Spain the audit 




The general view was that Spain was set to move away from the conspicuous traditions, 
like manipulation of financial reports for tax evasion that had characterized the 
management and reporting of corporate financial affairs in the country.
256
In fact, such 
views even go beyond the auditing profession, with commentaries in the financial and 
academic accounting press frequently referring positively to recent audit and 
accountancy legislation. Auditing in Spain represented not a gloomy atmosphere of 
unmet audit expectations and questionable financial reporting practices that sometimes 
characterized the United States’ audit environment but a current economic reality and 
promise of a better future. These sentiments were expressed by various observers in 
these words: 
 
Auditors have been the voice of conscience of institutions and companies, and 
the collaborators involved most closely in the attempts that have been 
undertaken to modernize the state of accounting information.
257
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The introduction of modern criteria for the preparation of accounting 
information, such as the concept of the true and fair view and the audit and 
publication requirements is a radical change from previous practices. Although 
Spanish companies will go through a period when there are adjustment 




The objectives of the Spanish mercantile reforms could not suitably be attained 
without having established the general obligation to submit (corporate) financial 
information to audit by an independent expert, as a way of guaranteeing the 




We consider that the audit obligation and the publication of annual financial 
statements will make it possible for business accounting information systems to 
be much more transparent than at present and will provide a greater impulse for 
the long-desired accounting reform, so as to achieve a situation in which the 





5.2 ENTER THE EXPECTATION GAP IN SPAIN 
The enthusiasm and public optimism ushered in by the Spanish financial reforms took a 
bad turn by the mid-1990s, as a string of major corporate failures repeatedly questioned 
the ‘New Spain’ euphoria and made it look like a fairy tale. No case highlighted the 
apparent failure of Spain to break away from its yesteryears of poor accounting tradition 
than the case of Banesto.
261
 The Banesto debacle, reminiscent of the recent Bankia 
scandal, involves fraud and falsification of accounting document by top management 
with acquiescence of its auditors. The audit profession, which had at one stage looked 
so positive, and comfortable with the plaudits and high expectations being lauded on 
it,
262
 must now respond to the public on what went wrong or whether the public trust it 
enjoyed was misplaced? Subsequent by the Spanish Central Bank investigators only 
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confirmed the public’s worst fears of corruption and insider-dealings at the highest 
level. These revelations increased the public doubt over the audit function and auditors’ 
capacity to serve their interest. The romance between the public and auditing profession 
seems to be over.  
 
The audit profession however appeared much more defensive on its response than 
remorseful. Like their counterparts in the United States, they responded that the audit 
expectation gap was because of ignorance of the nature and function of audit by the 
public. In fact, the auditing profession in Spain thought they were just victims of 
unfortunate corporate scandals.
263
 The words of JESÚS PEREGRINA summarize auditors’ 
sentiments: 
 
The auditor is not God at the time of signing his report. The job of the auditor is 
to affirm the financial statements at a time determined by the company. One 
cannot expect [auditors] to have a crystal ball with which to predict the future, 
although one could ask them to get sufficient information to make a prognosis 
more quickly in serious cases. And neither could one ask them to detect frauds 




What was surprising about the Banesto debacle was the fact that the bank was closely 
monitored by the Bank of Spain with its inspectors been ever-present in Banesto 
because of its pending public offer. Banesto’s 1992 accounts were also duly audited and 
certified by its auditors, Price Waterhouse, without any adverse qualification. But six 
months after the public issue of its shares, the most successful in Spain’s history and 
approved by the Bank of Spain, a deficit of 605,000 million Pesetas emerged from its 
accounts. Explanation to the Banesto situation remained suspect to the public with ripe 
rumors of witch-hunt and political machination. But as observed by John Hooper: 
 
No matter which way you read the Banesto affair, one of its messages is: 
‘Foreign investors beware’. . . . Now, either J. P. Morgan was right in thinking 
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Banesto could be saved (in which case the Bank of Spain intervened 
unnecessarily), or Mr. Rojo was right in thinking it was doomed (in which case 
J. P. Morgan made a serious misjudgment when they bought into it so heavily 
last summer). Whichever way, the implications for foreign investors are 
disturbing. If the Spanish authorities intervened unnecessarily, it raises a 
suspicion they were playing politics with the economy – pouncing on an 
opportunity to discredit an enemy and critic. Mr. Conde had long been at 
loggerheads with the Socialist government and was suspected of nurturing 
political ambitions. He had bought heavily into the media. If, on the other hand, 
J. P. Morgan made a mistake, it raises questions about the accuracy of the 
accounts that were made available to the Americans. Neither suspicion reflects 
well on Spain as a home for foreign capital. The first implies a country in which 
the authorities are prepared to skew the operation of a free market in order to 
settle a grudge. The second suggests one in which the business culture is so 





As seen in the above case, very high expectations have been dampened as a result of 
those corporate scandals. Consequently, substantial fines had been imposed on a 
number of the major international audit firms by the Spanish audit regulatory body, the 
ICAC, for inadequate auditing.
266
  Nonetheless, the response by the Spanish auditing 
profession had been defensive when questioned on their role leading up to the scandal 
and issues relating to regulation of auditing. They pointed to public misunderstandings 
of what can reasonably be expected of the auditor, emphasizing the significant 
responsibilities of company management with respect to the prevention of fraud. They 
particularly see the Spanish regulatory body, ICAC as interventionist that needs urgent 
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6. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR AUDIT EXPECTATION GAP 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from the above review of professional and 
governmental investigations over the last three decades across different countries is that 
the expectations gap appears to be a persistent problem. In addition, whilst the 
expectation may be partly blamed on the evolutionary changes in the auditing 
environment over time, it is entirely reasonable for users of auditing services, as 
primary beneficiaries of the audit process, to expect the auditor to deliver quality service 
including warning signals when necessary. If they feel that good work has not been 
delivered by the audit, they become suspect which in turn contributes to the persistence 
of the expectation gap.
268
 In the following paragraphs, questions concerning the factors 
responsible for the persistence of the expectations gap shall be addressed. 
 
As with the definition of expectation gap, there are different explanations offered for the 
continued presence of the expectation gap problem. For example, LEE & AZHAM in their 
study of the factors contributing to the existence of the audit expectation gap identified, 
among other factors, the “complicated nature of an audit function; conflicting role of 
auditors; retrospective evaluation of auditors’ performance; time lag in responding to 
changing expectation; and self-regulation process of the auditing profession” as 
prominent reasons for continued existence of the audit expectation gap.
269
 An outline of 
these factors will be attempted below. 
 
6.2 IGNORANCE OF AUDIT FUNCTION 
The general public’s poor understanding of the complicated audit function has been 
identified as a likely factor that contributes towards the existence of an audit expectation 
gap.
270
 According to LEE & AZHAM, “the complexity of auditing could be due to the fact 
that the objective of auditing and the role of auditors have always been a dynamic rather 
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than a static one.”
271
 Auditing, inevitably, has been affected and influenced by the 
socio-economic circumstances obtained at a given period of time and place in history, 
like the collapse of big corporations, the verdict of the courts, and technological 
developments. Therefore, any major changes in these contextual factors are likely to 




The complicated nature of audit function can also be seen by a change in the auditing 
paradigm over the years. According to LEUNG, et al. the audit practice for centuries had 
undergone various changes.
273
 For example, in the mid 1800s to early 1900s an auditing 
function can be regarded as “traditional conformance role of auditing,” which signifies 
that auditors then had to ensure that statements of accounts are correct as well as free 
from frauds and errors. Over the past 30 years or so, the auditor only plays an 
“enhancing role” by enhancing the integrity and credibility of the financial information 





Obviously, given the substantial changes that audit practice had undergone over the 
years, it is to be expected at a certain point that the public may be confused about the 
essence of an audit. In addition, there are some arcane terms used in audit like true and 
fair view, reasonable, materiality, adequacy, reliability and relevance, which are 
amenable to subjective interpretation and are at best confusing even to the reasonable 
man.
275
 For instance, the ombudsman term “true and fair” used in the audit reports has 
still defied precise definition which does not help in easing the users’ understanding of 
audit. LEE & AZHAM further argue that because most of audit terms and concepts are not 
well defined, in applying these terms auditors usually resort to the exercise of individual 
judgment and “given the complicated nature of auditing and the objective of an audit, 
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6.3 CONFLICTING ROLE OF AUDITORS 
Users of financial statements view the provision of consultancy services by the same 
audit firm as an imminent area of conflict of interest and at best a bad incentive for 
independence. Accounting firms have over the years diversified by providing a wide 
range of services and products which include engagements for risk assessment, business 
performance measurement, information reliability systems, and electronic commerce 
among others.
277
 A study in the US revealed that accountants have become increasingly 
dependent on consulting.
278
 In 2001, for instance, PricewaterhouseCoopers earned only 
40% of its worldwide fees from auditing, 29% came from management consulting and 
most of the rest from tax and corporate finance work.
279
 Auditors’ multiple role is seen 
to have negative implications on the auditor’s ability to perform a fair audit, as they are 
likely to compromise and yield to the management’s pressure in order to protect their 
lucrative consultancy services. A similar conclusion was reached by users of financial 




6.4 RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION OF AUDITORS’ 
PERFORMANCE 
The society usually is incapable of determining the quality of an audit and performance 
of auditors till after the occurrence of an event, like corporate failure. Thus, whenever a 
financial scandal strikes the news headlines, the public suspect’s lack of sufficient 
diligence on the part of auditors. According to SHAKED & SUTTON, this is due to the fact 
that the public have difficulties in comparing between one audit and another.
281
 In a 
similar vein, HUMPHREY et al. argue that any after the fact judgment through hindsight 
evaluation of auditors is unfair. They further emphasized that hindsight assessment of 
audit quality is based on after the fact knowledge that may be, at times, unpredictable.
282
 
Criticism through hindsight was lamented by the former AICPA vice-president as part 
of auditors’ life: 
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As long as investors suffer losses from a sudden and drastic drop in earnings or 
the bankruptcy of a corporation which was widely regarded as a good 
investment, our profession is going to be criticized in the new media. And since 
such situations are not likely to disappear completely, we ought to become more 
mature in our reactions to criticisms and recognize that this is an inescapable 




Through hindsight evaluation, auditors have found themselves to be targets of negative 
publicities even when it is known that they are not to shoulder all the blame all the time. 
Many reasons could lead to the fall of a corporation, like mismanagement, bad strategic 
decisions, industry downturns, competition, and poor oversight by boards of directors or 




6.5 TIME LAG IN RESPONDING TO CHANGING EXPECTATIONS 
Auditors must be conscious of the ever changing times technology had thrust upon them 
and react accordingly. According to the Cohen Commission, users generally have 
reasonable expectations of auditor’s abilities and of the assurances they can give.
285 
The 
Commission therefore attributed the expectation gap much to the public accounting 
profession’s failure to react and evolve rapidly enough to keep pace with changing 
business and social environment.
286
 As it is usual with the accounting profession, 
whenever there is a financial or corporate scandal, it comes up with new or revised 
accounting standards. This, according to TRICKER, suggests that the accounting 
profession is gradually and constructively responding to the changing expectations of 
society.
287
 TRICKER’s assertion was, perhaps, understandable through the actions taken 
by the AICPA (Auditing Standards Board) as a result of the financial scandals in the 
80’s and the successive Statements on Auditing Standards issued since then. 
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Nonetheless, this effort has been criticized for not going far enough in keeping pace 




6.6 SELF-REGULATION PROCESS OF THE AUDITING PROFESSION 
The self-regulated framework usually in form of professional organization is blamed for 
been reluctant to enforced regulatory standards.
289
 SHAKED & SUTTON pointed out that 
the rationale for self-regulation by a profession is premised on the ground that service 
quality may be maintained through self-review or other mechanism by the same 
professionals when the consumers (i.e. audit beneficiaries) are unable to measure the 
audit quality themselves.
290
 The shortfall of this arrangement was highlighted by 
HUMPHREY, et al. in the following words: 
 
The audit profession is not regarded as selfless, neutral body, responding 
diligently to the changing dictates and expectations of society. Rather, it is seen 
in a more proactive, economically interested light, needing to maintain the 
appearance of independent, highly technically competent individuals in order to 
defend and advance its members’ interest. Symbolic traits of independence, 
trustworthiness, altruism and expertise are viewed as professional mystiques that 
together with the existence of a professional monopoly of labor give rise to a 
mutually dependent relationship with the state and serve to enhance the 




The self-regulated framework is seen as a means used by the accounting profession to 
retain and maintain a considerable power to itself and to keep within its control the 
fortunes of its members. MITCHELL argued in the same vein, albeit, without reservation 
in his condemnation of the disciplinary process under the self-regulation framework: 
 
The profession’s disciplinary procedures are even more feudal. Occasionally, in 
secret meetings, from which its own membership, press and public are excluded, 
it suspends some individuals from membership….And what about the big fish? 
                                                     
288
 LEE, T. H.  & AZHAM, M. A., The Audit Expectation Gap…, op. cit., p. 33. 
289
 This has now been overtaken by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which created a semi-state controlled body. 
290
 SHAKED, A. & SUTTON, J. (1982) in LEE, T. H.  & AZHAM, M. A., The Audit Expectation Gap…, op. 
cit., p. 33.        
291
 HUMPHREY, C., ET AL., Audit Expectation Gap – Plus…, op. cit., p. 138. 
85 
 
To date, no partner from any major firm has ever been barred from practice by 
the Institute, even though the same firm has been criticized by the DTI 
inspectors again and again…The Institute is completely dominated by the 




Finally, with little to fear from the flawed disciplinary process of the self-regulatory 
framework, auditors capitalize on that to deliver a minimum level of service quality to 
their clients and by extension to users of financial statements. Naturally, this is likely to 
be in contrast with the expectation of the public who will expect auditors to act more in 
accordance with the spirit of the auditing professional standards than following the 
letter of the law. Only by so doing will auditors provide a good auditing service and 
better accountability of their performance. Anything short of that only confirms the 
thesis of GLOECK & DE JAGER that “the process of self-regulation and its attendant 




6.7 THE UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
Although users of financial statements generally have reasonable expectation of 
auditors, many users at times appear to exaggerate the work of auditors. These users 
usually consider an auditor’s report to be a clean bill of health. This high expectation, 
according to HUMPHREY, et al. is associated with the problem of misconception of the 
nature, purpose and capacities of an audit function.
294
 This situation is sarcastically set 
out by TWEEDIE as follows:  
 
…the public appears to require (1) a burglar alarm system (protection against 
fraud) (2) a radar station (early warning of future insolvency) (3) a safety note 
(general reassurance of financial well-being) (4) an independent auditor 
(safeguards for auditor independence) and (5) coherent communications 
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This misconception often leads to unreasonable expectations being imposed on the 
duties of the auditors. Moreover, it has harmful implications on the audit profession as 
the public may not be able to recognize the contribution of auditors to society and hence 
remain unsatisfied. Given that public auditing is meant to inspire confidence any 
dissatisfaction “is detrimental to the auditing profession as it has negative influences on 




6.8 CONCLUSION: BRIDGING THE GAP BY STATUTORY MEANS 
To address the issue head on, in 1985, the ASB began a series of studies in an attempt at 
closing the gap between public expectations and the auditor’s professional requirement 
as enshrined in generally accepted accounting principles. Eventually, these studies were 
combined into the “expectations gap” project and resulted in the issuance of Statements 
on Auditing Standards, (SAS). Succinctly, Statements on Auditing Standards, (SAS) are 
statements issued by the AICPA’s Auditing Standards Board from time to time, and are 
considered as interpretations of how the 10 GAAS statements should be understood and 
applied. Through these SAS the auditing profession assumed the responsibility for 
evaluating and reporting on material uncertainties, including a company’s ability to 
remain a going concern. Since then, the AICPA has been issuing Statement on Auditing 
Standards with the aim of bridging the expectation gap between what financial 
statement users believe auditors are responsible for and what auditors are ready to 
accept as their responsibility.  
 
 
7. THE EFFECT OF AUDITING STANDARDS ON EXPECTATION 
GAP 
 
7.1 THE CONFLICTING VIEWS  
The above mentioned studies on expectation and performance gap of auditors did not 
only conclude that such a gap exists but also emphasized the responsibility of auditors 
in bridging that gap. This responsibility has been described in a similar fashion by the 
Cohen Commission as follows:  
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The burden of narrowing the gap between performance and expectations falls 
primarily on auditors and other parties involved in the preparation and 




The remainder of this chapter will appraise the importance of audit standards in 
changing auditors’ behavior with greater attention to the recent debate about audit 
expectation gap generated by the well publicized corporate failures that had affected a 
better part of the industrialized world.  In the wake of these bankruptcies, “public 
criticism of auditors has focused on not only their responsibility for fraud, but also their 
responsibility to issue a going-concern opinion when a business is about to fail.”
298
 The 
magnitude of the scandal can only be measured by the symbolism and reach represented 





Many have asked why auditors did not raise any alarm in the events leading up to these 
failures. In addition, most of these companies announced bankruptcy soon after 
receiving an unqualified opinion from their auditors. This fact increased public 
suspicion of the accounting profession, especially its inability to raise a ‘red flag’ about 
the possibility of business failure. These and other events prompted a global race to 
change audit laws, regulations and standards. The following paragraphs will examine 
the effects, if any; these changes have in the performance of the auditor. 
 
There are different points of view on the role audit regulation plays and the manner it 
may contribute to reduce the expectation gap. This is reflected in different approaches to 
auditing. The first point view represented by MAUTZ & SHARAF, which is forward 
looking, contends that any auditing standards and regulations implemented should be in 
the interest of society.
300
 The more critical perspective, on the other hand, is of the view 
that auditing and accounting regulations are self-serving. They argue that audit 
standards are mere public relations tools employed by auditors to give users of audit 
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reports the impression that they act on their behalf, but in reality these standards only 
benefit auditors not the society.
301
 However, since the effect of auditing standards may 
have on reducing the audit expectation gap can only be measured empirically; this thesis 
will look at some studies conducted to evaluate the impact of new auditing standards on 
auditors’ performance in the United States as well as in Spain. 
 
7.2 PERFORMANCE RATE STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES 
For empirical study on auditors’ performance rate in the United States, this thesis uses a 
research conducted by RYU et al. to compare the performance of audit firms for three 
different periods of SAS No. 34 issued in 1981 and SAS No. 59 issued in 1988 and 
post-SOX period.
302
 This study, therefore, examines how these interpretations of GAAP 
issued by the ASB influence auditors’ considerations in classifying companies as going 
concerns over these periods and which one made the most impact. Preliminary result of 
the research found that there was no significant difference in auditors’ audit accuracy 
between the SAS No. 59 and post-SOX period, although there was important difference 
between the SAS No. 34 and No. 59 periods. RYU et al. finding reveal that in post-SOX 
period; the accuracy rate of audit opinion issued by auditors on a going-concern reached 
a 44.4% accuracy rate i.e. 8 out of 18 bankrupt clients.
303
 They contend further that 
during the SAS No. 34 and No. 59 periods, the accuracy rates were 40.7% and 51.9%, 
respectively. They however, cautioned that this result is by no means a definite reason 
to conclude that the changes in auditing standards provoked by the SOX had no effect 




According to RYU et al., the study took the form of a search of the Wall Street Journal 
Index for firms that went bankrupt in the years 1985–1997 and 2004–2006 under the 
heading “Bankruptcies.” Then, to find audit opinions, they examined annual reports 
issued within 15 months prior to filing for bankruptcy. They initially gathered more 
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than 300 firms from the Index, but because of unavailability of auditors’ opinion, about 




The research came up with result of auditors’ accuracy rate of only 40.7% of accuracy, 
i.e. 11 out of 27 bankrupt firms received a qualified opinion during the SAS No. 34 
period. This result was significantly improved after SAS No. 59 became effective. 





In the same study, a review of the accuracy rate between the SAS No. 34 and No. 59 
periods for both the so-called Big 6 (now 4) and other firms indicated to the same 
tendency, i.e. that there was a significant difference in accuracy between the two 
periods. The result showed that auditors’ accuracy rates greatly improved after the 
issuance of SAS No. 59, from 43.5% to 52% for Big 6 firms and from 25.0% to 50.0% 
for Non-Big 6 firms. However, in the post-SOX period, the result showed a diminishing 
accuracy rate. Of the 15 firms audited by the Big 4 audit firms, only 6 were issued 
going-concern opinions, representing accuracy rate of 40.4%, but because of the small 
sample size of the firms involved in the study, the result cannot say anything conclusive 




This result, according to RYU et al., may be attributed to the fact that under SAS No. 34, 
The Auditor’s Consideration When a Question Arises about an Entity’s Ability to 
Continue in Existence, issued in 1981, in which an entity’s continuation was usually 
assumed, and substantial doubt alone did not warrant going-concern qualification. 
Instead, substantial doubt about continued existence only led auditors to perform more 
procedures in order to evaluate the recoverability of assets and the amount and 
classification of liabilities. Thereafter they are required to give a qualified audit report if 
they still have doubt about assets and liabilities. In contrast, under SAS No. 59, 
substantial doubt is now in itself sufficient to require an explanatory paragraph in the 
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audit report, i.e. without even the necessity of looking at the possibility of asset 




In other words, SAS No. 59 affirmatively imposed responsibility upon the auditor to 
evaluate, in every engagement, the assumption that the audited company can continue as 
a going concern.
309
 In contrast, SAS No. 34 required the auditor to assess going concern 
only when contrary information came to the auditor’s attention. Thus, SAS No. 59 
increased the auditor’s responsibility for detecting firms displaying characteristics that 
raise substantial doubt about the firm’s ability to continue in its existing form for at least 
one year from the financial statement date. As ELLINGSEN, et al. argue, SAS No. 59 
expands the auditor’s traditional boundary in reporting on the entity’s ability to continue 




The clear motive behind SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 as well as the post-SOX 
standards was to close the gap between public expectations of the auditor’s 
responsibility and the auditor’s service level as prescribed in the generally accepted 
accounting principles. But what singles out the post-SOX period, was “the increased 
risks associated with auditing and the sustained negative publicity about auditors in the 
media, auditors are now expected to use even more vigorous processes and more 
conservative steps in deciding whether to issue going-concern or other qualified 
opinions than they used previously.”
311
 But the result shows the contrary. Whilst the 
accuracy rate (51.9%) recorded in the aftermath SAS No. 59 was higher than the rates 
reported by any previous research conducted before SAS No. 59 became effective, the 
accuracy rate recorded in the post-SOX period was a far cry from that. In fact the result 
indicates that the accuracy rate went back down to below 50%, a clear retrogression 








 The auditor’s report, presumably not on only points to the financial state of a company but it also 
“plays a critical role in warning market participants of impending going concern problems. Indeed, the 
term audit failure typically refers to cases in which auditors fail to issue going concern opinions to clients 
that subsequently file for bankruptcy” DEFOND, M., et al. contended. See DEFOND, M., RAGHUNANDAN, 
K. & SUBRAMANYAN, K., “Do Non-Audit Services Fees Impair Auditor Independence? Evidence from 
Going Concern Audit Opinions”, Journal of Accounting Research, 40, 2002, p. 1254. 
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However, because of the small sample size involved as well as the relatively short 
period of application of the post-SOX audit standards, RYU et al noted that, it may be 
premature to draw a clear conclusion from the result. Ultimately, they concluded that 
more comprehensive research on the subject using more sample firms may be necessary 
in the future. Meanwhile, they emphasized that the primary objective of this study of 
providing the basis for evaluation of auditors’ performance has been accomplished by 





7.3 THE SPANISH CONTEXT 
 
7.3.1 AUDITING STANDARDS IN SPAIN 
The study of a going concern opinion in Spain is interesting because of cultural 
differences and its relatively short auditing tradition in comparison with countries like 
the United States and Britain. One discernible peculiarity of the Spanish audit market is 
its lack of market-based institutional incentives like loss of reputation and litigation 
costs that outweigh economic dependence and promote auditor independence.
314
 In 
audit markets like the United States and Britain failure to issue a going-concern opinion 
to a deserving company can harm the auditor’s reputation. But in case of Spain, 
empirical evidence shows that when it comes to auditor choice fees are the most 
important consideration above other factors like audit quality and auditor reputation.
315
 
Another important factor worthy of note in the Spanish context is the low risk of 
litigation faced by auditors. Until very recently, third party liability of auditors is almost 
non-existent in Spain and no audit firm has suffered damages to third parties.
316
 The 
peculiarities that the Spanish context brings to the expectation gap debate make an 
exciting comparison. 
 
As indicated above, in Spain, the audit expectation gap phenomenon came as a bolt 
from the blues because it happened only a few years after coming into effect of a much 
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 With little or no auditing tradition at that time, Spain had 
no precedence to follow or any specific auditing standard on going concern evaluation. 
Even the Audit Law did not make specific provision regarding any obligation on the 
part of auditors to evaluate their client’s risk of bankruptcy.
318
 Although such 
responsibility may be implied from the provision of article 5 of “Ley 22/2015”, which 
requires auditors to give their opinion if the non-application of any accounting 
principles has affected the elaboration of the audit report in any way.
319
 Another law 
that requires auditors to assess company’s risk of failure is “Ley de Sociedades de 
Capital.” 
 
Under its articles 262 and 263, “Ley de Sociedades Sociedades de Capital” obliges 
auditors to make observations in their audit of both the annual and director’s report with 
regards to any fact that might pose a threat to the company’s financial situation. A 
similar provision is also found in the Technical Auditing Standards issued by ICAC in 
1991 which addresses issues like the independence and conduct of the auditor in 
carrying out his or her duty among other things.
320
 Article 1.5 of that law also requires 
auditors to pay attention to those situations and circumstances that might jeopardize the 
company’s ability to continue in business. According to RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al., 
although these rules require auditors to warn users of accounting information if they see 
risk of bankruptcy in their clients, none of them have provided detailed “procedures for 




To respond to the expectation gap question and as well fill the necessary regulatory 
lacuna, Spanish regulators and the professional associations came up with a new 
auditing standard. The new standard called ‘Norma Técnica de Auditoría sobre el 
Principio de Empresa en Funcionamiento’ was published on 31 May 1993 by the ICAC 
(NTA-May/1993, auditing standard on the going concern assumption).
322
 This change 
was to assist auditors in detecting and conveying the right signal or, if you like, the 
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“red-flag” to financial statement users if they doubt their client’s ability to continue in 
business. In addition, the new standard is meant to fill the expectation gap vacuum by 
providing auditors with guidance on the application of the going concern assumption.  
 
The auditing standard, inter alia, specified the scope of auditor’s responsibility in 
assessing a company’s risk of continuing as a going concern, as well as provided 
operational guidance to the auditor to enable him or her form an opinion on the 
question. With the implementation of the new audit standard by the ICAC, the auditor 
did not only have his or her responsibility defined but had also been provided with a 
process for evaluating a client’s ability to continue as a going concern.
323
 Moreover, 
given the atmosphere of sustained criticism and suspicion that informed the reforms in 
the first place, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. argue that, all things being equal, the change 
was expected to motivate auditors to be more vigilant in finding and reporting going 




7.3.2 AUDIT  QUALITY AND GOING CONCERN OPINION 
Whether the auditing standards promulgated in Spain have achieved their aim of 
reducing the audit expectation gap is an empirical question that may only be measured 
by statistics. But for reasons outlined above, empirical literature on going concern 
opinion in Spain are few and far between. Nevertheless, this thesis will review two 
important empirical studies conducted on going concern opinion in Spain.  
 
In the first study, published in 2004, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. attempted to establish a 
relationship between audit quality and the likelihood of financially troubled companies 
receiving a going concern opinion. The study covered the period from December 1991 
to December 2000. The second study published recently in 2012, examined the impact 
of the May 1993 auditing standards promulgated in Spain on auditors’ behavior. The 
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7.3.3 STUDY OF GOING CONCERN OPINION IN SPAIN 
This study aims to find out the reasons behind auditors’ going concern opinion. Is it to 
do with competence or independence, or both of them? RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. took a 
sample of companies on the brink of bankruptcy. Using this data, they separated 
problem companies with a going concern opinion from problem companies without a 
going-concern opinion.
325
 They came to the conclusion that although auditors may find 
a company in financial distress and also doubt its ability to continue as a going concern, 
yet they may refrain from issuing a going concern opinion because of lack of economic 




The results show that the likelihood of auditors issuing a going-concern opinion do not 
only depend on the company’s financial problems, but also on auditor’s ability give 
such an opinion, i.e. the auditor’s independence from the company. In other words, the 
going concern opinion may depend on the auditor’s capacity to withstand the risk of 
losing the client. However, they have not found any evidence linking a going concern 




The firms included in this study have been selected from the database of the National 
Securities Market Commission for the fiscal year ranging from December 1991 to 
December 2000 period. This database was chosen because of the access it affords the 
researchers to the audited financial information of all companies listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange. In addition to being the exclusive place to find annual accounts 




At the beginning, the researchers gathered a sample of all the 4,817 audited companies 
for the years from 1991–2000. They thereafter removed insurance and financial service 
companies because as they noted “their financial ratios may differ significantly from the 
rest of the companies and could generate misleading results.”
329
 They also eliminated 
companies in liquidation from the sample because these companies’ financial 
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information is of little significance for users of financial statements. Following this 




Next, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. determined from this sample those companies that have 
shown signs of financial distress. They used the trio features of (a) negative working 
capital; (b) negative retained earnings, or (c) a bottom-line loss as a measure to 
determine financially distressed companies. Any company that exhibit one or more of 
these feature is so classified. These variables were selected, as noted by RUIZ-
BARBADILLO et al. because they “are also based on the so-called contrary factors 
identified in the Spanish guidelines (ICAC, 1991).”
331
 They have also considered those 
factors that when present can mitigate the problems of financial distress. Mitigating 
factors are known to serve as justification for auditors to refrain from qualifying an 
audit report even though the company has going-concern problems. In evaluating the 
existence of these mitigating factors, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. examined the financial 
statements of subsequent fiscal year to see if there have been some important sales of 
assets or the issuance of new debt or equity on the part of the companies. Since these are 
factors that may influence the auditor’s decision, they chose to exclude companies with 
one or both factors from the sample. They were then left with a sample of 1,199 




In their analysis, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. used indicators like probability of failure, 
tenure, specialization, client size, auditor size, receivable and inventory as yardstick to 
measure competence and/or independence, the factors that finally determines a going 
concern opinion.
333
 Each of these variables is taken below. 
 
The authors started with PROBABILITY OF FAILURE (hereafter PROBFAIL), a 
variable which relates to the financial health of a company. As indicated in a prior 
research, a company’s financial situation at times may be in so severe or distressed that 
it would make a going-concern opinion inevitable for auditors.
334
 Therefore, RUIZ-








 Id. at p. 606. 
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conservatism because there is more management judgment, and hence a greater chance of financial 
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BARBADILLO et al. concluded that when a company has a high probability of failure, 




TENURE is used here to signify the duration of the relationship between auditor and 
client. As noted by RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. with time “an auditor develops an in-depth 
knowledge of the client’s business operations, processes and systems, which is crucial 
to performing effective audit work.”
336
 Some researchers noted that auditors that have a 
long-term relationship with their clients, have a better understanding of the client’s 
financial condition which puts them in a better position to detect their client’s going-
concern problems. They also argue that there is evidence in the literature to the contrary 
that long term relationship jeopardizes auditors’ professional diligence and 
compromises their independence. Therefore, tenure is classified here as a negative 




SPECIALIZATION, on the other hand, is a measure of the audit firm’s knowledge base 
and experience in the industry. A firm’s specialization in an industry is viewed by 
researchers as a way of improving auditor performance. A research conducted by 
CRASWELL et al. has shown that audit quality can increase firm’s clientele and its 
market share.
338
 Accordingly, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. noted that SPECIALIZATION 
by auditors leads to “easier identification of financial distress and, therefore, with a 




CLIENTSIZE is used here to measure the effect of client loss of a given audit firm as a 
consequence of a qualified opinion issued. Evidence abound that well established 
auditors may issue a qualified opinion to a client in a dire situation without fear of 
losing the client. However, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. adverted that there is also evidence 
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suggesting that auditors may have economic incentives to issue unqualified opinion to 




AUDITORSIZE is classified here as positive influence on audit firm capable of 
swinging the pendulum to the side of truth. As RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. observed, 
auditors of renowned goodwill are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to 
deserving client knowing full well that any contrary opinion may affect their reputation 
as well as value of their services.
341
 In order to protect their reputation auditors will 
have to maintain a balance between two potentials, a client’s probability of receiving a 




RECEIVABLE and INVENTORY are included here to reflect the potential losses 
auditors may incur from litigation. Litigation risk may sometimes be a determining 
factor for auditors when evaluating a going concern opinion. Conservative reporting can 
at times be the saving grace for auditors because, as noted by RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. 
‘qualified audit reports issued prior to bankruptcy reduce both the incidence and the 
magnitude of litigation if bankruptcy subsequently occurs.’
343
 Hence, they classified 




7.3.4 THE RESEARCH RESULTS  
The research results which mirror the empirical evidence drawn from the United States 
show that out of the 1,199 cases observed auditors expressed a going-concern opinion in 
only 100.
345
 This indicates that auditors are generally reluctant to issue going-concern 
opinion. In addition, it can be argued that notwithstanding the contextual differences 
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plaintiffs' claims against auditors.” See CARCELLO, J. & PALMROSE, Z., “Auditor Litigation and Modified 
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that exist between the United States and Spain, the general tendency of auditors issuing 
less going-concern opinion is true in both countries. Table 1 below is adopted from 
RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. and describes the sample of the 1,199 distressed companies 
observed. 
 









       PROBFAIL 
 





1 11 4.59 
 
2.67 





0.02 1 0.23 
 
0.35 










0 0.98 0.08 
 
0.15 
PROBFAIL: Probability of company’s failure; TENURE: Number of years being 
audited by the same audit firm; SPECIALIZATION: Audit firm’s market share in the 
client’s industry; CLIENTSIZE: Client’s assets to total clients’ assets of the auditor; 
AUDITORSIZE: Audit firm’s market share; RECEIVABLE: Receivable/total assets: 
INVENTORY: Inventory/total assets. 
 
Table 2 below is used by RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. to test the explanatory variables. The 
test is meant to find if there are any significant differences between companies in 
financial problems and companies that are not in problem, while the z-statistic in the 
table is used to compare the means of the two groups. It can therefore be seen in Table 2 
that there are significant differences between companies that have financial difficulties 
that have received a going-concern opinion and those that did not. This situation is 
invariably reflected in the PROBFAIL variable, where signs of financial failure are 
greater in the companies that received qualified reports, which is consistent with earlier 




Table 2. Univariate analysis of the explanatory variables classified according to the 
existence of going-concern or not 
   
      Mean       Median Standard deviation   
Variables 
  
No GC GC No GC GC No GC GC z-statistics    
PROBFAIL 
 
0.174 0.557 0.031 0.648 0.281 0.381 8.967***    
TENURE 
  
4.61 4.32 4.00 4.00 2.695 2.287 0.501    
SPECIALIZATION 
 
0.193 0.131 0.088 0.080 0.246 0.240 0.359    
CLIENTSIZE 
 
0.232 0.189 0.025 0.019 0.353 0.354 2.703***    
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0.197 0.211 0.048 0.072 0.274 0.271 3.042***    
RECEIVABLE 
 
0.156 0.208 0.089 0.171 0.178 0.169 3.877***    
INVENTORY 
 
0.081 0.130 0.005 0.053 0.143 0.203 3.900***    
*** denote the levels of confidence ranging from 99%, 95% and 90% respectively.  
PROBFAIL: Probability of company’s failure; TENURE: Number of years being 
audited by the same audit firm; SPECIALIZATION: Audit firm’s market share in the 
client’s industry; CLIENTSIZE: Client’s assets to total clients’ assets of the auditor; 
AUDITORSIZE: Audit firm’s market share; RECEIVABLE: Receivable/total assets: 
INVENTORY: Inventory/total assets. 
 
The TENURE variable, on the other hand, shows no significant differences between 
companies that received a going-concern opinion and those that did not, which is 
contrary to what is expected. The common logic backed by some research findings, is 
that auditors’ knowledge and familiarity with their client may significantly sway the 
balance of audit opinion in favor of the client. Nevertheless, the old argument still holds 
because the results indicated, albeit slightly, a bias in favor of clients with longer tenure 
with the auditor. As shown by the results, ‘the average length of audit contracts of those 
companies receiving going-concern opinions is 4.32 years, while among those 
companies not receiving this qualification it is 4.61 years.’
347
 Therefore RUIZ-
BARBADILLO et al. concluded by lending credence to the thesis that longer audits 




A similar result is found with the SPECIALIZATION variable, which shows a value of 
only 0.131 in companies that have received qualified reports. This result, according to 
RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. is indicative of the fact “that the lower the auditor’s degree of 
knowledge in specific sectors, the greater the company’s probability of receiving going-
concern opinions.”
349
 However, one variable that has been consistent here is that of 
economic trade-offs. This variable showed a clear difference between both of the 
groups, which is also the expected result.  
 
Meanwhile, the CLIENTSIZE variable is meant to measure the estimated cost of loss of 
a client in case of a qualified opinion. Accordingly, it is a considered opinion of RUIZ-
BARBADILLO et al. that clients with a relatively lower weight in auditor’s portfolio are 
more likely to receive qualified audit report than clients with higher weight in the 
auditor’s portfolio even if both companies seem to be in distress. With respect to 
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AUDITORSIZE variable, the results of the research shows that audit firms with good 
reputation protect their reputation jealously and therefore will issue a going-concern 
opinion in deserving cases. Finally, the RECEIVABLE and INVENTORY variables 
used here to deduce litigation risk, show a higher value in companies that have received 




RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al used table 3 below to show the results from the analysis of the 
“model used to estimate the relationship between audit quality and the auditor’s going-
concern reporting decision. Three goodness-of-fit measures (the likelihood ratio test, the 
pseudo-R 2 and the percentages of concordant pairs) are shown. The x2 model is highly 
significant, suggesting that the variables in the models did indeed have joint 
significance. The logit pseudo-R 2 indicates how well the data fit the presumed 
underlying theoretical distribution. Pseudo-R 2 is computed as an x2 model divided by 
the number of observations minus the number of variables plus one plus the x2 model. 
The value of pseudo-R 2 is 0.227.” The authors also “detail the percentage predicted 




As can be seen, there is a consistency between this result and that of the univariate 
analysis in Table 2. As expected, the PROBFAIL variable demonstrates a coefficient 
that is statistically different from zero. This goes to show that when a company’s 
financial distress level is so high, there is a high probability of that company receiving a 
qualified audit report. In such situation auditors can only do the inevitable by issuing 




   
Table 3. Logistic regression results 
   
Variables 
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 Statistics (with 7 degree of 
freedom) 
   
117.61 
 % Correctly classified 
     
79.7 
 PROBFAIL: Probability of company’s failure; TENURE: Number of years being audited by the 
same audit firm; SPECIALIZATION: Audit firm’s market share in the client’s industry; 
CLIENTSIZE: Client’s assets to total clients’ assets of the auditor; AUDITORSIZE: Audit 
firm’s market share; RECEIVABLE: Receivable/total assets: INVENTORY: Inventory/total 
assets. 
 
The TENURE and SPECIALIZATION variables also performed as expected, but their 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. Another consistent variable is that of the 
CLIENTSIZE with coefficient different from zero as expected.  
 
The finding of RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. goes to confirm the thesis that companies with 
less weight in the auditor’s portfolio are more probable to receive a going concern 
opinion when in financial problems. This result supports other research findings that 
intervening factors like pressure from a reputable client may force the hands of the 
auditor especially in Spain where companies can hire and fire auditors at will. Thus, at 
times going concern decisions are hard calls for auditors given the competitive nature of 
the Spanish audit market and the probability they face of losing their client. In situations 
like this auditors lack the incentive to reveal the financial difficulties of their client if 




In direct contrast to what client size may signify in terms of influence on their auditors, 
the AUDITORSIZE is a counter force to such influence. As can be seen in the table, the 
coefficient of AUDITORSIZE variable is significantly different from zero, which 
indicates that big audit firms with renowned goodwill have incentives to reveal their 
clients financial problems. These kinds of audit firms place more prominence to their 
reputation in audit reporting. Any damage to their reputation in terms of important error 
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Finally, as reflected in the table, the variables representing RECEIVABLES and 
INVENTORY are statistically insignificant, which suggests that litigation risk does not 
deter or determine auditor behavior in Spain. This is largely due to the low litigation 
risk in the Spanish audit environment which is changing very fast. 
 
7.4 THE IMPACT OF AUDITING STANDARDS ON EXPECTATION GAP 
In their recently published study on audit expectation gap, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. 
examined the impact of auditing standards in relation to auditors’ behavior when 
assessing a going concern opinion. They particularly centered on the NTA-May/1993 
auditing standards to determine whether its implementation has been accompanied by 
the desired change of attitude on the part of auditors.
355
   
 
Auditing rules are known to be implemented as a response to public criticism in the 
aftermath of crisis and have as a main goal is setting a benchmark for a minimum 
acceptable quality and professional competence in the auditing practice. As such, when 
a new standard bar is implemented in the form of auditing standards, a correspondent 
change of behavior should as well be expected of auditors. In fact, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et 
al. assume in this study that the adoption of the NTA-May/1993 standards in Spain 




In this study, RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al. focused on companies quoted on the Spanish 
stock market from 1991 to 1996 financial years, albeit, excluding financial companies. 
They gathered the data from the sample of 2,070 companies quoted on Spanish stock 
exchange. From this number, they used the indicators of ‘negative working capital; a 
loss from operations in two consecutive financial years; and stockholders’ equity being 




After applying the above criteria they were left with a final sample of 412 companies 
for observation. Out this number about 123 companies representing 30% relates to ‘the 
period before the issuance of the audit standard (1991–1992), while 289 (70%) refer to 
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the subsequent period (1993–1996).’
358
 They identified only 16% of qualified going 
concern reports, i.e. 65 companies. Out of this number 23 qualified audit reports were 
issued in the period prior to the issuance of NTA-May/1993 auditing standards, which 
stands at 18.7%.  The remaining 42 qualified audit reports were issued after the 
implementation of NTA-May/1993 standards, which represents 14.5%. RUIZ-
BARBADILLO et al. therefore, asserted that the ‘ICAC resolution NTA-May/1993 
concerning the going concern principle has not impacted upon the auditors’ decision on 




The authors went on to analyze qualified going concern audit reports of individual audit 
firms in similar periods i.e. before and after NTA-May/1993 standards.
360
 In view of the 
fact that auditors are obliged to comply with auditing rules made to streamline the 
criteria for identifying companies with financial problems and risk of continuing in 
business, some level of consistency should be expected in reports issued by different 
audit firms. However, this is not the case because of some evidence in the audit 
literature suggesting that auditors do not alter their behavior subsequent to new auditing 
standards. So this study is undertaken to determine whether there is any change of 
propensity to issue a qualified opinion subsequent to the implementation of NTA-
May/1993.
361
   
 
Although the results show no change in auditors’ tendency to issue qualifying audit 
reports, there is a notable difference among the individual firms. For instance, the 
results reveal that the qualified reports issued by AA in the period 1991 to 1992 
amounted to 18% of its financially distressed clients i.e. before NTA-May/1993 
standards. After the implementation of the new standards in 1993-1996 this percentage 
dropped to 8%. The same results are found in cases of CL, which saw a significant 
decrease in the percentage of qualified audit reports issued to its clients in the period 
under investigation. Other firms like DT, KPMG and OTH witnessed an increase in the 
percentage of qualified audit reports issued to distressed clients. EY on the other hand 
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saw a slight decrease in its reports. The authors did not find any significant link between 




The findings of these studies have been mixed for many reasons. First, auditing 
standards prescribe guidelines on determining going concern in a general, and at times, 
ambiguous language which is amenable to different interpretation. Secondly, in 
following these guidelines auditors apply their individual judgments that may vary in 
accordance with their experience and knowledge of the industry as well as the company 
in question. The third reason, according to RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al., has to do with cost 
of applying the new rules. Adapting auditing procedures to the new standards entails 
additional costs to auditors that include among others staff training. This, of course, 
affects audit firms in different measures, ‘depending on their size and their client 
portfolio.’
363
 If the additional cost is to be transferred to clients, then its impact on 
smaller firms will be greater than bigger firms and thereby leave the smaller firms at a 
competitive disadvantage. That being the case, these audit firms will be reluctant in 





8. REDUCING THE EXPECTATION GAP 
The constant rise in litigation against auditing firms has been cited as evidence of the 
widening in the expectation gap and a reflection of a change in public opinion 
concerning the role of auditors.
365
 Although, it is argued that the nature of the 
components of the expectations gap make it difficult to eliminate. It is possible that it 
can be reduced substantially. For this reason a number of researchers and professional 
bodies have examined and provided valuable insight into how this may be achieved. 
These approaches are discussed below. 
 
8.1 EXPANDED AUDIT REPORT 
The expanded audit report is a method employed to improve the communication gap, 
making changes to the wording of the audit report particularly arcane phraseology 
appearing in audit reports, giving meaningful information on the business enterprise and 
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also sharing the auditor’s findings. This change is based on the premise that if users 
better understood the code being used by auditors in reporting their opinions, they 
would more accurately perceive the messages being given by the various forms of audit 
report.
366
 Indeed, there have been signs of improvement. 
 
A study conducted in the United States by NAIR & RITTENBERG found that following the 
introduction of the expanded audit reports, perceptions of users about the relative 
responsibilities of management and auditors is changing.
367
 KELLY & MOHRWEIS 
sustain that with the modification of words used in audit reports, users now appreciate 
the nature of audit more.
368
 Another study by MILLER et al. also revealed that ‘bankers 
found expanded audit reports to be more useful and understandable than the short form 
reports.’
369
 Generally, it can be found from these studies that the ‘expanded audit report 
gives a fuller understanding of the scope, nature and significance of the audit and 
influences the reader’s perceptions concerning the audit and the auditor’s role.’ That is, 





8.2 EDUCATING THE PUBLIC 
Public awareness and education on the role and function of audit has been suggested as 
a means of reducing the expectations gap. Some studies have found evidence to support 
the thesis that knowledge of users of audit has direct influence on how they perceive the 
expectation gap. Hence, some researchers advocate education in narrowing the 
expectation gap. For instance, in a study conducted by BAILEY et al. in the US, it came 
to light that more knowledgeable users placed less responsibility on auditors than less 
knowledgeable users, which implies a larger gap among less sophisticated users than are 
more informed users.
371
 Similarly, EPSTEIN & GEIGER found that investors with broader 
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understanding of accounting and finance are less likely to demand higher auditor 
assurance. They therefore proposed increased public awareness of the nature and 




A similar conclusion was reached by the Treadway Commission.
373
 The Treadway 
Commission conducted a study in October 1985 of the financial reporting system in the 
United States to find more effective ways to prevent fraudulent financial reporting. In its 
final report, issued in October 1987, the Commission recommended for the need to 
improving the communication between auditors and the public regarding the auditor’s 
role, the Treadway Commission concluded that:  
 
Auditors can and should do a better job of communicating their role and 
responsibilities to those who rely on their work. Users of audited financial 
statements need to understand better the nature and the scope of an audit and the 




The Commission also suggested that there is no better way to increase users’ knowledge 
and awareness than to communicate the auditor’s responsibility more clearly and 
explicitly to report readers, which include limitations of an audit at every available 
chance, like in shareholder meetings. Another way is to have the audit report explicitly 
indicating reasonable assurance.
375
 But EPSTEIN & GEIGER argued that both auditors and 
users of audit reports must re-examine the fundamental role of an audit in society and 





8.3 STRUCTURED AUDIT METHODOLOGIES 
With continued rise in litigation against auditors, more audit firms increasingly resort to 
the use of auditor decision aids in order to narrow the expectation gap, and eventually 
reduce their liability exposure. Decision aids or audit support systems are technology 
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applications used by audit firms to enhance audit effectiveness and efficiency. The 
systems they usually employ include electronic work-papers, extensive help files, 
accounting and auditing standards, relevant legislation, etc. Audit firms believe that 
decision aids can enhance audit quality through promoting compliance with accounting 
standards and the firm’s methodology. With increased and consistent audit efficiency, 
auditors believe they can deliver high-quality audits and thereby keep audit liability at 
bay. JENNINGS et al.
377
 took an empirical study to measure the ‘legal impact of the 
increased use of audit decision aids and structured audit approaches in the audit 
environment.’ Their results ‘revealed that decision aids are used as surrogate standards 
of the auditors by jurists. That is, jurists do accept and use audit decision aids as a 




8.4 EXPANDING AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES  
HUMPHREY et al., on other hand, suggested a more radical ways to combat the 
expectation gap. They are of the view that the public would not abandon the belief they 
have that auditing involves fraud detection through the approaches suggested above like 
educating the public, or modifying the length of the audit report, or trying to pretend 
that audit failures are exceptions blown out of proportions by the media. In the 
alternative, they came up with three solutions: ‘setting up an independent office for 
auditing to enhance auditor independence by overseeing the appointment of auditors of 
large companies and to regulate audit fees; extending auditors’ responsibilities by 
statute so that they clearly include responsibilities to shareholders, creditors and 
potential shareholders; and clarifying that auditors have a duty to detect fraud.’ 
However noble this proposal may sound, KOH & WOO were quick to advert that given 
‘the magnitude of the expectation gap and the costs and benefits of these suggested 






 is in agreement with HUMPHREY et al. that detection of fraud should be 
made part of auditors’ responsibility. He proceeded to propose the following four 
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additional responsibilities worth considering by the auditing professional bodies like: 
‘management and auditor evaluation of internal control systems; compliance reporting; 
direct reporting by auditors to regulators; and auditor association with interim financial 
information.’ O’MALLEY, nonetheless, adverted to the risk that the application of his 
proposal might pose to auditor liability and advised that the liability crisis must be 
addressed first. Arguably, an ‘expansion of auditors’ responsibilities will not be feasible 






9. AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM-SPAIN  
The mercantile reforms implemented by Spain in the 1980’s drew much from a better 
experimented audit environment like that of the United States especially, as the chunk 
of the audit practice in Spain as well is undertaken by the same players on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The 1988 Audit Law, apart from some regulation it ceded to the audit 
professional organizations, it created a quasi-official regulatory body known as ICAC. 
The body was assigned with monitoring and investigating the activities of the audit 
profession, an experiment which has worked relatively well. A glowing testimony to the 
‘dominant belief that the audit function can deliver what is expected of it ‘if only’ the 
appropriate (regulatory) system can be established.’ Also a great stride without a doubt 
that ‘reinforced the need to broaden the focus of debates on audit expectations; to move 
from a situation which (at best) implicitly assumes the general applicability of the 
British/American context to one which actively seeks to explore differing local contexts 
and reactions to existing and changing audit systems’. Drawing from the relative 
success of the ICAC, GARCÍA BENAU & HUMPHREY argued that: 
 
The particular significance of broadening analysis from the privileged confines 
of Anglo-Saxon contexts is well illustrated by reference to the present nature of 
audit regulation in Spain. In the Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoria de Cuentas 
(ICAC), Spain would appear to have the type of regulatory body monitoring and 
investigating the activities of the audit profession that increasingly is being 
demanded by a variety of interest groups in Britain…..Given our concerns as to 
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the tendency of regulatory proposals to presume an audit potential, we would 
stress the importance of such investigative powers in opening up the audit 
function to greater public scrutiny and in assessing the appropriateness of its role 




The Spanish regulatory structure was attended with criticism stemming from the view 
that the Spanish structure should have imitated those countries with longstanding 
auditing traditions like the United States or the United Kingdom where self-regulation 
by independent professional associations has always been emphasized. A sentiment well 
captured by CEA GARCÍA: 
 
Many have criticized this [current regulatory] model as unduly interventionist, 
and although this adjective may be more or less accurate, it must be said that 
above all it is the logical consequence of the previous situation of confrontation 
existing in Spain for many years between the various professional groups, each 
of which considered itself to have legitimate rights to take responsibility for the 
practice of auditing. . . . The ideal solution would be for the various bodies to be 
merged into a single powerful entity that would group together all Spanish 
auditors, because if this occurred the effective intervention by the 
Administration (eg. ICAC) would be very substantially reduced, and the auditing 




Well, time changes and “alternative perspectives on the accounting function are 
generally being communicated, particularly in countries where English is not the first 
spoken language”, and have been vindicated with hindsight. This is perhaps the case 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provoked by the Enron and Arthur Andersen failures in 
the late 2001 and early 2002, respectively. The act greatly altered the regulatory regime 
of auditing by shifting the oversight of audit firms from the private-sector American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants to the quasi-governmental Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, a body prototype of the Spanish ICAC.  
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AUDITOR LIABILITY AS PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As seen in the above chapters, audit of financial statements is obligatory in the United 
States as well as in Spain. Despite the differences between the two legal environments, 
auditor’s relationship with the audited company is generally based on contract in both 
jurisdictions.
384
 The company’s management after preparing the financial statements 
employs the auditor to conduct an audit and determine if the assertions made in the 
financial statements fairly portray the operation of the company’s business. Before 
embarking on the audit, the auditor usually prepares an “engagement letter” in which 
the scope, duties and responsibilities of both parties are clearly specified.
385
 
Accordingly, the first point of call to determine the auditor’s liability is the engagement 
letter.
386
 In fact auditors have increasingly included clauses in the engagement letter to 
limit their liability to the client. 
 
After reviewing the client’s records and the evidence that supports those statements, the 
auditor issues a report.  The report expresses the auditor’s independent and professional 
opinion on whether the statements fairly represent the financial status of the entity.
387
 In 
the report the auditor certifies that he has examined the accounts in accordance with the 
GAAS, and has found the financial statements, taken as a whole, to be in conformity 
with GAAP and fairly presents all material aspects of the financial position, results of 
operations and changes in financial position of the client.
388
 In this assessment, the 
auditor is required to be objective and maintain independence with his client, as 
required by the AICPA professional ethics code as follows:  
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For a member in public practice, the maintenance of objectivity and 
independence requires a continuing assessment of client relationships and public 
responsibility. Such a member who provides auditing and other attestation 
services should be independent in fact and appearance. In providing all other 




The audit culminates with the delivery of the audit report to the client.
390
 But the 
audited financial statements acquire value when the client presents it to the investing 
public to raise capital.
391
 Arguably, the essence of audit is in the trust the public places 
on it when making investment decision. However, according to FEINMEN, “auditing is a 
mix of judgment and technique which may result in certain pitfalls.”
392
 FEINMAN further 
argues that “auditors can make seemingly reasonable judgments”, which may be 
questioned by third parties who later rely on the audit, or they may fail to discover an 
error or may reach a wrong conclusion on the financial position of their client.
393
 The 
third parties who rely on the audit and suffer loss frequently sue auditors to recover their 
loss. However, financial loss that is not accompanied by injury or damage to property is 
classified by common law courts as pure economic loss and therefore not recoverable. 
How the concept of pure economic loss is shaped over the time by the courts to 
accommodate third party claims is discussed next. 
 
 
      2. THE CONCEPT OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
 
     2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Under common law, legal claims brought for compensation for damages caused by 
negligent acts are tried under the principles of tort of negligence.
394
 But because liability 
for negligent misstatement is not an autonomous category within the law of negligence 
it is usually analyzed in the wider context of economic loss.
395
 It is trite law that 
economic loss is formerly not recoverable under common. Does this apply to a civil law 
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jurisdiction like Spain as well? The following paragraphs will try to answer this 
question by comparing the application of pure economic loss rule under the tort laws of 
civil and common law systems as respectively represented by Spain and the United 
States. It will appraise the courts’ reluctance to allow recovery not linked with physical 
loss or injury for the fear that such admission would open the door to mass litigation 
which might very well overwhelm the courts. It is argued that the mutual concern 
common law and civil law courts share, of an open-ended liability, led to invocation of 
policies like the concept of duty in case of common law and causation for civil law to 
bring liability exposure to a reasonable limit. Attention will also be given to the 
uncertainty regarding the prerequisites for compensation of economic loss and the lack 
of consistent framework in determining recoverability. It concludes by contending that 
the economic loss rule is a necessary mechanism that serves the ends of the law and that 
of society as well. However, before proceeding to examine the economic loss concept, it 
is convenient to start with what tort is and how it relates to contract. 
 
2.2 TORT OF NEGLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC LOSS 
 
2.2.1 TORT DEFINED 
Tort is originally a French word for wrong but fortunately, not all wrongs are remedied 
at law.
396
 God forbid that the law should furnish remedy for all wrongs! A tort is, thus, 
known in common law as a violation of some private obligation by which like damage 
accrues to the individual.
397
 It is a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which 
the law will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.
398
 Tort law seeks to 
protect the rights and privileges of persons against wrongful acts by others. This is 
premised on the policy that a person who unreasonably interferes with the interest of 
another should be liable for the resulting injury and thus provides redress from wrongful 
acts that affect some legal interest of the complaining party.  While negligence, 
according to WINFIELD,
399
 is a violation of a legal duty to take care which results in 
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customs, philosophy, and religion. It serves as the glue of society; it is also the thread that binds humans 
to one another in community. Duty constrains and channels behavior in a socially responsible way before 




 WINFIELD, P. H., The Province of the Law of Tort (Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 32. 
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damage to the claimant. It is the most common area of torts law in modern 
jurisprudence and perhaps also the broadest category of tort liability imposed for harm 
caused to others.  
 
The Spanish perspective on tort law, which somehow reflects the common law, is also 
fault-based (culpa), premised on the obligation of the tortfeasor to repair any damage his 
action or omission caused to the complainant.
400
 The significance of fault under this 
system is that damage alone is not sufficient to sustain a claim; there must be fault or 
negligence on the part of the defendant as required by art. 1902 CC. However, with the 
advent of new technologies, the chances of massive tort have multiplied sometimes with 
no apparent fault. Spanish courts have therefore, transformed the doctrine of fault 
“culpa” to mirror the damage rather than how it was caused. The courts now would 
compensate all torts, “ubi jus ibi remedium”,
401
 without following strict requirement of 
fault. Once there is link between the complained act and the damage suffered by the 




It was formerly a settled law in common law jurisdictions that liability in tort did not 
extend to pure economic loss, in the absence of physical damage.  Claims for pure 
economic loss were rejected out rightly by common law courts. The position of the law 
then was that an aggrieved person who wants to claim compensation for the loss 
suffered must come under an action for breach of contract or for negligence. Once the 
plaintiff could not prove privity the action under contract would fail. Any claim under 
the tort of negligence would as well not succeed unless there was proximity between the 
plaintiff and the defendant or the damage is reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and 
must not be remote. Apart from all these, the plaintiff must also show that the loss 
suffered by him was not pure economic loss, in order to be recoverable. 
 
Common law courts viewed the allocation of risks and opportunities of pure economic 
loss as exclusive to parties in contract.
403
 In fact one of the reasons adduced for refusing 
to impose liability for pure economic loss has been the need to prevent the disruption of 
                                                     
400
 Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code, (Hereinafter CC). 
401 
Wherever there is right there is remedy, as the saying goes. 
402
 INFANTE  RUIZ, F. , La Responsabilidad por Daños: Nexo de Causalidad y “Causas Hipotéticas”, 
Tirant lo Blanch, Valencia, 2002, p. 1. 
403
 This had been the state of the law until the case of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd 
[1964] AC 465 
114 
 
the ‘contractual structure’. Hence the general rule under common law is that third 
parties can neither be bound nor be endowed by an agreement to which they are not a 
party. Only parties who have furnished a consideration can claim.
404
 Under this rule a 
disappointed beneficiary of a will, not properly performed cannot have a valid claim 
against the solicitor.
405
 In America, however, since the second half of the 19
th
 century 
the courts have progressively abandoned consideration as an excuse for refusing to 
enforce contracts on behalf of third parties.
406
 “Thus, in the earlier part of the 20
th
 
century,” we find the American courts setting the pace in admitting liability in the 




This position brought American law on par with Spanish law. In Spain the concept of 
pure economic loss is ipso facto a non sequitur.
408
 Spain has a general system of 
liability which in principle does not limit the sphere of its protection. Accordingly all 
kinds of damage are compensated, be they physical or economic.
409
 Thus, rights and 
interest are not classified according to their importance or the level of protection they 
enjoy under the law. The notion of some damage being “consequential” loss and 
therefore recoverable and others being “pure” economic loss present in common law is 
of no consequences under Spanish legal tradition.
410
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 This notion has been incorporated into the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) under its Art. 
2:102, (Protected interests), which provides thus: (1) The scope of protection of an interest depends on its 
nature; the higher its value, the precision of its definition and its obviousness, the more extensive is its 
protection. European Group on Tort Law 2 (2) Life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity and liberty 
enjoy the most extensive protection. (3) Extensive protection is granted to property rights, including those 
in intangible property. (4) Protection of pure economic interests or contractual relationships may be more 
limited in scope. In such cases, due regard must be had especially to the proximity between the actor and 
the endangered person, or to the fact that the actor is aware of the fact that he will cause damage even 
though his interests are necessarily valued lower than those of the victim. Accordingly, bodily and 




The Spanish law maintains a broader view of contract that is derived from the notion of 
freedom of contract itself. It is premised on the fact that if the function of the court is to 
give life to the skeletal intentions of the parties, there can be no reason why the law 
should not draw consequences for third parties, not merely from the will of the 
contracting parties but also from the nature of the contract celebrated. As enshrined 
under article 1257 CC:  
 
Los contratos sólo producen efecto entre las partes que los otorgan y sus 
herederos; salvo, en cuanto a éstos, el caso en que los derechos y obligaciones 
que proceden del contrato no sean transmisibles, o por su naturaleza, o por 
pacto, o por disposición de la ley. 
 
Si el contrato contuviere alguna estipulación a favor de un tercero, éste podrá 
exigir su cumplimiento, siempre que hubiese hecho saber su aceptación al 
obligado antes de que haya sido aquélla revocada. 
 
Thus, by the provision of the above quoted section, depending on the nature and type of 
the transaction, third parties can enforce a contract made for their benefit. Under 
Spanish law therefore; there is no question as to the recoverability in tort for negligently 
performed service. For instance, in addition to their liability in contract auditors and 





2.2.2 DEFINITION OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
What then does pure economic loss signifies? ‘After all pure economic losses are 
eventually measured in economic terms.’
412
 There seems to be no consensus on the 
exact contents of the phenomenon of pure economic loss.
413
 Perhaps for the simple 
reason that a number of legal systems neither recognized the legal category nor 
distinguish it as an autonomous form of damage. Where the concept is recognized 
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however, it is mostly associated with no liability rule.
414
 FELDTHUSEN defined pure 
economic loss as “a financial loss not causally consequent upon physical injury to the 
plaintiff or his property or other infringement of his absolute (that is, protected erga 
omnes) rights.”
415
 It generally refers to a negative change in the victim’s financial state 




2.2.3 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSEQUENTIAL AND PURE 
LOSS 
Economic loss is referred to as “consequential” and therefore compensated when it 
follows “immediately” or “directly” from the causation of a physical injury to the 
plaintiff’s own person or property.
417
 A clear example is of a claimant who suffers 
personal injuries, and was allowed to recover his loss of earnings; a ship owner, whose 
ship is sunk or damaged, recovers for his loss of freight.
418
 It is however referred to as 
“pure” and therefore non-recoverable “when it is not consequent on bodily injury to the 
claimant or on physical damage to land or chattel in which the plaintiff has a proprietary 
interest”.
419
 The common law precedent on this class of cases dates back to the seminal 
cases of Cattle v. Stockton
420
 and Simpson v. Thomson.
421
 In laying down this principle 
his Lordship, Lord PENZANCE argued in the case of Simpson v. Thomson that:  
 
The principle involved seems to me to be this – that where damage is done by a 
wrongdoer to a chattel not only the owner of that chattel, but all those who by 
contract with the owner have bound themselves to obligations which are 
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 Consequential economic loss is compensable in all common law jurisdictions. See for example Nat’l 
Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., 574 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) “When a defendant’s negligence 
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rendered more onerous, or have secured to themselves advantages which are 
rendered less beneficial by the damage done to the chattel, have a right of action 
against the wrongdoer although they have no immediate or reversionary property 
in the chattel, and no possessory right by reason of any contract attaching to the 
chattel itself, such as by lien or hypothecation. 
. . . . 





The difference is said to lie in the question of whether the loss is related to physical 
injury or not. A typical example is where a contractor, employed to construct building 
and during the construction works damaged an important power cable. This had led to 
cutting power supplies to a commercial business district. As a result businesses of the 
district, suffered severe financial losses. Whereas the owners of the power cable may 
recover damages, the financial losses sustained by these businesses were termed as pure 





3. TORT OF NEGLIGENCE AND ITS LIMITED REMEDY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen above, the essence of tort was that if anyone infringes the right another 
he should be made to pay for it. Moreover, in early English law, the basis of the 
American common law, requirement for this conduct was absolute, and a person who 
acted in a wrongful manner was liable for any resulting damages irrespective of any 
relationship between himself and the defendant. Since presumably, defendant’s 
obligation was owed to the whole world. In cases where a breach of this right is 
intentional or reckless, the absolute wrong concept still remains and courts make no 
distinction between the categories of loss, they readily oblige the plaintiff. For example, 
in America there is a general tort doctrine that remedies any intentional harm without a 
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 Where, on the other hand, the damage is negligently caused the moral 
imperative becomes weaker and courts were more reluctant to allow recovery. That was 
how the courts began to develop the duty concept under the tort of negligence.  
 
The law of negligence, thus, obliges one to act with reasonable care and prudence. 
When one fails to so act or meet a recognized minimum standard of prudence, he would 
be said to be negligent. If his action or omission causes harm to another person, he will 
be held liable to compensate the victim for the harm sustained.
425
 It must be noted 
however that negligence law ‘takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract.’
426
 
According to Lord MACMILLAN: 
 
It concerns itself with carelessness only where there is a duty to take care and 
where failure in that duty has caused damage. In such circumstances 
carelessness assumes the legal quality of negligence and entails the 
consequences in law of negligence. The cardinal principle of liability is that the 
party complained of should owe to the party complaining a duty to take care, and 
that the party complaining should be able to prove that he has suffered damage 




Negligence, it must be emphasized, covers positive actions as well as omissions. Hence, 
one can be liable for acting negligently or negligently failing to act. There are many 
torts other than negligence but they are usually identified by the particular interest they 
seek to protect. For example, nuisance is known to protect against interference with the 
claimant’s use and enjoyment of land, while defamation protects against damage to his 
or her reputation. By contrast, negligence is not tied to a particular relationship, type of 
harm, or the protection of a particular interest. In fact “the categories of negligence are 
never closed”.
428
This however, is by no means underestimating the importance of other 
class of torts but that they are beyond the purview of this thesis.
429
 Let us now look at 
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tort of negligence and the duty concept as applied by courts in pure economic loss 
cases. 
 
3.2 THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION 
In order to prove the negligence of the defendant and therefore warrant the defendant 





Duty of care: Does the defendant owe the claimant a duty of care? 
Breach: Has the defendant breached that duty? 
Damage: Had that breach caused a legally recognized damage to the claimant? 
 
3.3 THE CONCEPT OF DUTY OF CARE  
Duty is simply defined as a legally recognized relationship between the defendant and 
the plaintiff, and due to this relationship the defendant is obligated to act with care 
towards the plaintiff.
431
 FLEMING defines duty of care as, “an obligation, recognized by 
law, to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of danger to others.”
432
  Lord 
ATKIN was very explicit from the onset that not every instance of carelessness which 
results into harm will lead to liability under tort law. Whether a duty of care exists in 
any set of circumstances is a question of law.
433
 In pure economic loss cases, in 
particular, it is a requirement that poses difficulties for the claimant. In fact courts 
themselves have found it difficult to articulate a clear test for assessment of duty of 
care.
434
The development of the duty of care can be traced to the seminal English case of 
Donoghue v. Stevenson,
435
 where Lord ATKIN propounded the first general rule for 
determining duty of care.  
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The Plaintiff, Mrs. Donoghue was purchased a ginger beer by her friend. The ginger 
beer was contained in an opaque bottle, which prevented the contents from being 
viewed clearly. After consuming some of the product, remains of a decomposed snail 
emerged from the bottle during a refill. The Plaintiff suffered from resulting nervous 
shock and gastroenteritis, which she blamed on the accident, and sought damages 
against the manufacturers.  
 
The Plaintiff could not sue the shopkeeper with whom she never had a contract because 
the drink was bought for her by a friend, and neither could she have had any remedy on 
contract against the manufacturers of the ginger beer.
436
 She therefore sued the 
manufacturers for negligence. The court then had to decide whether the defendants 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff in the absence of any contractual relationship. 
 
The House of Lords decided the matter in the affirmative with Lord ATKIN going on to 
formulate what is now commonly known as the ‘neighbor principle’ and undoubtedly 
the bedrock of the English law of tort.
437
 The main thrust of his Lordship’s dictum is 
reproduced below: 
 
The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other 
systems as a species of “culpa,” is no doubt based upon a general public 
sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or 
omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be 
treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In 
this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent 
of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbor becomes in law, you 
must not injure your neighbor; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbor? 
Receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or 
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your 
neighbor. Who, then, in law is my neighbor? The answer seems to be – persons 
who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to 
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have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to 




The significant of this case lies in the fact that it established a separate cause of action in 
negligence. It also made proximity of relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant 
and the reasonable foreseeability of injury the basis of duty. Above all, it is regarded as 
the foundation of modern negligence law upon which later developments are built. As 




Donoghue v. Stevenson . . . may be regarded as a milestone, and the well-known 
passage in Lord Atkin’s speech should I think be regarded as a statement of 
principle. It is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require 
qualification in new circumstances. But I think that the time has come when we 
can and should say that it ought to apply unless there is some justification or 




Generally, the courts have little difficulty in finding that a duty of care exists in cases 
where the damage suffered is personal or to property. In such cases the nature of the 
damage, like consumption of faulty product, demonstrates some closeness between the 
parties at some point. However, where the damage is pure economic loss, the courts 
have found this principle inappropriate for fear of inordinate liability. This reason 
prompted the courts to restrict the application of the ‘neighbor principle’ to only cases 
of physical damage. This concern was well articulated by Lord PEARCE in Hedley Byrne 
& Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd
441
 as follows: 
 
Negligence in words creates problems different from those of negligence in act. 
Words are more volatile than deeds. They travel fast and far afield. They are 
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used without being expended and take effect in combination with innumerable 





Hedley Byrne was the first case decided on grounds of pure economic loss in the context 
of negligent misstatement. The fact of the case succinctly, is that the Appellants sought 
to recover their loss after granting credit on the strength of the report given by the 
Respondent bank to their bank which turned out to be incorrect. The House of Lords 
held that a duty did exist, but the Appellants were unsuccessful because of an express 
disclaimer on the credit report which stated “in confidence and without responsibility.”  
 
The decision by the House of Lords that duty of care may exist in these circumstances 
was seen as an extension of the Donoghue principle, and may be applicable to other 
facets of economic loss as well. However, the Hedley Byrne principle was later 
interpreted to apply exclusively to negligent misstatement cases.
443
 This position was 





Apart from the special case of imposition of liability for negligently uttered false 
statements, there is no liability for unintentional negligent infliction of any form 
of economic loss, which is not itself consequential on foreseeable physical 




Since the decision of the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne the tendency has been to 
categorize the circumstances in which recovery is permissible by reference to the type 
of conduct which has occasioned the loss. Where the loss results from a negligent act or 
omission, the general view was to disallow recovery. Thus the right to recover pure 
economic loss in tort, not flowing from physical injury, does not extend beyond the 
situation where the loss is sustained through reliance on negligent misstatement as 
established in the case of Hedley Byrne.   
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Another effort to create a general test applicable to all types of harm was initiated by the 
House of Lords in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.
446
 The case was about 
structural defects in a property leased by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff sued the builders as 
well as the local authority in negligence for approving the building plans. Lord 
WILBERFORCE, in his speech, attempted to move the principles for determining duty of 
care to the next level and expounded that: 
 
Through the trilogy of cases in this House, Donoghue v Stevenson, Hedley 
Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd and Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co 
Ltd, the position has now been reached that in order to establish that a duty of 
care arises in a particular situation, it is not necessary to bring the facts of that 
situation within those of previous situations in which a duty of care has been 
held to exist. Rather the question has to be approached in two stages. First one 
has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has 
suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood 
such that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part 
may be likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie duty of 
care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmatively, it is 
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which ought to 
negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class of person to 




The above decision laid down a two-stage test for determining duty of care. First, did 
the parties satisfy the neighbor test – in other words, was the claimant someone to 
whom the defendant could reasonably be expected to foresee a risk of harm? If the 
answer was yes, a prima facie duty of care is presumed. Second, was there any policy 
consideration for excluding that presumption? If there were no policy considerations 
that stand against establishing a duty of care, then a duty would be imposed. 
 
Soon Anns decision came under criticism for its expansion of the situations in which a 
duty of care could arise, and therefore in the scope of negligence. In fact, the growth in 
liability for negligence this case provoked set all sorts of alarm bells ringing. 
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Eventually, the problems of insuring against the new types of liability, and the way in 
which tort seemed to be encroaching on areas traditionally governed by contractual 
liability, led to a rapid judicial retreat and, in a series of cases, the judiciary began 
restricting new duties of care. Lord KEITH in Yuen Kun Yeu v. Att-Gen of Hong Kong
448
 
took the bait as he rejected the Anns test and articulated the issue as follows: 
 
[T]he two-stage test formulated by Lord Wilberforce for determining the 
existence of a duty of care in negligence has been elevated to a degree of 
importance greater than it merits, and greater perhaps than its author intended . . 
. . [Their] Lordships consider that for the future it should be recognized that the 
two-stage test in Anns is not to be regarded as in all the circumstances a suitable 




The Anns principle was finally laid to rest by the House of Lords in the case of Murphy 
v. Brentwood District Council,
450
 where their Lordships invoked the 1966 Practice 
Statement
451
 and overruled Anns. The rejection of Anns case as a litmus test for duty of 
care soon paved the way for a new test set down by the same House of Lords in Caparo 
Industries Plc v. Dickman,
452
 which is now regarded as definitive measure for 
determining the duty of care. The case itself is about negligent misstatement and the 
question is whether auditors could be held liable to investors who detrimentally relied 
on their statement. The dictum of Lord Bridge is worth reproducing here: 
 
[I]n addition to the foreseeability of damage, necessary ingredients in any 
situation giving rise to a duty of care are that there should exist between the 
party owing the duty and the party to whom it is owed a relationship 
characterized by the law as one of ‘proximity’ or ‘neighborhood’ and that the 
situation should be one in which the court considers it fair, just and reasonable 
that the law should impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the 
benefit of the other. But it is implicit in the passages referred to that the concepts 
of proximity and fairness embodied in these additional ingredients are not 
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susceptible of any such precise definition as would be necessary to give them 
utility as practical tests, but amount in effect to little more than convenient labels 
to attach to the features of different specific situations which, on a detailed 
examination of all the circumstances, the law recognizes pragmatically as giving 
rise to a duty of care of a given scope. Whilst recognizing, of course, the 
importance of the underlying general principles common to the whole field of 
negligence, I think the law has now moved in the direction of attaching greater 
significance to the more traditional categorization of distinct and recognizable 
situations as guides to the existence, the scope and the limits of the varied duties 
of care which the law imposes. 
 
As seen above, the Caparo case laid down a three-stage test for determining the duty of 
care viz., foreseeability of harm, proximity of relationship and fairness, justice and 
reasonableness (policy factors). Accordingly, in addition to establishing proximity and 
foreseeability, the claimant must also establish that it is just and reasonable to impose a 
duty of care. These tests may be classified as follows, 
 
1. That harm was reasonably foreseeable to the claimant. 
2. That there was a relationship of proximity between the claimant and defendant. 
3. That under the circumstances of the case, it is fair, just and reasonable to impose 
a duty of care on the defendant. 
 
The following paragraphs will elaborate more on these three tests. 
 
3.3.1 FORESEEABILITY OF HARM 
The foreseeability test requires that the claimant must be shown to fall within the class 
of persons put at risk by the defendant’s failure to exercise due care. This rule derives 
its origins from the ‘neighbor principle’ enunciated by Lord ATKIN in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson.
453
 It requires a person in defendant’s position to reasonably foresee that the 
act or omission he was contemplating would possibly affect the claimant or someone in 
his class. This test is necessary to be able to determine whether the defendant can 
reasonably foresee the negative consequence of his want of care to others. If he can so 
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predict then he would be expected to take steps to avoid causing the harm. The rule 
serves to weed out claims that are far-fetched and so remotely removed from the 
defendant’s negligence.
454
 Practical example of this test is found in case is Langley v. 
Dray,
455
 where the claimant was a policeman who was injured in a car crash when he 
was chasing the defendant, who was driving a stolen car. The Court of Appeal held that 
the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that he was being pursued by the claimant, 
and therefore in increasing his speed he knew or should have known that the claimant 
would also drive faster and so risk injury. Hence the defendant had a duty not to create 
such risks and he was in breach of that duty.  
 
However, the most notorious elaboration of this rule is found in the judgment of 
CARDOZO J in the New York Court of Appeal case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad 
Co.
456
 The plaintiff Mrs. Palsgraf was standing on a train platform when two men ran to 
catch a train. The second man who was carrying an apparently innocuous small package 
was help aboard by the guards. The man dropped the package which happened to 
contain fireworks. The box exploded and the shock of the explosion caused scales at the 
other end of the platform many feet away to fall, striking and injuring Palsgraf. In its 
judgment the majority of the court held that the railway employees owed no duty of care 
to the plaintiff as she was not a foreseeable victim of their negligence. Cardozo J 
explained: 
 
One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing 
without more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not 
willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so many 
and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the 
harm was unintended…The victim does not sue derivatively, or by right of 
subrogation, to vindicate an interest invaded in the person of another…He sues 




It must be added that the foreseeaility requirement is not without criticism. Its detractors 
sustain that between innocent and careless injurer, the equities clearly favor the 
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 Foreseeability has also been criticized for being manipulated and serves as 
means to obscure the policy considerations that are behind the rule in the first place.
459
 
Accordingly, MULLIS & OLIPHANT sustain that in recent decisions the courts have 
adopted a better approach of distinguishing issues of legal policy from factual duty 




3.3.2 PROXIMITY OF RELATIONSHIP 
The requirement that the defendant must be in close proximity with his victim, earlier 
equated with “foreseeability”,
461
 has now assumed independent and central importance 
in the tort of negligence. Proximity literally means closeness, in terms of physical 
position. But more than closeness in time and space proximity is used as a legal term of 
art. Thus, it signifies a relationship, if any, between the defendant and the claimant or 
that the defendant is in a position to avoid harm to the claimant.
462
 For example, Lord 
ATKIN was using the word ‘neighbor’, not to describe geographical closeness, but in 
terms of those we might reasonably anticipate as in danger of being affected by our 
actions if we are negligent.
463
 DEANE J in Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman
464
 
describes what proximity entails, thus:  
         
It involves the notion of nearness or closeness and embraces physical proximity 
(in the sense of space and time) between the person or property of the plaintiff 
and the person or property of the defendant, circumstantial proximity such as an 
overriding relationship … of a professional man and his client and what may 
(perhaps loosely) be referred to as causal proximity in the sense of the closeness 
or directness of the causal connection or relationship between the particular act 
or course of conduct and the loss or injury sustained. It may reflect an 
assumption by one party of a responsibility to take care to avoid or prevent 
injury, loss or damage to the person or property of another or reliance by one 
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party upon such care being taken by the other in circumstances where the other 
party knew or ought to have known of that reliance. Both the identity and the 
relative importance of the factors which are determinative of an issue of 





Proximity, however, is far more complex and should not be regarded as having an 
immutable meaning but rather a generic name applicable to specific circumstances in 
order to determine the existence of duty in different types of cases. Consequently 
different proximity rules apply in different duty situations. For instance, it can be seen 
in that in typical negligence cases, like personal injury, proximity ipso facto adds very 
little for the determination of duty since foreseeability of harm sufficiently covers both 
of the requirements. In more problematic areas, however, “proximity imposes a more 
substantial hurdle.”
466
 This type of hurdle is more apparent in pure economic loss cases 
where the courts hold that for a defendant to be liable he must have voluntarily assumed 
a responsibility for the task at hand.  
 
This of course does not mean that the claimant and the defendant must know each other, 
but that their circumstances must warrant that the defendant could reasonably be 
expected to foresee that his action could harm the claimant. As abundantly illustrated by 




I consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded as settled that if 
someone possessing special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to 
apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such skill, a 
duty of care will arise. The fact that the service is to be given by means of or by 
the instrumentality of words can make no difference. Furthermore, if in a sphere 
in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely upon his 
judgment or his skill or upon his ability to make careful inquiry, a person takes it 
upon himself to give information or advice to, or allows his information or 
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advice to be passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will 




Under this premise, it is the assumption of responsibility that fulfills the necessary 
proximity requirement. According to WITTING,
469
 the essential function of the proximity 
test is to identify whether the defendant was appropriately placed to avoid harm to the 
plaintiff. Thus, it refers to legal rules established by judicial precedents, which varies 
according to the circumstances of a particular case, which serve to place liability where 
it rightly belongs. 
 
3.3.3 FAIRNESS, JUSTICE AND REASONABLENESS 
A duty will only be recognized by courts when it is fair, just and reasonable in the 
circumstances of the case to hold the defendant liable to the claimant. These are non-
legal considerations that may be economic, social, or ethical, which a judge may employ 
in deciding the outcome of a case. Policy factors play significant role in the law of 
negligence, particularly in relation to duty of care. Where proximity is said to be policy 
“crystallized” into a principle of law; fairness is “raw” policy. The test is whether a 
specific policy factor exists in the particular circumstances which should be used to 
deny a duty of care.  
 
This essentially involves ‘pragmatic consideration’ by the courts whether it is just, fair 
and reasonable to impose a duty of care on the defendant, having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case. In the dual tests of foreseeability and proximity, judgment is 
based on factual evaluation while here the court weighs the balance between principle 
and policy considerations. Among other factors, ordinary reason and common sense are 
considered but the case is ultimately determined by reference to judicial value. 
 
One case that demonstrate the application of policy is the case Arthur JS Hall v 
Simons,
470
 where the House of Lords was to determine whether or not to abolish 
advocates’ immunity from liability for his conduct of a case in court. Lord BROWNE-
WILKINSON reasoned as follows: 
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First . . . , given the changes in society and in the law that have taken place since 
the decision in Rondel v Worsley . . . , it is appropriate to review the public 
policy decision that advocates enjoy immunity from liability for the negligent 
conduct of a case in court. Second, that the propriety of maintaining such 
immunity depends upon the balance between, on the one hand, the normal right 
of an individual to be compensated for a legal wrong done to him and, on the 
other, the advantages which accrue to the public interest from such immunity. 
Third, that in relation to claims for immunity for an advocate in civil 
proceedings, such balance no longer shows sufficient public benefit as to justify 




Judges in determining liability for pure economic loss were influenced by extra-legal 
consideration. An approach that has been called into question in recent years, with the 
House of Lords casting doubt as to the appropriateness of using policy consideration in 
legal reasoning.
472
 There is a considerable divergence of opinion over the justifiability 
of policy consideration in judicial undertaking. One fact that is supreme however, is the 
difficulty of taking an extreme stance either way. While it will be naïve to deny policy 
consideration in determining legal questions, the application of blanket policy 
consideration regardless of legal principle will certainly leave much to the discretion of 
individual judge. I find the position enunciated by Stephen J in Caltex Oil (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v. The Dredge Willemstad
473
 to be a middle ground: 
 
Policy considerations must no doubt play a very significant part in any judicial 
definition of liability and entitlement in new areas of law, the policy 
considerations to which their Lordships paid regard in Hedley Byrne are an 
instance of just such a process and to seek to conceal those considerations may 
be undesirable. That process should, however, result in some definition of rights 
and duties, which can then be applied to the case in hand, and to subsequent 
cases, with relative certainty. To apply generalized policy considerations 
directly, instead of formulating principles from policy and applying those 
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Finally, all the three elements of reasonable foreseeability, proximity, and justice and 
fairness have to be considered in determining whether a duty of care should be said to 
exist in any particular case. How these factors come to play and their degree shall be 
seen in the following chapters of this thesis. 
 
 
4. AMERICAN VIEW AND THE ADVENT OF ‘BRIGHT LINE RULE’ 
It is instructive to point out from the onset that the American tort law is in theory not 
one, but many, as each member state may decide its own private law, including tort as it 
sees fit. In practice however, the states do not move complete independence on this or 
any tort issue,
475
 for reasons of their shared source of common law. A heritage that had 
helped to provide a confluence for American private law, as common law, continues to 
transcend state boundaries.
476
 That notwithstanding, judicial pronouncements have 
sometimes being varied across the commonwealth. In fact a fundamental factor for the 
introduction of the Restatements of Torts was to bring harmony to the judicial system.  
 
This must not however be confused with application of the stare decisis doctrine, (the 
binding effect of an earlier judgment to subsequent ones on similar facts) where judges 
“create” the law in common law jurisdictions, as represented by America. In contrast 
with the Spanish legal system and the civil law family, to which it belongs, where the 
jus commune from which Spanish law is derived contained substantive rules considered 
as complete and coherent. The work of a judge is merely reduced in principle to 
applying the law. The written law here fundamentally reigns supreme. 
 
In America the economic loss rule is generally associated with uncontrollable and 
unforeseeable floods of claim to which there may be no end.
477
 Subject to a few 
exceptions recovery for pure economic loss is strictly denied. In practice American 
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courts have developed a bright line rule very similar to the English exclusionary rule.
478
 
The bright line rule like the exclusionary rule is a judge made rule, which places 
emphasis on physical damage as prerequisite for recovery of economic loss. It is a 
clearly defined legal rule created by judicial precedents, which must be applied once 
those factual situations are met, and leaves no room for varying interpretation. Its 
opposite rule is the balancing test rule, where the courts will look at the surrounding 
circumstances of the case to determine the result. The application of this rule is 
reaffirmed in a recent class action case of In re:  Bertucci Contracting Company, 
LLC,
479
 where a vessel owned by Bertucci collided with a bridge owned by the 
Louisiana State. The damage to the bridge led to its closure to vehicles and pedestrians 
for several days. 
 
Residents of the area filed for a class action claiming damages for loss of use of their 
properties, and loss of income due to the lack of access to their homes and businesses 
during the bridge closure. The court held that the plaintiffs’ action must fail because 
they have failed prove any property damage they had sustained and that interference 
with access was not physical damage. The bright line rule applied here was a rule of the 
federal maritime law, known as Testbank rule,
480
 which specifically denies recovery to 
non‐proprietors for economic loss. 
 
A similar decision was reached in the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case of Robins Dry 
Dock v. Flint,
481
 where time-charterers sought to recover for loss of use of a chartered 
vessel while it was being detained for repairs which were necessitated in consequence 
of the defendants’ carelessness in permitting the propellers to become fouled. HOLMES J 
held that while intentional-interference to bring about a breach of contract may give rise 
to a cause of action, there could be no recovery for such loss:  
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As a general rule a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the 
tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured party was under a contract 




As seen in the above quoted dictum, the U.S. Supreme Court followed the traditional 
common law view that in a tort action there cannot be liability on the part of the 
defendant without violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff. According to common law 
courts, this duty is owed only to those who have a right in rem with respect to the 
damaged property. Therefore, those who have a right of use of such a property by virtue 
of a contractual right are excluded from the protection of tort of negligence. Thus, when 
plaintiff cannot connect his economic loss to a physical injury or damaged property to 
the acts or omissions of defendants, courts will deny recovery. In Stevenson v. East 
Ohio Gas Co. Ltd,
483
 Morgan J made it quite clear that the ruling in Robins
484
 was based 
on the same utilitarian logic which had been employed by English and Common law 
courts as quoted below: 
 
To permit recovery of damages in such cases would open the door to a mass of 
litigation which might very well overwhelm the courts so that in the long run 
while injustice might result in special cases, the ends of justice are conserved by 
laying down and enforcing the general rule as is so well stated by Mr. Justice 




Federal as well as state courts in the United States have faithfully applied the broad 
interpretation of the “bright line rule” to the great majority of pure economic loss cases. 
Only a few exceptions have been admitted. Moreover, to cap it all, the rule has been 
further incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
486
Whereas outside the 
United States, especially in Europe and Canada, the doctrine of  pure economic loss is 
well-covered as any in torts, pure economic loss “remains a backwater within the 
discourse of the American tort law.”
487
 Commentators have never agreed on how to 
classify the cases that fall within its ambit. They even disagree on what to call the 
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5. PURE ECONOMIC LOSS UNDER SPANISH LAW 
 
5.1 AN “EXTRANJERO” CONCEPT 
The Spanish legal situation paints a different picture, unlike in the United States where 
the doctrine merely begs for merited recognition, Spanish tort law is neither familiar 
with a separate category of pure economic loss, nor does the concept itself appear in any 
Spanish legal scholarship dealing with tort law.
490
 Only very recently has it appeared in 
Spanish legal discourse, borrowed from the international debates, to refer to some very 
specific problems.
491
 Hence in Spanish law, liability for pure economic loss is not a 
problem. The Spanish Civil Code, a system of personal responsibility based on the 
principle of fault, is delicately managed by courts by shifting around the arteries of 
causation and injury, focusing on the wrongful act rather than the nature and extent of 
the plaintiff’s right.
492
 Therefore, it can be safely asserted that classification of rights in 
terms of their importance to determine their recoverability prevalent in common law 
countries is ipso facto non-existent under Spanish law. 
 
The tenor of section 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code (CC) which provides that “the 
person who by action or omission causes damage to another by fault or negligence is 
obliged to repair the damage caused”, is a general clause whose wording allows the 
assumption of liability for any act that causes any kind of damage and does not limit the 
scope of rights and interests it seeks to protect.
493
 In fact, Spanish law, in principle, 
compensates all legitimate interests with no further distinction. Any injury, physical, 
non-physical or economic is prima facie recoverable under this system. 
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This position however is by no means a carte blanche for all shades of pure economic 
loss. Hence, under this system as well, the debate over the extent and limitation of 
liability is ever present. Like their common law counterparts, Spanish courts have had 
the necessity to limit liability to its proximate consequences and thereby excluding the 
damages that are remote.
494
 As rightly observed by DIEZ-PICAZO as follows: 
 
Se plantea el problema de fijar límites oportunos a la responsabilidad, el 
principal de los cuales es el de la selección de las consecuencias dañosas, cuya 





In other words, Spanish courts have devised a method of keeping the floodgate shut as 
well.
496
 They usually employ causation elements to sort out recoverable from non-
recoverable cases, and to restrict liability to a reasonable limit. This invariably takes the 
form of proof, where the damage suffered must be established to be certain and directly 
linked to the action or omission of the defendant. The elements Spanish courts use merit 
brief discussion below. 
 
5.2 UNLAWFULNESS (ANTIJURÍCIDAD) 
This is not a requirement as an element of proof under Section 1902 CC. According to 
MARTIN-CASALS & JORDI RIBOT, it was likely borrowed from Spanish criminal 
jurisprudence and legal scholarship.
497
 Although its exact application is hard to 
ascertain, courts usually make reference to unlawfulness as a breach of duty not to harm 
as enshrined under section 1902 CC. OLIVA BLÁZQUEZ is of similar opinion, the learned 
author traced unlawfulness requirement back to traditional Spanish doctrine that relates 
civil liability to an unlawful or illegal act, and its compensation is considered as a sort 
of reproach to breach of the law.
498
 It follows as well that, this has been the position of 
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the Spanish Supreme Court in some notable cases, like the Supreme Court case of 
October 6 2006. In this case the court held that for a conduct to be liable for 
compensation it must be unlawful. A similar opinion was reached in the locus classicus 
of March 17, 1981, where the court reasoned as follows: 
 
[A]anque nuestro Código Civil, siguiendo al francés (y a diferencia del 
austríaco, el alemán, el suizo, el italiano y el portugués), no menciona 
expresamente la nota de antijuridicidad en su artículo 1902, no cabe duda que 
debe verse la misma no sólo en la actuación ilícita caracterizada por la falta de 
diligencia contraria a una disposición legal, sino también en consecuencias de 





According to ROCA TRÍAS, unlawfulness referred to in Spanish tort law and reflected 
under article 1902 CC does not need to proceed from an illegal act, strictu sensu, but 
must be understood in the context of alterum non laedere, the general norm in tort law 
that prevents harm.
500
 This argument found judicial support in the Supreme Court case 
of February 24, 1993 as follows: 
 
[D]icho tipo de responsabilidad, que establece el artículo 1902 del Código Civil, 
viene condicionada por la exigencia de que el acto dañoso sea antijurídico por 
vulneración de la norma, aún la más genérica ("alterum non laedere"), protectora 
del bien agraviado, y culpable, por omisión de la diligencia exigible, que 
comprende no sólo las prevenciones y cuidados reglamentarios, sino todos los 




However, a good part of Spanish legal scholars do not consider unlawfulness as a 
necessary requirement for the proof of liability. In this sense, DIEZ-PICAZO noted that 
unlike the Italian and Portuguese Civil Codes that predicate tort liability on illicit act, a 
plethora of Spanish judicial pronouncements seems to indicate that tort liability does 
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emanate from acts that are completely legal or in the exercise of one’s legal right.
502
The 
learned author argued further that the continued allusion to alterum non laedere under 
Spanish law only serves to create more confusion on the doctrine of antijuricidad. His 
reflections are reproduced below: 
 
La alusión, tanta veces repetida, al brocardo o aforismo alterum non laedere, 
resulta enormemente perniciosa e incrementa la confusión. En su origen cuando 
formaba parte del tria iuris praecepta, de ULPIANO, era poco más que un 
precepto moral, es decir, un principio generalísimo, absolutamente necesitado de 
concreción o concretización. En términos estrictamente jurídicos, hay que 
proceder a esta concreción del non-laedere que es un concepto de daño explícito, 
a menos que se incurra tajantemente en la anfibología que poco más o menos 





In a similar vein, Professor PANTALEÓN PRIETO argued that unlawfulness is an 
unnecessary addendum to the explicit provision of section 1902 of the Spanish Civil 
Code. PANTALEÓN PRIETO noted “muchas veces se generan daños sin que exista una 
norma prohibitiva que los sancione; que algunas veces se lesionan bienes que no 
constituyen auténticos derechos subjetivos y que otros planteamientos adolecen de una 
absoluta vaguedad.”
504
He argues further that the general liability clause enshrined under 
section 1902 sufficiently covers all torts without the necessity of alterum non laedere. 
Therefore tort liability in Spain is compensated not because of its unlawfulness but for 
the damage suffered by the claimant. As sustained by PANTALEÓN as follows:  
 
La inexistencia de conexión funcional entre las normas sobre responsabilidad 
extracontractual y las normas penales impide considerar como elemento del 
supuesto de hecho de las primeras la antijuricidad basada en el desvalor de la 
conducta. Y la ausencia de dicha conexión entre las normas sobre 
responsabilidad extracontractual y las normas de atribución impide lo propio 
para la antijuricidad basada en el desvalor del resultado, siendo evidente que no 
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hay una norma que prohíba de manera absoluta dañar a otro. Por tanto, debe 
rechazarse que el supuesto de hecho de las normas sobre responsabilidad civil 




Accordingly, injury is remedied not for being an unlawful act but as a consequence of 
fault or damage caused by the tortfeasor, although not illegal per se.  
 
5.3 FAULT (CULPA) 
This is the reason why damage or injury is compensated under Spanish tort law. In the 
civil law legal tradition, as in common law, the existence of injury alone does not 
warrant a recovery unless such is demonstrated to have occurred as result of the 
tortfeasor’s fault or negligence. This, according to DIEZ-PICAZO, requires the proof of 
fault or negligence in the action or omission that produces the damage.
506
 This, in 
essence, signifies establishing a causal link between the action or omission and the 
personality of the tortfeasor. Even as such, the court would still have to evaluate the 
circumstances of the case to determine not only the fact that the defendant has caused 
the damage but whether or not to hold the defendant legally responsible for the damage.  
 
DIEZ-PICAZO argued further that there is an implicit reproach in this assessment,
507
 
where the defendant is held responsible for not doing enough to avoid the damage or 
otherwise the damage would not have happened. The application of fault under Spanish 
law is more or less like that of foreseeability under the American common law. It 
amounts to acting in a negligent or improvident way.
508
The development of culpa is 
amply illustrated in Spanish Supreme Court case, STS of June 10 2003, where it was 
held as follows: 
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La concepción clásica de la culpa se apoya invariablemente como elemento 
indispensable en la omisión de la diligencia exigible al agente. La posición 
moderna, en  cambio, caracteriza la culpa por notas distintas de esa falta de 
diligencia y llega a hablar de una culpa social o culpa sin culpabilidad. El 
sentido clásico de la culpa civil parte de identificarla con negligencia, concepto 
que se opone al de diligencia; basado todo ello en un criterio subjetivo. La culpa 
es desviación de un modelo ideal de conducta: modelo representado, una veces 
por la “fides” o “bona fides”, y otra por la “diligentia” de un “pater familias” 
cuidadoso.  
 
En la culpa el elemento intelectual del dolo (previsión efectiva) queda sustituida 
por el de “previsibilidad”, o sea, la posibilidad de prever, y el elemento volitivo 
queda reemplazado por una conducta negligente: no se ha creído efectivamente 
el efecto, pero se ha debido mostrar mayor diligencia para evitarlo. 
 
La previsibilidad del resultado es el presupuesto lógico y psicológico de la 
evitabilidad del mismo. La diligencia exigible ha de determinarse en principio 
según la clase de actividad de que se trate y de la que puede y debe esperarse de 





It envisages the defendant’s ability to predict the outcome and consequences of his 
action or omission. Where he does not take steps to avoid the conduct called into 
question, he is bound to compensate the plaintiff. Where on the contrary, the damage is 
unpredictable to the defendant such would be a motive for his exoneration.
510
 As 
observed by DIEZ-PICAZO as follows: 
 
En materia de responsabilidad por daños, especialmente cuando se trata de 
responsabilidad por culpa, sólo se responde de aquéllos que hubieran podido 
debido preverse. De este modo, la previsibilidad es una condición de la 
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 STS de 10 de junio 2003 (RJ 2003/6008). 
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 Article 1105 of the Spanish Civil Code is clear that there cannot be liability for unforeseeable or 









This is by no means construed as a duty requirement as in common law. Nonetheless, 
OLMO GARCÍA concluded that the same result might be reached through the application 




In determining the conduct of the defendant the courts apply the test enshrined under 
article 1104 thus: “La culpa o negligencia del deudor consiste en la omisión de aquella 
diligencia que exija la naturaleza de la obligación y corresponda a las circunstancias de 
las personas, del tiempo y del lugar. Cuando la obligación no exprese la diligencia que 
ha de prestarse en su cumplimiento, se exigirá la que corresponda a un buen padre de 
familia.” This article has been duly interpreted by the court as follows: 
 
La medida de la diligencia exigible es variable para cada caso; según el artículo 
1104 del Código Civil, dependerá de la naturaleza de la obligación y ha de 
corresponder a las circunstancias de las personas, del tiempo y del lugar. Según 
el mismo artículo que cuando la obligación no exprese la diligencia que ha de 
prestarse en su cumplimiento, se exigirá la que correspondería a un buen padre 
de familia. Es, pues, una medida que atiende a un criterio objetivo y abstracto. 
Exigible según las circunstancias es la diligencia que dentro de la vida social 
puede ser exigida en la situación concreta a personas razonables y sensatas 
correspondientes al sector del tráfico o de la vida social cualificadas por la clase 
de actividad a enjuiciar. Según este criterio objetivo, ha de resolverse la cuestión 
de si el agente ha obrado con el cuidado, atención o perseverancia exigibles, con 
la reflexión necesaria y el sacrificio de tiempo precisos. Al respecto no es pues 
decisiva la individualidad del agente, sino las circunstancias que determinarán la 
medida necesaria de diligencia y cautela. Apunta también a un criterio de 
valoración de la culpa civil la facultad de moderación de la responsabilidad que 
procede de diligencia, concedida a los Tribunales según los casos por el artículo 
1103 del Código Civil. Pero también ha de tenerse en cuenta un aspecto 
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In another case, the Spanish Supreme Court cited with approval the Principles of 
European Tort Law, as it adopts the reasonable man test encapsulated therein. The 
relevant part of the judgment reads: 
 
[E]n los trabajos preparatorios de los “Principios de Derecho europeo de la 
responsabilidad civil”, actualmente en curso, se define el “Estándar de conducta 
exigible” como “el de una persona razonable que se halle en las mismas 
circunstancias, y depende, en particular, de la naturaleza y el valor del interés 
protegido de que se trate, de la peligrosidad de la actividad, de la pericia exigible 
a la persona que la lleva a cabo, de la previsibilidad del daño, de la relación de 
proximidad o de especial confianza entre las personas implicadas, así como de la 
disponibilidad y del coste de las medidas de precaución y de los métodos 




5.4 CERTAINTY AND DIRECTNESS 
Under the Spanish law, a plaintiff in an action for damages in tort must satisfy a high 
standard of proof that requires certainty as well as directness of damage.
515
 In other   
words, there cannot be recovery in the absence of a real and existing damage. It was 
held in the judgment STS of April 9 1996 (RJ 1996/4182) that for a damage to be 
recoverable it must be shown to be existing at the time of the commencement of the 
legal action. In this sense, OLIVA BLÀQUEZ argues that “simple logic dictates that an 
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action for recovery of damages should only prosper on the proof of the existence of 
such damage.”
516
This view concurs with the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court 
STS of February 21, 2003 (RJ 2003/2135) where the court concluded that: 
                    
Dice la sentencia de 31 de Enero de 2002, siguiendo la doctrina constitucional 
(S. de 17-7-1995), que la carga de la prueba corresponde al reclamante del daño 
cuando le resulta disponible la misma. [...] Al faltar tal presupuesto necesario no 




A similar conclusion was reached in the case STS February 10, 2009 (J2009/50847), 
where an HIV patient initiated this action against the hospital authorities for failure to 
inform her of the condition earlier. Her claim was refused by the court for her inability 
proof the damage she suffered as a result. The court concluded thus, “en el proceso (…), 
siquiera sea de forma indiciaria, cuáles son los perjuicios concretos, singulares, 
tangibles (…) que le ha causado la tardanza en la toma de conocimiento de la tenencia 
del virus del SIDA”. The damage must also be present not hypothetical, as held in STS 
of July 20, 2009 (RJ 2009\3161) that “gastos de fisioterapeuta, clases de natación [y 
otros], teniendo en cuenta que se trata de unos daños, perjuicios y gastos futuros 
hipotéticos, que por tal circunstancia no pueden ser objeto de una condena de futuro”. 
 
The application of certainty in Spanish law is more apparent in the area of causation. 
Spanish courts requirement in causation is very strict and must be established to the 
level of certainty. Although, it has been held that certainty of causal link need not be 
always absolute,
518
 it should however be reasonably certain.
519
 This is demonstrated in 
the case STS of February 8 2000 (RJ 2000/1235), where the court reiterated that “in the 
sphere of causal relationship there is no room for deductions, guesswork or 
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probabilities, only evidential certainty is sufficient.” Thus, the standard of proof based 





These two requirements originally associated with the burden of proof in contract are 
perhaps the Spanish law version of reasonability and fairness tests. It creates a margin 
for maneuver where courts can weigh the veracity of individual cases to choose which 
merit recovery and which not. The application of these elements will lead to similar 
result like of those systems where rights are classified as protected and non-protected, 
although it does not relate to property damage in the American sense. 
 
 
6. TAXONOMY OF STANDARD ECONOMIC LOSS CASES 
Legal scholars have differed on how to classify cases of pure economic loss, especially, 
cases of unintentional harm. As such, there has been a number of different       
taxonomy of economic loss cases by different authors. One example is the taxonomy by 
BUSSANI et al. that came up with four groups: ricochet loss, transferred loss, closures of 
public service and infrastructures, and reliance upon flawed information or professional 
services.
521
 HERBERT BERNSTEIN, on the other hand, found only three groups: 
intellectual services, defective products, and interference with use of resources.
522
 This 
thesis will device a taxonomy based on the classifications by both BUSSANI and ANITA 
BERNSTEIN,
523
 albeit, with some important modifications to describe the economic loss 
cases.  
 
6.1  CONTRACT-LIKE RELATIONS   
This type of economic loss, also referred to as relational loss, arises where a physical 
injury to the person or property of a tortfeasor leads to a financial loss incurred by the 
plaintiff. Thus, the direct victim suffers physical damage to his property, while the 
plaintiff sustains financial loss as a secondary victim. In these kind cases there is a 
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condition precedent to recovery which requires that the plaintiff’s loss must stem from 
physical injury to his person or to property of which he was the owner or was in 
possession at the time the damage was suffered. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to 
show that he had contractual rights and obligations in respect of the damaged property 
(meaning he was not the owner or in possession) and that he had suffered financially as 
a result. The case of Spartan Steel & Alloy Ltd v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd,
524
 
clearly demonstrates the operation of this requirement to bar recovery of pure economic 
loss.  
 
In this case, the defendant contractors had negligently caused a power failure; as a result 
the plaintiff had suffered loss when power supply to his electric furnace was interrupted. 
The loss suffered was in respect of material which had been in the furnace at the time 
and which had solidified during the power cut. The plaintiff also suffered loss due to the 
processing time lost during this period. The court held that the plaintiff could claim the 
profits which he could have made by selling the final product had the material not been 
damaged by the interruption to the process. This was loss which was causally linked to 
physical damage to the plaintiff’s own property. However, the loss of profits due to the 
failure to process material during the power cut did not stem from any damage to the 
plaintiff’s property. It was true that the defendant’s negligence had caused damage to 
the electric cable which then led to the interruption in power supply but the cable was 
not the property of the plaintiff. The loss of profits under the second category was 
therefore pure economic loss. 
 
Another example in this category of pure economic loss is where the plaintiff is not the 
direct victim of physical injury or damage. “Here, C causes physical damage to B’s 
property or person, but a contract between A and B (or the law itself) transfers a loss that 
would ordinarily be B’s onto A,” BUSSANI et al. elucidate.
525
 These are mostly contracts 
that separate property rights from use or risk bearing, like leases, sales, insurance 
agreements and other contracts. These cases present a clear illustration of how the 
plaintiff can suffer an injury in absence of proprietary right or human body due to 
defendant’s negligence. As is typical of bright line rule, American courts out rightly 
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deny compensation for this line of cases.
526
 Courts are cognizant of the fact that a star 
athlete may be injured by some negligence from a torfeasor that could lead to revenue 
loss to the team, but these issues should be better left within the realm of contract.
527
 
Consequently, case law has in a plethora of cases “rejected separate actions by 




Spanish law does not distinguish between loss arising from damage to one’s own 
property and loss arising from damage to the property of another. Once there is fault and 
damage accompanied by causal link, there is bound to be compensation. If Spanish 
courts would allow or deny any recovery, it must be on the individual merit of a case 
not by operation of the law. For instance, factory workers were allowed compensation 
for damage to their work place which led to their temporary dismissal.
529
 However, 
where destruction of rented premises led to the determination of a lease recovery was 
denied by the Spanish Supreme Court for absence of causation.
530
 There are no legal 
provisions regarding claim by a creditor for death or injury of a debtor caused by the 
defendant but it seems, taking cue from Italian law Spanish courts are disposed to award 




In fact Spanish courts have at many occasions considered transferred loss cases in ways 
other than contractual, especially the state claims for injury sustained by public servants 
or law enforcement agents in their course of duty. In one case where an officer was 
injured as a result of the tortfeasor defendant’s fault compensation was denied, the court 
argued that the state has failed to prove any additional expense incurred in filling the 
post vacated by the victim.
532
 In the same vain a claim by a company to recover for the 
continued payment of salary to an injured worker for traffic accident was also rejected. 
It was held that there was no link between the accident and the company’s workers’ 
compensation scheme.
533
 These decisions were however criticized for not being in line 
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with Spanish general doctrine of liability.
534
 Please note that pay continuation statutes 
are virtually non-existent in America. 
 
6.2 PRODUCT DEFECTS AS ECONOMIC LOSS 
The rule against recovery of pure economic loss extends to pure economic loss suffered 
as a result of defects in goods supplied. As noted earlier, the notion of pure economic 
loss by design or default has escaped the attention of American scholars. The area of 
product liability marks an exception to this generalization. It involves claims by product 
owners against sellers for defects that lead to pure economic loss. This ranges from cost 
of repair to replacement and also lost of profits between the time of report and repair or 
replacement.
535
 It is in this context that American courts have become familiar with the 
pure economic loss rule.  
 
In the wake of the industrial development in the early nineteenth century, American 
courts needed an answer to numerous suits under tort of negligence brought by product 
owners against suppliers. The courts responded by creating strict liability rule that 
allows product owners to recover damages for physical harm suffered. But the courts 
have distinguished between damage to the “defective product” itself and damage to 
“other property”, the former is not compensated.
536
 Thus when the defendant supplies 
defective goods and these defects lead to physical injury or damage to other property of 
the plaintiff, there is no problem with the recovery.  
 
Having consolidated strict liability for product defects as a course of action under 
American tort law,
537
 product owners began to invoke the strict liability rule in claims 
for pure economic loss in defective products not necessarily brought about by physical 
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harm. This line of argument was brought to test in the leading case of Santor v. A & M 
Kargheusian, Inc.,
538
 where the New Jersey Supreme Court answered in the affirmative 
that pure economic loss is indeed recoverable in a strict liability action. The decision 
was not meant to last as a few months later the Supreme Court of California held that 




Finally, in 1986 the Supreme Court of the United States of America brought down the 
curtain on product owners in East River S.S. Co. v. Transamerica Delavan,
540
 by 
placing its seal of approval behind the no liability in tort for pure economic losses 
caused by product defects, which eventually became the majority rule
541
 in the US. In 
this case the plaintiffs, charterers of four oil supertankers, brought a strict liability 
products suit against the turbine manufacturer, seeking solely economic damages 
resulting from alleged design and manufacturing defects that caused the supertankers to 
malfunction while on the high seas. The court held that the pure economic loss doctrine 
barred tort claims in circumstances where quality of such products was at question, the 
court elaborates: 
 
But either way, since, by definition, no person or other property is damaged, the 
resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself 
occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair 
costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser 
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those related with economic loss rule. This time, after more than a quarter of a century, the Institute 
provided under Section 21, that harm to persons or property subject to tort recovery may include 
economic loss, provided they fall under categories:  
 
Harm to the plaintiff’s person;  
 
Harm to the person of another when harm to the other interferes with an interest of the plaintiff protected 
by tort law;  
 
Harm to the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.  
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Product owners having failed to extend the strict liability rule to pure economic loss 
now turned to tort and began to file actions for pure economic loss under negligence 
law.
543
 Early response to the new course of action was mixed. Some courts found reason 
in allowing recovery for pure economic loss under negligence when there was no 
remedy under strict liability rule.
544
 But other courts rejected this argument,
545
 in the 
belief that it will be untenable to allow recovery for pure economic loss under tort law 
when contract and warranty have provided a better framework to resolve those issues. 
By the end of the last century recovery for pure economic loss in negligence as well as 
in strict liability had become almost a settled law in the United States.
546
 This happened, 
of course, subject to necessary limitations applied by courts to the particular   
circumstances of the cases. Thus a claimant will be entitled to compensation for expense 




It must be noted however, that the application of the rule in America varies according to 
the state concerned. The minority rule
548
 essentially rejects the application of the pure 
economic loss doctrine. It allows a plaintiff to recover in tort for pure economic loss 
without limitations. The minority view is followed loosely by only a handful of states 
like New Jersey and California. The rest of the country follows either the majority rule 
or the intermediate rule. The intermediate rule is similar to the majority rule, except that 
it allows for tort recoveries under certain limited circumstances, attempting to 
differentiate between the disappointed consumer and the endangered consumer. Thus a 
consumer disappointed with the performance of a product and consumer whose life or 
                                                                                                                                                           
                             
 
The Institute goes on to justify the rationale behind the exception under Comment A to Section 21 as 
below:  
 
First, products liability law lies at the boundary between tort and contract. Some categories of 
loss, including those often referred to as ‘pure economic loss’ are more appropriately assigned to 
contract law and the remedies set forth in Articles 2, and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
When a code governs a claim, its 4 provisions regarding such issues as statute of limitation, 
privity, notice of claim, and disclaimer ordinarily govern the litigation. Second, some forms of 
economic loss have traditionally been excluded from the realm of tort law even when the 
plaintiff has no contractual remedy for a claim. Id. 
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limb is endangered. One example is the sudden and calamitous failure of a product or 
product failures which prove dangerous to the consumer.
549
 The intermediate rule will 
allow recovery in such situations as an exception to the pure economic loss rule, while 
the majority rule will not.  
 
In Spain, product liability as a distinct area of law became known after the passage of 
the Consumer Protection Act of 1984.
550
  Until the coming into force of this Act, what 
may be considered as product liability disputes are dealt with under the general 
principles of contract and tort liability found under the Spanish Civil Code. Spanish    
courts, generally, apply rules of liability found in article 1101 CC, and more 
specifically, the rules governing latent product defects enshrined under article 1486 CC, 
and later the provisions under articles 1902 and 1903.4, dealing with tort liability.
551
 All 
consumer protection laws in Spain, like the Consumer Protection Act of 1984, Product 
Liability Act of 1994 as well as the current law in force, General Consumer Act of 





Claimants for damages for product defects in Spain have used the general liability 
provisions obtainable under the Civil Code with some relative successes. As evidenced 
by the Supreme Court case STS of February 12, 1931 [Col. Leg. Num. 124], where a 
buyer of second hand car with latent steering column defect was allowed to rescind the 
contract under article 1486 CC. Even though, article 1257 CC restricts contract to the 
privity of parties and their heirs, claimants were still able to enforce contracts against 
third party manufacturers. This was the case, for instance, in STS of December 29, 1978 
[Col. Leg. Num. 447], where the Spanish Supreme Court indirectly applying the French 
doctrine of action directe, side-stepped the provision of article 1257 in favor of article 
1101, and held the manufacturer liable for supplying a dangerous product to the seller 
who was in privity with the claimant.
553
 However, it is worthy of note that the Supreme 
Court later overruled this decision in the case STS of November 14, 1984, where the 
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Apart from the above examples, tortuous liability for defective product did not become 
entrenched into Spanish law until when the courts began to apply the provisions of the 
Consumer Protection Act of 1984.
555
 The first case to apply this law was STS of May 
29, 1993. In this case the claimant suffered burns as a result of explosion and ignition of 
a bottle of benzene he used to clean clothes. The Spanish Supreme Court applying this 
Act came to the right conclusion and found the manufacturer liable, albeit wrongly 




Like its American counterpart, Spanish law views the arena provided by contract law as 
best for risk distribution between two contracting parties. Therefore guarantee, 
exclusion clauses and limitation are best let be established by parties where necessary, 
and where per chance they neglect to do so, the relevant regulation on the material 
prevails. In this case, the applicable law is Article 9 of EC Directive 85/374. Here article 
142
557
 of the Spanish Consumer law as amended. In practice, the law operates almost 
the same way like the situation under American law. In fact Spanish legal writers and 
commentators have drawn inferences on the American system on several occasions.
558
 
As important as these consumer protection Acts are, they only supplement the existing 
contract and tort remedies already in existence under the Spanish law. 
 
6.3 WRONGFUL DEATH 
This category includes cases of death or injury to one person that brought about 
economic loss to his family. In a wrongful death action in America, a relative of a 
person who died as a result of negligent conduct has two fronts for recovery of pure 
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economic loss. First under survival statute, second an action for wrongful death.
559
 The 
survival statute allows the representative of a dead plaintiff to proceed with litigation on 
behalf of the deceased person, as if she had not died. Wrongful death, by contrast, sites 
the loss in heirs rather than the deceased person herself. Courts measure the value of the 
lost life in two ways. First, they can count the amount of support that the deceased’s 
dependents would have expected to receive but for the wrongful death. Second, they can 
estimate the amount of savings the deceased would have accumulated but for the 
wrongful death, and presume that she would have left her estate to these family 
members. A spouse can also maintain a cause of action for an injury to her husband,
560
 
likewise a mother for injury to her children.
561
  
       
Spanish courts on the other hand recognize dependents’ rights in cases of wrongful 
death without any a priori restriction of the class of relatives entitled to recover. This is 
encapsulated in the civil liability law which has a very wide coverage.
562
 Accordingly, 
Spanish courts, would award compensation both for pecuniary loss indirectly sustained 
and non-pecuniary loss for the pain and suffering of the victim’s relatives. The latter is 
measured according to the proximity of kinship. Judicial pronouncements in this 
category show the magnanimity of the Spanish courts as below indicated:  
 
Parents but not heirs to the victim were awarded a non-pecuniary compensation for their 
pain and suffering for the loss of a son,
563
 court awarded compensation to the widow 
and son of a victim of work accident.
564
 Other persons in this category also include, the 
fiancée of the deceased,
565
 the step son,
566
the girl who lived with the deceased and took 
care of her,
567
 old people’s home where the deceased was living
568
 and the religious 
community the deceased belonged to.
569
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6.4 IMPEDIMENTS TO BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
This category of pure economic loss has nothing to do with contract. It usually relates to 
harms sustained as a result of accidents which affect another’s business expectations. In 
this class of cases, the defendant negligently causes damage to a source of some 
resource like water, heating, electric power, air conditioning and the like that is 
necessary for the plaintiff’s business operations. The wrongful physical act here takes 
place in the property not owned by the plaintiff but only suffers the pure economic loss 
thereof. American courts generally do not admit this class of claim. It is in relation to 
the negligent interference type cases that the twin fears of indeterminate liability and 
unending litigation are at their most potent. In such cases the only factor which forms 
any connecting link between the plaintiff and the defendant is the accident itself and it is 
clear that the destruction or impairment of a road, bridge or public utility may have the 
effect of rendering the performance of many contracts either more onerous or 
impossible. One important case that exemplifies this class of cases is People Express 
Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
570
 where defendant’s negligence caused a fire 
in a railroad yard which led the authorities to evacuate the plaintiff’s airport terminal 
close by for fear of explosion from the fire. As a result the plaintiff suffered revenue 
loss for booking cancellations. The New Jersey Supreme Court out rightly rejected the 




Whereas tort of negligence is the predominant cause of action for most plaintiffs in 
economic loss cases, some litigants prefer actions in public nuisance. Under public 
nuisance law, plaintiffs who could demonstrate to have suffered a different kind of 
injury from that of the general public is bound to succeed.
572
 Successful plaintiffs under 
this category, in claims for negligence as well as nuisance, were fishermen whose 




Other scenarios in this class include situations where a highway or a bridge is destroyed 
or where carelessness of the defendants leads authority to close an area where the 
plaintiff has his business. For example where a bridge is negligently damaged, resulting 
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in loss of business to commercial establishments on an island which is temporarily cut 




Spanish courts have considered cases on similar fact situations albeit, with mix results. 
For example, SAP ORENSE 16. 6. 1994 sentenced the city council of CARBALLINO to 
compensate the plaintiff for loss of earnings due to a power cut, which interrupted his 
business.
575
 The problem was caused by another stall owner who placed his stall on top 
of the grille of the power transformer. The council was held liable for culpa in vigilando 
under article 1903 CC.
576
 Then factory workers were allowed compensation for damage 




6.5 FLAWED SERVICES 
Under this category falls a professional and other service provider on whose services, 
skill and expertise the victim of pure economic loss places reliance. This scenario is 




In those cases there was no dichotomy between negligence in act and in word, 
nor between physical and economic loss. The basis underlying them is that if 
persons holding themselves out in a calling or situation or profession take on a 
task within that calling or situation or profession, they have a duty of skill and 
care. In terms of proximity one might say that they are in particularly close 
proximity to those who, as they know, are relying on their skill and care 




Ordinarily, disappointed clients whose economic loss is attributable to the service 
rendered, may have a cause of action in contract “and, somewhat more controversially, 
deviations from a professional standard of care that cause losses to certain types of non 
clients.”
580
 For example, where the plaintiff was unable to inherit an estate by the 
negligence of a notary public who had failed to have a will properly attested to by the 
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required witnesses, the court held the attorney liable for financial loss even without 
privity.
581
 Accountants, auditors, and other professional reviewers of financial 
conditions who do not fulfill relevant standards of care in their examination have been 
held liable to investors who relied on the accuracy of their reports as a condition of 
investment. Courts in this kind of situation are more liberal in granting remedies for 
causation of pure economic loss. 
 
The Spanish situation is captured under article 26.2 of the Audit Law, where it stated 
that civil liability of auditors shall be proportionate to the loss they have caused to their 
client or third parties.
582
 This provision should not be taken in isolation of judicial 
requirement of causation which in this instance is reliance. As such, notaries public will, 
in addition, to their contractual responsibility be also liable to third parties in tort. The 
starting point is Article 705 (CC) which reads as follows:  
 
When an open will has been declared null on account of the fact that the 
formalities that are required in the case have not been followed, the notary that 
has authorized it shall be liable for the damage resulting thereof, if the 





Here a victim of avoided will would be entitled to recover the difference between what 
he inherited intestate and what is in the aborted will. In a case where the notary failed to 






7. JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTION OF PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 
Contrary to orthodox view pure economic loss is recoverable as seen in cases of 
consequential loss and negligent services, it is only in cases of legitimate concern for 
disproportionate liability that courts on grounds of reasonability and common sense 
disallow compensation. Arguments abound for the rationale of no recovery rule and are 
                                                     
581
 The leading case here is Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal.1958). 
582
 Art. 11. 1 Ley 19/1988, de Julio, de Auditoría de Cuentas.  
583
 For other types of scenarios, please see Articles 712 and 715 CC. 
584
 STS de 2 de diciembre de 1998 (RJ 1998/ 9156). 
155 
 
so common place that not repeating them would be of any disservice.
585
 The floodgates 
rationale nonetheless stands apart, especially, in cases of auditor liability and therefore 
merits some attention. Its bone of contention is built on the premise that allowing 
recovery in pure economic loss would place a great burden on the defendant and 
overwhelm the enterprise. PROSSER
586
 observed that “it is the business of the law to 
remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of “floodgate claims”, and it is 
pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon 
the ground that it will give the courts too much work to do”. On the consequential loss, 
BUSSANI & PALMER
587
 argue that “the central assertion that physical damage is different 
from financial damage because it is more contained and judicially manageable seems 
increasingly difficult to understand in view of today’s mass torts…..” Left to them any 
‘intransigent argument’ that seeks to deny recovery to the victims of pure economic loss 




The above stance sound appealing. Indeed pure economic loss suffered in isolation is 
sometimes afforded no particular significance whereas pure economic loss suffered in 
conjunction with physical damage is virtually always a routine element of recoverable 
harm. Nonetheless, it is my thesis that the distinction between kinds of pure economic 
loss and physical loss is essentially a technical one. The tests of foreseeability, 
proximity and policy had but reveal an enduring concern about the limits of liability in 
tort that continues to present day. While none is satisfactory and for that matter, the 
combination of all, to a certain extent, they have been useful to administratively manage 
a balance between the desire to compensate the innocent plaintiff and the reluctance to 
subject the inadvertent defendant to an inordinate liability. These tests are not fool-proof 
however, as observed by Lord DENNING: 
 
Sometimes I say: “There was no duty”. In others I say, “The damage was too 
remote”. So much so that I think the time has come to discard those tests which 
have proved so elusive. It seems to me better to consider the particular 
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relationship in hand, and see whether or not as a matter of policy, pure economic 




It is very obvious that foreseeability test cannot hold true in the landmark case of 
Ultramares,
590
 where auditors were held not liable to investors, as auditors are well 
aware that class like those of investors would rely on their report for judgment. It is 
contended that this is sheer judicial policy to limit liability. All the tests are just the 
means to that end. The court’s view in the case of Biakanja v. Irving
591
 better 
illuminates this point: 
 
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to 
a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of 
various factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of 
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame 
attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm. 
 
In fact there are cases of pure economic loss that have received different treatment. Like 
the example of J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
592
 where the plaintiff operated a restaurant at 
the Sonoma County Airport in facilities rented from the county. The defendant, a 
building contractor, entered into an agreement with the county to renovate the air 
conditioning and heating system in the restaurant and to install insulation. Because of 
the defendant’s delays in construction, the plaintiff suffered an unanticipated loss of 
profits for which he brought suit against the builder. The court dismissed the 
defendant’s objection that the case involved exclusively pure economic loss, and held 
that the plaintiff stated a claim for damages in tort for the lost profits.  
 
It is also true that over the course of a century the courts have come to attach particular 
significance to the problem of personal injury that is now inconsistent with prospect of a 
widespread injury one single act of negligence can cause, like plane crash. These are 
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however, situations of common harm that cannot be equated with chain of commercial 
losses triggered by closure of a main road. Consider the view of CARDOZO J in H.R. 




The plaintiff would have us hold that the defendant, when once it entered upon 
the performance of its contract with the city, was brought into such a relation 
with everyone who might potentially be benefited through the supply of water at 
the hydrants as to give to negligent performance, without reasonable notice of a 
refusal to continue, the quality of a tort… We are satisfied that liability would be 







The lines have not always been clearly drawn and admittedly, some may be 
indefensible. As seen above, although the courts have deliberately formulated a device 
of limiting the scope of its recovery in some areas, “economic loss remains recoverable 
in a number of other situations.”
595
 Whilst it seems, generally, the courts do not like 
encouraging claims for pure economic loss there are confusing signals that sometimes 
make it difficult to predict with any certainty whether a claim will be successful or not. 
But “the central tendency to deny liability for categories of widespread loss has 
appealed to an enduring sense of fairness” in America as well as in Spain.
596
 But, how 
wide are the courts prepared to extend the parameters of duty and of economic loss in 
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AUDITOR’S LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN 
 
1. LIABILITY UNDER CONTRACT 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Auditors’ liability is for most part based on contract with their clients, and thereafter at 
common and statutory law. When an auditor is set to work for a client, a contract of 
employment is created, usually referred to as an engagement letter. Auditors’ liability 
under a contract is governed by the terms set out by the parties themselves in the 
engagement letter. Albeit, some necessary terms may in appropriate circumstances be 
implied by law. Implied terms include inter alia, a term that a contracting party will 
exercise due skill and care in performing what he agrees to do.
597
 Inclusive in these 
terms is the requirement by the courts that parties in contract must abide by the 
“strictures of good faith and fair dealing.” This entails that “neither party shall do 
anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to 
receive the fruits of the contract.”
598
 When the auditor fails to execute the requirements 
on the engagement letter, the auditor is said to be in breach. Breach of contractual terms 
naturally comes with consequences in damages. Damages are monetary compensatory 
instruments employed by courts to bring, the injured party as nearly as possible, to the 
same position as if the contract had been performed. These “consequences can and 




However, in a breach of contract action, the plaintiff must first of all establish before the 
court that there is an existing contractual relationship between himself and the 
defendant. This contractual relationship is known in law as privity. Privity signifies that 
the parties are bound by the contract to each other and owe each other a duty to perform 
in accordance with the terms of the contract. Parties outside the contract do not have 
locus standi to sue under the contract.  
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When the plaintiff is the client for whom audit was done, it is relatively straight forward 
to determine whether the auditor is liable or not. However, when the party complaining 
is a third party who relies on an inaccurate audit report then the determination of 
liability becomes more complicated and treacherous. Common law courts had 
constantly denied remedy to ‘strangers’ both under contract law and under tort, perhaps, 
because tort as an equitable remedy must follow the law.  As symbolized by the maxim, 
“equity follows the law.” 
 
1.2 THE OVERLAP OF CONTRACT AND TORT: THE DOCTRINE OF 
PRIVITY 
It is trite law that contractual remedies under common law were originally a preserve 
solely of parties that had furnished consideration. But more often than not common law 
courts had found a veritable instrument of justice in tort law to fill the vacuum left by 
the rigid requirement of consideration in contract. Yet, there still remain some 
borderline even though the two are said to perform separate functions.
600
 Tort law 
undertakes the protection of an existing wealth or health, while future gains falls within 
the purview of contract law. As observed by WEIR, ‘contract is productive, [while] tort 
is protective’.
601
 Since physical losses are presumed to affect present wealth they are 
compensated in tort. On the contrary, when the loss is non-physical it would be denied 




It is further argued that contract looks to the future and creates expectations that the law 
seeks to protect. Tort law on the contrary creates no future obligations. Its standard of 
duty of care is not deliberately derived from the will of the parties, but imposed from 
outside by reference to societal norms. Remedies in tort are therefore not designed for 
frustrated expectancies but for a loss sustained. However, put so broadly, this clearly 
does not always hold good. Professor ATIYAH,
603
 for example, noted that damages for 
personal injuries which are typical of tort often include an important element of 
compensation for lost expectations, i.e. the expectation to earn a living in the way which 
the injuries prevented. 
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On the other hand tort and contract may overlap, in that the same wrong may 
concurrently be both a breach of contract as well as a breach of duty which constitutes a 
tort.
604
 During the course of its development, there was a time when courts viewed tort 
and contract remedies as mutually exclusive.
605
 It has been submitted that when there is 
a contract, it may be raised to negate the possibility of an action in tort. As observed by 
Lord SCARMAN in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd. v. Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd.
606
 as follows: 
 
Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage of the 
law's development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a 
contractual relationship. This is particularly so in a commercial relationship. 
Though it is possible as a matter of legal semantics to conduct an analysis of the 
rights and duties inherent in some contractual relationships including that of 
banker and customer either as a matter of contract law when the question will be 
what, if any, terms are to be implied or as a matter of tort law when the task will 
be to identify a duty arising from the proximity and character of the relationship 
between the parties, their Lordships believe it to be correct in principle and 
necessary for the avoidance of confusion in the law to adhere to the contractual 
analysis: on principle because it is a relationship in which the parties have, 
subject to a few exceptions, the right to determine their obligations to each other, 
and for the avoidance of confusion because different consequences do follow 





The above stance, notwithstanding, the courts still maintain the tendency to allow 
claimants to choose whether to sue in contract or in tort, incidentally, a similar situation 
is obtained in Spain.
608
Moreover some liabilities are inherently concurrent especially in 
the context of relationship with professionals like solicitors, accountants and doctors 
among others. But, as seen above, in third parties liability actions the doctrine of privity 
reigns supreme.  
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The doctrine of privity was first established in the 1842 English case of Winterbottom v. 
Wright.
609
 Succinctly, in this case, the plaintiff a mail coach driver on contract was 
injured when the coach collapsed. He sued the repairer of the coach who had a 
maintenance contract with the owner of the coach for negligence. The court held in 
“favor of the defendant, stating that there was no privity of contract between the 
plaintiff and defendant; therefore, no duty flowed to the plaintiff, and no liability 
existed.”
610
 The court reasoned that holding the defendant liable outside the realm of 
contract could open a Pandora’s Box of liability: 
 
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, 
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by 
the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the 
operations of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the 





In other words, the law assumes that parties in contract acquire duties and liability from 
the contract, and shields them from liability outside the contract.
612
 Therefore any 
liability for negligence is to be determined in accordance with the principles of the law 
of contract, and is only enforceable by the contracting parties. This principle was 
reinforced in the case of Seaver v Ransom
613
 as follows: 
 
The general rule, both in law and equity was that privity between a plaintiff and 
a defendant is necessary to the maintenance of an action on contract. The 
consideration must be furnished by the party to whom the promise was made. 
The contract cannot be enforced against the third party, and therefore it cannot 
be enforced by him.
614
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While it is trite that independent audit is primarily meant to provide information for the 
client on how well it is doing in its accounting functions, it also serves as an 
independent source of information from which third parties evaluate their own potential 
risks.
615
 SEPTIMUS asserted that the accountant might have no contract with these 
persons, but their decisions and conduct are influenced by his findings,
616
 and thereby 
make them the most obvious victims of a poorly conducted audit.
617
 These persons, 
according to the AICPA,
618
 apart from the client, are “credit grantors, governments, 
employers, investors, the business and financial community, and others who rely on the 





Moreover, it can be safely asserted that in today’s information economy independent 
audit is used more by the public for evaluation of a company’s financial stability than 
by company’s officers for the purposes of internal management. This fact was judicially 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Arthur Young & 
Co.
620
 in no equivocal terms. Chief Justice WARREN BURGER expounds: 
 
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s financial 
status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any 
employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant 
performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s 
creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public. This “public 
watchdog” function demands that the accountant maintains total independence 




Notwithstanding the above recognition, the question of auditor’s liability to third parties 
with no contractual privity still remains unsettled. Many persons who suffer loss from 
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auditor’s negligence may still be denied a remedy.
622
 So with no recourse under 
contract, third parties who felt that they had been misled by negligent auditing readily 
sought resort in the tort of negligence. But unfortunately for them the line of judgments 
regarding auditor liability in the United States found mere negligence insufficient to 
warrant recovery for damages from auditors for performance of their professional 
responsibilities.
623
 As forebears of common law tradition, the United States’ courts as 
well had kept liability for negligence between parties in privity.  
 
With no duty from the auditor in the absence of privity, the only recourse left for 
aggrieved third parties was litigation for fraud.
624
 But fraud on the other hand was 
difficult to prove because normally, higher degree of proof is required. Since there is no 
such thing as an accidental or negligent fraud in law, plaintiffs in a fraud claim are 
required to show evidence of intent to deceive on the part of the auditor.
625
 Thus, the 
plaintiff has to establish that the auditor actually knew the audit was in error and did not 
belief in its contents when submitting the audit report. This requirement was elucidated 
by Judge SWAN in the case of O’Connor v. Ludlam,
626
  below: 
 
Fraud may be established by showing a false representation has been made 
either knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or in reckless disregard of 
whether it be true or false... If they did have that honest belief, whether 
reasonably or unreasonably, they are not liable. If they did not have an honest 
belief in the truth, of their statements, they are liable... Further, if the audit made 
was so superficial as to be only a pretended audit and not a real audit, then the 
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Because of the greater evidentiary burden they encounter in claims brought under fraud, 
third party plaintiffs are drawn more to tort of negligence as a more viable medium to 
recover their losses. But the courts continue to cling to the mindset that negligence per 
se cannot ground an action for recovery of damages. As reiterated by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in the case of Landell v. Lybrand.
628
 The case is concerned with a suit 
brought against a certified public accounting firm by a third party that had relied on 
financial statements they certified. The plaintiff alleged that the financial statements 
were misleading and that he relied on them when making his investment. He also 
charged that the auditors were negligent in the performance of their duties and 
consequently liable for the loss he sustained. The court found for the accountants, 
stating the following: 
 
There was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendants, and 
if there is any liability from them to him, it must arise out of some breach of 
duty, for there is no averment that they made the report with intent to deceive 
him. The averment in the statement of claim is that the defendants were careless 
and negligent in making their report, but the plaintiff was a stranger to them and 
to it, and, as no duly rested upon them to him, they cannot be guilty of any 




Accordingly, the court drew a line of difference between intent to deceive, a necessary 
ingredient to sustain an action for fraud,
630
 and a breach of duty which arises out of 
contract.
631
 The court further reasoned that for the plaintiff to prevail he must show a 
relationship of privity with the auditor, such that there is duty imposed by law on the 
auditor to act with care towards him. In the absence of such a duty and without proof of 
fraud, the court concluded that mere negligence does not suffice, even if damage is 
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With time, the courts began to question the rationale behind the privity doctrine. In fact 
the courts have consistently sidestepped it in the area of negligent acts resulting into 
physical injury. One such instance was the locus classicus of Heaven v. Pender.
633
 In 
that case, the plaintiff, a painter employed by a painting contractor was injured when a 
staging erected by a dock owner collapsed. In an action for damages by the painter, the 
dock owner cited the principle of Winterbottom v Wright
634
 and contended that he owed 
no duty of care to the painter because his contract was with the ship owner not the 
painter. The Court of Appeal, in reversing the Divisional Court and allowing the appeal, 
observed in a renowned passage by BRETT, M.R. as follows: 
 
Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard 
to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once 
recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with 
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or 





In the United States the first assault on the “citadel of privity” could be traced back to 
the case of Savings Bank v. Ward.
636
 Although, the ratio decidendi of the case was 
notorious for importing the privity rule into the U.S., in the same judgment, the U.S. 
Supreme Court made exceptions to privity in “imminently dangerous” acts and in cases 
involving articles that were inherently dangerous and likely to “put human life in 
imminent danger.”
637
 This reasoning was put to practice by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in the case of Smith v. Atco Co.
638
 where the court observed: 
 
We deem that the time has come for this court to flatly declare that in a tort 
action for negligence against a manufacturer, or supplier, whether or not privity 
exists is wholly immaterial. The question of liability should be approached from 
the standpoint of the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent 
person in the shoes of the defendant manufacturer or supplier. Such an approach 
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But it was the insightful judgment of Judge CARDOZO in Macpherson v. Buick Motors 
Co.
640
 that finally opened the courthouse doors to persons claiming negligent injury as a 
separate cause of action. Although liability for negligence that results in physical injury 
to person or property soon became a settled law in the United States, the courts have 
been reluctant to extend this liability to cases of pure economic loss. 
 
 
1.3 LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
1.3.1 AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE SHIFT AWAY 
FROM PRIVITY 
The history of accountant liability in the United States is characterized by two important 
periods. The first period, which coincided with the build up to the industrial revolution 
and extended through the 1950s, liability restriction by courts made it almost impossible 
for third parties to recover their loss for negligently performed audit. This is not 
surprising because liability restrictive rule was adopted as a general policy. At the onset 
of the industrial revolution, the general concern was that “infant” businesses and 
manufacturers should not be overburdened with liability.
641
 To protect these businesses 
and manufacturers, privity was devised by the courts to limit their liability to those who 
contracted them. The courts as a matter of policy, favored industrial growth, and the 
possibility that manufacturers might be forced into bankruptcy outweighed any moral 
concern to compensate every injured consumer.
642
 As Friedman argues, “if railroads and 
enterprises generally had to pay for all damage done ‘by accident,’ lawsuits could drain 
them of their economic blood.”
643
 Consequently, the attitude taken by the courts 
generally, was that of no interference with the industrialization process, and where 
possible “to limit damages to some moderate measure.”
644
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The second period of auditor liability history began in the 1950s, when the industrial 
growth had already taken hold. With the consolidation of the industrial revolution, the 
policy of protecting manufacturers against litigation also diminished.
645
 As the twentieth 
century manufacturing got more sophisticated, consumer safety emerged as a factor of 
consideration in the design of a product.
646
 Accordingly, policy consideration in law 
that defines court’s stance on liability shifted to the protection of consumers whose lives 
were affected by the huge industrial complex.
647
As SEPTIMUS points out, “the desire to 
provide this protection was so great that the new form of liability for unsafe products 
was a liability without fault, imposed in the form of a warranty implied by law in the 
sale of goods.”
648
 In the same sense, BAKER & PRENTICE argue that “changes in legal 
liability through time have often occurred in response to social and economic 
conflicts”
649
 affecting societies: 
 
As William L. Prosser, in his classic tort treatise, observed, “perhaps more than 
any other branch of the law, the law of torts is a battleground of social theory.” 
Although torts are sometimes perceived as a system of immutable rules, tort 
remedies are inevitably contested and contestable socio-legal terrain. Our review 
of the historical waxing and waning of rights and remedies demonstrates that 
torts have never been and can never be value-neutral. As Mannheim reminded 




Moreover, the dynamics of the twentieth century was far different from what then 
informed the privity doctrine. As ANDERSON argues,
651
 it was inevitable that this rule of 
law, formulated before the industrial revolution, should become subject to exceptions 
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and limitations as the twentieth century was ushered in. Hence, the courts, faced with 
the necessity to extend the scope of tort law to the needs of the time, did not defraud. 
They rightly responded by expanding the reach of tort law to embrace new classes of 
plaintiffs as well as new categories of actions.
652
 This revolutionary expansion of 
liability for negligence under common law is best understood by examining the 





In justifying the expansion of liability rules, courts seldom rely primarily on the 
need to correct some perceived injustice visited on an individual plaintiff by the 
alleged tortfeasor. Reform instead is frequently defended as a means of 
furthering broader policy goals, such as creating incentives to encourage risk 
creators to take optimal levels of care or allocating the costs of accidents to 




In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
655
 for example, where the buyer of a car with a 
defective wheel brought an action in negligence against the car manufacturer, even 
though the wheel was actually built by another party who had a contract with the 
manufacturer. CARDOZO J. went against the then established legal precedents and 
enlarged the scope of recovery for negligence to the next level by holding the 
manufacturer liable. Prior to this case, exception to privity is admitted only when 
products involved are “inherently dangerous” but Judge Cardozo broadened the 
exception to privity to include products that are dangerous if negligently made. In 
allowing recovery for the plaintiff, the learned Judge held that a car when negligently 
built was dangerous to the ultimate user. Cardozo’s insightful dictum is produced 
below:  
 
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb 
in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. If to the element of 
danger there is added the knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other 
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than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the 




Six year later, the same CARDOZO J. imposed liability for economic loss in the first case 
involving the recovery of damage for financial loss, Glanzer v. Shepard.
657
 In this case, 
the seller of beans contracted a weigher to certify the weight of the beans. The 
wiegher’s certificate, which forms the basis of the contract between buyer and seller, 
was overstated. The buyer instituted this action asserting negligence on the part of the 
weigher. Even though the court recognized that the plaintiff was not a party to the 
contract, it reasoned that the plaintiff was the primary beneficiary of the contract hence 
the weigher owed a duty of care to him. CARDOZO J. went on to elucidate the concept of 
‘primary benefit’ as follows: 
 
[T]he plaintiff's use of the certificates was not an indirect or collateral 
consequence of the action of the weighers.... It was... the end and aim of the 
transaction.... The defendants held themselves out to the public as skilled and 
careful in their calling.... In such circumstances, assumption of the task of 
weighing was the assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all 




Under this analysis, although there was no contract between the weigher and the buyer 
because the “end and aim” of the transaction was to provide a service to the buyer, the 
weigher was held liable. The fact that the contract was not between the plaintiff-buyer 
and the defendant-weigher was of no consequence, if the relationship between the 
plaintiff and the contracting parties is as close as in this case. The buyer, therefore, can 
maintain an action against the weigher either for negligent performance of service or as 
a third party beneficiary of the weigher’s contract with the seller. Here, recovery is 
premised on the relationship between the plaintiff and the parties in contract, a clear 
triumph of practical substance over legal form: “equity looks to the substance rather 
than to the form”, as the maxim goes. 
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1.3.2 THE RETURN OF PRIVITY  
The departure from the restrictive notion of privity marked by these cases and the new 
era of liability-expanding theory of negligence they heralded met with a brick wall in 
the case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touch, Niven & Co.
659
 where privity was re-established. 
Judge CARDOZO declined the opportunity presented by this case to expand tort liability 
for economic loss. He refused to extend the foreseeability principle of MacPherson to 
economic loss caused by an auditor’s neglect, and he also limited Glanzer’s ‘end and 
aim’ concept to cases in which there was a connection between the plaintiff and the 




In this case, the creditor of Fred Stern & Co. brought an action against the accounting 
firm, Touch, Niven & Co. that audited the accounts of its then bankrupt-debtor. The 
creditor claimed it suffered a loss due to reliance on erroneous information in the 
financial statement of the debtor, audited by the defendants.  The plaintiff citing 
numerous discrepancies in the audit report argued that the defendants had been 
negligent and fraudulent in performing the audit. 
 
The Court of Appeal found that the accountants were only guilty of negligence, but 
because of the lack of a specific contract between the plaintiff and the defendant there 
was no duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Therefore no liability ensued 
on the accountants’ part. In his judgment Judge CARDOZO referred to Glanzer and 
distinguished it from Ultramares. He reasoned that in Glanzer the plaintiff was not one 
out of many who may be recipients of the certificate but was the purpose of the contract 
from the first place. In fact, the only foreseen user was the plaintiff, whereas in 
Ultramares the plaintiff was one of many foreseeable users. Judge CARDOZO went on to 
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hold that an accountant could only be liable to the person who hired him. Meanwhile, in 
terms of privity, it is pertinent to point out that CARDOZO did not restrict accountant 
liability along traditional privity of contract lines or foreclosed recovery for those 
specific persons the auditor knew were recipients who would rely on the information. 
However, if the auditor’s actions constituted fraudulent misrepresentation liability will 
ensue. The court went on to discuss how the act of fraud might be inferred from a 
negligent act: 
 
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of fraud. It 
does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to justify a finding 
that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no 
more than say that if less than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless 
misstatement nor insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the 
ensuing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to 
be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has been made. We doubt 
whether the average business man receiving a certificate without paying for it, 
and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of possible investors, would 




CARDOZO J. thought that allowing third parties to recover would place an undue burden 
on the auditor and concluded that: 
 
To creditors and investors to whom [Stern] exhibited the certificate, the 
defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in 
the circumstances of its making that the employer did not intend to keep it to 
himself .... A different question develops when we ask whether they owed a duty 
to these to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence exists, a 
thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to a theft or forgery beneath the cover of 
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a 
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a 
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The policies stated in Ultramares set the standard for accountant liability for the next 
third of a century. The doctrine set forth in Ultramares supports the finding that 
accountants are not liable to an indeterminate class of individuals who may rely upon 
the accountant’s negligent audit even if they suffer loss.
663
 Through the years, 
Ultramares has been cited in innumerable cases as the landmark decision protecting 




Yet, as seen above, outside the accounting arena, the merits of liability limitations based 
on privity had been increasingly attacked, particularly, in the area of products liability 
where the notion of privity has been a clog in the wheels of justice.  The argument that 
recovery should be denied to an injured or killed third party because he is not in contract 
with the defendant no longer resonate with the courts. As a result, a number of states, 
like New Jersey and Wisconsin had abandoned contract-based theory in favor of a 
negligence regime.  These states measure the scope of manufacturer’s duty to extend to 
all those who might foreseeably be injured by its product.  
 
As a result of these changes, the foreseeability of harm, rather than the nature of the 
contract, began to define legal duty in many areas of the law across the United States.
665
 
Nonetheless, as common law is a matter of state law, jurisdictions vary on the scope of 







                                                     
662
 Id. at p. 180 
663
 GREENE, D. F., ALFONSE R., PETROCINE, R. A. & FITZPATRICK, C. R., “Holding Accountants 
Accountable: The Liability of Accountants to Third Parties”, Employee Responsibilities and Rights 
Journal, 15, 2003, p. 25. 
664
 DALY, B. A. & GIBSON, J. M., “The Delineation of Accountants’ Legal Liability to Third Parties: Bily 
and Beyond”, St. John’s Law Review, 68, 1994, 620. 
665
 SILICIANO, J. A., Trends in Independent…, op. cit., p. 344. 
173 
 
2. THE CONSTANT QUEST FOR ADEQUATE STANDARD OF CARE 
 
2.1 THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
The cases that have interpreted the common law regarding auditor’s duty of care to third 
parties have varied from state to state within the United States.
666
 A split exists among 
the States as to the individuals to whom the auditor owes a duty of care. There are 
different doctrinal views on third party liability: the privity or Ultramares rule, the near 
privity rule, the foreseeability standard, and the Restatement approach. Therefore, 
because of the differences in these approaches, and depending on which view is adopted 
in a particular state, an auditor may be subject to suit in State A but not in State B under 
the same set of facts.
667
 This section examines these differences. 
 
2.2 THE PRIVITY STANDARD 
This time-honored concept in tort law was first applied in the United States through the 
medium of the Supreme Court case of Savings Bank v. Ward.
668
 In this case, a bank 
which lent money for the purchase of a real estate in reliance on an erroneous title report 
sued the lawyer who prepared the report. The court cited Winterbottom with approval 
and held that if allowed, third party actions could lead to ‘absurd consequences’ and 
push this remedy to an impracticable extreme. Accordingly, Savings Bank v. Ward 
quickly established that there cannot be recovery for economic loss in the absence of 
privity.
669
 Some sixteen years later the Supreme Court of California asserted that the 
“overwhelming weight of authority” supported the doctrine. The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, in the early accountant liability case of Lybrand, applied the same rule developed 
in Savings Bank to bar an action by the purchaser of stock in a company against the 
accountant that had prepared its financial statements. 
The line of authorities after Ultramares hold audit sacred within the boundaries of 
contract. Third parties standing outside the agreement might gratuitously benefit from 
the audit report but they generally have no recourse against the public accountant if they 
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suffer any harm as a result. One notable authority here was State Street Trust Co. v. 
Ernst,
670
 where the court noted: 
 
We have held that in the absence of a contractual relationship or its equivalent, 
accountants cannot be held liable for ordinary negligence in preparing a certified 
balance sheet even though they are aware that the balance sheet will be used to 
obtain credit … Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, even 
where there is lacking, deliberate or active fraud … [H]eedless and reckless 




Under this analysis, third parties might have relied and acted upon the auditor’s opinion, 
nonetheless they are not third party beneficiaries, but incidental beneficiaries of the 
contractual relationship between accountant and his client. Hence, they can neither 
enforce the contract nor complain, in the legal sense, if the accountant’s negligent 
performance under the contract causes financial loss to them. This rule became known 
as strict privity doctrine because it does not admit of any duty beyond the realm of 
contract. 
 
Although in Ultramares, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed privity as a 
prerequisite of liability for the negligent performance of an audit. The Ultramares 
court’s interpretation of Glanzer effectively established a rule that only if the third party 
could enforce the defendant’s contract as a third-party beneficiary would he be able to 
bring the action in negligence. This rule provided an excellent example for future 
expansion of third party liability. 
 
In a series of cases, the New York Court of Appeals has explained and modified the 
Ultramares doctrine in ways that have been influential in other jurisdictions. This 
development came to be referred to as near privity standard. Under this approach an 
auditor is imputed with a duty of care to those parties with whom he has an 
acknowledged relationship. For example in the case of Credit Alliance Corp. v. 
Andersen & Co.,
672
 the court again rejected a wider duty for the auditor. The court while 
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reaffirming its commitment Judge CARDOZO’s concerns in Ultramares, revised 
Ultramares and outlined the following test as a prerequisite for holding accountants 
liable to third parties user of financial information not directly in privity: 
 
Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to non contractual parties 
who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial reports, certain prerequisites 
must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial 
reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in furtherance of 
which the known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must have 
been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or 





This requirement defines a relationship sufficiently narrow for the accountant to avoid 
indeterminate liability and predict the scope of its exposure to liability. At the same 
time, the test aims to provide criteria that are easier to apply than the more general 
formulations prescribed in Ultramares and Glanzer, nonetheless, they “do not represent 
a departure from the principles articulated in Ultramares [and] Glanzer ... but, rather, 




In a practical illustration of the application of this rule, in Credit Alliance, an accountant 
was found not liable to a non-privity plaintiff that had loaned money to the accountant’s 
client in reliance on the accountant’s erroneous audit, a report of which had been 
provided to it by the client. And despite a constructive knowledge of the defendants that 
the report has been shown to the plaintiff to induce a loan. The court found no evidence 
of any word or action that link the plaintiffs to the defendants. The court in reaching this 




[T]here is no allegation that [the accounting firm] had any direct dealings with 
the [creditor], had specifically agreed with [the debtor] to prepare the report for 
the [creditor's] use or according to the [creditor's] requirements, or had 




 Credit Alliance Corp. v. Andersen & Co., at p. 118.  See also FEINMAN, J. M., Liability of 
Accountants…, op. cit., p. 35. 
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specifically agreed with [the debtor] to provide [the creditor] with a copy or 
actually did so. Indeed there is simply no allegation of any word or action on the 
part of [the accounting firm] directed to [the creditor], of anything contained in 
[the accounting firm’s] agreement with the [debtor] which provided the 




The principle enunciated in Ultramares continues to evolve by accommodating some 
measure of flexibility as seen in White v. Guarantee.
677
 The case concerned an end of 
year audit by the defendant on Guarantee-Harrington Associates, a hedge fund investing 
and trading in marketable securities. White, a limited partner, commenced an action 
against the audit firm alleging, among others, negligence by the auditor to disclose the 
improper withdrawal of $2,000,000 by the two general partners. 
 
The defendants relying on Ultramares successfully applied for summary dismissal in 
the lower court. But the Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding that accountants 
may be held liable in negligence to third parties when the potential group of plaintiffs 
could be defined. The court reasoned that services of the accountant are not extended to 
a faceless or unresolved class of persons, but to a known group possessed of vested 
rights, in this case actual limited partners fixed and determined. Therefore it is 
foreseeable to the defendants that as one of the limited partners, the plaintiff would rely 
on the audit to prepare its own tax returns. Although White did not overrule Ultramares, 
it certainly detracts from the sense of invincibility formerly attached to Ultramares and 
signaled a new trend for the future.  
 
The privity doctrine as articulated in Ultramares and extended in Credit Alliance still 
commands good following in the United States. It is applied by some federal courts,
678
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2.3 THE REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY STANDARD  
For several decades, faithfulness to the privity or near privity doctrine has kept tort law 
at bay by maintaining accountant liability within the spheres of the law of contract, 
admitting recovery only where there is privity or a third-party benefiary relationship,
680
 
and in some cases where there is ‘conduct linking’ element.
681
 However, by the mid 
1900 the same forces of progress which forced a retreat from Winterbottom v. Wright 
began to question the wisdom of the Ultramares’ position.
682
 According to FEINMAN, 
the series of challenge these forces mounted resulted in many jurisdictions moving 
away from the privity rule in significant respect.
683
 One of such cases where similar 
sentiment was reechoed was Carter v. Yardly & Co.
684
 as reproduced below: 
 
The time has come for us to recognize that asserted general rule no longer exists. 
In principle it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust results. It has been 





The courts then went on to treat these cases the same as ordinary negligence cases and 
apply a rule of liability for foreseeable harm, as was the case with defective product. 
They used this standard to extend an auditor’s liability to all those whom the auditor 
should reasonably foresee as receiving and relying on the audited statement. Liability no 
longer depends on the accountant’s knowledge of either the users or the intended class 




                                                     
680
 FENCL, E. R., “Rebuilding the Citadel: State Legislative Responses to Accountant Non-Privity Suits”, 
Wash. U. L. Q. 67, 1989, p. 866. 
681
 FEINMAN, J. M., Liability of Accountants…, op. cit., p. 16. 
682
 Anderson, A. P., op. cit., p. 161. The first important challenge to the wisdom behind the Ultramares 
doctrine came on the other side of the Atlantic by way of dissent opinion by Lord Denning in Candler v. 
Crane, Christmas & Co., 2 K.B. 164 (1951). Denning argued that by insulating accountants from liability 
through privity the court is disregarding the realities of the audit function, which is meant to evince 
reliance from  investors: 
 
[Accountants make reports on which other people . . . other than their clients ... rely in the 
ordinary course of business . . . [They are] in my opinion, in proper cases, apart from any 
contract in the matter, under a duty to use reasonable care in preparation of their accounts and in 
the making of their reports. Id. 
 
683
 FEINMAN, J. M., Liability of Accountants…, op. cit., p. 16. 
684
 (1946), 64 N.E. 2d 693 
685
 Id. at p. 700. 
686
 GREENE, D. F., ET AL., Holding Accountants Accountable…, op. cit., p. 27. 
178 
 
The most celebrated case on foreseeability in accountant liability is the New Jersey 
Supreme Court case of Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.
687
 The facts of the case mirrored 
Ultramares. A public accountant again had negligently failed to uncover serious errors 
in the financial statement of another ailing company, this time Giant Stores Corporation. 
In the wake of the company’s bankruptcy, the third party plaintiff sued the accounting 
firm for losses suffered as a result of reliance on the firm’s audit. 
 
The firm defended on privity grounds that the plaintiffs were strangers to the contract 
between the accounting firm and the audited company, but the plaintiffs countered with 
the analogical argument of audit-as-product. This time the court took the bait, affirming 
the plaintiffs’ grounds. The court argued that since injury resulting from negligent 
misrepresentation in product defects is generally actionable without regard to privity, 
there is no basis on which to bar a claim of ordinary negligence for a similar lack of 
privity. The court turned its discussion on fairness of this proposition, and noted that:  
 
[T]here remains to be considered whether the public interest will be served by a 
proposition holding an auditor responsible for negligence to those persons who 
the auditor should reasonably foresee will be given the audit to rely upon and do 




The court then went on to analyze the basic principle of tort law: the historical 
movement away from privity in cases of physical injuries to defective products as well 
as economic loss cases, and held that: 
 
Unless some policy considerations warrant otherwise, privity should not be, and 
is not, a salutary predicate to prevent recovery. Generally, within the outer limits 
fixed by the court as a matter of law, the reasonably foreseeable consequences of 




The court looked farther to securities statutes and reasoned that the accountant is “a kind 
of arbiter” among the competing interests of his client, third parties who may rely on his 
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work, and of course his own professional responsibility.
690
 The court continued further 
that it is untenable to bar economic loss recovery in negligent misrepresentation cases 
when same is allowed in product defects cases. The court in dispelling any liability 
concern, concluded that contrary to the view expressed in Ultramares,
691
  imposition of 
liability through negligent misrepresentation will not have deleterious consequences but 
rather it will provide an incentive for accountants to exercise due care.
692
 The court then 
went on to weigh the risk involved in this decision against the public interest it would 
serve, and stated: 
 
[T]he burden [that the suggested duty] would put on defendant’s activity; the 
extent to which the risk is one normally incident to that activity; the risk and the 
burden to [the] plaintiff; the respective availability and cost of insurance to the 
two parties; the prevalence of insurance in fact; the desirability and effectiveness 




Thus, the accounting firms who bore such liabilities could easily avoid financial ruin 
through insurance, the cost of which would be passed onto the client and ultimately to 
the client’s consumers.
694
 The court went on and formulated a liability rule based on 
foreseeability of harm as follows: 
 
When the independent auditor furnishes an opinion with no limitation in the 
certificate as to whom the company may disseminate the financial statements, he 
has a duty to all those whom that auditor should reasonably foresee as recipients 
from the company of the statements for its proper business purposes, provided 




The New Jersey Supreme Court found on behalf of the plaintiff that use of financial 
statements for purposes such as securities offering and corporate acquisitions were 
foreseen or foreseeable by the defendants, therefore liable. Moreover, defendants were 
aware of the merger negotiations, but the court found that liability does not depend on 
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the accountant’s knowledge of either the users or the intended class of users of the 
report. All that was necessary for imposition of liability was that the client, Giant Stores 
Corporation, used the report for a proper business purpose in the course of which a third 
party justifiably and foreseeably relied on the report.
696
 The court then concluded that 
making auditors liable to all foreseeable users was the way to go if users of financial 
statements were to be protected and auditors held accountable for the quality of their 
work/product: 
 
Certified financial statements have become the benchmark for various 
reasonably foreseeable business purposes and accountants have been engaged to 
satisfy those ends. In those circumstances, accounting firms should no longer be 
permitted to hide within the citadel of privity and avoid liability for their 





The Supreme Court of Wisconsin followed Rosenblum on quick succession with its 
decision in Citizens State Bank v Timm, Schmidt & Co.
698
 The court here argued, in 
favor of full resolution of these kinds of cases on the merit instead of dismissal or 
summary judgment. It was of a considered opinion of the court that accountant liability 
cases ought to be determined in accordance with the general principles of negligence 
law, where “a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act except 
as those consequences are limited by policy factors.”
699
 The court recognized that some 
public policy factors might justify limiting the accountant’s duty. These justifications 
are that:  
 
(1) [t]he injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly 
out of proportion to the culpability of the [defendant]; or (3) in retrospect it 
appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about 
the harm; or (4)  because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a 
burden on the [defendant]; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too 
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likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would 




The foreseeability rule had earlier enjoyed wide acceptance and found support among 
some commentators, who argued that it serves important policy objectives such as 
deterrence and cost spreading.
701
 Despite this fact, currently only a handful of states like 





2.4 THE RESTATEMENT STANDARD 
Another way of considering auditor’s duty of care to third parties under common law is 
known as the Restatement of Torts approach. A notion of liability to third parties 
proposed and incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 552 as a 
standard for accountant liability. Section 552 is adopted by the courts as an alternative 
to the rigid requirement of the Ultramares standard and its progeny.
703
 The pertinent 
part of section 552 provides: 
 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a 
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance 
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability 
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance 
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the information. 
 
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in 
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered 
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(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for 
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the 
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply 
it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so 
intends or in a substantially similar transaction. 
 
Under this section, liability for negligent misrepresentation is imposed on one whom in 
the course of his business, supplies false information for the guidance of others who 
justifiably relied upon this information and as a result suffered a pecuniary loss. These 
persons need not to be known to the auditor so long as they belong to a class that the 
audit was intended to benefit for a particular transaction known to the auditor. 
Consequently, an accountant who audits financial information for a client would be 
liable to third parties “provided they belong to a ‘limited group’ and provided that the 





By application of the provision of section 522, an auditor needs not know the specific 
identity of the lender, to be liable to a third party lender. It would be sufficient if he was 
informed by his client that the purpose of the audit is to help obtain a loan. As held, for 
example, in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,
705
 the first case to apply the Restatement 
standard. The facts of Rusch Factors are as follows, a corporation applied for financing 
from the plaintiff. The plaintiff requested audited financial statements of the debtor to 
measure the debtor’s financial position. The debtor then engaged the defendant 
accounting firm whose audited financial statements “represented the [debtor] to be 
solvent by a substantial amount. In fact, the corporation was insolvent.”
706
  The court 
held that although the auditors did not know the plaintiffs they were aware that the audit 
was meant to help obtain a loan. Hence, they were held liable.   
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In its evaluation of the Rusch case, the court adopted the end and aim analysis of 
Glanzer with transaction in Rusch, but “distinguished Ultramares by defining this 
particular plaintiff as a party whose reliance was actually foreseen by the defendant.”
707
 
The court noted: 
 
[In Ultramares] the plaintiff was member of an undefined, unlimited class of 
remote lenders and potential equity holders not actually foreseen but only 
foreseeable. Here the plaintiff is a single party whose reliance was actually 




The court then concluded that “[t]he defendant knew that his certification was to be 
used for, and had as its very aim and purpose, the reliance of potential [creditors] of the 
... corporation.”
709
 The court went on to question the wisdom of the Ultramares 
decision, as pronounced below: 
 
[t]he wisdom on the decision in Ultramares has been doubted ... and this court 
shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliable party be forced to carry the 
weighty burden of an accountant’s professional malpractice? Isn’t the risk of 
loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting 
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk onto its 
customers who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public? 
Finally, wouldn’t a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary techniques of the 
accounting profession? For these reasons it appears to this Court the decision in 
Ultramares constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that the risk 




But, why did the Rusch court in claiming to apply the Restatement standard retreat to 
the end and aim analysis in Glanzer? To this, ZISA argues that, “[t]o the extent that the 
auditor knew of the plaintiff-creditor at the time of his work and that this plaintiff's use 
of the financial statements was contemplated by all parties to the audit contract, the 
plaintiffs use was the end and aim of the audit engagement. While the Rusch court noted 
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that the Glanzer principle had been effectively adopted by the Restatement, the court 
would not so limit the scope of Restatement recovery. Instead, the Rusch court held that 
an “accountant should be liable in negligence for careless financial misrepresentations 
relied upon by an actually foreseen and limited class of persons.” That Rusch 
represented the first meaningful departure from privity motions is undeniable. The 
Rusch court clearly followed the Glanzer rule, identifying the Restatement (Second) 
approach as the Glanzer approach and applied it to accountants. However, such analysis 
ignores the clear distinction between the actual knowledge of an identified plaintiff 
required by Glanzer and the specifically foreseen person standard used in the 
Restatement (Second) approach. But as the auditor in Rusch knew that he was engaged 
to prepare audited financial statements to be used by his client, the Rusch result is 




The Rusch case was closely followed by the case of Ryan v Kanne,
712
 a Supreme Court 
of Iowa decision also adopting the Restatement standard. In this case, the defendants 
were employed by a company to prepare a balance sheet for the purpose of obtaining a 
loan. The balance sheet they prepared showed that the company was solvent, when it 
was actually insolvent. The court, in embracing the restatement standard, held that the 
purpose of the defendants’ employment was enough to make them liable irrespective of 
the fact that they did not know the plaintiff. 
 
In adopting this standard, the American Law Institute (ALI) took cognizance of the 
concern expressed by CARDOZO J. in Ultramares and reasoned that the foreseeable 
proposition, where virtually any third parties can sue the auditor could potentially ruin 
the profession.
713
 This prospect, they argued would lead to a reduction in audit services, 
which would in turn restrict the flow of information “upon which the operation of the 
economy rests.”
714
 Although the Restatement of Torts does not constitute US law, it has 
been adopted by the overwhelming majority of states. The Restatement rule is preferred 
by its adherents for prescribing a middle-ground between the restrictive privity 
approach and a possible unlimited liability facilitated by the foreseeability doctrine. 
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This much was affirmed by North Carolina Supreme Court in its celebrated opinion in 




[Section 552] recognizes that liability should extend not only to those with 
whom the accountant is in privity or near privity, but also to those persons, or 
classes of persons, whom he knows and intends will rely on his opinion, or 
whom he knows his client intends will so rely. On the other hand, as the 
commentary makes clear, it prevents extension of liability in situations where 
the accountant “merely knows of the ever-present possibility of repetition to 
anyone, and the possibility of action in reliance upon [the audited financial 
statements], on the part of anyone to whom it may be repeated.” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts section 552, Comment h. As such it balances, more so than the 
other standards, the need to hold accountants to a standard that accounts for their 
contemporary role in the financial world with the need to protect them from 




Notwithstanding above cases, the leading case articulating the application of section 
552 is the case of Bily v Arthur Young & Co.,
717
 where the California Supreme Court 
overturned the state’s prior adoption of the reasonable foreseeability rule in 
International Mortgage Co. v John Butler Accountancy Corp.
718
 The Bily case arose 
from the failure of the Osborne Computer Corporation. In early 1983, certain plaintiffs 
provided direct loans to Osborne or standby letters of credit to secure bank loans. The 
loans were to have served as short-term financing until Osborne’s completion of an 
initial public offering. The public offering never occurred and Osborne filed for 
bankruptcy in 1983.  
 
After a thorough analysis of the various legal standards applicable to accountants’ 
liability, the Bily court adopted the Restatement standard. Bily is significant because the 
court’s rejection of the foreseeable user doctrine represents a policy shift away from 
protecting the rights and expectations of investors, lenders, and the public in favor of a 
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policy that shields accountants from liability to a large number of non clients.
719
 The 
court reasoned as follows:  
 
Given . . . the difficult and potentially tenuous causal relationships between audit 
reports and economic losses from investment and credit decisions, the auditor 
exposed to negligence claims from all foreseeable third parties faces potential 
liability far out of proportion to its fault; (2) the generally more sophisticated 
class of plaintiffs in auditor liability cases (e .g ., business lenders and investors) 
permits the effective use of contract rather than tort liability to control and adjust 
the relevant risks through "private ordering" ; and (3) the asserted advantages of 
more accurate auditing and more efficient loss spreading relied upon by those 




The representation must have been made with the intent to induce plaintiff, or a 
particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, to act in reliance upon the 
representation in a specific transaction, or a specific type of transaction, that 
defendant intended to influence. Defendant is deemed to have intended to 
influence [its client’s] transaction with plaintiff whenever defendant knows with 
substantial certainty that plaintiff, or the particular class of persons to which 
plaintiff belongs, will rely on the representation in the course of the transaction. 
If others become aware of the representation and act upon it, there is no liability 




In the light of the decisions in Rusch Factors and Ryan, the application of the 
Restatement rule became reasonably clear when the auditor actually knows and intends 
that financial information be relied upon by a particular third party or limited group.
722
 
But, GRUBBS & ETHRIDGE JR. contends that, “courts have had to contend with how to 
interpret and how far to extend the intended beneficiary or “knows that the recipient 
intends to supply it…” provision.”
723
 A comment to the Restatement reads in part 
follows: 
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…it is not required that the person who is to become the plaintiff be identified or 
known to the defendant as an individual when the information is supplied…it is 
enough that the maker of the representation intends it to reach and influence 
either a particular person or persons, known to him, or a group or class of 
persons, distinct from the much larger class who might reasonably be expected 
sooner or later to have access to the information and foreseeably to take some 




In Carello v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P.,
725
 the plaintiffs made the decision to sell 
their company upon relying on an audit prepared by the defendants, which happened to 
be erroneous. The plaintiffs brought this action for the loss of their stock because of the 
bankruptcy declared by the purchasing company. Defendant had prepared the financial 
statements and audit reports for the buyer. Defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment,
726
 contending that they were not aware at the time of the audit that it was 
being performed for the purpose of the sale or that the audit report would be used in 




The audited financial statements that the plaintiff relied on were filed with the SEC on 
March 31, 1998, and March 31, 1999. There was evidence that the plaintiffs were not 
approached regarding the sale until July 1, 1999.
728
 Defendants argued that they could 
not have owed a duty to the plaintiffs under Restatement of Torts Section 552 because 
the section requires that “a defendant must have owed to the plaintiff the requisite 
discovery duty at the time the alleged misrepresentations were made”.
729
 However, 
material evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to the contrary regarding the 
defendant’s knowledge about the potential use of the statements. The plaintiffs 
contended that further discovery would reveal that the defendants were “actively 
assisting LASON (the prospective buyer) in gobbling up companies” prior to and during 
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the relevant time period and therefore should have been aware that third party sellers 




The court denied the motion for summary judgment and found on behalf of the 
plaintiffs that, the words “should have known” is not requirement of actual knowledge 




In a similar development, the Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals in Blue Bell, Inc. v 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
732
 (1986) held that “actual knowledge of a particular 
plaintiff or class of plaintiffs is not necessary if the defendant should have had this 
knowledge through current business practices”.
733
 The court went on to argue that: 
 
To allow liability to turn on the fortuitous occurrence that the accountant’s client 
specifically mentions a person or class of persons who are to receive the reports, 
when the accountant may have that same knowledge as a matter of business 
practice, is too tenuous a distinction for us to adopt as a rule of law. Instead, we 
hold that if, under current business practices and the circumstances of that case, 
an accountant preparing audited financial statements knows or should know that 
such statements will be relied upon by a limited class of persons, the accountant 





Expansive interpretation of the Restatement rule is the most favorable to plaintiffs and 
approaches one of foreseeability. However, there is other side of the argument that 
opted for restrictive application of the Restatement rule. For instance, in Nycal Corp. v 
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
735
 the defendants were retained by a company to audit its 
financial statements. The audit report prepared by the defendants was included in the 
company’s annual report and made available to the public. The plaintiffs allegedly 
placed reliance on the audit in buying the controlling shares of the company. Two years 
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after this transaction the company filed for bankruptcy and the shares bought by the 
plaintiffs became worthless. The plaintiffs instituted this action against the accounting 
firm for negligent misrepresentation. In a case of first impression
736
 in Massachusetts, 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts declined to follow the broad construction in the 
Blue Bell case and opted for the “better reasoned” court decision interpretations 
“limiting the potential liability of an accountant to non contractual third parties who can 
demonstrate ‘actual knowledge on the part of accountants of the limited—though 
unnamed—group to potential [third parties] that will rely on the [report], as well as 





The court held in summary judgment that the defendant owed no duty of care to the 
plaintiff. Since “the accountant’s knowledge is to be measured ‘at the moment the audit 
[report] is published, not by the foreseeable path of harm envisioned by [litigants] years 




The same decision was reached in the case of McCamish, Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. 
F.E. Appling Interests,
739
where the court applied the Restatement rule for negligent 
misrepresentation against attorneys, and stated that, “a section 552 cause of action is 
available only when information is transferred by an attorney to a known party for a 
known purpose.”
740
 In another case, Tara Capital Partners L.L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 
L.L.P,
741
the Court of Appeals of Texas in Dallas held that the plaintiffs in this case were 
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The Restatement standard is obviously more generous than the privity rule but it is also 
narrower than the foreseeability approach.
743
 Strict privity is contractually based, such 
as between the auditor and the client. The criteria for the Restatement and “near” privity 
approaches are very similar. The difference between them is the extent of the 
relationship required. The “linking conduct” element in the third part of the Credit 
Alliance, “near” privity approach requires not only that the third party be known to the 
auditor, “but that the auditor either directly convey the audit report to the third person or 
otherwise act in some manner specifically calculated to induce reliance on the report. In 
this regard, a mere ‘unsolicited phone call’ by the third party to the auditor is 
insufficient. The auditor must be aware of a ‘particular purpose’ for the audit 
engagement and must act to further that purpose….This additional showing is not 




The merit of the Restatement rule lies in a middle ground it represented between a 
closed door standard of privity and the opened-ended liability of the foreseeability rule. 
The courts have generally found the privity-based stance of Ultramares to be too 
protective of the public accountants who know the result of their audit will be used to 
influence specific third parties.
745
 At the same time, the foreseeability of the Rosenblum 
is regarded too open-ended to permit accountants reasonably to predict and manage 
their liability exposure. Restatement standard is therefore, a preferred choice as “it 
balances, more so than other standards, the need to hold public accountants to a 
standard that accounts for their contemporary role in the financial world with the need 
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4. LIABILITY OF THE “AUDITORES DE CUENTAS” TO THIRD 
PARTIES 
 
4.1 SPANISH JUDICIAL CONTEXT 
In order to appreciate the doctrinal structure of the Spanish system of liability, it is 
important to consider the civil law tradition upon which it was built, in particular the 
French Civil Code. The nineteenth century drafters of the French Civil Code, from 
where the Spanish Code is derived, sought to embody certain fundamental moral 
principles. Although with the passage time these moral principles have evolved and 
embraced other challenges that today, “the law of civil liability not only allows the 
courts to uphold against those who would disregard the rights already acknowledged to 
exist, but also contributes to the emergence and protection of rights as yet inchoate and 
unrecognized. It thus constitutes a method of complementing and improving the legal 




Auditor’s liability like other civil liabilities in Spain is traditionally divided between 
contract law and tort. The former, are the parties to the auditor’s contract, and the latter 
are those third parties that are not parties to the contract but have suffered a loss as a 
result of it. These third parties could take benefit of tort law to recover their loss. Thus, 
pursuant to the relevant provision under the Civil Code, section 1902 anyone whose 
fault or negligence causes harm to someone else is legally obliged to compensate the 
victim. It is pertinent to point out here that this provision is a progeny of section 1382 of 
the French Code from which it was derived. In practice it shares the similarity of tort of 
negligence under the common law.  Generally, this legal obligation not to wrongfully 
inflict harm is owed to the world at large and the nature of the loss as being purely 
economic or financial is irrelevant in this regard. Moreover, under this system the 
question of auditors’ liability towards third parties is not dealt with through the 
application of a specific standard of liability like in the United States, under Spanish law 
any claim that fulfills the three conditions of recovery in tort, fault, damage and the 
causal link between the two is ipso facto recoverable. This section will give a broad 
overview of the relevant rules of “responsabilidad civil extracontractual” under this 
jurisdiction.                                                          
                                                     
747
 See generally, VAN GERVEN, W. G., LEVER, J. & LAROUCHE, P., Cases, Materials and Text on 
National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2000. 
192 
 
4.2 ARTICLE 26 OF “LEY 22/2015” 
 
4.2.1 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Auditors in Spain, like other professionals, may incur liability because of an action or 
omission by them, which results in a financial loss to their clients or third parties. It is 
common knowledge that liability of professionals, like auditors in common law 
jurisdictions, including the United States is fundamentally based on the operation of 
negligence law. A stare decisis or judge made law.  
 
However, in a civil law country like Spain, professional liability naturally has to come 
from a written law, like the civil code. But the civil code made no mention of the figure 
of an auditor. In fact, there was no law on auditors or their liability until the 
promulgation of Ley de Sociedes Anonimas LSA in 1951.
748
 The LSA under its article 
108 introduced, for the first time, professionals like Accionistas Cenceros and Cenceros 
Jurados, widely considered the predecessors of auditors in Spain. Even at that the LSA 




The first Spanish law to make direct allusion regarding the liability of auditors was in 
the 1988 Audit Law and the 1989 revision of the LSA that came as result of 
transposition of an EU law, Directive 84/253/EEC on the approval of persons 
responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents, into Spanish 
law.
750
 Accordingly, article 11 of LAC in its original version provided that auditors are 
jointly and severally liable for damages they caused to their clients and third parties as 
result of their failure to fulfill their obligations. Thus, where the auditor who signs the 
audit report works in an audit firm all members of the firm shall jointly be responsible 
for his action.
751
 Without a doubt, this article is the single most important law as far as 
auditor liability in Spain is concern. It is also true that more than the provision of article 
11 (now 26), liability of auditors is sanctified under a combination of laws and 
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standards, like LAC, RAC and NTA together with the general principles of private law 
in 1902 of the CC. 
 
Given the importance of article 11 to our discussion and the evolutionary process it had 
undergone over the course of time, it is appropriate to briefly recap this process. As 
stated here, article in its original provision contemplated a joint-and-several liability 
regime, which was greeted with criticism, especially, PANTALEÓN for being arbitrary 
and to principle of fairness in the law.
752
 Irrespective of several attempts in the past, the 
law suffered its first amendment in 2002 through the financial reform law, “Ley 
44/2002, de 22 de noviembre, de Medidas de Reforma del Sistema Financiero.” This 
law, under its article 52, effectively repealed and replaced joint-and-several liability 
regime of auditors with individual and proportionate liability by interposing the general 
liability principle obtained under articles 1101 and 1902 of the CC respectively.
753
 The 
article also omitted to mention third parties present in the early provision of article 11. 
 
However, a similar provision found under article 42 RAC was left intact together with 
its provision that liability of auditors is unlimited. Apart from leaving unlimited 
provision of intact, the LAC also made reference to it that without prejudice to 
unlimited liability in article 42 RAC.
754
 This provision generated conflicting points of 
views, with some commentators questioning liability limitation clauses in audit 
contracts. Others like PANTALEÓN sustained that the unlimited liability refers to the 
guarantee that auditors are obligated to maintain apart from their liability insurance.
755
 
Amendment to the audit law continued until recently with the “Ley 22/2015, de 20 de 
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4.3 APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY 
UNDER ARTICLE 1902 CC 
Under Spanish law, plaintiffs to any claim in damages benefit from a general right of 
action without any a priori limitation on the scope or nature of protected rights and 
interests as long as they are legitimate.
756
 Indeed, from the Spanish law standpoint, it is 
a non sequitor for instance to speak of “protected rights” in an exclusionary sense. 
Compensation for fault or negligence is not predicated on a prior duty of care towards 
the plaintiff applicable under the American common law.
757
 Generally, damage is 
compensated whenever some three prerequisite conditions are met: the defendant has 
committed a fault, the plaintiff has suffered harm, and there is a causal link between the 
two events. This unitary approach to the issue of liability does not however prevent 
flexible judicial decision making. Thus, not every act of the defendant will constitute a 
fault, and not all harm claimed will be worth compensating. Where, for policy reasons, 
access to a remedy needs to be denied, the Spanish courts do not hesitate to employ the 
above three conditions to restrict the extent of the general principle of liability.
758
 
Nonetheless, the main device used by the courts to control liability in auditor liability 




In Spain, civil liability in tort is regulated under article 1902 CC. The same article 
provides the legal basis for civil liability in instances of intentional harm as well as 
cases of mere negligence. Article 1902 is essentially fault based. Significantly, the 
notion of fault is deemed sufficiently broad to cover not only positive acts but also 
omissions by the tortfeasor. Thus, in principle, it ought to make no difference that the 
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Apart from the general principle of liability enshrined in the “Código Civil”, the 
legislators in Spain had also made explicit provision for auditor’s liability towards third 
parties. As found under article 26.1 of the new Audit Law, “Ley 22/2015, de 20 de julio, 
de Auditoría de Cuentas”, which provides:  
 
Los auditores de cuentas y las sociedades de auditoría responderán por los daños 
y perjuicios que se deriven del incumplimiento de sus obligaciones según las 
reglas generales del Código Civil, con las particularidades establecidas en el 
presente artículo. 
  
This provision is a specific application of the general principle of liability enshrined 
under article 1902 CC. It must however, be interpreted in conjunction with the 
requirements of proof like, fault, damage, and causation.
761
 Hence, the article only re-
emphasized the principles already existing in the “Código Civil”. The Spanish legislator 
by reaffirming these general principles in the area of auditor’s liability towards third 
parties seeks to make it clear that the third party is not an “indirect victim” whose prima 
facie right to recovery is in doubt.
762
 Moreover, according to OTERO CRESPO, the 
publication requirement of the annual report together with auditor’s certificate has by 
analogy made third parties recipients of the auditor’s report through the Mercantile 
Registry, thereby made the compensation for the loss they suffered as a result of its use 




The specific provision of article 26 of the Audit Law does not by any means make the 
third party’s claim easier. In practice, the Spanish courts allow themselves plenty of 
leeway so as to avoid having to order compensation for damage that is too remote.
764
 
They usually achieve this by the use of the following elements: action or omission, 
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4.3.1 THE FAULT REQUIREMENT 
Fault or negligence as well as damage have been sufficiently treated the first part of this 
Chapter under pure economic loss the following paragraphs will deal with causation 
under Spanish law. 
 
4.3.2 CAUSATION REQUIREMENT: CAUSAL NEXUS AS A 
PREREQUISITE FOR LIABILITY 
Causation is a fundamental concept in the civil law system when it comes to proving 
liability. It presupposes establishing a causal relationship between the conduct of the 
auditor and the loss of the third party plaintiff.  According to OTERO CRESPO, the 
concept of causation helps the court to determine where to place liability as well as on 
the extent of the liability.
766
 Either way, the plaintiff must prove that the action or 
omission of the auditor in certifying the audit report is responsible for the loss he 
sustained. Thus, in preparing the audit report must have omitted to see an obvious fact, 
failed to comply with a relevant accounting standard or emit a report that is not in 
accord with financial state of the company.
767
 As pointed out in the case of Snell v. 
Farell,
768
 it is said to be an expression of the relationship that must be found to exist 
between the tortious act of the tortfeasor and the injury to the victim in order to justify 
compensation of the latter out of the pocket of the former.  
 
According to OTERO CRESPO, the tenor of article 26 LAC is clearly making allusion to 
the causal nexus between the loss of the plaintiff and breach of the auditor, which 
requires the concurrence of physical causation and determination of liability by court, 
known as causation in law.
769
 As indicated above, causation is sometimes viewed in the 
light of two requirements of damage, namely certainty and directness. The requirement 
of certainty as recognized by the courts in Spain has been amply discussed in the first 
part of this chapter under pure economic loss. The latter requirement is derived from 
article 1107 CC. which reads: 
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Los daños y perjuicios de que responde el deudor de buena fe son los previstos o 
que se hayan podido prever al tiempo de constituirse la obligación y que sean 




Although this is a provision that concerns liability for breach of contracts, it has been 
interpreted as an expression of a general principle applicable to tort law as well. Thus 
between the act or omission of the auditor and the damage that ensued, there must exist 
a relation of cause and effect.
771
 The causative requirement of this provision has found 
judicial expression in the case of Lepanto Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros, SA and 
Price Waterhouse Auditores, SA,
772
 when the court in reference to instances of third 
party liability opined as follows: 
 
De los presupuestos de la responsabilidad extracontractual prevista en el artículo 
1902 del Código Civil ( LEG 1889, 27) , aplicable al caso, tiene particular 




There is no express provision under Spanish law with regard to assessment of causation 
by courts. It only requires the damage to be direct and immediate consequence of the 
fault. In practice, under the civil law’s deductive approach to legal reasoning, general 
tort principles - including fault - only acquire meaning through their application to 
individual cases. Of necessity room is made for pragmatism in the process.  
It is of common knowledge that the term causation refers to a certain material link 
between two acts in line with natural law. While in many instances obvious, the 
determination of causation can be difficult in cases where several factors are susceptible 
to causing the damage. However, sometimes it may be so complex that it may require 
intervention of an expert. Different theories have been developed by legal writers and 
commentators as guidance for the determination of causation. These theories however, 
                                                     
770
 REGLERO CAMPOS argues here that directness signifies a link between the tortdeasor and the damage to 
the plaintiff El daño es directo y mediato cuando existe un nexo de causalidad suficientemente fuerte 
entre el hecho y el perjudicado ‘por rebote’, con independencia del daño inicial del que se considera 
autónomo. En consecuencia, este requisito no limita los daños que se consideran reparables… REGLERO 
CAMPOS, F., (coord.), Tratado de Responsabilidad Civil, Ed. Thomas-Aranzadi, Cizur Menor, Navarra, p. 
215. 
771
 DE ÁNGEL YAGÜEZ, R., La Responsabilidad Civil, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, 1988, p. 241. 
772
 Sentencia núm. 798/2008 de 9 octubre RJ 2008/6042 
773
 Id.  
198 
 
are not foolproof and do not always respond properly, to the specific problems 
encountered in the practical application of the causation requirement by courts. 
 
Although theories abound to provide criteria to resolve the issue of causation, Spanish 
courts mainly tend to adopt the following theories:  
 
A) CAUSE IN FACT (CAUSALIDAD DE HECHO) 
As evidential requirement, this criterion is determined through the sine qua non 
condition, or ‘but for condition’, it only requires a proof that, but for the breach of 
contract or tort by the defendant, the claimant would not have suffered the loss. 
Causation is established if the court comes to the conclusion that the damage would not 
have occurred, had the fault or negligence not been committed.
774
 When the damage 
was allegedly caused by an act, the test is whether there would be no such damage if the 
specific act did not happen. In case the damage was allegedly caused by an omission, 
the test is whether the damage would have arisen if the defendant had acted in 
accordance with his duties. The fault or negligence need not be the exclusive cause of 




This is by far the most widely used criteria for establishing the causal connection 
required in accord with ordinary moral notions of responsibility, however, INFANTE 
RUIZ pointed out that there may be occasions when the law deviates from this theory.
776
 
For example, if two huntsmen independently but simultaneously shoot and kill a third 
person, it is intuitively clear that each should be held responsible for the death. Yet the        
but-for-test seems to yield to the conclusion that neither has caused the harm. The courts 
in Spain as well as in America impressed by what they see as a drawback obtained in 
but-for test moved to accommodate multiple or alternative causes.
777
 This is seen in the 
celebrated American case of Anderson v. Minneapolis, St: P. & S. St. R.R. Co.,
778
 where 
substantial factor rule was developed as an expansion of the “but for test”. In fact, it was 
the perceived limitation of the sine qua non doctrine as a causal principle that has led to 
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Dicha relación se reconstruye, en una primera fase, mediante la aplicación de la 
regla de la “conditio sine qua non”, conforme a la que toda condición, por ser 
necesaria o indispensable para el efecto, es causa del resultado; y la de la 
“equivalencia de condiciones”, según la cual, en el caso de concurrencia de 
varias, todas han de ser consideradas como iguales en su influencia causal si, 




Now with numerous judgments
781
 by the Spanish Supreme Court on diverse contexts of 
causation in law, the doctrine can be said to be well consolidated in Spanish law. This 
doctrine also enables the courts to cut third party liability to a reasonable limit by 
filtering section 1902 CC not only through the trio valves of cause in fact, foresight test 
and negligence but also in the mirror of cause in law.
782
   
 
Afirmada la relación causal según las reglas de la lógica, en una segunda fase se 
trata de identificar la causalidad jurídica, para lo que entran en juego los criterios 
normativos que justifiquen o no la imputación objetiva de un resultado a su 
autor, en función de que permitan otorgar, previa discriminación de todos los 
antecedentes causales del daño en función de su verdadera dimensión jurídica, la 





This line of reasoning is confirmed in a recent judgment where the Spanish Supreme 
Court
784
 held that the causal relationship contemplated by the Spanish law is not solely 
limited to natural cause or cause in fact but also a judicial evaluation of the 
circumstances of the case in apportioning liability, known as causation in law.
785
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Como es bien sabido, la Sala Civil lleva ya varios años aplicando esta doctrina 
en diversos contextos con lo que parece consolidado el criterio predominante en 
la doctrina  penal y civil según el cual la relación de causalidad que exige la ley 
no consiste únicamente en la llamada causalidad natura o de hecho sino que 




B) CAUSATION IN LAW (IMPUTACIÓN OBJETIVA)   
Under this causation theory, when the cause of damage is a combination of several 
factors, then the cause is adjudged as total of the contributory sum that had produced the 
result. In other words, all of the contributing conditions are considered equal in their 
influence as a cause because by removing anyone of them, the result disappears as well. 
Here the Plaintiff must establish that the damage sustained by him is the natural and 
adequate consequence of the Defendant’s conduct and that the outcome is probable and 
reasonably foreseeable to the Defendant. Where the chain of causation is so long or 
tenuous that the loss is not reasonably foreseeable, the loss is described as too “remote” 
to be recoverable. The act committed, in addition to having materially caused the 
damage in question, must be capable of causing this type of damage when considered 
alone irrespective of the surrounding circumstances. Unforeseeable damage is not 




Y ello porque para la determinación de la existencia de relación o enlace preciso 
y directo entre la acción u omisión -causa- y el daño o perjuicio resultante -
efecto-, en la que la doctrina jurisprudencial viene aplicando el principio de la 
causalidad adecuada, se exige, para apreciar la culpa del agente, que el resultado 
sea una consecuencia natural, adecuada y suficiente de la determinación de la 
voluntad; debiendo entenderse por consecuencia natural, aquella que propicia, 
entre el acto inicial y el resultado dañoso, una relación de necesidad, conforme a 
los conocimientos normalmente aceptados. 
 
En cada caso concreto debe valorarse, si el acto antecedente que se presenta 
como causa, tiene virtualidad suficiente para que del mismo se derive, como 
consecuencia necesaria, el efecto lesivo producido, no siendo suficiente las 




 See Sentencia núm. 243/2007 de 19 junio JUR 2008/52859          
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simples conjeturas, o la existencia de datos fácticos que por mera coincidencia, 
induzcan a pensar en una interrelación de esos acontecimientos, sino que es 
preciso la existencia de una prueba terminante relativa al nexo entre la conducta 
del agente y la producción del año, de tal forma que haga patente la culpabilidad 




The yardstick to measure this proof is nonetheless a subject of dispute among legal 
scholars, whether the test should be subjective i.e. whether the defendant can avoid the 
outcome or it should rather be objective i.e. whether the outcome is foreseeable to an 
average person.
789
 In the event of willful misconduct, the auditor shall be liable for all 





It is trite law that liability goes much farther than occurrence of an action or omission 
which harms the defendant. In a determination of liability a link must be established 
between the defendant’s conduct and loss of the plaintiff, which is a question of fact to 
be proved by evidence. The imposition of liability however is a question of law to be 
determined in accord with public policy.  
 
El nexo de causalidad no puede ser establecido únicamente en el plano 
fenomenológico atendiendo exclusivamente a la sucesión de acontecimientos en 
el mundo externo, sino que causalidad física debe ser acompañada de una 
valoración jurídica en virtud de la cual, con criterios tomados del ordenamiento, 
pueda llegarse a la conclusión de que el daño causado se encuentra dentro del 
alcance de la conducta del agente, en virtud de lo que en nuestro ámbito 
científico suele llamarse imputación objetiva. 
 
Although causation may be established factually, the court may still hold the defendant 
not liable to the claimant because in the circumstances of the case, defendant is not 
deemed, in a legal sense, as beholden to the claimant. In a relevant judgment,
791
 the 
Spanish Supreme Court endorsing the Principles of European Torts Law reasoned that 








 STS de 2 de marzo de 2009. 
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the determination of causation need not be evidential proof and disproof of facts alone 
but must of necessity be accompanied by judicial evaluation.
792
 This in essence entails 
the considerations in law why the defendant may be freed from liability or held liable 




Thanks to the support received from the Spanish Supreme Court in the 1980s, the sine 
qua non approach is the one commonly adopted by the courts
794
 and implies the 
existence of a direct link between the cause and the damage. However, Spanish legal 
scholars have most recently favored the application of causation law in the 
determination of causation. This view has also been admitted by some courts.
795
 It is 
noteworthy that the Spanish Supreme Court in recent judgments is embracing the cause 
in law at the expense of the sine qua non and foresight theories courtesy of the influence 
of the Principles of European Torts Law (PETL). 
 
Even though Spanish courts sometimes rely on the theories discussed above, their 
intellectual process is usually not based on any theoretical ground, logical explanation 
or a search for mathematical precision. After all, none of the various philosophical 
theories propounded for the determination of causation, can only on itself, provide a 
solution to the diverse problems courts are called to resolve. The Spanish Supreme 
Court observed here that, theoretical discussions on causal relationship are best left with 
philosophers, and courts in turn must seek for justice by looking at the circumstances of 
the case at hand rather than a particular theory.
796
 Hence the courts rather rely on 
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4.3.3 THE EXTENT OF LIABILITY: PROPORTINATE LIABILITY 
According to the provision of article 1107 CC, “auditors de cuentas” shall only respond 
to losses that are necessary consequences of their personal faults, and they cannot be 
substituted with the fault of the management.
797
 Commenting on this principle, ESPINOS 
argues that auditors who have acquiesced by their silence to accounting irregularities, 
bad practices or manipulations are equally at blame in these manipulations. However, it 
is also true that they can only be responsible to the extent of their fault.
798
 Thus it is 
argued that, in their evaluation of “auditores de cuentas”’ liability courts need to take 
cognizance of article 1107 CC to make sure that they respond only to the part of the loss 
directly linked to their fault.
799
 In practice however, there is a discernible tendency to 
apply the theory of “causalidad adecuada”, and to condemn “auditores de cuentas” with 
the management.
800
Moreover, section 26.2 of the revised audit law now advocates for 
proportionate liability:     
La responsabilidad civil de los auditores de cuentas y las sociedades de auditoría 
será exigible de forma proporcional a la responsabilidad directa por los daños y 
perjuicios económicos que pudieran causar por su actuación profesional tanto a 
la entidad auditada como a un tercero. 
Finally, the courts have frequently absolved the “auditores de cuentas” of blame when 
the chain of causation is broken by the plaintiff’s contributory negligence,
801
 through 
the intervention of a third party
802
 ordinary risk of business or force majeure (section 
1105 CC). This fact, however, present in every case, does not usually in itself prevent 
the courts from finding a causal link; rather, such a fact demonstrates the prima facie 
indirectness of the actions of the “auditores de cuentas” as a cause of the failure of the 




Spanish law here shares a concern of indeterminate liability with the common 1aw. As 
such, this double qualification, in that the loss must be both “certain” and “direct”, 
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provides as many safeguards against the granting of a remedy that, mainly from a policy 
perspective, would be unwarranted. Interestingly, it is a qualification that does not 
feature in the actual tort provisions of the Code. Rather, it was borrowed from the 
Code’s provision on the law of contract. Specifically, the courts apply article 1261 CC 
to the law by analogy to fill an existing lacuna in the tort law as contemplated by article 
4 CC. 
 
4.3.4 DIRECT LINK WITH THE DAMAGE SUFFERED 
Article 1261 CC formally limits entitlements to compensation to proven loss that is 
certain and a direct result to the harm sustained. Plaintiffs are also required under article 
26 LAC to show not only reliance on the audit report but that it was decisive in their 
decision. Spanish courts have frequently rejected claims where the damage suffered by 
the plaintiffs is not linked to the “auditores de cuentas” fault. In a recent ground 
breaking judgment,
804
 the Spanish Supreme Court rejected a claim founded on a 
disciplinary inaction of the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) rather 
than the reliance placed by the plaintiffs on an erroneous audit report. A third party 
claim will also fail where the evidence shows that the irregularities would not have been 
discovered even if the “auditores de cuentas” had exercised their control with diligence 
and prudence;
805
 when the decision of the plaintiff is based on considerations other than 
the auditor’s fault;
806
 where the detrimental act is directly linked with the administrators 
of the company;
807
 or there is evidence to show that the plaintiff knew, or had reason to 
know about the real financial standing of the company.  
 
In the above cited important judgment rendered by the Spanish Supreme Court on 
October 9, 2008, the plaintiffs, securities investors, sued the “auditores de cuentas” of 
the Securities Company they had invested in. The company fell into bankrupt after it 
had been audited by the defendants, which led to the subsequent intervention of the 
CNMV. The plaintiffs contended that had the audit report reflected the true and fair 
view of the company it would have prompted the intervention of the CNMV to save 
their investments. The court held that the protection of the audit law is meant for those 
third parties that had justifiably relied on the veracity of an audit report, it is not meant 
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to draw the attention of a public regulation agency to save those who invested in the 
market. In other words, the bad investment decision of the plaintiffs was not based on 
the strength of the audit report, which they did not know of. Meanwhile there are many 
factors that could cause the intervention of the CNMV, when the regulatory agency 
deems it necessary.  
 
The plaintiffs’ in the above case failed mainly on wrong pleadings. The strength of their 
case should have been on the reliance they had placed on the erroneous audit report and 
how that caused their loss other than it had failed to reveal the actual financial situation 
of the company to the regulatory body. 
 
 
4.3.5 ASSESSMENT OF CAUSATION 
Finding a proper measurement for determining causal links between the complained act 
and the damage had always proved a hard task for the courts, and the specific area of 
auditors’ liability towards third parties presents even more difficulty in meeting this 
requirement. First, the conduct of the “auditores de cuentas” in majority of cases is one 
of omission rather than of positive action, which creates some evidentiary difficulties. 
Nonetheless, OTERO CRESPO argues that two possible conducts are contemplated on the 
part of the auditor. Thus, either an auditor gives out a report with incorrect information 
or where, on the other hand, the failure to include some information makes the report 
erroneous.
808
 Whatever the case may be, the auditor’s conduct must be shown to be 
false or deceptive and capable of causing the plaintiff’s loss.  
 
Second, experience demonstrates that in these types of cases there is a concurrence of 
factors that lead to misstatements. Traditionally, preparation of accounts is a 
responsibility saddled with the management of the company,
809
 and “auditores de 
cuentas” have the obligation not to participate in the management of the company.
810
 
Consequently, they are not the only ones to blame for the loss suffered by the company 
or the third party. More often than not the fault flows primarily from the lack of care or 
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 This is however, not to underestimate concern in some quarters that auditors may come under the sway 
of important clients as evidenced by the recent financial failures of companies when their auditors looked 
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the fraud of the administrators, auditor’s only error is probably the failure to discover 
this fact. For this reason, the Spanish law prescribes proportional liability between 
auditors and administrators of the company wherever possible.
811
 As held in Euskal Air 
as follows: 
 
No se puede descartar a priori en absoluto que los auditores sean 
corresponsables civiles junto con otra personas, que toman decisiones, cuando 
no han cumplido correctamente sus obligaciones contractuales, por esa labor 
primordial que tienen en la fiscalización de las cuentas y por la confianza que 
inspiran sus informes, y en el supuesto concreto esto es lo ha acaecido, en que la 
conducta de la sociedad auditora generó los perjuicios que se han concedido, 
como indica la sentencia apelada y mantendremos más adelante. Por último, 
recalcar que doctrinalmente se admite la posibilidad, lógica lo demás, de que 
pueda existir una responsabilidad solidaria entre administradores y auditores 
cuando ambos son los causantes del daño producido.
812
   
 
This decision and the statute that followed thereafter limiting the liability of auditors 
perhaps answer the call by auditors for legal protection against the third party plaintiff 
who take undue advantage of the so called deep pocket of auditors. Arguably, it also 
gives credence to the reluctance shown by courts to allow recovery in favor of third 




Moreover, the extent of reliance placed by the third party claimant on the audit report is 
hard to measure and require a subjectivity test something very difficult to overcome.
814
 
Finally, the complexity of factors that inform third party’s decision and the difficult 
process of discerning whether or not the damage suffered by him was as a result of 
reliance on the audit report or was occasioned by the inherent risk of the financial 
market. All these considerations imply how complex and demanding is the 
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determination of the causal nexus in the Spanish legal tradition where it is required to be 
certain and direct, thus giving no room for doubt. The perceived difficulty in meeting 
the high standard of certainty and exactitude prompted some authors to suggest a move 
by the Spanish courts to a more flexible standard of proof. In a manner that causal link 
need not be demonstrated with scientific exactitude, but that the court at the end is 




In assessing whether or not there is a causal nexus, Spanish courts usually apply an 
objective reasonable man standard.
816
 The test is whether the “auditor de cuentas” under 
consideration, exercising the care and skill reasonably to be expected of a normally 
diligent and prudent professional of his calling and station would have permitted the 
plaintiff to avoid the loss.
817
 A causal connection is not considered to exist if the 
damage would have occurred, regardless of whether the auditors had discovered the 
unsatisfactory state of affairs of the company or not.
818
 According to CARVAJAL, apart 
from the reliance burden placed on the plaintiff, he must also establish that he had 
correctly interpreted the report and that the fault of the “auditor de cuentas” provoked 
his error in the evaluation of the finances of the company. Lastly, he would have taken a 
different decision had the audit report been otherwise.
819
 In some instances, the 
evidence that the plaintiff’s could not take any measure to prevent or mitigate the 
damage could strengthen causation. 
 
It is noticeable that the courts do not require the fault of the “auditores de cuentas” to be 
the only or even the main cause of the plaintiff's loss.
820
 Such an approach would have 
the consequence of making almost every case inadmissible. Third parties loss may be 
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occasioned through multiple of causes and lie, at the outset, in the fault or fraud of the 
administrators. But since it is the function of the “auditores de cuentas” to inspire 





In making a liability decisions, the courts also consider the expertise of the plaintiffs to 
come to the conclusion of whether the plaintiffs could, or should, have discovered the 
irregularities themselves.
822
 The courts could also look out to whether the plaintiffs 
failed to exercise reasonable care in relying on the accounts or they wrongly interpreted 
the audit report or they took a wrong decision relying exclusively on the audit without 
considering other factors like the market condition or that the administration of the 
company have interfered with the defendant’s work, which have contributed to the 




In a similar vein, in the French case law, the Court of Appeal of Paris on February 1, 
1984
824
 held that the plaintiff shall only be entitled to the part of the compensation for 
contributory negligence on his part. In this case a company seeking financing to 
overcome its difficulties signed an agreement with the plaintiff, rescuer. After the 
general assembly approved the certified accounts, the plaintiff invested in the company. 
Three months later, the plaintiff, by then the principal shareholder and officer of the 
company, discovered grave irregularities in the accounts of the company. The court held 
that the auditors are only liable for half of the damage suffered by the plaintiff. After 
stating that he had the right to rely on the certified accounts, the court criticized the 
plaintiff's attitude as being careless and imprudent, since he did not, before getting 
involved, verify the values indicated on the accounts, carry out a thorough accounting 
verification, or seek information from accountants and the auditors. Moreover, the court 
believed that he should have requested a more recent statement, since the financial 
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4.3.6 THE THIRD PARTY FIGURE (EL TERCERO) 
The third party figure is well recognized under Spanish law as seen in the above quoted 
provision of article 1257 CC, where third parties can enforce contracts made for their 
benefit. In addition to their right under third parties contract in article 1257 CC, third 
parties may sue under the general tort liability clause found under article 1902 CC. The 
same figure “tercero” is repeated under article 113 of the Spanish Penal Code as 
follows:  
 
“La indemnización de perjuicios materiales y morales comprenderá no sólo los 
que se hubieren causado al agraviado, sino también los que se hubieren irrogado 
a sus familiares o a terceros.” 
 
Although this law is found under criminal code, it is considered in Spain as universal 
and applicable to all tortuous liabilities.
825
 Thus, third party figure in Spain is trite law, 
but who is a third party under the law and the reach of “tercero” concept has been 
subject of debate among legal authors and commentators.  
 
Literally, third parties can be defined as parties outside the realm of the audit contract. 
ALEMANY, on the other hand, defined third parties as those who are excluded for not 
being part of the contract “ni por intervencion ob origine ni por sucesion universal.”
826
 
However, this does not mean that third party definition is without legal intricacies, 
given that even the audit law since its debut in 1988 has undergone several 
amendments, especially, auditor liability regime. As seen above on our discussion on 
article 26, the reference made to third parties in the original article 11 was completely 
eliminated by article 52 of Ley 44/2002  and replaced with reference to articles 1101 
and 1902 CC. 
 
The debate actually began with the original article 11 over the extent of its reach. 
Authors like PETIT LAVALL and ARANA GONDRA consider third parties as whoever can 
prove damage from a negligently performed audit report.
827
 PANTALEÓN on the other 
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end maintained his thesis that third parties should be a determined group.
828
 Third party 
has been duly defined in the 2010 amendment to the LAC and remains the same under 
article 26.2 of “Ley 22/2015” as:  
 
“cualquier persona física o jurídica, pública o privada, que acredite que actuó o 
dejó de actuar tomando en consideración el informe de auditoría, siendo éste 
elemento esencial y apropiado para formar su consentimiento, motivar su 
actuación o tomar su decisión.”  
 
The same definition is repeated under article 22 RAC but OTERO CRESPO believe that 
definitions should not supplant the court’s labor of interpretation and assessing case by 
case circumstances in determining liability.
829
 The learned author further argues that it 
is unnecessarily repetitive and its requirements that the audit report should be the 
determining factor in third party’s decision has the excluded creditors.
830
 Moreover, 
creditors can proceed against auditors through contractual door under article 240 of the 
LSC. In this sense Spanish law accords the same right of action against the company as 
its members under article 236 LSC. As such members cannot proceed against the 
company as “terceros” under article 1257 CC. In interpreting third party beneficiary 
right under article 1257, Spanish courts have held that “el contrato de auditoría 
concertado entre la sociedad y la entidad auditora no contiene estipulaciones en favor de 
los socios en calidad de terceros.”
831
 This position, according to OTERO CRESPO 
contrasts with the German doctrine where members may sue the company for wrong 




Meanwhile, Spanish courts in other important judgments on auditors’ liability have held 
third parties to include, creditors, shareholders, investors and members of a 
cooperative.
833
 In the light of the above quoted judgment, one may conclude that the 
case of PSV brought by members of the company as third parties was a remedy that 
should have been more appropriately pursued under contract. Therefore the decision 
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reached that members of the same company have a locus standi as third parties was per 
incuriam, with all due respect.
834
   
 
 
5. JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE LAW: SPAIN’S RESPONSE TO 
ECONOMIC LOSS PLEA 
It has been argued in some quarters that exclusionary rule on economic loss that has 
characterized the laws of countries with common law lineage had not in any way 
produced a downward trend in litigations on the subject. It is rather the countries of civil 
law heritage, where rights to recovery of economic loss are not classified according to 
their importance, that have rather had less litigation to contend with in terms of 
economic loss cases. Spain falls under the second category. Liability of auditors to third 
parties in Spain was a sterile doctrinal debate by academics as well as legal scholars 
with rarely any judgment on the subject, especially at the Supreme Court level. The 
long wait ended recently with the three successive high profile cases of XM 
Patrimonios, PSV and Euskal Air where the highest court pronounced on the subject. 
These cases are analyzed below. 
 
 
5.1 XM PATRIMONIOS STS 9 DE OCTUBRE DE 2008 (RJ 2008, 6042) 
This is the maiden case involving question of auditor’s liability to third parties to reach 
the Spanish Supreme Court. It was an appeal from Barcelona High Court where the 
court affirmed the decision of the court of first instance. Unsatisfied with the decision, 
the shareholders of XM Patrimonios, further appealed to the supreme court. The simple 
fact of the case was that auditors of XM Patrimonios, Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) 
gave a favorable report in their audit of the company’s accounts of 1993 financial year 
presented to Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV). In the report PwC 
have failed to mention the fact that some of the investor funds have been diverted by the 
Manager of the Security firm. The shareholders brought this action against the audit 
firm for failure to detect the irregularities in the accounts.  
 
                                                     




The fact in issue that the supreme was asked to determine was whether there was a 
causal relationship between the audit report of the Respondents and the Appellants’ 
loss. The Appellants argued that had the irregularities been detected and made public by 
audit report, the CMNV might have acted in time to prevent their loss. The Supreme 
Court rejected the above argument and held the auditors not liable because the 
protection offered by the Spanish audit law is to those persons who justifiably relied on 
erroneously performed audit report or failure on the auditor’s part to detect irregularities 
negligently. The Appellants have complained of neither situation. In other words, the 
Appellants were unable to convince the court that their loss has a link with the auditor’s 
report either because of reliance or in other form. The appeal failed. 
 
 
5.2 PSV STS DE 14 DE OCTUBRE 2008 (RJ 2008, 6913) 
Here the workers’ union UGT formed a cooperative to promote a low cost housing 
project across Spain. The project became paralyzed midway into construction, mainly 
because the Managers of the venture fraudulently diverted the funds of the cooperative 
to their private companies. This fact was not reflected on the audited accounts presented 
to the members at the Annual General Meeting. Members of the cooperative sued Ernst 
& Young and Allianz, the insurance company. They demanded for the additional cost 
they had to pay for the delay in the construction work which they attributed to the 
negligence of the auditors. The Plaintiffs succeeded at the court of first instance. On 
appeal to the Madrid High Court the decision was reversed. The high court exonerated 
the auditors and held that the conduct of the Managers was the cause of the delay.  
 
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, the apex court reversed the Madrid High 
Court’s decision and reaffirmed the lower court’s decision. In its judgment the court 
applied the equivalence of causation theory and reasoned that although the auditors did 
not cause the delay in the construction, they had contributed to it. The evidence revealed 
that for several years the auditors have failed to reflect the dire financial situation and 
mismanagement of the cooperative in their audit report. The court here, drawing a line 
of difference between causation in fact and causation in law, concluded that liability 
could be attributed to the auditors for denying the members of the cooperative the 
correct information and the opportunity to make the right decision. The court granted 
the appeal against the auditors and the insurance company. They were both ordered to 
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5.3 EUSKAL AIR STS 5 DE MARZO DE 2009 (RJ 2009, 1631) 
On similar facts, the Receivers of the bankrupt Euskal Air brought this case against 
PwC for its favorable audit report on the company’s 1990 fiscal year accounts. The 
plaintiffs alleged that the audit report should have been unfavorable because the then 
assets of the company were less than half the assets accredited by the audit. They 
therefore demanded the difference between the company’s assets on dissolution and its 
presumed assets had the auditors adverted to its imminent collapse. The court of first 
instance gave reason to the Receivers. The auditors appealed.  
 
The Appellants argued that their relationship with the company was contractual and the 
Respondents were strangers to the contract. The court citing section 11 (now section 26) 
LAC rejected their argument and stressed that third parties can also sue under the said 
section. The Supreme Court analyzed various theories of causation before arriving at a 
decision. It concluded that causation in law is the most relevant doctrine applicable 
because it gives objective approach to judicial consideration. The court finally rejected 
the appeal and concluded that loss based on reliance on wrongful audit report is what 
the law is out to prevent with tort liability provisions. 
 
In fact, the disproportionate audit liability issue forms part of the arguments adduced in 
the above cases. The liability question still remains a battle ground aside from the clear 
provisions of article 26 LAC. Litigants still appeal to it in order to avoid liability. 
Despite its attraction, the argument of Professor PANTALEÓN that article 26 LAC only 
protects a determined third party is yet to make significant adherents.
835
 The learned 
author employing the duty of care test observed that the auditor cannot be negligent to 
the whole world, but only to determinable receivers of the audit report. This will 
suppose a reduction of the risk faced by auditors and stability in the audit market.  
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But this is a civil law system where general principle of liability is the norm although 
proof is all together a different ball game. Hence, in the Euskal Air case above, the 
Supreme Court did not mince words in clearly rejecting the allusion to contract as the 
only medium for remedying audit liability. Certainly this may not be the end of 
economic loss plea in Spain but the Supreme Court has faithfully demonstrated that 
justice is according to the law. However, it is pertinent to point out that following the 
transposition of the European Parliament Directive 2006/43/CE into the new Spanish 
audit law, proportionate liability is now part of Spain’s law. 
 
If anything, these judgments signify the importance of prudence and informed judgment 
when it comes to investing in a volatile market like that of securities. Equity aids the 
vigilant not the indolent - as the saying goes! Moreover, “owing to the inherent 
limitations of an audit, there is an unavoidable risk that some material misstatements of 
the financial statements may not be detected, even though the audit is properly planned 
and performed in accordance with the ISAs.”
836
 Hence, it is generally imprudent for the 
plaintiff not to undertake a verification of the financial information contained in the 
statements. While these decisions are striking, considering the weight given by the law 
to the certification of the French “commissaires aux comptes”, this type of argument is 
widely found in the cases and has been approved by some commentators, who 
emphasize that certification is not insurance.
837
 
    
 
6. CONCLUSION: SIMILARITIES WITH THE COMMON LAW 
From the onset, a third party plaintiff in Spain is not preoccupied with considerations of 
duty or restriction related with economic loss. The system guarantees a general principle 
of liability as enshrined in articles 1101 CC and 1902 CC respectively. All damages are 
prima facie recoverable once the elements of liability can be proved – usually fault 
based. This is in contrast with the US system where liability is generally restricted to 
contract. Hence a third party plaintiff must prove the existence of duty between himself 
and the defendant to succeed. Moreover, economic loss actions are also restricted. Apart 
from these general doctrinal differences, the two systems share much in common. For 
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instance, in a recent judgment, the Supreme Court of Spanish placed importance on the 
absence of reliance on the statements.
838
 Moreover, some judgments have incorporated 
considerations similar to the notions of causation in fact and in law, remoteness of 
damage and proximate cause respectively in their interpretation of the general principle 
of responsibility in Spain.
839
 Finally there are arguments by contemporary Spanish legal 
scholars in favor of limiting the auditors’ liability to instances where auditors know or 
can foresee the specific plaintiff or class of plaintiffs to whom the accounts will be 


























                                                     
838
 RJ 2008/6042 supra. 
839
 PANTALEÓN PRIETO, F., Causalidad e Imputación…, op. cit., p. 1561. 
840





PUBLIC AUDIT OVERSIGHT AFTER ENRON: COMPARISON OF 




The marriage between modern economies and financial markets is not of convenience 
but of necessity. To say that financial markets depend on sound financial statements is 
an understatement; they are the main thrust of financial markets. Accounting by 
companies does not only serve the managements of companies that undertook them but 
also the wider public interest, which may include the stability of a country’s economy. 
Invariably, the decision by investors to invest or divest capital from a given country 
depends on the trust they place on the quality of its audit. If investors cannot trust 
financial statements coming out from companies, the companies will no longer have 
access to the capital they need, which in turn would deprive the said economy of 
necessary portfolio investment. So to protect investors and the users of financial 
statements by ensuring that information that emanate from companies to the public were 
credible was the rationale behind audit regulation.  
 
Accounting and auditing today is a hallmark of an irrepressible innovation undertaken 
over the time to suit the ever evolving needs and opportunities of investors.
841
 This, 
perhaps, points to the fact that the corporate paradigm, like any other human endeavor is 
not immutable, so long as expectation gap cannot be closed forever. We may well have 
to be adjusting corporate rules to accommodate our immediate as well as the foreseen 
future challenges. As DOTY argues, “as the moment passes, we change it to suit the 
next.”
842
 Thus, whenever audit standards set by the audit regulatory authorities cannot 
prevent audit failures due to lapse of time or development in the market, it is logical that 
societies should intervene and revise these standards or their laws to keep pace with the 
markets. 
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As indicated in Chapter I, it is relevant to emphasize that audit oversight can hardly be 
discussed in exclusion of corporate governance. In discussing audit oversight as it 
affects corporate governance, perhaps, the logical starting point is to present, by way of 
introduction, a historical background of corporation as we know it today. The modern 
corporation is a product of the ancient need to amass large sums to finance high-risk 
trading expeditions across oceans.
843
 These types of expedition, usually capital 
intensive, cannot be sponsored by a single individual. Therefore a group of people with 
similar interests, acting as a body, will come together and gather the capital required to 
embark on the expedition.
844
 In England, for example, many of such voyages were 
financed by the Crown. It is a common knowledge that various European nations had 
also financed such types of expeditions. Some of these trade missions included the 
Dutch East India Company, the British East Indian Company and the Hudson’s Bay 
Company,
845
 and the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria among others.  
 
We may think of globalization as a 20
th
 century phenomenon. But arguably, 
globalization began much earlier than its reckoning, especially in the area of trade and 
exchange. As European nations transformed from agricultural economies to mercantile 
and manufacturing activities, private international trade flourished.
846
 In the 14
th
 
century, for example, England began exporting manufactured goods to Prussia, the 
Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Thus, according to DOTY, centuries ago international 
trade became more significant to the British economy than the domestic trade.
847
 Even 




The role of auditors nonetheless, became more pronounced in the immediate aftermath 
of the Industrial Revolution, a period when Europe witnessed high economic growth 
that eventually led to the transformation of once small family business enterprises into 
large industrial corporations.
849
 These corporations later metamorphosed into joint stock 
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companies, the precursor of the modern-day public company.
850
 The increasing 
popularity of the joint stock companies, the separation of ownership and management 
and the demand by shareholders of independent information on how a company they 
partly own but not controlled is run, gave rise to the modern auditing.
851
 Over time, 
auditors came to symbolize transparency on the part of the companies as well as 
invaluable agents of the shareholders.
852
 The information they provide to the public 
became the most credible yardstick used by investors and creditors to measure the 
performance of the companies. This trust placed by third parties on auditors usually is 
the only thread that links them with their investments. As observed by a prominent 
securities lawyer, BLACK as follows: 
 
A strong public securities market, especially a public stock market, can facilitate 
economic growth. But creating strong securities markets is hard. That these 
markets exist at all is almost magical. Investors pay enormous amounts of 
money for completely intangible rights, whose value depends entirely on the 
quality of the information that the investors receive and on the honesty of other 
people, about whom the investors know almost nothing. This magic does not 




The relevance of the above analysis on this chapter is that the U.S. accounting 
profession emerged from that groundwork. By the last quarter of the 19
th
 century, the 
first major accounting body was established in the U.S., being American Association of 
Public Accountants, the lineal predecessor of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants.
854
 This was followed in 1896 by the New York state by passing the first 
law to recognize the qualification known as Certified Public Accountant, which, as 
CAREY writes, “marked the beginning of an accredited profession of accounting in the 
United States.”
855
 As financial statements became popular in the 1920s, audit work 
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blossomed. Increasing number of listed companies began to issue audited financial 
statements. By 1926, more than 90 percent of industrial companies listed on the New 
York Exchange were audited,
856
 even though the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
did not require audited statements until 1933.
857
 Yet in some ways, the NYSE had 
encouraged companies to publish their audited financial statements. 
 
With further development of financial markets, the provision of an independent opinion 
on the financial statements to the general public became the primary objective of an 
audit. Financial statements came to play a key role in the financial markets, which are 
essential source of funding to businesses and the heartbeat of the industrialized nation’s 
economy. Given the assurance role they play, auditors were recognized as professionals 
who act in public interest. The main objective of their work therefore changed from 
informing the management of inadequacies in the company to ensuring accurate 
financial disclosures to investors who entrust the companies with their capital. Audited 
financial statements assumed a crucial role in the functioning of capital markets because 
the auditing process reduced the information gap between the management and diverse 
groups of players on capital markets. But who would ensure that auditors remained 
committed to their founding objectives? We would find out in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
2. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND AUDIT CONTROL 
 
2.1 THE REGULATION VACUUM 
The debate and search for adequate measure of control over the audit profession has 
been a recurrent decimal right from the humble beginning of the profession. In Chapter 
III, we discussed audit expectation gap and how it contributes to growing number of 
cases against auditors. Among the myriad of problems highlighted as responsible for 
this gap, chief among them was leaving auditors to set their own rules. Incidentally, this 
is not a novelty. At the hearings held by U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency on the heels of the 1929 market crash, one of the central questions addressed 
was, if financial statements were to be made obligatory, “what assurance the public 
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would have that those statements were reliable.”
858
 Another option considered was 
whether to require periodic government audits of companies’ financial statements. An 
alternative was the proposal of the accounting profession which rooted for independent 
auditors to certify companies’ financial statements. In the arguments that ensued in the 
course of the Committee hearings, Senator BARKLEY, one of the skeptics of audit 
profession proposal engaged in an intense exchange with Col. CARTER, the senior 
partner of Haskins & Sells and the president of the New York State Society of Certified 
Public Accountants.  The outcome of their exchange went on to determine the future of 
audits in the United States, which is still relevant today. Some recount of their exchange 
is reproduced below: 
 
Sen. Barkley: Is there any relationship between your organization with 2,000 
members and the organization of controllers, represented here yesterday with 
2,000 members? 
 
Col. Carter: None at all. We audit the controllers. 
 
Sen. Barkley: You audit the controllers? 
 
Mr. Carter: Yes; the public accountant audits the controller’s account. 
 
Sen. Barkley: Who audits you? 
 




Whether Col. CARTER’s assertion of auditors acting in accord with good conscience is 
true is subject to proof in the following paragraphs. It may however, be safe to argue 
that the role they played in some of these monumental financial scandals is anything but 
conscionable. Be that as it may, finally, Col. CARTER, on behalf of the audit profession, 
succeeded in convincing the Committee on Banking and Currency, to allow the private 
sector instead of government agency to undertake audit of companies under the 
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Securities Acts under consideration.
860
 That was how government takeover of public 
companies’ audits was averted in what was to become the first most important 
legislation on audit of financial statements, the Securities Act of 1933. This was 
followed by Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which created the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and vested it with the authority to establish accounting 
principles to be applied in preparing those financial reports.
861
 Moreover, the Securities 
Acts, by requiring that all companies have their financial statements audited by 
independent CPAs elevated the accounting profession and increased the demand for its 
services. But it was how the SEC used its founding authority that is crucial in the 
history of the audit accounting in the U.S. and perhaps in the world at large. This 
sentiment was echoed by NIEMEIER as follows: 
 
While seemingly delegating a great part of that authority to the profession, to my 
mind the Commission’s early policy is better described as abandoning the 
profession to the vagaries of client pressures, thus suppressing the conscience of 




With its new status, the American Institute of Accountants went on to merge with its 
rival association, the American Society of Certified Public Accountants to form the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), thereby consolidating into 
one national body.
863
 The SEC on the other hand, notwithstanding its statutory mandate, 
chose to empower the accounting profession to establish accounting requirements.
864
 
This measure taken by the SEC, however, was not devoid of critics even within the 
Commission.
865
 Yet the Commission went ahead to permit companies the use of 
accounting practices for which there was “substantial authoritative support” as approved 
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and published by the Institute’s Committee on Accounting Procedure,
866
 the origin of 




The accounting profession, with leave of the Commission also established a standing 
committee on auditing standards, even though right from the beginning there were signs  
of the accounting profession’s inability to stand up to senior management, as evidenced 
by the accounting fraud at McKesson & Robbins in 1939.
868
 In that case, the 
management of McKesson & Robbins inflated its inventories and receivables after their 
expropriation of the company’s funds to the tune of $20 million. Their auditors, Price 
Waterhouse failed to neither confirm the receivables nor test the inventories thereby 
missing the fraud committed by the management. The scale of this scandal hugely 
embarrassed the accounting profession, as the Editor of the Institute’s Journal of 
Accountancy wrote in February 1939, “Like a torrent of cold water the wave of 





In the investigation carried out by the SEC to unearth the cause of the scandal, it was 
concluded that the overstatement of the management “should have been disclosed...if 
the auditors had corroborated the company’s records by actual observation and 
independent confirmation through procedures involving regular inspection of 
inventories and confirmation of accounts receivable….”
870
 Price Waterhouse in a swift 
response retorted that the findings of SEC investigation was unfair because it was 
supposedly hinged on their failure to test inventory and confirm receivables, procedures 
not required as audit practice at the time. Moreover, they claimed to have been 
instructed not to do so by the management. In a statement emitted in their defense, the 
Price Waterhouse wrote:  
 
While the procedures for whose omission we are now criticized were 
regarded as optional at the time, we were expressly instructed not to follow 
some of them, and we were not instructed to follow others, notwithstanding 
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our written warning that the scope of our examinations was not sufficiently 
extensive “to reveal either possible misappropriations of funds or 
manipulations of the accounts.” Furthermore, [the SEC report] quite 
overlooks the fact that the determination of the scope of our audit was 
delegated to the president of the company, who has now proved to have been 
the keystone of the intricately organized conspiracy.  
To address this lacuna, after the SEC inquiry, the profession expressly began 
requiring auditors to test inventories and confirm receivables as standard audit 
procedures. What the profession did not address however, was the seeming reliance 
by auditors on managements as indicated in this case. Contrary to the earlier 
assertions of Col. CARTER recounted above, auditors were not an independent check 




The years of 1940s to 1960s witnessed the rise of the auditing and accounting 
profession to the height of its reputation.
872
 Throughout this period, the SEC relied 
on the accounting profession for generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
as well as auditing procedures adopted by accounting firms in their engagements. 
This power and influence enjoyed by the accounting profession in the U.S. was 
unprecedented. No accounting profession has had such a privilege of setting the 
norms of professional practice anywhere,
873
 a sought of carte blanche if you will. 
NIEMEIER argues that although public oversight would not have been a magic wand 
and may not have solved all financial troubles forever, nonetheless, it might have 
alleviated some of the worst consequences of the financial scandals.
874
 NIEMEIER’s 
view is produced here: 
To my mind, the SEC’s failure to directly regulate accounting and auditing 
in those early days contributed to the profession’s difficulties in establishing 
robust standards that would have provided the basis to challenge 
management, when necessary. The roots of many of the recent auditing 
scandals lay in that flawed early policy, including the audits of W.R. Grace, 
                                                     
871
 Id. at p. 4. 
872







Waste Management, Xerox, Enron, WorldCom and others. But even before 
the scandals of our day, the SEC’s policy proved problematic, offering many 
warning signs that, if heeded earlier, might have spared both the profession 




3.2 FAILURE OF THE AICPA AND THE ADVENT OF PEER REVIEW 
The concern expressed above became evident in 1973 with the sudden collapse of 
Equity Funding, coming on the heels of equally damaging bankruptcy of Stirling 
Homex a year earlier.
876
 These failures raised questions as to the effectiveness of the 
standard setting system put in place by the accounting profession. The huge losses 
suffered by investors, especially, in Equity Funding securities coupled with the 
discovery of fraudulent dealings, like illegal and improper payments by major 
corporations that were not reflected in their financial statements, drew the criticism of 





This succession of events prompted an investigation by both the United States House of 
Representatives and the Senate. Rep. MOSS, Democrat from California, chaired the 
House subcommittee’s investigation of federal regulatory agencies.
878
 In its report, the 
subcommittee recommended that the SEC take charge of accounting and auditing 
standard setting and thereby removing this authority from the hands of the private 
sector.
879
The Senate on its part undertook a major investigation of the accounting 
profession by setting up a subcommittee to look into the activities of the accounting 
profession. The subcommittee was chaired by Sen. MELCALF, Democrat from Montana. 
The subcommittee launched an extensive factual examination of inter alia, the Big Eight 
firms, the Institute, and the FASB.
880
 In its final report, The Accounting Establishment 
(1976), the subcommittee came up with groundbreaking as well as controversial 
recommendations, which OLSON, the Institute’s Chief Executive later described as 




 Both are successful American companies in the 70s that filed for bankruptcy amid allegations of 











“almost as damaging to the profession as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was to the 




Prominent amongst the conclusions reached by the Senate subcommittee were that the 
accounting firms lacked independence from their clients and that they dominated the 
AICPA as well as its process of standard setting.
882
 The study also asserted that the Big 
Eight accounting firms exercise control over the FASB to advance the interest of their 
clients.
883
 The Senate subcommittee in its recommendations followed the footsteps of 
the House subcommittee by recommending the takeover of accounting and auditing 
standard setting process of publicly traded corporations by the federal government.
884
 
Although these investigations did not end up in legislation, they set in motion a debate 





As would be expected, the accounting profession through the medium of the FASB and 
the AICPA responded to the findings and recommendations of the Senate 
subcommittee.
886
 In a 40-page booklet tagged The Institute Responds, the AICPA 
countered the arguments advanced by the Senate subcommittee in its report. In response 
to the charge that accountants compromise their independence by advocating positions 
favorable to their clients, the Institute affirmed that such did not make them tools in the 
hands of their clients.
887
 While the FASB, in its 44-page reply stood firm in defense of 
the independence, integrity and objectivity of its process.
888
 But aside from the 
posturing, it was dawning on the accounting profession that the negative publicity 
generated by the investigations of both Houses of Congress had put them on a bad stead 
with public opinion. In fact it served as impetus for the introduction of self-regulation 
by the accounting profession. 
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2.3 ENTER THE SELF-REGULATION PROGRAM 
The unwanted publicity coupled with hearings at the United States House of 
representative and the Senate forced AICPA to rapidly change its methods to avoid 
public regulation. In fact, a bill proposed by Rep. Moss contemplated a body that in 
great aspect looked like the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, now 
established under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002.  The Institute hurriedly created its 
Division for the CPA, which consists of the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) and the 
Private Companies Practice Section.
889





Council created the division for CPA firms without seeking a vote of the 
membership because it believed that Congress would enact new legislation to 
regulate the profession if immediate steps were not then taken to bolster the 
profession’s system of self-regulation. That perception was borne out by the 
introduction by Congressman Moss on June 16, 1978 of H.R. 13175, which 
provided for a new federal statutory regulatory organization under the oversight 





The peer review was purposefully established to provide assurance to the public that 
firms that audited publicly-held companies had effective and quality control systems. 
Meanwhile, the CPA firms Division was meant to serve as vehicle for self-regulation. 
The SECPS, on the other hand, was intended to improve the quality and standard of 
firms that audit companies who filed statements with the SEC.
892
 Since all AICPA 
members who audited publicly-held companies were required to belong to the SECPS, 
it was a fundamental prerequisite for membership that they must submit to a mandatory 
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In order to boost its public image, the AICPA also constituted a body known as Public 
Oversight Board (POB), comprising of distinguished public servants that would oversee 
the activities of the SECPS, including the setting and enforcing of quality control 
standards and a newly established peer review process.
894
 The POB was funded by the 
SECPS membership dues. It represented the public, and meet with various elements of 
the self-regulatory program on a regular basis to give them the public perspective and 




What then is the peer review program? It is essentially an appraisal of auditors’ work 
based on designated accountants or a firm, named reviewers, carrying out a review of 
quality control systems, documents, manuals and checklists of another firm being 
reviewed, called the reviewee.
896
 The reviewers will begin by first acquainting 
themselves with the firm’s quality control policies and procedures. The reviewers then 
selected a sample of engagements for which the work papers, correspondence files and 
other documentation were walked through and checked. On the final day, an exit 
conference is held where the reviewers would explain to the reviewee the scope of their 




The SEC, which had long been advocating for the peer review welcomed this 
development. But unfortunately, the peer review could do little to tame the growing 
competition among auditing firms for clients that was becoming more intense and 
vicious by the day. The aggressive pursuit of profit by audit firms in wanton disregard 
of professional values was more reminiscent of commerce than a profession. 
 
The fierce competition embarked upon by auditors might be because of the changing 
conditions in the practice of public accounting or may be better attributed to changes in 
auditors’ code of ethics. Auditors like other professionals such as doctors and lawyers 
are subject to certain professional etiquette usually drawn up by their professional 
bodies. Part of these professional ethics rules, was the prohibition of direct, uninvited 
solicitation and competitive bidding. But due to unrelenting pressure from the United 
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States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the 1970s 
over portions of its Code of Professional Ethics alleged to be in restraint of trade, the 
AICPA was compelled to remove the ban on competitive bidding from its code of 
ethics.
898
 This amendment together with the unbanning of uninvited solicitation, to the 
AICPA’s code of ethics completely changed the climate in which audit firms conducted 
their affairs. ANREDER, a close observer of the accounting profession described the 
situation in an article in Barron’s as follows: 
 
What’s happened, essentially, is that the nation’s top accounting firms-some big, 
some smaller-are locked in a fierce battle marked by vigorous price cutting. 
Some blame a growth-at-any-cost syndrome they say has afflicted some of the 
profession’s top firms. Others contend that it is an inevitable consequence of a 




With the elimination of bans on activities, such as advertisement, uninvited solicitation 
and competitive bidding that were previously seen as unethical by the AICPA, auditing 
became mired in an unrestrained environment of competition for clients, which placed 
strains on its professional values. This development fundamentally changed 
accountants’ relationship with their clients forever. MASON,
900
 a long critic of the 
AICPA and the big firms, complained in 1985 about fast erosion of professionalism in 
the accounting profession as follows:  
 
Today, the media describes public accounting as an industry, seldom as a 
profession-and it does have all the earmarks of an industry including cut-throat 
competition, ‘low-balling,’ cheap advertising, and open solicitation by one CPA 




Mr. MASON was quick to point the blame at the FTC and the Justice Department for 
creating what he characterized as “unprofessional and undignified atmosphere.”
902
 This 
disturbing atmosphere of the 1980s as described by BOWMAN, was a sought of rat race 
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where the major accounting firms were pitted against one another in the sharply 
competitive bidding process.
903
 He also denounced how companies bid for tenders of 
between 25 and 50 percent below the previous year’s audit fee charged. This situation 
inevitably leads to one conclusion; auditors were at the receiving end and at the mercy 
of their clients.  
 
In what may be described as a call for prudence on his professional colleagues, 
BEECHER, reasoned that, “price competition had always existed between audit firms, but 
that the firms sold quality as well as price. Clients prized audit quality, before they 
began to view the audit as a commodity.”
904
 The same sentiment was expressed by the 
architect of the modern firm of Arthur Andersen & Co., SPACEK, while reflecting on 
accounting values of yesteryears. He wrote:  
 
The competition [today] is in fees only. We always had such competition, but to 
offset it a firm can strengthen itself by the energetic position it takes to make it a 
leader… outstanding service is equally an offset, and both characteristics are 
prime offsets to price. I know because I practiced it for 20 years- saying publicly 
that we were the highest priced firm, but the higher price was more than matched 





Unrestrained competition coupled with the desire to retain valued clients eventually led 
the big firms to entirely change their posture towards their clients. In previous years, for 
instance, auditors “conveyed a firm position on the propriety of any borderline 
accounting and disclosure practices adopted by the client”, but during the 1980s 
auditors would rather find any technical means to go around it or a suitable analogy in 
order to approve the position sought by their client.
906
 They would be seen huddling 
with their clients to find ways of compromising rather than standing firm on 
professional principles. Unsurprisingly, those were the years of consulting known then 
as Management Advisory Service (MAS).  
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3. MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES AND AUDIT PRACTICE 
 
3.1 THE IMPACT OF MAS ON AUDITING SERVICES 
As audit accounting continue to transform itself into consulting services, earlier referred 
to as Management Advisory services, consulting services had become the vogue for 
accountants, and was fast overtaking the audit services. The reason for this is simple, 
since a chunk of their revenue came from consulting services, auditing was the means 
they used to cuddle and appease the client, essentially by foregoing the rigorous 
requirement of a principled audit. The SEC and other stakeholders have from time to 
time expressed concern about the apparent conflict of interest the consulting services 
may suppose for audit practice. A similar concern was expressed by GREGORY when he 
warned auditors of an increasingly deteriorating professional climate: 
 
It seems that the effects of the phenomenal growth in the profession and the 
competitive pressure have created in some CPAs attitudes that are increasingly 
commercial and nearly devoid of the high-principled conduct that we have come 
to expect of a true professional. It is sad that we seem to have become a breed of 
highly skilled technicians and businessmen, but have subordinated courtesy, 
mutual respect, self-restraint, and fairness for a quest for firm growth and a 




The SEC tried to find ways to reduce the damage the consulting services may cause the 
profession by limiting the scope these services. This was reflected in the SEC’s 1978 
annual report submitted to the Senate’s Metcalf subcommittee by the SEC Chairman 
WILLIAMS as follows: 
 
Another important issue requiring immediate attention is the question of the 
appropriate range of services―other than the performance of the audit 
itself―which accounting firms should be permitted to offer to their audit 
clients… 
 
In considering this issue, it will be necessary to resolve three basic questions: 
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a. Are there situations in which the magnitude of the potential fees from 
management advisory services is so large as to affect adversely an auditor’s 
objectivity in conducting an audit? 
 
b. Are there some services that are so unrelated to the normal expertise and 
experience of auditors that it is inconsistent with the concept of being an 
auditing professional for auditors to perform those services? 
  
c. Are there, conversely, some services so closely linked to the accounting 
function that, for the auditor to perform those services for his client means 
that, the auditor will, in conducting the audit, be in a position of reviewing 
his own work? 
 
These questions were raised at a critical juncture of audit accounting history, when 
unprecedented growth and unbridled competition threatened its will to serve the public 
interest; incidentally the same questions are still being raised today. In a 1979 Release 
ASR No. 264, “Scope of Services by Independent Accountants”, the SEC did not mince 
words in its warning, which reads as follows: 
 
…the growing array of non audit services offered by some independent public 
accountants―and the growing importance of management advisory services to 
the revenues, profits, and competitive position of accounting firms―are a cause 
for legitimate concern as to the impact of these activities on auditor 
independence, objectivity, and professionalism. 
 
In a response to the above release, the accounting profession argued that auditors 
rendering management advisory services to a client actually get to have a better 
understanding of the client, which helps them in carrying out audit work. The profession 
concluded that complaints about ‘scope of services’ was a perception only of those who 
misunderstood the audit process.
908
 This was, in spite of a 1979 study by the POB on 
Scope of Services by CPA firms, which stated that: 
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…there is enough concern about the scope of services in responsible quarters so 
that the question cannot be dismissed as a “non problem.” The Board believes 
that there is potential danger to the public interest and to the profession in the 
unlimited expansion of MAS to audit clients, and some moderating principles 




This study notwithstanding, the POB was reluctant to take on the profession on the 
issue, at least, in the second year of its existence. The POB therefore concluded on a 
reconciliatory note that “at this time no rules should be imposed to prohibit specific 
services on the grounds that they are or may be incompatible with the profession of 
public accounting, might impair the image of the profession, or do not involve 




Meanwhile, the deterioration of audit professional values continued unabated. Many 
observers feared that on the long run the uncontrolled expansion of auditing to non-
audit services will diminish the faith in the auditor’s independence. In a move to find 
some answers to the issue, the AICPA constituted a committee called Special 
Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants. The 
committee was headed by ANDERSON, AICPA Board Chairman 1980-1981. In its 
interim report, the committee could not sound more alarming: 
 
There has been an erosion of self-restraint, conservatism and adherence to basic 
professional values at apace and to an extent that is unprecedented in [the] 
profession’s history… We believe the profession is on the brink of a crisis of 




This Special Committee was appointed in October 1983, and came up with its final 
report in May 1986. The committee reiterated its observations in the interim that “the 
competitive environment has placed pressure on the traditional commitment to 
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professionalism in the practice of public accounting.”
912
 The committee however came 
up with proposals on standards of conduct to “impose a measure of self-restraint and 
self-regulation by calling upon AICPA members to use their judgment in applying 
broad standards to determine what is consistent with professional conduct in the 
provision of non-attest services.”
913
 On the same note, LEE, the AICPA Board Chairman 
1983-84 and member of the Special Committee was also quoted as saying: 
 
The profession is changing and change is necessary, but we need to approach it 
with caution and there needs to be reasonable limitation on what services we 
should be providing as a profession. There’s a perception by our critics, 
Congress for one, that we may be sacrificing our objectivity if not our 





3.2 AUDITING AS MULTIDISCIPLINARY PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 
As the world economy expanded in the 1950s and 1960s the demand for audit services 
became global. Accounting firms pursued aggressive expansion overseas to cater for 
their globally expanding clients. This expansion included in consulting services as well. 
Meanwhile, by the 1970s audit firms had apparently came to the conclusion that the 
audit market was becoming saturated.
915
 To remedy this situation, the firms diversified 
and broadened their consulting services. The expansion in consulting services markedly 
shifted the distribution of their gross fees from auditing to consulting services. This 
margin only grew wider in the 1980s to the extent that consulting commanded larger 
share of their gross fees. 
 
Audit firms like any other profit-seeking enterprises, had always been run as businesses, 
but unlike other business enterprises they were guided by professional values―their 
most proud profit. But all this changed in the 1980s. The drive of audit firms became 
global competiveness and dominance. To achieve this they must widen the scope and 
scale of the lucrative consulting services, develop strategic plans to promote growth and 
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global reach and of course greater profitability.
916
 What they achieved in the end was 
transformation into worldwide enterprises, serving multinational clients around the 
globe in services across the board. This is evident in the global dominance of the audit 
market by the so-called Big Four. 
 
One important factor that adds credence to the fact that audit firms had abandoned their 
professional aims in their quest for profitability was the pressure they placed on partners 
to reach certain “income targets.” Partners must strive to attain these targets or face the 
consequences, which may include dismissal from the firm, in extreme cases. This 
business strategy was by no means empowering nor was it compatible with a partner 
having the necessary confidence to stand up to clients on questionable accounting 
practices. WALTERS argued that in their push for profitability the big firms were 




The practice of dismissing underperforming partners is not novel to auditing, but it was 
usually on grounds of non-adherence to professional standards, not because of failure to 
bring more business to the firm. This fearsome competitive atmosphere in the practice 
of public accounting was well captured by COOK when he observed in 1985 that: “Five 
years ago if a client of another firm came to me and complained about service, I’d 
immediately warn the other firm’s executive…Today I try to take away his client.”
918
 In 
the heat of the pursuit of profitability Peat Marwick and Thornton & Co. were reported 
in 1985 to have dismissed some partners for their failure to meet marketing targets.
919
 
On this altered professional to business mindset, WALTERS in 1985 was quoted to have 
observed that: 
 
The major firms are on growth treadmill that inevitably will stop, but each 
manager is determined to keep it moving even faster during his regime. This has 
required diversification into many “information based” services. The aggregate 
effect of these diversifications is to change the balance of the professional 
mindset―moving farther from an audit mentality and toward a consulting 
mentality. The diversified service draws the firms increasingly into competition 
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with other disciplines that have few or no professional/competitive constraints, 





With the apologist mindset adopted by the audit firms, mainly to appease their clients 
instead of standing up to them, it was just a matter of time before something goes 
wrong. Sooner than later it happened.  
 
When many banks and savings institutions began to file for bankruptcy in 1980s, 
questions were raised about the propriety of auditing and accounting practices.
921
 
Moreover, auditor fraud allegations in high profile cases like E.S.M. Government 
Securities, Wedtech Corp. and ZZZZ Best embarrassed the accounting profession.
922
 
These cases, nevertheless, did not make things better instead things took a turn for the 
worse, because regulators of banks and the thrift institutions encouraged the use of 
deceptive accounting practices to “rescue” these institutions because of “public 
interest.”
923
 The AICPA was also reported to have joined the regulators in pleading with 




What followed thereafter was the accounting profession raising the ante. Moreover, 
with the help of a new regulation, Regulatory Accounting Practices (RAP), that allowed 
banks to ignore losses they sustained on bad loans or amortize the losses for a period of 
five to ten years, in clear violation of GAAP.
925
 Almost at the same time, companies 
CEOs were under enormous pressure to achieve forecasted earning targets, the CEOs 
will usually turn to companies’ accountants to help them “manage” to achieve these 
targets. Auditors would subsequently be asked to do whatever they can to approve these 
accounts. This was referred to as “creative accounting technique.”
926
 In other words 
auditing had become the means of looking for loopholes in regulation or whatever is 
necessary to validate client’s accounts. 
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 The regulatory accounting practices regulation was actually contrary to GAAP. 
926
 ZEFF, S. A., How the U.S. Accounting Profession…, Pt. II, op. cit. p. 273. 
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As this trend continued, the SEC had so far avoided confrontation with the accounting 
profession. It nonetheless strongly disagreed with the profession that independence 
should be judged “from the perspective of a reasonable and prudent person who 
possesses both knowledge and experience.”
927
 The SEC emphasized that independence 





Meanwhile the profit mentality of the profession continued unabated. STEVENS in his 
1991 book made this resounding warning on the future choices that await the 
profession: 
 
As the firms become more intimately involved with their clients through their 
consulting practices, as they think of themselves more and more as consultants 
who happen to do audits just to get a foot in the door and as they continue to 
reward salesmanship and marketing over technical proficiency, they are clearly 
headed toward a day of reckoning―a day when the firms, or Congress acting for 
them, will force the issue and demand that they decide whether they want to 
retain the licensed privilege of auditing the corporate community by spinning off 
the MAS practices, or whether they want to join in the open competition of 




As increasing number of non-audit personnel who are not bound by the Code of Ethics 
of the profession continue to climb their firms’ ladder of leadership, the SEC voiced out 
its concern to the audit profession on the consequences of this development on 
credibility of auditing.
930
 Meanwhile in its 1993 report, the POB adverted to the 
growing public concern on the performance of the audit profession and recommended 
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 Public Oversight Board (1993, pp. 43-46) in ZEFF, S. A., How the U.S. Accounting Profession…, Pt. 
II, op. cit. p. 276. 
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By the second half of the 1990s market consulting and non-audit services intensified. 
Arthur Anderson for example created Anderson Consulting. Their only concern was 
threat of litigation. To cast away this threat, the big firms together with the AICPA 
lobbied the US Congress to overturn President Clinton’s veto and approve the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
932
 With threat of litigation at bay, auditors felt 
safer and took more risks by broadening the scope of their consulting services with new 
services like “assurance services”,
933
 and attestation, which according to ZEFF implies 
retrospective auditing.
934
 The cumulative effect of this was that it created a climate of 
insecurity for the audit partners to resist applying the sometimes illicit accounting 
interpretation of their client or risk jeopardizing their chief source of income. This 
atmosphere was best summarized by the Public Oversight Board’s Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness as follows: 
 
The growth in equity value over the past decade has introduced extreme pressure 
on management to achieve earnings, revenue or other targets. These pressures 
are exacerbated by the unforgiving nature of the equity markets as securities 
valuations are drastically adjusted downward whenever companies fail to meet 
“street” expectations. Pressures are further magnified because management’s 
compensation often is based in large part on achievement earnings or other 
financial goals or stock-prices increases. These pressures on management, in 
turn, translate into pressures on how auditors conduct audits and their 




Indeed the financial crisis could not find a more fertile ground to happen; shame of a 
profession that had gained the world at the expense of its soul. ZEFF described it as a 
recipe for disaster.
936
 Perhaps that disaster was the financial crisis. 
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 The Panel on Audit Effectiveness 2000, pp. 2-3 cited from ZEFF, S. A., How the U.S. Accounting 





4. EUROPE: FROM NATIONAL TO ‘FEDERAL’ AUDIT FRAMEWORK  
As seen above, although Europe may have a shared history with US in the evolution of 
auditing to what it is today, their respective regulatory framework grew on a different 
footing. Whereas, the US audit developed within a relatively unified regulatory and 
legal environment, audit regulation in the EU developed heterogeneously at national 
levels. Although audit regulation in both the EU and the US are established for the same 
purpose: to protect the users of financial statements, both had threaded different paths to 
achieve that aim. When regulation is discussed in Continental Europe, for example, this 
typically means public supervision.
937
 The US on the other hand had a long history of 
peer review mechanism until very recently.  
 
Since the individual countries of Europe pursued audit regulation through their national 
laws, it means that variations in the national regulations may translate into differences 
in the quality of audit, which makes a single audit market a farfetched idea. All the 
same, under the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC, the EU continued to use the 
existing national legislations by recommending that companies covered by the Directive 
“must have their annual accounts audited by one or more persons authorized by national 
law to audit accounts.”
938
 This requirement was later extended by the Seventh Council 




After observing that divergent external quality assurance is inimical to the single market 
goals, the EU through the Eighth Directive 84/253/EEC prescribed common standards 
for approval of persons undertaking statutory audits. This inter alia, included minimum 
educational qualifications and/or practical experience required of auditors. The 
Directive, however, “stops short of including requirements as to how an audit should be 
performed.”
940
 Obviously, a single audit market cannot thrive on divergent ways of 
conducting audits. To tackle this problem, a number of issues have to be resolved by the 
EU. These issues are, first, “the extent to which auditing practices are standardized 
across the EU to ensure that financial statements of companies in member states are 
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underpinned by common levels of assurance and credibility.”
941
 The second is the issue 
of audit expectation gap, seen in Chapter III as responsible for some high-profile 
corporate failures in the EU as well as around the world. These “failures invite rigorous 
scrutiny of the role and independence of the statutory auditor, which invariably leads to 
calls for reform.”
942
 The third, according to DEWING & RUSSEL “is the extent to which 
there is a European market in audit services, as differences remain in laws and 
regulations” among member states. In fact the countries that constitute the single market 




The EC, with all the symptoms of a federation, albeit in denial, realized that no single 
market can endure with this incompatibility. To unearth the problems, the EC promoted 
some studies, such as the study on “Competition in European accounting” (1992) and 
on the “Role, the Position and the Liability of the Statutory Auditor” (1996).
944
 The 
studies indeed showed that so long as the important differences between the national 
laws and regulation of member states remain, there cannot be a European market in 
audit services. This is succinctly summed up in the published Green Paper
945
 as follows: 
 
The role of the statutory auditor has recently been the subject of much debate 
worldwide. As a result in particular of a number of important financial failures, 
questions have been raised concerning the function of the statutory audit and the 
independence of the auditor. At EU level, it has been difficult to respond to these 
questions because the regulatory framework which surrounds the statutory audit 
at EU level is incomplete. There is no common view at EU level on the role, the 
position and the liability of the statutory auditor. The absence of such a common 
view has a negative impact on audit quality and on the freedom of establishment 












 FERREIRA-GOMES, J. J. M., “Auditors as Gatekeepers: The European Reform of Auditors’ Legal 
Regime and the American Influence”, Colombian Journal of European Law, 11, 2005, p. 672. 
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The document after analyzing and discussing the “existing regulation of the statutory 
audit at EU level and the reasons why renewed action at EU level may be justified” 
came to the following priorities for action, which among others are that: 
 
a. The absence of a common definition of the statutory audit in the EU creates a 
damaging expectation gap. A common approach to the statutory audit, taking 
account of the latest developments at international level, seems desirable. If the 
audit is to add confidence to published financial statements, users need to know 
what the audit certificate means in terms of assurance. In this regard, particular 
attention should go to the role of the auditor in respect of the going concern 
status of the company and the action to be undertaken by the auditor in case of 
fraud and other illegal acts. 
 
b. Consideration should be given to what extent existing International Standards on 
Auditing could be the starting point of a common definition of the statutory 
audit. Full account would also need to be taken, however of any particularities 
which distinguish the European from the international environment. 
 
c. To be effective, the common definition would need to become part of the 
regulatory framework in all Member States. It is for consideration whether an 
EU Directive would be needed to achieve this result or whether a 
Recommendation would suffice. In either case, due attention would need to be 
paid to flexibility, so that any legal requirement can easily be adapted to the 
rapidly changing environment in which the auditor operates. 
 
d. Once an agreement has been reached on the definition of the statutory audit, it 
should be easier to agree on the minimum content of the audit report. Because 
the audit report is the medium through which the statutory auditor communicates 
with shareholders, creditors, employees and with the public at large, it seems 
desirable that a similar wording in the audit report is used throughout the EU. 
 
e. In several member states the wording of the audit report has been adapted to that 
developed by the International Federation of Accountants. It is for consideration 
to what extent this could also be the starting basis for a common definition at EU 
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level. Proper attention would however need to be given to any particularities 
which distinguish the European from the international environment. In order to 
reduce the expectation gap, it would be necessary for the audit report to provide 
more information on what the auditor has actually done, which professional 
standards he has applied in carrying out his task and whether the financial 
information prepared by the company conforms with legal and other regulatory 
requirements. It would also be necessary for any reservations which the auditor 
might have to be clearly spelled out in his report. 
 
f. As for the definition of the statutory audit, it seems necessary for the common 
definition of the audit report to have legislative backing in the Member States. It 
is for consideration whether this points to binding legislation (i.e. a Directive) at 
the EU level, or whether a Commission Recommendation would be enough. Due 
attention must in any case be paid to flexibility, so that any legal requirement 
could be easily adapted to the rapidly changing environment in which the 
auditor operates, in particular developments related to the introduction of new 
information technologies. 
 
g. It is for consideration which instrument is most appropriate to ensure that an 
agreement reached at EU level is likely to be adhered to in practice. 
 
h. Recent debates about corporate governance have stressed the need to define 
more clearly the role of the board of directors in preparing the financial 
statements. The issue is however much more complicated and extends to 
defining the role of all parties involved in the financial reporting process (board 
of directors, supervisory board, general meeting of shareholders, auditor). In 
order to improve the system of checks and balances within the company, more 
attention should be paid to issues such as the creation of an audit committee and 
the establishment of a proper functioning system of internal control. 
 
i. It is difficult to deal at EU level with matters of corporate governance: past 
efforts to harmonize law on the structure of the company have not succeeded. In 
order to contribute to the debate at national level, it might be useful to consider a 
Recommendation at EU level on possible ways to improve the present system of 
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corporate governance, especially in as far as it relates to financial reporting. It 
would then be up to member states to initiate any necessary legislative action at 
national level. 
 
j. The absence of a legal requirement at EU level that all statutory audits 
conducted on the basis of Community law must be carried out on the basis of an 
agreed set of auditing standards is a handicap for the Single Market and in the 
international context. It should be examined whether the standards on auditing 
developed by the International Auditing Practices Committee of the 
International Federation of Accountants and already applied to a certain extent 
in most member states could provide a possible basis for agreed standards at EU 
level. As with international accounting standards, it would seem necessary to 
devise a mechanism to determine whether existing IFAC standards meet 
European requirements and to ensure increased European influence in the 
development of international auditing standards. 
 
 
k. Such a mechanism at EU level could bring together all parties involved at 
national level in the definition of auditing standards and could discuss all 
relevant auditing matters. It would be important that an assurance be obtained 
that any auditing standards agreed upon at EU level were actually being 
followed in practice at national level. This might be difficult to achieve without 
giving those standards some kind of legal backing. 
 
l. Even if a code of principles on auditor independence and a core set of auditing 
standards can be agreed upon, the system will only be effective if the standards 
are enforced and if there is appropriate quality control. If a mechanism were set 
up at EU level, as suggested above, one of its tasks could also consist in 
examining the way in which quality control in the audit field is assured in the 
various Member States. Within the context of the Single Market, it is also 
important that the regulatory authorities in member states communicate with 
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This was followed by further consultations and conference
948
 to discuss the issues raised 
in the Green Paper. The Green Paper quickly got the support of Economic and Social 
Committee,
949
 which urged the Commission to establish priorities and an action plan 
setting forth minimum requirements for the European Union. The European Parliament 
followed suit by adopting the Green Paper in its resolution of January 15, 1998. The 
Parliament further emphasized the importance of auditor independence requirements 
and urged for a new legislation on the issue.  
 
 
Based on the results of the studies promoted and the comments received, the EC issued 
a communication on “The Statutory Audit in the European Union: The Way 
Forward.”
950
 This communication proposed setting up of a committee on auditing 
composed of experts nominated by Member States, representatives of the bodies 
responsible for elaborating auditing standards at national levels and representatives of 
national and European accounting and auditing profession. The committee is charged 
with the following task with emphasis on self-regulation: 
 
A. a review of existing international standards on auditing and their application in 
an EU context with the objective of determining whether the application of these 
standards meets the full need for auditing standards in the EU or whether there 
are gaps to be filled, 
 
B. contributing to the work of the International Auditing Practices Committee of 
the International Federation of Accountants, including coordination of views on 
exposure drafts, 
 
C. an examination of the audit quality monitoring systems in the member states and 
of possible proposals for improvement, 
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D. an examination of a set of core principles on independence developed by the 
European accounting profession. 
 
 
Further recommendations of the communication included: that audit should be seen in 
the wider context of corporate governance, and therefore the position of the auditor 
within the company must be strengthened; the professional liability of auditors should 
also be examined; and that more effort should be exerted to ensure that member states 




After some fault starts, like the failure of the Proposed Fifth Directive (1972–1988), the 
EU managed to get its initiatives on audit quality assurance back on track with 
publication of two recommendations.
952
 The first being, the Commission 
Recommendation 2001/256/EC, of November 15, 2000, on quality assurance for the 
statutory audit in the European Union: minimum requirements. In this document, the 
Commission sets out a benchmark for member states on their quality assurance systems 
by recommending common minimum requirements, as shown below: 
 
1. Member States should have a minimum standard of assurance on financial 
statements reliability; 
 
2. Both peer review and monitoring(where peers carry out quality assurance review 
and where employees of professional body or regulators do so) are acceptable 
methods for quality assurance; 
 
3. All auditors should be consistently reviewed over a maximum period of six 
years except those auditing ‘public interest entities’ and auditors with less than 
satisfactory review results; 
 
4. The scope of quality should include an assessment of the internal quality control 
system of an audit firm; 
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5. Quality assurance systems should have adequate public oversight consisting of a 
majority of non-practitioners on the overview board, and should also publish its 
results; 
6. Member states should have a disciplinary mechanism with power to sanction 
auditors, including their removal from the statutory auditor’s registry; 
 
7. Audit files that are subject to review for the purpose of quality assurance should 
be exempted from confidentiality clauses, nonetheless, reviewers must comply 
with the same confidentiality standards required of auditors; 
 
8. Finally, member states should ensure that reviewers have necessary resources to 
be objective and independent. 
 
 
The second recommendation was the Commission’s Recommendation 2002/590/EC, of 
May 16, 2002, on Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental 
Principles. As the name suggests, it sets out some fundamental principles and specific 
requirements regarding the independence of auditors in member states of the EU. It 
went on to emphasize that the responsibility of upholding the principles of 
independence lies first and foremost on the auditor. Hence, auditors must desist from 
carrying out an audit “if there are any financial, business, employment or other 
relationships between the statutory auditor and his client (including certain non-audit 
services provided to the audit client) that a reasonable and informed third party would 
conclude compromise the statutory auditors independence.”
953
 These fundamental 
principles were inter alia that: 
 
a. Auditors must be and be seen to be credible, independent and objective in 
carrying out their functions; 
 
b. Auditors have the responsibility to ensure that the principles of independence are 
upheld in the course of their duty; 
 





c. Circumstances that pose threat to auditor’s independence must be identified and 
avoided. The nature of these threats according to the recommendation include,  
self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity or trust and intimidation; 
 
d. Where there may be threat to independence, adequate safeguard measures should 
be put in place to mitigate or eliminate the threat; 
 
e. Auditors should undertake individual policies on independence which must be 
flexible to accommodate future changes; 
 




Audit regulation in Europe continue to develop within the single market, albeit, at a 
slow space until the financial scandals struck. The EU, according to DEWING, had prior 
to the financial scandals abandoned its approach of issuing company law directives as 
evidenced in the EC communication (EC, 2003b) on statutory audit,
954
 where the EC 
signaled its preference to International Standards (ISAs) on Accounting prepared by the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB). The EU felt more at 
home with international standards like the ISAs and was keen to encourage their mutual 
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5. ENRON AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
5.1 THE INCEPTION OF THE CRISIS 
Right at the beginning of the new millennium a wave of corporate and financial 
scandals gripped the US financial market. But what caught the most public attention 
was that of the Enron, considered to be the largest bankruptcy in US history.
956
 The 
circumstances of Enron’s fall should be analyzed in a wider context of its abrupt rise to 
fame. As the saying goes, hasty climbers have sudden falls. The Enron fairy tale began 
as a response to a lot of debt it incurred in the course of the merger process and made 
worse by deregulation in the sector which broke the exclusive rights it had to its 
pipelines.
957
 The company had to find a new and innovative ways to make profit and 
keep its cash flow, if it wants to survive.  
 
The company assigned this task to Jeffrey SKILLING, a young consultant with a 
background in banking and asset and liability management. The young consultant came 
up with a revolutionary solution to Enron’s problems cash flow and profit.
958
 SKILLING 
proposed the creation of a “gas bank” in which Enron would buy gas from a network of 
suppliers and sell it to a network of consumers.
959
 This way Enron would control and 
guarantee both the supply and the price, thereby charging fees for the transactions and 
assuming the associated risks. Through the guidance of the young consultant, the 
company returned to profit as well as created both a new product and a new paradigm 




The company was so impressed by SKILLING’s genius that it created a new division 
called Enron Finance Corp to be headed by Skilling. Under SKILLING’s watch Enron 
dominated the market for natural gas, with more contacts, more access to supplies and 
more customers than any of its competitors. With its market power, Enron could predict 
future prices with great accuracy, thereby guaranteeing superior profits. As a result, 
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Enron parts from a comparatively advantaged position in relation to its close 
competitors, as Skilling puts it:  
 
If you look at this whole concept of creating markets, the fundamental advantage 
of a virtually integrated system vs. a physically integrated system is you need 
less capital to provide the same reliability. How do you do that? It’s a financial 
theory. Non delivery is a nonsystematic risk. If a pipeline blows up or a 
compressor goes down or a wire breaks, the bigger your portfolio, the greater 
your ability to wire around that....So, if for example, I’m just starting in the gas 
merchant business and I’m selling gas from central Kansas to Kansas City, if the 
pipeline [between those places] blows up, I’m out of business. For Enron, if that 
pipeline blows up, I’ll back haul out of New York, or I’ll bring Canadian gas in 
and spin it through some storage facilities. If you can diversify your 
infrastructure, you can reduce nonsystematic risk, which says there’s a...very 
strong tangible network effect.... But you’ve got to get big, you’ve got to get that 
initial market share, or you're toast. That's why we’ll continue to see shakeouts 




Enron, like many other companies, took advantage of US accounting rules, which 
allows the use of “special purpose entities” (SPEs) to access capital and manage assets 
off balance sheet. These accounting rules were measures companies were allowed to use 
in order to spread their risk.
962
 Through the use SPEs return on an asset (ROA) can be 
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 The use of the SPEs was by no means a standard accounting practice. It was a novelty introduced in 
the 1990s to help companies spread their risks. In this sense, DEAKIN & KONZELMANN in DEAKIN, S. & 
KONZELMANN, S. J., Learning from Enron, ESRC Centre for Business Research, Cambridge, Working 
Paper No. 274, p. 5 argue as follows: 
 
It is a basic principle of modern company law and accounting practice that the accounts of parent 
and subsidiary companies in the same group should be consolidated. Otherwise, it is a fairly 
simple matter to shift assets between parent and subsidiary in such a way as to give a misleading 
impression to shareholders of the state of their respective balance sheets. This principle has been 
recognized for over half a century in developed economies and was introduced as a response to 
some of the more egregious accounting scandals that accompanied the Great Crash of 1929 and 




maximized, and risk minimized, by transferring it to an SPE, which must at some point 
repay the debt that it has incurred to the vendor company. An outside investor comes in 
to supply external capital and share the risk with the vendor, in exchange for which it 
also gets to share in the high rate of return that the SPE can provide. Albeit, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) guidelines requires that only 3% of the 
SPE be owned by an outside investor.
963
 Otherwise such SPE must be classified as a 
subsidiary and its financial position declared in the company’s financial statements. 
Under the leadership of Andrew FASTOW, Enron embarked on a complex and 
sophisticated financial engineering that overstretched the limits of accounting rules and 
took the use of SPEs to new heights.
964
 Typically, Enron SPEs, with the acquiescence of 
major banks, would borrow money often with guarantees from Enron. The borrowed 
cash would then be used to bolster Enron finances, but was not necessarily transferred 
to Enron. The debt is not reflected on its financial reports and Enron did not disclose the 
contingent liability for the debt as required by GAAP.
965
 Other dubious method 
encouraged by FASTOW was the transfer of losses of investment companies owned by 
Enron to the SPEs in order to avoid reporting those losses in Enron’s financial report. 
Often failed investments are sold to these SPEs at inflated prices and the cash payment 
by the SPEs is then used to transfer borrowed money as cash flow from sale of 
investments.
966
 In addition, one unit of Enron would sell energy to a SPE that would 
then resell it to another Enron unit. The SPE would borrow money to pay for the 
energy. Then the cash would be subsequently transferred to the selling unit of Enron as 
an increase in revenues. Through these various methods, Enron manipulated its finances 
to reflect positive cash flow from its operations.
967
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As Enron’s fortunes rose, in particular during the second half of the 1990s, Enron was 
celebrated in the financial press and in business schools as a case study and it was seen 





 This perception was all Enron needed. As a result Enron’s share prices 
enjoy enormous growth as it was seen as a low-risk option by investors. Enron rode on 
the wave of success of the U.S. economy during the 1990s, perhaps the longest bull 
market in the history of the country. However, from early 2000 as the result of the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble, Enron’s shares took a dive and began a free fall. There 
was little or nothing Enron could do about this. But as the share price steadily declined 
through the spring and summer of 2001, it looked increasingly likely that its SPEs 
would default on their obligations to Enron.
969
 DEAKIN & KONZELMANN argue that 
Enron made matters worse, when it made no attempt to “take out a separate ‘hedge’ on 
the deals in question by transacting for a third party to take the risk of default. 
Essentially this was because the assets concerned (the Rhythms stock and similar 
financial investments) were simply too ‘large and illiquid’ (in effect, too risk-prone) to 




The fall of Enron was spectacular in its depth and its global consequences. Enron’s 
collapse came to be known as the largest and most significant corporate failure to grip 
the United States and perhaps the industrial world in recent memory. But it was only 
one in a series of clients failures suffered by Andersen, one of the biggest five auditing 
firms of its days.
971
 According to DRAKE “Enron hurtled towards bankruptcy in a matter 
of months: three months before its demise, the seventh largest company in the US stood 
$62.8 billion strong on paper. The Enron share price plummeted from $75 to 72c in less 
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The severity of Enron’s collapse and the scope of previously hidden losses discovered 
sent shockwaves through the global corporate community. Approximately 11,000 
employees lost both their livelihood and their pension, as the Enron employee pension 
fund constituted 62% of Enron’s total shares, all of which was now rendered completely 
worthless.
973
 An unsuccessful attempted merger with Enron’s smaller energy 
competitor, Dynegy, signaled the end of an era: On the first of December 2001, Enron 
finally filed for bankruptcy protection.  
 
As the external auditor of the company since its inception,
974
 Andersen was the Enron’s 
only external auditor for sixteen years. Andersen implemented a newly designed 
“integrated audit” package that combined a wide array of audit and non-audit services: 
this package left Andersen in charge of the whole internal audit function since 1994, 
after securing a lucrative five-year contract with Enron worth $18 million. The 
integrated audit package also included business and legal advice.
975
 As Enron 
employees themselves were previously in charge of the internal auditing function before 
the task was outsourced to Andersen, the whole Enron internal audit team was promptly 
hired by the external auditor. Andersen employees even set up their office inside 
Enron’s Houston building. The overly close relationship between Enron and Andersen 
staff was strengthened by the fact that many ex-Andersen employees were snapped up 
by Enron and consequently, Andersen auditors were auditing the work of ex-colleagues. 





Andersen’s Professional Standards Group, an internal committee of experts that 
determined the accounting protocol to be followed by all Andersen staff, frequently 
questioned the methods used by the Andersen staff on the Enron audit, only to cave 
under pressure from their client. Enron continued to increase pressure on Andersen to 
approve the use of “creative and aggressive”
977
 accounting methods and even 
“intelligent gambling” with revenue figures and off-balance sheet transactions,
978
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eventually, resulted in the dismissal of a member of the Professional Standards Group 




The amount of influence that Enron exercised over its auditor is directly in contrast to 
the principle of independence. As word spread that the SEC would launch an 
investigation into Enron’s spectacular third quarter losses, the audit partner in charge of 
the Enron audit ordered the mass shredding of Enron paperwork and deletion of 
electronic records.
980
 The shredding only stopped more than two weeks and 
approximately 30,000 computer files and emails later on November 8, 2001, pursuant to 
the issue of a subpoena against Andersen.
981
 It was this mass erasure that resulted in the 
obstruction of justice charge, the indictment alleging that Andersen had “knowingly, 
intentionally and corruptly persuade[d] and attempt[ed] to persuade other persons, to 
withhold and… alter, destroy, mutilate and conceal objects with [the] intent to impair 




Andersen was subsequently found guilty on the charge of obstruction of justice, and 
ceased auditing public companies by August 31, 2002 due to pressure from the 
authorities to give up its auditing license.
983
 On May 31, 2005, the Supreme Court 
unanimously overturned the Andersen conviction, citing that the jury instructions 
“failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing”, which left the scope to 
determine intent too wide. This technicality, although saving Andersen some dignity, 
did not allow the defunct auditor a re-entry into the auditing industry.
984
 All of 
Andersen’s clients moved on to rival auditors leaving only a few employees at the 
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The significance of the Enron bankruptcy was that it not only led to the demise of 
Arthur Andersen, one of the Big Five accountancy firms, it also opened a Pandora’s 
Box of scandals. Some few months after Enron other companies like WorldCom, Tyco, 
Xerox and Adelphia followed.
986
 These scandals, as indicated above, did not happen 
overnight. They were made possible by the continued relaxation of accounting and 
auditing standards over the years by the accounting profession for selfish ends. The 




The importance and leadership of the US in the financial markets as in the free market 
world has never been in doubt. Accordingly, the US system of corporate self-regulation 
was equally celebrated and admired to be a model around the world for number of 
reasons adumbrated by ERIKSSON, like: “the absence of detailed technical rules makes it 
a flexible system, the emphasis is on the spirit rather than the letter of rules, persons 
concerned with a self regulation system are experts in their field, the responsibility of a 
person operating in a system of self regulation produces greater professional integrity 
and discipline, sanctions of disapproval and damaged reputation are much stronger than 
legal sanctions in this field, legislation is concerned with minimum standards and 
operates at the margin while self regulation is said to operate from a higher threshold 




The sudden collapse of Enron casted doubt on these beliefs and revealed inherent lapses 
in the US system which undermined the trust people had placed on the self regulation. 
This, in turn, created a ‘crisis of confidence’ in the US financial and capital markets. 
According to ALLES et al, prevailing public opinion on the cause of  the corporate 
failures was that “it is due to deliberate fraud between managers, aided and abetted by 
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auditors, who, at best, are incompetent and, at worst, corrupt and outright compliant.”
989
 
However, it was the report of the Enron Special Investigations Committee that set the 
stage for the debate that ensued.  
 
The initial report by POWERS et al concluded that: “The tragic consequences of the 
related-party transactions and accounting errors were the results of failures at many 
levels and by many people: a flawed idea, self enrichment by employees, inadequately-
designed controls, poor implementation, inattentive oversight, simple (and not-so-
simple) accounting mistakes, and overreaching in a culture that appears to have 
encouraged pushing to the limits. Our review indicates that many of those consequences 
could and should have been avoided.”
990
 Moreover Enron presumably adhered to what 
was considered good corporate procedure. But obviously, the system was open to abuse 
and the oversight model was ill-prepared to prevent it. A financial writer, SLOAN 
summed up the situation as follows: 
 
The multilayered system of checks and balances that is supposed to keep a 
company from running amok completely broke down. Executives of public 
companies have a legal and moral responsibility to produce honest books and 
records – but at Enron they did not. Outside auditors are supposed to make sure 
that a company’s financial reports not only meet the letter of accounting rules 
but also give investors and lenders a fair and accurate picture of what is going on 
– but Arthur Andersen failed that test. To protect themselves, lenders are 
supposed to make sure borrowers are creditworthy – but Enron’s lenders were as 
clueless as everyone else. Wall Street analysts are suppose to dig through 
company numbers to divine what is really happening – but almost none of them 
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The Enron case illustrates that US GAAP once regarded as the best and most rigorous 
accounting standards available seems to generate less powerful checks against abuse 
than many had believed. Although HARVEY PITT, the then chairman of SEC, argued 
before the Sarbanes Committee that the US regulatory system was still the best in the 
world. He nonetheless recognized that some reform of the system was necessary,
992
 this 
reform, incidentally, turned out to be a direct regulation of the accounting profession 
enshrined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
 
 
5.2 THE US REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ENRON 
 
5.2.1 THE SARBANES-OXLEY BILL 
The end result of those hearings was the Sarbanes-Oxley bill, named after its co-
authors―Senator PAUL S. SARBANES and Congressman MICHAEL G. OXLEY. Despite 
the hysteria caused by the Enron collapse the bill still lacked general support at the 
beginning, mainly because of the effectiveness of the audit lobby in trying to block it. 
The eventual collapse of WorldCom in June 2002 served as the final straw to break the 
Congress’ resistance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was signed into law on 30 July 2002 by 
President George W. Bush.
993
 The Act represent the most significant and far-reaching 
regulatory statute on public accounting since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, at its core, “was designed to fix auditing problem of US public 
companies, which is consistent with the official name of the law: the Public Company 




The Act is fundamentally meant “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to securities laws, and for other 
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  To achieve this goal and prevent the reoccurrence of the problems that led 
to the corporate failures, the Act seeks to improve the integrity of audits of public 
companies by removing undue influence on auditors. It requires that audit committees 
be composed of only independent directors.
996
 It also strengthens auditor independence 
by prohibiting acts that may lead to conflict of interest like performing audit 
simultaneously with lucrative non-audit work such as consulting.
997
 Above all it created 
a new accounting oversight board, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was hailed as the most important reform of American business 
practice since the Securities Acts of the 1930s.
998
 However, it also has some critics. It 
has been criticized for being a precipitated over reaction.
999
 It was pointed out that the 
fall of Enron does not validate the regulation of the accounting profession.
1000
 
BRANSON, on other hand argued that it should not be forgotten that self regulation had 
worked reasonably well over decades of unrivalled economic growth in US history. The 
Enron scandal might just be considered as an aberration which did not signify the 
meltdown of a whole system. He argued further that the Enron scandal together with 
others that followed Enron, were insignificant if compared with nearly 16,500 
companies that file reports with SEC. However, what is worth noting about the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that it was borne out of a public demand for reforms which was 
reflected in the unusually overwhelming bi-partisan support it received from the U.S. 
Congress.  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a package of reforms aimed restoring public confidence in 
badly damaged financial markets by ensuring accuracy in financial reporting thereby 
reducing the chances of a repeat of another Enron. The main reforms introduced by the 
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5.2.2 THE PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT 
BOARD (PCAOB) 
The US Congress, dissatisfied with the track record of private self-regulatory bodies, 
was left with no conventional choice other than to innovate. As COATES argues, 
“Congress could have delegated to one of three traditional types of agents: 1) the 
executive branch of government, like an agency within the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury; 2) an independent agency, like the SEC; or 3) a private “self-regulatory” 
body, like the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) or the Public 
Oversight Board that had previously overseen auditors. However, each of these options 
risked leaving audit quality too low.”
1001
 That is how it came up with the PCAOB, the 





The financially independent PCAOB is neither a traditional private body, nor a public 
agency. Officially, it is a non-profit corporation with a legal mandate to “oversee the 
audit of public companies that are subject to the securities laws…in order to protect the 
interest of investors and further public interest in the preparation of informative, fair, 
and independent audit reports.”
1003
 The body functions independently of the US 
government, and can only be disbanded by an Act of congress. The PCAOB is to 
oversee, inspect and investigate accounting firms. By virtue of section 102 of the Act, 
only firms registered with the PCAOB are allowed to perform audit for public traded 
companies in the US, and all are subject to the auditing, quality control, and ethics 
standards adopted by the PCAOB.
1004
 Audit firms in the US were given until October 
2003 to comply with the requirements of SOX while foreign firms will have up to May 
2004 to comply. The fact that these foreign firms include about 280 companies from the 
European Union provoked a row between the EU and US. I will return to this later. 
 
The PCAOB is the first semi-governmental agency created in the US to regulate the 
accounting profession, which eventually “ended the profession’s long standing tradition 
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of self-regulation and peer review.”
1005
 Although it performs the task usually ascribed to 
state organization and it is controlled by and reports to the SEC, the PCAOB is not a 
functionary of state.
1006
 The PCAOB consists of five members who are appointed by the 
SEC in consultation with other federal agencies.
1007
 These members must be of good 
reputation and demonstrate commitment and understanding of securities laws and the 
obligations of accountants with respect to the preparation and issuance of audit 
reports.
1008
 They are to hold office for a once renewable term of five years and may not 
be removed except for “good cause shown.”
1009
 PCAOB is to be funded directly by 
public companies rather than by accountants,
1010
 to ensure that its members are 




The main function of the PCAOB is “to oversee the auditors of public companies, 
protect the interests of investors, further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports”,
1012
 and generally, administer the 
accounting provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. To accomplish this task, the PCAOB 
follows the pattern of its predecessor agencies by means of hiring experts, promulgating 
rules, and setting up an enforcement mechanism for those rules. The PCAOB makes a 
further effort to ensure that fraud does not continue at the level of the external auditor. 
These functions are statutorily outlined as below, namely to: 
 
(1) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for issuers, in 
accordance with section 102; 
 
(2) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control, ethics, 
independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for 
issuers, in accordance with section 103; 
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 According to Section 109 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB is to be funded through a levy placed 
on corporate issuers in proportion to their “equity market capitalization”.  
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(3) conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, in accordance with 
section 104 and the rules of the Board; 
 
(4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning, and impose 
appropriate sanctions where justified upon, registered public accounting firms 
and associated persons of such firms, in accordance with section 105; 
 
(5) perform such other duties or functions as the Board (or the Commission, by 
rule or order) determines are necessary or appropriate to promote high 
professional standards among, and improve the quality of audit services offered 
by, registered public accounting firms and associated persons thereof, or 
otherwise to carry out this Act, in order to protect investors, or to further the 
public interest; 
 
(6) enforce compliance with this Act, the rules of the Board, professional 
standards, and the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of 
audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of accountants with respect 
thereto, by registered public accounting firms and associated persons thereof; 
and 
 
(7) set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the staff of the 
Board. 
 
This, in practice, involves PCAOB staff being on-site with auditing firms to monitor 
their work. Unlike the POB before, the PCAOB “has authority to report deficiencies to 
the SEC, and provides a sanitized version of its inspection reports to the public. It 
reviews audit firm practices and policies on compensation, promotion, assignment, 
independence, client acceptance and retention, internal inspection, and training. If 
auditors fail to cooperate with its investigations, or if it finds violations, it may 
discipline auditors.”
1013
 Thus, where appropriate, the PCAOB can sanction errant 
auditors by way of fines, and in the worst case scenario deregister the auditor, which 
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brings his or her practice to an end.
1014
 Although PCAOB acts independently of the SEC 
and manages its own budget, its budget, rules and standards still have to be approved by 




5.2.3 AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
The second important reform was to reinforce independence of auditors. Following 
numerous reports in the wake of the Enron scandal that point out weaknesses in the 
audit process, especially close relationship between management and auditors, the SOX 
introduced more rigorous procedures designed to give auditors independence from 
management. For example, under section 201 of the Act, auditors are prohibited from 
providing certain non audit services to their client. The section went on to list these 
services, which include bookkeeping, financial information system design, valuation 
services, actuarial services, internal audit outsourcing, management functions or human 
resources, broker/dealer services or investment adviser and legal services.
1016
 The firm 
can on the other hand engage in any non-audit service not listed in section 201 if it is 
approved in advance by the audit committee of the public company. 
 
To reduce conflict of interest, the Act has forbidden audit services to any company 
whose chief executive officer or senior accounting officer were employed by that audit 
firm and participated in any capacity in the audit of that company in the preceding year. 
The Act further requires audit partner rotation every five years.
1017
 In direct response to 
the negligent behavior of auditors leading to recent financial crisis, the Act requires 
more detailed reports by the auditor to the audit committee regarding all critical 




5.2.4 THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The third in line of reforms undertaken by the SOX was to strengthen corporate 
responsibility. In doing so the SOX gave board members a greater degree of 
independence by requiring that public companies’ audit committees be composed solely 
of independent directors. A director will not be deemed independent if he receives other 
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remuneration from the company apart from his compensation as member of the audit 
committee.
1019
 In the circumstances where a director is so closely affiliated with 
company that he or she may not be able to separate his or her interest with that of the 
company, he or she is disqualified to act as such. This however, does not necessarily 




The SOX also enhanced the power as well as responsibilities of the audit committee by 
requiring chief executive officers (CEO’s) and chief financial officers (CFO’s) of public 
companies to personally certify to the accuracy  of  the financial reports and take 
complete responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting.
1021
 Additionally, in a deliberate move to enhance the 
knowledge and competence of audit committee to enable it scrutinize better the 
financial statements, the Act requires that at least one member of the committee be a 
“financial expert”. A financial expert is defined as someone “having experience as a 
public accountant or an auditor or financial officer, controller or principal accounting 
officer of an issuer”.
1022
 However, this does not suppose that the financial expert 





To give teeth to the reform, the Act under section 305 empowers the SEC to (a) remove 
officers and directors from their positions, and to bar them from occupying similar 
offices at other public companies by simply demonstrating their “unfitness,” and (b) 
institute an action in a Federal court to obtain “any equitable relief that may be 
appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”
1024
 Further, the audit committee in 
carrying out its oversight duties might, when it deems necessary, engage the services of 
other independent accountants or consultants.
1025
 According to ERIKSSON, the Act has 
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effectively substituted the management and board of directors with the audit committee 




5.2.5 CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
With the Enron and other high profile scandals in mind, the authors of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act have the goal of reestablishing public trust in the financial statements. They 
were convinced that it is only by the creation and maintenance of norms of fairness and 
trust would the financial markets be sustainable. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act therefore 
pushed into the comfort zone of company CEO’s and demanded more accountability 
and probity in the financial statements. Thus, under section 302 of the Act, chief 
executive officer and financial officers of public companies must  “certify in every 
annual and quarterly report that they have read the report, that the report, based on their 
knowledge, does not contain any material misstatements or omissions and that the 





This way, the Act sought to enhance financial disclosures by requiring companies to 
update and disclose material changes in their finances;
1028
 protecting securities analysts 
from retaliation in case of conflict of interest with their mother firms;
1029
 and enforcing 
corporate accountability. Particularly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act places the responsibility 
for financial reporting and internal control on shoulders of chief executives’ and 
financial officers’ of the company by prescribing penalties for fraud as well as 




Taken as a whole, this Act serves as a clarion call to auditors to be proactive in their 
review function. It clearly places more responsibility on auditors and practically ended 
their excuses of placing the blame on a particular corporation. The Act has also made it 
painfully clear that government regulators believe that the auditor’s role of gatekeeper is 
of utmost importance and will no longer be taken lightly.  
 
                                                     
1026
 BRANSON, D., (2003) in ERIKSSON, K., Corporate Governance…, op cit., p. 193 
1027
 Id at p. 194. 
1028
 Section 401 SOX 
1029
 Section 501 SOX 
1030
 Section 801 SOX 
263 
 
6. EUROPE’S REGULATORY RESPONSE TO ENRON 
 
6.1 THE EARLY RELUCTANCE 
In the immediate aftermath of the corporate scandals in the US, the mood in Europe 
“was that they could not have happened in Europe because of the European emphasis on 
substance over form”,
1031
 in contrast with the US where reliance is placed more on 
accounting rules than principles, and greedy executives obsessed with forecasted 
earnings. In Britain, for example, the accounting profession was quick to argue that the 
scandals in the US were anomaly peculiar to US and did not reflect the then realities of 
British business environment. President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales further stated that the good corporate practice and financial 
regulation in place in the UK made it something like “an island of calm, proficient and 
virtuous practice.”
1032
 That was until the debacle in Royal Ahold came to light, a 
company based in Holland and the world’s third biggest food retailer, disclosed that it 
had overstated its 2001 and 2002 earnings by almost US$500 million, that all these 
claims turned out to be unfounded and a fool’s paradise. Europeans then began to view 




As indicated above, even before the scandals in the US the need for company and 
capital market law reforms had since been recognized by the European Union. The 
scandals only served as a reminder for its urgency.
1034
 Moreover, the SOX requirement 
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Enron the mandate was extended to cover “issues related to best practice in corporate governance and 
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management remuneration, management responsibility for financial information and auditing practices.” 
Id at p. 199. 
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that foreign companies reporting under US securities law, and their auditors, must 
comply with the provisions of the Act did not go down well with the EU. The EU 
considered this measure as another inconsiderate imposition of US regulations on it. 
The EU unsuccessfully sought for exemption for EU audit firms from registering with 
the PCAOB. The option left for the European legislators was to either respond by 
strengthening the EU statutory auditor law or be left at the mercy of the US PCAOB, 
given that the US regulators thought that existing EU legislation was too weak. Europe 
chose to take the challenge and move on as observed by the then EU Internal Market 
Commissioner Frits BOLKESTEIN: 
                     
We in the European Union were faced with a simple choice: Either we could 
oppose tooth-and-nail the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and add yet another fiery dispute 
to our post-Iraq bilateral relations, or we could try to find a constructive, 
cooperative way forward, jointly respecting to the maximum degree possible our 




On 25 April 2006, the Council of the EU adopted Directive 2006/43/EC on the 
Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts. The Directive also 
known as the 8th Company Law Directive is an expanded version of the 1984 Directive 
which dealt with qualification of auditors in the EU member states. Directive 
2006/43/EC, seen as the EU version of the SOX came into force in June 2006 and 
member states were required to implement it by June 2008.
1036
 Directive 2006/43/EC 
enhanced the responsibilities and strengthened the independence of statutory auditors. It 
also improved external quality assurance process by seeking for better public oversight 
of the audit profession and close co-operation amongst member states oversight bodies.  
 
Another move by the European Union to reform its audit market in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis began in 2010 with a European Commission consultation Green Paper 
entitled “Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis”. Following this consultation, the 
European Commission (EC) came up with Proposals in November 2011 and subjected 
them to debate. The outcome of these open discussions and debates, which took nearly 
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1036
 The implementation process has since been concluded by the EU member states adopting the 
provisions of the Directive into their local audit laws. In Spain its result was the 2011 Audit law. 
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three years, was the two legal instruments, i.e. Directive 2014/56/EU on statutory audits 
of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, amending the Directive 2006/43/EC on 
statutory audits and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 on statutory audit of public- interest 
entities containing additional requirements that relate specifically to statutory audits of 
Public Interest Entities, published in the Official Journal of the EU on 27 May 2014  
 
Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 are both aimed at correcting 
some errors and deficiencies noted during the application of the 8
th
 Directive by 
member states. The reform introduced measures to strengthen the independence of 
statutory auditors by making the audit report better and more informative, as well as 
improving audit supervision in the EU member states. These new measures of restoring 
investor confidence in the European market after the financial crisis will be taken in the 
following order: 
 
6.2 THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
Directive 2014/56/EU mandates member states under article 39 to ensure that each 
public interest entity has an audit committee. The committee is to be composed of non-
executive members of the administrative body and/or members of the supervisory body 
of the audited entity and/or members appointed by the general meeting of shareholders 
of the audited entity or, for entities without shareholders, by an equivalent body. The 
audit committee is required to have at least one member with financial competency 
while the rest of the members are required to have knowledge in the field of operation 
of the company. The audit committee is, among other things, responsible for monitoring 
the audit control and effectiveness of the company’s internal control. The committee 
shall monitor and review the independence of the statutory auditors or the audit firms, 
where necessary. The committee is also responsible for the appointment of auditors or 
audit firm as the circumstances may require in accordance with the provision of the 
Directive.  
 
Under this dispensation, the auditor is responsible to the audit committee and must 
report to the committee all matters of audit control, especially, material weaknesses in 
financial reporting. The auditor must every year provide the audit committee with an 
additional report consisting of sixteen items related to the work of the auditor, including 
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the independence declaration, the scope of the audit, the timing, the communication 




6.3 AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Auditor independence is widely considered as the bedrock of the audit profession, and 
any crack in that foundation is a threat on the value of the audit which has direct 
consequences for investors and creditors, who may rely on the financial statements for 
their investment decisions. The concern about audit independence is instrumental to the 
debate on whether the performance of non-audit services for an audit client impairs 
auditor judgment and independence. The audit profession, on the other hand, has argued 
that their independence is not impaired by performance of non audit services, on the 
contrary it enhances audit. They further claim that non audit services do not present a 
conflict of interest, although the evidence indicates that they are often soft on clients 
when audit issues arise in order not to risk losing lucrative non-audit services. In fact, 
one of the fundamental reasons advanced as been responsible for the corporate scandals 
was familiarity between directors and auditors, which undermined their independence.  
 
Therefore, Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 have introduced 
changes to strengthen auditor’s independence. Provisions of the Directive are applicable 
to all statutory company audits while the Regulation applies to the audit of ‘Public 
Interest Entities’ (PIEs), especially, the additional independence requirements imposed 
by the Regulation for PIE audits under the amended article 5. 
 
As seen earlier, the Directive mainly clarifies and specifies some provisions of the 2006 
Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC). The notable additions and amendments 
include, inter alia, the provision of article 1.2f of Directive 2014/56/EC, where the PIE 
has been redefined to include all companies listed on an EU regulated market together 
with other unlisted banking and insurance companies. Another is the requirement of 
independence from the audited entity that has now been expanded to include not only a 
statutory auditor or audit firm but also “any natural person in a position to directly or 
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267 
 
The Regulation, which is the novelty of the two legal instruments, proposes for non-
audit services fee limits for PIE audits under article 4.2. The article requires limiting the 
proportion of non-audit fees that can be incurred in a year, by reference to the average 
audit fee, which may be applied as follows. 
 
1. The requirement applies at a group audit fee level, for PIE audits. 
 
2. Group non-audit service fees may not exceed 70% of the average of group 
statutory audit fees over the previous three years. 
 
3. For the provision to apply, the audit firm must have provided at least some non-
audit services in each of the previous three years. 
 
4. The restriction applies to non-audit services fees charged by the audit firm itself, 
not the services provided by other firms within the network. 
 
In relation to non-audit services prohibition, on the other hand, the Regulation has 
preserved the existing basic notion of auditor independence standards, of an overall 
requirement for independence, the analysis of threats and the application of safeguards, 
together with a list (primarily for PIE audits) of prohibited non-audit service activities in 
respect of services by audit firms to the entities they audit. 
 
In addition, the Regulation under article 5 has introduced a new list of prohibited 
activities for PIE audits. The new list covers the ground as current independence 
requirement except that it has a wider scope. As seen below: 
 
a. Tax – current requirements prohibit various types of tax service: the new ones 
cover substantially all tax work unless it has no material effect on the financial 
statements being audited; 
 
b. There is a virtually complete prohibition on several other activities where there 





c. The prohibition on being involved in management activities now specifically 
includes (according to a Recital to the Regulation) working capital and cash 
management and providing financial information; 
 
d. The current exception for immaterial items is now restricted only to tax and 
valuation services; 
 
e.  The provision of design and implementation of internal control over financial 
information and systems is now prohibited in the 12 months before appointment 




The Regulation has also made audit firm rotation mandatory under articles 16 and 17, 
such that PIEs have to appoint a new firm of auditors every 10 years. However, member 
states have the option to extend this maximum period to 20 years (24 if there is a joint 
audit) provided the audit is subject to a public tendering carried out after 10 years. Key 
audit partners are also required to rotate after seven years of appointment. Nonetheless, 
partners may be eligible to audit the said company again after two years. Furthermore, 
auditors are required under article 42 of the Directive to write an annual report to the 
audit committee on their compliance with independence requirements. 
 
6.4 PUBLIC OVERSIGHT IN EUROPE 
Directive 2014/56/EC requires all member states to appoint audit oversight boards, 
which will be responsible for the registration of audit firms; the adoption of national 
standards on audit ethics; quality control of audit firms and auditors as well as 




Other notable requirements of the amended Directive are the adoption of harmonized 
ethical and quality standards for audit firms across the EU; the creation of European 
Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB)―a body responsible for coordinating 
the public oversight systems of statutory auditors across the EU. This body is required 
to provide technical assistance to the Commission on the implementation of the 
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 Article 32 Directive 2014/56/EC 
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Directive; and finally, auditors and/or audit firms from ‘third countries’ must register in 






7. COMPARISON OF THE SOX AND DIRECTIVE 2014/56/EC 
The SOX and Directive 2014/56/EC have the same aim, which is to restore investor 
confidence in the financial markets after the spate of corporate scandals and accounting 
fraud that affected both sides of the Atlantic. They are also similar in great respect in 
that the Directive is widely believed to mirror the SOX and both are said to cover the 
same ground. In the following paragraphs we shall attempt to compare the two 
regulations. 
 
7.1 PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BODIES 
SOX and Directive 2014/56/EC have both established independent public oversight 
entity responsible for overseeing audit firms and the financial reporting process. For 
example in the EU, the European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB) plays 
the same role as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in the US. 
 
In the US, all accounting firms carrying out audits for public companies must register 
with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. These firms are also required to 
file the names of the companies they audited in the previous as well as the companies 
they expect to audit in the course of the existing year. Accounting firms are also 
required to report the annual fees they received to the Board. Furthermore, accounting 
firms must prepare and submit to the Board their quality control policies on accounting 
and auditing practices. Accounting firms are required to submit to the Board a list of all 
their accountants who participated or contributed to the preparation of audit reports. 
 
To carry out audit of public interest companies in Europe, audit firms are required to 
register with oversight bodies appointed by the member states. The audit firms must 
provide the list of their auditors as well as their registration numbers to the oversight 
body. All these information must be stored in electronic form and remain in the public 
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domain. Directive 2014/56/EC like the SOX also requires third country auditors 
carrying out audit of public companies to register as well. But unlike the SOX, 
Directive 2014/56/EC needs to be transposed and adapted by EU member states to their 
needs in accordance with the intent and spirit of the Directive. So while in the US 
PCAOB is mostly responsible for oversight function, in Europe member states may 
assign this function to one or more competent authorities. 
 
Sarbanes - Oxley specifies the different authorities which are required to approve, 
register, inspect, oversee and investigate registered accounting while the 8
th
 Company 
Law addresses the ”competent authority” in general. In Sarbanes - Oxley PCAOB is 
mostly responsible for the upper mentioned tasks, while in Europe, member states 
designate these tasks to one or more competent authorities, as long as conflict of interest 
is avoided and the Commission is informed. 
 
7.2 AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
Auditor independence or better lack of it is the capital issue blamed for the recent 
financial scandals. Auditors owed their briefs to the management of their client for the 
simple reason that they are hired, paid and fired by the client not the public whose 
interest they are supposed to protect. This is arguably, inherently a compromising 
position. The introduction of audit committee by the SOX as well as the 8
th
 Directive is 
aimed at eliminating or reducing the pressure that may be brought to bear on the 
auditors by their clients. Hence, the underlying premise of section 301 is to keep the 
auditor independent from audited company by giving the audit committee the 
responsibility of appointing the auditor. The auditor is also made answerable to the 
audit committee. 
Unlike what is obtain in the US, in Europe composition of the audit committee is 
determined by the individual member states as prescribed by Article 41: 
 
The Member State shall determine whether audit committees are to be composed 
of non-executive members of the administrative body and/or members of the 
supervisory body of the audited entity and/or members appointed by the general 




Under the SOX all members of the audit committee should possess some financial 
expertise and at least one of them must be a “financial expert.” The Directive now 
requires one of the Audit Committee members to have competence in accounting or 
auditing instead of “basic financial understanding” while rest of the need to have 
knowledge of the business of the entity. The new Directive here corrects the bizarre 
position it earlier took by the EU of not emphasizing accounting competence for 
someone who is to oversee an activity related with finance. 
 
7.3 THE AUDIT COMMITTEE 
With respect to the powers of the Audit Committee, the SOX empower the Audit 
Committee to be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight 
of the work of the auditors. The Directive on the contrary placed that responsibility on 
the shoulders of the ‘general meeting of shareholders or members of the audited entity,’ 
albeit, on the recommendation of the Audit Committee. It can be argued that giving the 
power of appointment of auditors to the shareholders may defeats the essence of the 
Audit Committee because it allows the controlling shareholder of a company to have the 
final say on the matter.  
 
7.4 PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP 
Relationship between audit client and the auditor that goes beyond audit service is 
believed to engender friendliness that may eventually endanger the auditor’s 
independence. So to prevent this kind of relationship, both the SOX and the Directive 
contain provisions restricting non-audit and any additional services to the client that 
might compromise the auditor’s independence. Furthermore, the two regulations wanted 
to avoid continuous relationship between auditor and client that may sometimes 
compromise the auditor’s independence. So they both provided for auditor partner 
rotation. SOX for example, require five year rotation of lead or coordinating audit 
partner while Directive 2014/56/EC require rotation of audit partner for every seven 
years.  
 
In addition, both the SOX and the Directive imposed a “cooling-off” period before an 
auditor may be allowed to take up a key management position with audited client, 
albeit, with a slightly different period of prohibition. Whereas the US established a 
waiting period of one year for audit firm partner who participated in any capacity in the 
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audit of the client, the EU chose a two year waiting period before such a partner could 
take appointment with a client 
 
8. AUDITING STANDARDS AND QUALITY CONTROL 
Under section 103 of SOX, the PCAOB is generally responsible for establishing and 
adopting auditing standards in the US while Europe prefers its auditors to carry out 
audits in compliance with international auditing standards. US accounting firms have 
usually used the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as standard 
guidelines for financial accounting. Europe on the other hand requires all EU listed 
companies to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). The EU’s preference for the 
IFRS is not by chance, to say the least, but a design to draw the US to a more 
internationalized arena than what EU considers unilateralism on the part of the US. 
Although the US has signaled its readiness to explore that possibility, whether it will 
























THE CASE FOR LIABILITY REFORM 
 
      1.    INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS THE LIABILITY GAP  
In recent times, audit liability has become a matter of increasing concern for the 
auditing profession. In a flurry of activities that followed the spectacular disintegration 
of Enron, the profession has witnessed significant transformation of its market structure, 
expansion in its duties vis-à-vis public companies, and the creation of a new regulatory 
oversight apparatus,
1042
 especially in the US. As is usual with financial turmoil, such as 
this, it exacerbated the longstanding polemic about the public’s discontent with the 
actual nature and scope of audit work.
1043
 Rather than going all out to improve audit 
quality, the profession, countered by claims about an inequitable reliance on the deep 
pockets of auditors.  
 
These facts coupled with large claims and the escalating cost of indemnity insurance 
cover provoked a great deal of lobbying by firms for changes in the law to limit their 
liability exposure, an exposure some claim threatens the very viability of the industry. 
They aver that an outmoded corporate liability laws have made them disproportionately 
liable for a company’s financial negligence, and that a major class action suit could 
vaporize another global accounting firm even with the minor contribution to the 
company’s problem.  
 
The Spanish version of disproportionate liability on the other hand is based more on the 
global trend than a serious evidence of liability claims. Although there have been some 
important judgments on audit liability cases, the calls for liability reduction in Spain 
predates these judgments, therefore can only be attributed to a global campaign by the 
major audit firms for reductions in auditor liability. The campaign incorporates a range 
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of demands from liability caps to promoting the concept of proportionate liability.
1044
 
However, there are concerns from some quarters that the auditing industry is 
campaigning for liability concessions to protect it from possible lawsuits resulting from 
its own failures, thereby responding to an expanding expectation gap by filling the 
liability gap.      
  
 
2. THE POLICY DEBATE OVER CATASTROPHIC RISK TO AUDIT 
FIRMS 
Increased market capitalization of companies during the last decade has in a similar way 
significantly increased the risk of auditing such companies. At the same time, access to 
insurance for auditors has fallen sharply, especially for firms auditing international and 
listed companies, thus leaving partners in audit firms with an unattractive prospect of 
entirely bearing the liability risks themselves. This situation that has inspired academic 
and professional debate over the equitable nature of auditor liability and the potential 
risk that a successful lawsuit against the auditors could serve to bring down one of the 
major audit firms. A hard call indeed for politicians and regulators alike against the 
backdrop of a financial crisis that is yet to abate; with prominent Wall Street firms 
collapsing and disappearing, almost overnight; the federal government engaged in serial 
bailouts of financial troubled institutions; and the recent passage by the US government 
of a financial reform that essentially toughens the regulatory oversight on the entire 
financial services industry. 
 
Obviously, in this volatile and changing landscape, proposal agitations for liability 
reform have received scant attention from U.S. regulators, as the more pressing business 
of the “credit crunch” commanded their attentions.
1045
 Having said that, although 
governments and regulators had their attention diverted by a serious financial crisis that 
has gripped their economies, it is reasonable to argue that the debate over the fairness or 
otherwise of civil liability of auditors and the existential threat it poses to the audit 
profession is a continued and recurrent debate that is as old as the modern audit 
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 This fact is seen in two similar opinions that spanned about half a century 
apart: 
 
The problem confronting the profession is to see to it that the liability is ‘clearly 
defined’, and that the extent of damages bears some reasonable relationship to 




We would not suggest that auditors should be freed from the threat of liability – 
as outlined earlier; exposure to liability is a driver of quality and should remain. 
But there needs to be some additional recognition of the fact that auditors do not 
‘guarantee’ the accuracy of a company’s accounts or the integrity of the 
underlying records and that, in some cases, auditors can and are deceived by 
directors and management. We agree that auditors should be responsible for 
their own mistakes, but query whether they should be also held responsible for 




As seen above, the audit profession has for many years complained about the continued 
rise of litigation against their members by both clients and other non-clients alike who 




The detractors of audit profession, on the other hand, would retort that such activity 
only goes to show a dwindling public confidence and the lack of trust the public have in 
the ability of auditors to perform their duties properly.
1050
 The latter point of view may 
be substantiated by the two notable collapses directly linked with audit failure i.e., the 
cases of Enron in 2001 and Lehman Brothers in 2008. The profession would, 
nonetheless, emphasize that these are isolated cases that do not reflect their general 
performance in myriads of other companies they audit. Moreover, the level of litigation 
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In support of their argument, the auditors have cited some record claims brought against 
them in recent memory, like the £2bn case of the British insurance company, Equitable 
Life against Ernst and Young as well as the $1bn claim brought against KPMG for the 
audit of the failed New Century Financial, as good examples of real existential threat 
the profession is faced with if such kinds of litigations were to succeed.
1052
The auditing 
profession claims over liability threat is underpinned by its desire to fight against what 
it considers as an unfair regulatory policy behind the ‘epidemic of litigation’ it endures, 
i.e. the joint-and-several liability,
1053
 which is discussed following. 
 
 
3. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND DEEP POCKET THEORY: 
THE EXPANSION OF LIABILITY 
The doctrine of joint-and-several liability was initially developed at common law as two 
separate theories of liability.
1054
 The application of joint liability at common law was 
therefore strictly limited, applying only to joint tortfeasors who have conspired or acted 
in concert. However, if the parties did not act in concert, the law will not permit joinder, 
and hence joint liability, was disavowed.
1055
 Joint liability stricto sensu is therefore 
originally related with issues of intentional torts because of the higher degree of intent 




Accordingly, in an action for recovery of damages where a plaintiff was injured as a 
result of the acts of two or more tortfeasors who did not act in concert, the plaintiff may 






 Joint and several liability presupposes that if several parties are liable for damages, the claimant can 
choose to sue all of the parties or one of them for the whole loss suffered. Therefore, in the case of 
financial loss with regards to errors in the financial statements, if both directors and auditors are liable for 
the loss sustained, the claimant may elect to sue either the directors or auditors for the whole loss, 
irrespective of who may be more culpable for the loss. More often than not, auditors are the ones sued and 
left to bear the full brunt of the damages awarded to the claimant perhaps for the simple reason that 
auditors are best placed to pay because of their ‘deep pockets.’ 
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sue any or all of the parties individually and recover the whole damages. However, 
since they did not act in concert, the plaintiff is not allowed to join all the parties in one 
suit during the early stage of development of the doctrine.
1057
 In addition, if the plaintiff 
recovers damages from one of the parties, he could not proceed further against the other 
defendants. For this reason, shrewd plaintiffs when filing their first claim, usually target 
defendants that are in a financial good position to shoulder the damages.
1058
 These types 
of defendants came to be known as deep pocket defendants.
1059
 Furthermore, since 
recovery could be obtained from any individual defendant irrespective of the 
defendant’s degree of culpability, once the plaintiff recovers all of his damages in the 
first suit then he or she would not need to proceed further against the other defendants, a 





As the doctrine developed in the course of time so did its application by courts, to allow 
plaintiffs join different defendants in a single suit so long as the harm produced by their 
separate negligent acts is one and indivisible.
1061
 Moreover, the plaintiffs were free to 
choose the way they deem expeditious to recover from the defendants, and one 
defendant had no legal right to seek contribution from other defendants.
1062
 The practice 
of joining defendants who acted separately but their actions created one indivisible 
harm, gained notoriety among plaintiffs for its simplicity from procedural standpoint. 





The challenges in the apportionment of liability led to the emergence of concept of 
contributory negligence, where the plaintiffs must demonstrate to the court that they 
have not in any way contributed to the resultant damage they suffered.
1064
 Usually, once 
the court decides that defendants were negligent the next question then was how much 
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damage the defendants should collectively pay rather than the individual defendant’s 
degree of culpability.
1065
 It is poignant nonetheless, to point out that some states in the 
United States eventually adopted the concept of “comparative liability” in order to 
alleviate the excesses of joint-and-several liability. Pursuant to the application of 
“comparative liability” the percentage of individual defendant’s fault came to determine 
the amount he paid known as comparative contribution. This rule apart, each defendant 
is, ipso facto, still liable for the full amount of damage to the plaintiff, regardless of the 




Auditors believe that the system of joint-and-several liability if not checked is capable 
of crippling the auditing profession. Moreover, they argue that if harm is capable of 
apportionment amongst multiple tortfeasors, it is only equitable that a single tortfeasor 
should be liable to the extent of his/her fault. Auditors sustain that the likely scenario is 
that they are the ones left to shoulder the entire burden, as the equitable distribution of 
judgment award often sacrificed because of complex and difficult task of aligning the 




In addition, auditors believe they are targets of unjustifiable litigation because they were 
held liable to mere negligence standard. This is in contrast with directors and officers of 
companies who are often protected by the business judgment rule, which incorporates a 
standard of gross negligence.
1068
 Thus, given the different standards applied to 
accountants and directors, there may be circumstances where auditors will be found 




 Id at p. 874. Another theory developed by the court is “alternative liability” as a parallel theory of 
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liable, while the directors of the company are exculpated.
1069
 This argument reechoes 
the concern expressed by the Supreme Court of California in Bily as follows:   
 
An award of damages for pure economic loss suffered by third parties raises the 
specter of vast numbers of suits and limitless financial exposure.... The auditing 
CPA has no expertise in or control over the products or services of its clients or 
their markets; it does not choose the client’s executives or make its business 
decisions; yet, when clients fail financially, the CPA auditor is a prime target in 
litigation claiming investor and creditor economic losses because it is the only 





Auditors also find themselves at the receiving end of liability because they are the only 
solvent parties standing when business goes bankrupt.
1071
 Particularly, the larger audit 
firms who have become targets of litigation because of their substantial amount of 
capital built up. The assets and insurance coverage of these firms have made them 
vulnerable to what is now referred to as the “deep pocket” theory. The “deep pocket” 
syndrome, auditors believe, is the forebear to the much dreaded doctrine of joint-and-
several liability.
1072
 By the application of this doctrine, even though auditors may be 
less culpable for the loss of the plaintiff, they are liable for the entire amount of damage 
if found negligent. This, in turn, encourages plaintiffs to directly go after the auditors 




If one may add, another reason auditors are being targeted is perhaps, because the public 
is looking for someone to hold responsible for their loss. According to SMITH, moments 
of crisis are usually followed up by low public perception of professionals, like auditors, 
who were in principle, deemed partly responsible for it.
1074
 As it is typical with crisis, 
there is a public outrage that somehow serves to fuel an increase of lawsuits against 
auditors that sometimes help to satisfy the public’s desire for retribution. In addition, 
auditors have been sued for performing at a substandard or even fraudulently colliding 




 Bily, 834 P.2d at 763. 
1071















4. AUDITORS’ CALL FOR INCREASED PROTECTION: CASHING IN ON 
PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY 
The grouse of auditors with liability litigations is based on a simple and common legal 
notion that damages are apportioned in accordance with a party’s fault. As trite and 
logical as this precept may sound, it is untenable under tort liability claims against 
auditors because of the doctrine of joint-and-several liability.
1076
 Consequently, a 
plaintiff in a claim for damages may proceed against any tortfeasor of his or her choice 
to recover the entire amount of his or her loss, with no regards whatsoever to the 
defendant’s contribution to the loss. Thus, if an auditor who conducts audit of a 
company fails to detect a fraud by the director of the company, the claimant has the 
option to sue either the auditor or the director to recover his full loss, irrespective of 
who is more culpable of the two. In practice, it is the auditor who is always sued 
because of the capacity he or she has to shoulder the bill.
1077
 For this reason, auditors 
are very often are forced to settle an unwarranted claim to avoid the arduous task of 




In addition, juries in the United States, like the general public, have difficulty in 
overcoming the assumption that auditors investigate and validate all the transactions 
undertaken by their clients. This difficulty faced by “deep pocket” defendants in 
convincing a jury that auditor’s function is not necessarily equivalent to detecting all the 




     
Overwhelmed by disproportionate liability regimes, auditors have sought for a statutory 
reform that will replace the joint-and-several liability with a more constrained liability 
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arrangement, such as capped or proportionate liability.
1080
 This method involves setting 
a cap on the amount of damages that a potential claimant can claim against the auditor 
or that damages awarded are measured in proportion to the degree of auditor’s fault. 
With this proposition, the audit profession embarked on an active campaign, engaging 
political actors as well as regulators to their cause of reform, both at national and 




Whereas some countries, especially in the aftermath of the Enron scandal, have re-
examined their rules governing the liability of auditors, others have adamantly refused 
to limit the liability of auditors.
1082
 In the United States, for example, auditors cannot 
contractually limit their liability for negligence and as evidenced in the philosophy 
behind the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this situation is not likely to change 
anytime soon. Similarly, as discussed extensively in Chapter III, under Spanish law, 




Auditor liability litigation in the United States has long been an area of concern right 
from the early 1970s. The influx of liability litigation in this period of United States’ 
history is attributed in part to the provision of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 which prohibits fraud in transactions that involves the sale or purchase of 
securities.
1084
 This section invariably creates liability far beyond fraud to include any 
misstatement or omission of a material fact, or any relevant information that would be 
important to investors in taking the decision to buy or sell the stock.  Because of its 
broad application, the Exchange Act antifraud provision has been used against all kinds 
of behavior, from misleading statements in company filings and documents used to sell 
the securities.  
 
Moreover, investors may also sue under Title 18 of the US Code for fraudulent 
statement in a company’s periodic filings with the SEC. Although difficult to prove, 
Title 18 gives the private right of action to investors, which is advantageous because it 
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creates potential liability for a wide range of defendants, including those who actually 
made the fraudulent statement, “control persons,” and their aiders and abettors. This 
fact, coupled with liability insurance coverage enjoyed by auditors made them 
convenient litigation targets.  
        
The legal theory of aiding and abetting soon became the basis of a flurry of liability 
actions even by individuals remotely associated with sale and purchase of securities. 
While securities actions can be said to represent only a fraction of liability claims 
brought against auditors, these suits generally popularized claims against auditors and 
practically open the flood gate of litigations against auditors. Auditors particularly have 
become targets of litigation because of the nature of their work. They are called to 
evaluate and exercise considerable judgment on materials and documents prepared by 
others in an environment not fully controlled by them. The complex scenario of 
auditor’s work was well expatiated the Supreme Court of California in the case of Bily 
as follows: 
 
An auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound. As a matter of commercial reality, 
audits are performed in a client-controlled environment. The client typically 
prepares its own financial statements; it has direct control over and assumes 
primary responsibility for their contents … [and] necessarily furnishes the 
information base for the audit…Thus, regardless of the efforts of the auditor, the 




In his or her examination of the audit materials and documents, the auditor must follow 
the requirements of Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAS). Likewise in 
reaching an opinion on the audit he or she is to be guided by Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Both of these guidelines are set rules written in general 
terms and their application is fundamentally based on individual auditor’s experience 
and professional judgment.  
 
Investors and the general public may seek a flawless or perfect audit but by its nature an 
audit is an exercise of estimation and judgment, therefore it is hardly perfect. Thus, in 
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the locus clasicus of Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., the California Supreme Court 
reasoned that “an audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that, like the 
weight of the load of beans…can be easily checked against uniform standards of 
indisputable accuracy. Rather, an audit report is a professional opinion based on 
numerous and complex factors. The court went on to conclude that the audit report is 
“the final product of a complex process involving discretion and judgment on the part of 
the auditor at every stage. Using different initial assumptions and approaches, different 
sampling techniques, and the wisdom of 20-20 hindsight, few CPA audits would be 
immune from criticism.”
1086
 In other words, audit is “as much an art of judgment and 





5. EARLY LEGISLATIONS TO STEM LIABILITY CLAIMS  
Auditors have for long complained about disproportionate threat they face. Although for 
some analysts, the threat of litigation is another means of enhancing auditors’ 
professional responsibility and thereby increasing the reliability of financial 
information. Nevertheless, “the threat of class action securities fraud litigation creates 
great financial risk for the profession,” and auditors cannot find insurance for it.
1088
 
Thus, even before the advent of the SOX, the accounting industry sought relief from 
Congress from litigation targeting deep pocket defendants. As indicated earlier, 
“auditors are a favored target of trial lawyers because any faulty judgment on the part of 
auditors may result in large monetary settlements. Accountants were also concerned 
about abusive discovery practices that imposed such burdensome costs that expensive 
settlements often were necessary.” 
1089
   
 
Thus, in 1991 the audit firms successfully lobbied various states to pass enabling 
legislation for the establishment of Limited Liability Partnership (LLP).  Traditionally, 
audit firms practiced as unlimited liability partnership in which all assets of the firm as 
well as personal assets of partners were at risk once the firm is found liable by a court of 
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 Whereas the liabilities of audit partners in case of a limited liability audit firm 
are limited to their personal contribution to the capital of the firm. Almost all audit 




The second stage of this development was the effort by the audit firms to reform the 
joint-and-several liability which was also rewarded with the US Congress overriding a 
presidential veto and passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 
1995.
1092
 The PSLRA was primarily an effort to prevent meritless “strike suits,” and it 
succeeded in part because it altered the nature of securities litigation against companies 
and their auditors. Large institutional shareholders became more involved in securities 
class actions because the PSLRA ceded control of such actions to the largest investor. 
The PSLRA minimized the exposure of external auditors by establishing a system of 





The PSLRA deterred both nuisance litigation and some unmeritorious cases.  Further, 
the Act served as a precursor to SOX by expanding the legal reporting responsibilities 
of auditors.  For the first time, statutory law required some specific “audit procedures,” 
including procedures reasonably designed to detect material illegal acts related to the 
financial statements of public companies.
1094
 This was followed in 1998 by the 
Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act (SLUSA). These laws, the LLP laws at 
States’ level and the PSLRA and SLUSA at national level restricted claims to a 
proportionate liability model, except in cases where auditors commit criminal offence 




Meanwhile, auditors’ campaign against the so-called liability ‘epidemic’ still continues 
in the United States today. However, it is worthy of note that securities laws did not 
come from the blues, they were measures undertaken to protect investors after an earlier 
financial catastrophe provoked by manipulation and greed as seen below. 
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6. EVOLUTION OF AUDIT REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Historically, crisis and regulation are not strange bedfellows, especially in the financial 
services industry.
1096
 Auditor regulation in the United States was first contemplated 
after an earlier financial crisis that came to be known as the Great Depression. During 
the years that followed the World War I, the United States economy witnessed a rapid 
strong growth.
1097
 With the economic expansion and surplus money, many individuals 
began to invest in stocks of publicly traded companies. This surge in investment 
activities led to calls in certain quarters for some form of government oversight and 
regulation of the financial sector, which fell into deaf ears. The main goal of both the 




In its formative years, investing in stock markets was unregulated and speculative. 
Practically, it was a free market in the most basic form, a sort of caveat emptor 
transaction with its inherent systemic problems.
1099
 It was an unfettered atmosphere of 
demand and supply, where corporations wanted capital and eager investors were willing 
to invest their money without any regards to whether the market was regulated or not. 
Corporations took advantage of this situation to artificially inflate stock prices to make 
them more attractive, while lenders were as well inflating interest rates. These factors, 
coupled with increase in stock purchase on the margin provoked the “final expansion 
and crash of the stock markets.”
1100
 The general sentiment was that the bubble created 
by the surge and eagerness to invest in stock markets had finally busted. But it was a 
later revelation of stock manipulation that ignited fear among the American public, this 
in turn created panic and rush to sell off their stocks that eventually caused the 1929 
stock markets to crash. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost most of its value with 
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The Great Depression completely shattered the United States’ economy. Investors were 
left with of over 25 billion dollars of worthless stocks in their possession and there was 
disillusionment and mistrust everywhere. Individual investors, corporations, banks, and 
the general public feared for the nation’s financial sector and economy.
1102
 Then, the 
erstwhile unpopular idea of federal regulation of securities markets is almost inevitable 
because the spread of this crisis required a national solution.
1103
  The responsibility of 
solving the problem fell squarely on the Congress, the only national body competent 




As earlier pointed out in this thesis, the regulation of auditing under US corporate law 
consists of both federal and state legislations. The power to regulate any activity 
directly or indirectly related to interstate commerce is constitutionally vested in the US 
congress.
1105
 DRAKE argues that “as a corollary, each state has the implied right to 
legislate on such interstate commercial activity that has been left unregulated by the 
congress.”
1106
 Simply put, American corporate law consists of two ‘parallel and 
interlocking systems’ of state corporate law which regulates the internal affairs of 
corporations and federal law which establishes a national policy for the securities 
markets.
1107
 The division of authority envisaged between federal and state officials is 
nonetheless, not sacrosanct. According to JONES, “the tradition of respect for state 
authority in securities regulation has significantly eroded”, as the U.S. Congress had 
increasingly intervened whenever necessary to decisively remedy a problem 
traditionally left to state law. One such situation was the promulgation of the Securities 




Following the Great Depression, the Congress immediately embarked on the task of 
looking into the causes of the financial crisis with a view of finding and effecting 
solution to the problem as well as restoring the financial markets. This took the form of 
holding hearings across the spectrum of stakeholders, such as investors, creditors, banks 
and corporations. In the course of several months of hearing, there seem to be “a 
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consensus that for the economy to recover, the public’s faith in the capital markets 
needed to be restored.”
1109
 This challenge would not be an easy one given the level of 





After several years of consultation and legislative work, the Congress came up with 
important and successive legislations in order to restore public trust in the economy. 
The series of legislative effort to fix loopholes in the capital markets began with the 
Securities Act of 1933. It was then followed up with the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. The Congress also created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an 




6.1 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACTS OF 1933 AND 1934 
As a response to a deep financial crisis brought about by manipulations and fraud, these 
Acts were based upon the philosophy of honesty and transparency in securities 
dealings.
1112
 This in essence, means that all issuers of securities are required to disclose 
all material information that a potential investor would require to reach an informed 
decision on whether to in invest in such securities or not .
1113
 The Acts imposed new 
financial reporting and disclosure requirements and prohibited certain practices, such as 
insider trading.
1114
The Acts also made auditing of public companies in the United States 
obligatory
1115
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6.2 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) 
The SEC was established under Securities Exchange Act 1934 The SEC with a mission 
to “restore investor confidence in our capital markets by providing investors and the 
markets with more reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing.”
1117
 To 
accomplish this goal, the SEC has adopted two major initiatives. First, all companies 
offering securities to public for investment are required to reveal the true state of their 
finances, the exact types of securities they are selling, and the risks involved in 
investing in such securities. Second, all persons that are involved in the financial 
markets, including brokers, dealers, bankers, and exchanges are required to treat 




Other methods employed by the SEC to attain its statutory goals is through the free flow 
of information transmitted to the public through various reporting requirements that 
publicly traded corporations were required to fulfill.
1119
 One important way that the 
SEC uses to ensure that information that emanates from corporations are accurate is by 
means of mandatory external audits. Once companies fulfill the various disclosures 





The SEC also acts as central authority responsible for oversight and discipline of the 
accounting profession, as well as forming and adopting accounting and auditing 
standards.
1121
 This authority was however sparingly employed by the SEC preferring 
instead to delegate the function to self-regulation of the accounting profession’s 
principal trade association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AICPA) and other non-governmental organizations like Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and Independence Standards Board (ISB).
1122
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The AICPA on the other hand established the Public Oversight Board (POB) and 
charged it with the task to oversee the work of public accountants. But the POB was 
unable to effectively undertake this task due to its lack of authority to sanction errant 
auditors.
1123
 For instance, in a disagreement over the POB’s plan to review the BIG 
FIVE
1124
 accounting firm’s compliance with auditors’ independence standards, the 
AICPA cut off funding for the POB. Finally, in 2002 the POB voted unanimously to 




The AICPA had also created the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) for the purpose of 
standard setting. However, there was dissatisfaction with the work of the members of 
the ASB, mostly practicing accountants, who were seen to be more protective of their 
colleagues than serving the public interest.
1126
 As expressed in no equivocal terms by 
LYNN TURNER, former SEC Chief Accountant at the Enron Congressional hearings in 
the following words: 
 
Those standards tend to be written to protect the accounting firms in case they 
get in trouble on an audit …it is not drafted with the public interest in mind … 
As long as you leave that standards setting process in the hands of the firms and 
of the firm’s legal counsel, you are going to get standards written to protect them 





In the wake of a number of high-profile accounting scandals, highlighted by the Enron 
meltdown and the foregoing testimony, among others, adduced before the congressional 
hearing, the U.S. Congress came to the conclusion that self-regulation by the accounting 
profession had been inadequate as a model for oversight and standard setting.
1128
 The 
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need to correct these excesses and protect the general public from the abuses of the 





7. AUDIT REGULATION IN SPAIN 
Accounting regulation in Spain is relatively a new phenomenon.
1130
 Unlike the 
experience obtained in the US and other industrialized countries, where a long standing 
audit tradition became a sine qua non for the development of their financial markets and 
economies, in Spain these conditions were not achieved until well into the 1960s.
1131
 In 
fact, prior to the Audit law of 1988, there was no legislation regarding obligatory filing 
and publication of annual financial statements.
1132
 Although auditing was legally 
required by the 1951 “Ley de Sociedades Anónimas”,
1133
 its effect is of very little 
significance. The 1951 law recognized some form of non-mandatory auditing called 
shareholder auditing “Accionistas Censores de Cuentas”. Under this type of audit, 
shareholders whose accumulated shares represent ten percent of the company’s capital 
stock may request for an auditor’s appointment.
1134
         
 
When so appointed, the auditors would ascertain the reliability of the company’s annual 
financial statements. However, their capacity to meet that goal has been curtailed by the 
law itself. The law had empowered the directors of a company to block auditors’ access 
to financial records when they feel that their company’s interest may be jeopardized.
1135
 
Hence, the work of the auditors was limited to reviews of the company’s financial 
statements, with little investigation of the accuracy and compatibility of the company’s 
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The driving force behind the rise and influence of audit in Spain did not come from 
legislation. It came from commercial and economic expansion taking place in Spain at 
the time.
1137
 As result, the Spanish government embarked on a series of reforms to its 
financial market aimed at updating Spanish regulations to cope with the fast growing 
capital markets activities in the kingdom.
1138
 These reforms involved enforcing the 
audits of financial statements of inter alia, state monopolies, regulated industries, such 
as banks, and utility companies, like electricity.
1139
 The enactment of the audit law in 
1988 further strengthened these reforms. As noted by Carlos SOLCHAGA CATALÁN, 
Minister of Economy and Finance as he then was, when presenting the bill: 
 
El proyecto de ley es cuidadoso, que constituye una pieza fundamental en la 
modernización de los hábitos financieros, contables y económicos de una 
sociedad que se está transformando muy rápidamente, como es la española y 
que, al mismo tiempo, se está abriendo a la economía internacional, con la cual 




The 1988 audit law,
1141
 based on the Directive 84/253/ EEC, was a milestone in Spain’s 
commercial and accounting history. It substantially transformed the way audit is 
organized and practiced in Spain, opened the Spanish economy to the world and 
brought the world to Spain. This much was also the conclusion of SALMON as 
reproduced below: 
 
…the most important structural change in the Spanish economy during the 
1980’s was the further opening up of the economy to international trade and the 
avalanche of foreign inward investment occasioned by new legislation and 
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The Audit Law established a combined system of public and private sector accounting 
regulation, namely, “Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas” Institute of 
Accounting in conjunction with Audit and professional auditors’ associations. 
According to RUIZ-BARBADILLO et al., “it is best to describe the system of audit 
regulation which was established in Spain as “mixed”. While the professional bodies 
were given a degree of flexibility, their operations were to be subject to the approval 




7.1 INSTITUTO DE CONTABILIDAD Y AUDITORÍA DE CUENTAS 
(ICAC) 
The public sector control is exercised by the ICAC,
1144
 a body corporate constituted 
under section 56 LAC. The ICAC as a body is made up of three units, consisting of the 
chair, auditing committee and accounting board. The chair, who presides over the body, 
is appointed by the government on the recommendation of the Minister of Economy. 
Membership of the other units is drawn from a cross section of stakeholders and experts 




The ICAC acts as central authority responsible for inter alia, the regulation of 
accounting, the discipline of the audit profession and the inspection and control of audit 
quality.
1146
 The 1988 law introduced, for the first time, an Official Auditor’s Registry 
ROAC and placed it under the management of the ICAC.
1147
 It made audit of financial 
statements obligatory for medium and large limited companies
1148
 and also “laid down a 
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The work of ICAC is duly complemented by associations representing auditors referred 
to as “public law bodies representing professional auditors”’ by the RD 1517/2011.
1150
 
These are Register of Economist-Auditors “Registro de Economistas Auditores” (REA), 
General Register of Auditors “Registro General de Auditores” (REGA) and Spanish 
Institute of Chartered Accountants “Instituto de Auditores-Censores Jurados de Cuentas 
de España” (IACJCE). The Regulation embraced these associations by recognizing 
them under article 104 RAC;
1151
 in fact many of the powers of ICAC are subsequently 




The Audit Law introduced a new structure of specialization where, the professional 
associations were assigned the roles of drafting technical auditing standards, ensuring 
quality control, organizing continuous professional training, and organizing the 
mandatory examinations and control of practical experience required to enter the 
profession.
1153
 The “Asociación Española de Contabilidad y Administración de 
Empresas” (AECA) for example, has been at the forefront of standard setting in Spain. 
Its approach to standard setting has been a participative one, where a cross section of 
institutions involved in preparation, verification and use of financial statements are 
brought together to discuss their views.
1154
 In fact the AECA’s recommendations are 
commonly adopted by companies and frequently form the basis for subsequent official 
regulations from the ICAC. The ICAC, where necessary, may ask these professional 
bodies to elaborate, revise or adapt any technical rule or norm. If they fail to act 
accordingly after the expiration of six months, the ICAC will employ its power of last 
resort and proceed to adapt the said rule.
1155
 Thus, while the auditing associations were 
given some measure of independence in the conduct of their affairs, they are 
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7.2 COMISIÓN NACIONAL DEL MERCADO DE VALORES 
Another body engaged in financial regulation is the National Securities Market 
Commission “Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores” (CNMV).
1157
 The CNMV is 
a body corporate established under section 13 of the Securities Market Law “Ley 
24/1988, de 28 de julio, del Mercado de Valores.”
1158
 It is composed of a chair and vice 
chair that must be knowledgeable in the field of securities, and are to be appointed by 
the government on the recommendation of the Minister of economy and Finance. Other 
members are Director-General of the Treasury, Vice President of the Central Bank and 




The CNMV has the mandate to oversee the activities of the Spanish stock Exchange and 
foster transparency and efficiency in the capital market. It also protects investors from 
unfair prices by promoting fair financial reporting, and generally, enforcing the 





8. AUDITOR LIABILITY CAMPAIGNS IN THE POST-ENRON CLIMATE 
For a long time, liability of external auditors has been regarded as one of the tools the 
SEC uses to put auditors their toes as well as increase investor confidence, but this is 
not without costs. While auditors were faced with liability problem even before the 
advent SOX, the requirement under SOX for auditors to attest to the validity of the 
statements provided by their clients has also increased the liabilities that auditors 
face.
1161
 Apart from threat of sanction by the SEC, liability they face from clients, and 
especially third parties, are a means of ensuring that auditors are vigilant and accurate in 
their review of financial statements.
1162
     
 
The magnitude of liability faced by auditors after coming into effect of SOX can be 
seen in some notable lawsuits brought against auditors. For instance, in the first quarter 
of 2008, the firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was forced to settle three lawsuits 
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brought against it, to wit: “Metropolitan Mortgage and SmarTalk Teleservices each for 
about $30 million, and Crocus venture capital, for $6.1 million.”
1163
 In a similar 
development, in 2005 Deloitte settled with Fortress Re. for $250; PwC had to settle a 
suit with the shareholders of Tyco shareholders to the tune of $225 million in July of 
2007; Arthur Andersen was forced to settle out of with Baptist Fund of Arizona for 
$217 million in 2002; and in another case with Adelphia in 2006, Deliotte settled for 
$210 million. Meanwhile, these are only some few representative sample of the 
liabilities that auditors have recently faced.
1164
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
Another case in point is the large settlement reached in a suit between the shareholders 
of Rite-Aid Corporation (Rite-Aid) and KPMG. KPMG agreed to pay $125 million to 
the shareholders as part of the Stipulation of Settlement. The shareholders allege that 
KPMG has failed to adequately audit 1999 restatement of Rite-Aid’s earning which was 
later proved to contain fraudulent information. The importance of this case lies in the 
fact that there is evidence to the effect that KPMG itself was a possible victim, like the 
shareholders, of a systemic fraud. The fact that KPMG resolved to settle the case shows 




According to SPELL, “this is the exact type of fraud and oversight that the SEC, through 
SOX, has been attempting to prevent. The immense legal liabilities that auditors face 
exist because it is necessary to hold them liable in order to increase investor confidence. 
To cap liability when mistakes like this are still occurring is simply giving auditors a 




The above cases are a testament to the liability problem faced by auditors but none is 
more obvious and notorious to the liability threat posed to auditors than the sudden 
demise of Arthur Andersen. As seen in Chapter IV, Arthur Andersen was at the time of 
its fall the fifth largest accounting firm in the world, and Enron’s accounting firm since 
the inception of Enron.
1167
 Although their appeal against liability in the Enron scandal 
succeeded at the Supreme Court in 2005, and led to the dismissal of the case, the Enron 
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 Id at p. 339. 
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scandal was so huge on the firm’s reputation that it could not survive.
1168
 At the end of 
the day the most important asset any audit firm could have is its reputation. In the wake 
of the Enron scandal Arthur Andersen’s lost the bulk of its clients for its inability to 
serve its gatekeeper role in Enron. Loss of clients and reputation coupled with its 




With the final collapse of Arthur Andersen, the auditing profession was faced with a 
grim fact that the failure of yet another firm is not an unforeseeable possibility. This 
prospect sparked yet another push towards restricting the liability faced by auditing 
firms. According to Spell, “auditors argue that there is a definite risk that more firms 
could implode in the near future in light of the liabilities that accounting firms face.”
1170
 
This fear is justified by two important events, as recounted by BUSH et al, in one “case 
of alleged criminal behavior of KPMG in the US with respect to fraudulent tax advice, 
the US Justice department chose to settle for a $456 million fine on the firm and action 
against the individuals involved, instead of disbarring the firm from performing audits 
of publicly held firms (U.S. Department of Justice, 05-433, August 29, 2005).”
1171
 
Another case was the “claim of £2.6 billion was made against Ernst & Young in the UK 
in the Equitable Life case. Although the claim was dropped,
 
had it succeeded at 





The arguments across auditor’s circles for liability caps revolve around the same shared 
concerns. “The fear is that the liability that auditors currently face could result in the 
collapse of another major auditing firm. The auditing profession lobby argues that while 
the role of private litigation is important in capital markets, there should be “concern 
over rising litigation costs, ‘mega’ suits, and pressure on audit firms to settle cases 
instead of litigating them.” Various actors have “moved in numerous ways to place 
enhanced scrutiny on the financial reporting and controls practices within publicly 
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traded firms. Amid this flurry of activity . . . [a]uditors now face enhanced vulnerability 
to liability risks that––at least according to some––threaten the . . . viability of the 
industry as we know it.”
1173
 But, what would happen if auditors were freed from the fear 
of liability for audit failure? SPELL retorts as follows: 
 
However, the increased liability auditors now complain of is the precise liability 
we want them to face. “The tort system is designed to create incentives for 
auditors to take appropriate actions to minimize the issuance of misleading 
financial statements and to compensate for their recoverable losses” should the 
auditor fail to properly perform its duties. Removing potential liability will not 
further the goal of increasing investor confidence through valid and thorough 





SPELL further argues that “[w]hile shareholders bringing federal securities class actions 
are understandably a potential cause of the demise of one of the Big Four auditors; there 
are other liabilities that auditors face in relation to their role as gatekeepers. An auditor 
could potentially implode as a result of losing its ability to practice following criminal 
sanctions. Money sanctions and penalizations imposed in both civil and criminal 
litigation could also bring about the potential collapse of an accounting firm. And 
finally, auditors face the threat of federal securities class action lawsuits—the impetus 




On the face of above arguments on liability and a supposed implosion threat that would 
create an unacceptably uncompetitive environment with only two or three large firms, 
“the Big Four accounting firms have decided to lobby for a cap on the potential 
liabilities they could face, and have also attempted to use contractual clauses to shield 
themselves. The Big Four are asking the firms they audit to limit their right to sue, and 
to waive their right to punitive damages. While this will only cap corporations’ ability 
to sue, it does have the potential to save the accounting firms the large sums of money 
they are forced to pay to the corporations. Even though auditors will still face liability to 
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the shareholders that bring federal securities class actions, the agreements attempt to bar 
derivative suits. Various complaints have been made by investors who argue that these 
agreements may violate SEC rules, and that the provisions overall are too self-interested 
and against the SEC principle of putting the investor first. Auditors have also attempted 
to further alter their liability, without government assistance, through contract law, by 
including arbitration clauses, indemnity and hold harmless provisions, and other similar 




They further contend that while the sheer numbers of securities class action suits filed 
against the major accounting firms have considerably dwindled, due largely to the effect 
of (PSLRA), the risk of catastrophic liability in any one of the remaining four 
accounting firms is enormous.
1177
 The example of Arthur Andersen’s demise following 
the collapse of Enron Corporation still serves as an objective lesson to all that a single 
exposure can lead to the ruin of any one firm. However, the politics of catastrophe 
embarked upon by the audit profession have led to suspicion in some quarters, with 
politicians and regulators saying that the risks to major accounting firms are overblown, 




This criticism may be justified by the profession’s submission in support of liability 
before the US senate where they overstated the case.
1179
 They claimed that their 
litigation cost estimate for the year 1992 was 14 percent of their total revenue. This 
figure however, included a 400 million settlement by Ernst & Young. It is noteworthy 
that US case law had already established that an auditor could only be found guilty if 
his conduct was reckless, i.e. something more than negligence.
1180
 According to 
SLAVIN,
1181
 acts of negligence can no longer impose statutory liability to third parties 
under SEC Rule 10.5b. Furthermore it was held in the case of Central Bank of Denver v. 
First Interstate Bank
1182
 that ‘aiding and abetting a fraud could not subject the auditor to 
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legal liability.’ Hence, it was argued that auditors were quite protected under the 
existing regime. 
 
8.1 THE BURDEN OF LIABILITY IN SPAIN 
Although Spain may be less litigious than the US and some other Western democracies, 
the risk of regulatory sanction is not a negligible cause of concern for auditors. Auditors 
are subject to sanctions by the ICAC if they fail to detect and report fraudulent financial 
reporting.
1183
 These sanctions can be quite severe, including the withdrawal or 
suspension of practicing licenses, admonishment, and monetary fines.
1184
 Meanwhile, it 
is the exercise of this power by ICAC that has proved especially controversial in Spain 
and have been a significant trigger for comments and actions on the part of leading 
representatives of the accounting profession. GARCÍA BENAU et al.
1185
 provide evidence 
that the existence of an independent regulatory body was never popular among the 
Spanish accounting profession when Spain was adapting to the EU Company 
Directives.
1186
 Legal writings in Spain have continued to bear that fact. For example, in 
an article “All against one and one against all”, OREGUI,
1187
 rightly captured the views 
of the leading members of the profession on ICAC, as is illustrated in the following 
comments attributed to José Luis DÍEZ, the president of REA: 
 
The sanction regime is totally unjust. It puts us at the feet of whichever person 
demands civil responsibilities. Almost all the proceedings are based on 
professional judgments. Why are the criteria of ICAC going to be better than 




Amid these comments, came the inevitable calls for reduction in auditors’ liability 
exposure drawing from trends taking place in the global arena. As profoundly advocated 
by Tomás FERNÁNDEZ DE PINEDO of PriceWaterhouse: 
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In terms of the contractual responsibility of the auditor towards the company that 
solicits its services, it is ridiculous to think that it can be unlimited. As happens 
in other countries such as Germany, Austria and Greece, one ought to impose a 
law, a maximum sanction, for example between three and four times the audit 
fee. On the other hand, it is unthinkable to think that bad managers cause the 
same damage as auditors. In case of negligence on the part of both, one should 
first demand responsibility from the management and then the auditors, but only 
for the part corresponding to them. . . . As to extra-contractual responsibility to 
third parties, the law doesn’t say anything. It is necessary to interpret who has 
the right and who is authorized to hold auditors responsible. From my point of 
view, as it is the company who contracts with the auditor through its board of 





One intriguing thing to note from the above quote is the fact that, third party liability 
claims cannot be said to be a burden on the Spanish audit market by all shades of 
imagination. This observation most certainly brings into context the concerns expressed 
by HOPWOOD on the international outreach of the lobbying power of the accounting 
profession: 
 
Agents of the international audit industry are amongst the most prolific 
conveyors of our present knowledge of and literature on questions of 
supranational and international accounting policy. They seemingly exert a 
significant influence over the discursive representation of the area and the forms 
in which options and debates are cast. The prevailing understandings are 
therefore in danger of being derivative from the processes of policy making 





The voice for reform within the accounting profession itself has not been unanimous. 
There were views that still sympathize with the Spanish legal tradition of individual 
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responsibility. But for how long it will last is entirely anyone’s guess. Ricardo BOLUFER 
represented such a view: 
 
Whichever new law is applied it ought to maintain the civil responsibility of 
auditors to third parties. If one changes this principle, what sense would there be 
in the situation of having publicly available audited accounts but with no third 




8.2 AUDIT LIABILITY REFORM PROPOSALS IN THE US 
There have been several proposals in the U.S aimed at protecting the accounting 
profession from the so called liability catastrophe. The following is an overview the 
important ones. 
 
8.2.1 THE PAULSON COMMITTEE REPORT 
This committee was so referred because it was created at the behest of U.S. Treasury 
Secretary Henry PAULSON. Its history began in November 2006, with the release of a 
preliminary report by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation. The Committee 
was led by Hal SCOTT, a Harvard law professor, Glenn HUBBARD, the dean of 
Columbia’s business school, and John L. THORNTON, a former president of Goldman 
Sachs and the incumbent chairman of the Brookings Institution. The Committee issued 
its “Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation” in order to address 
various challenges facing the U.S. capital markets, and to propose regulatory and 
market reforms directed to those challenges. The Committee’s Interim Report 
concluded that the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets was declining, a 
development the committee attributed in part to the comparatively high costs of U.S. 
regulatory compliance and litigation risk. Among other things, the committee 





The Interim Report discussed the increasing liability risks posed to the remaining Big 
Four accounting firms, and the possible impairment of consumer choice if one of those 
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firms were to fail. The Report noted in particular that there are more than three dozen 
cases involving tens of billions of dollars of potential exposure to accounting firms, and 
expressed the concern that even a relatively small share of proportional liability in these 
cases may lead to the financial failure of one of the remaining firms. ‘For the profession 
itself, there is consensus both inside and out that the demise of one of the remaining Big 
Four could have adverse consequences for audited companies and their 
shareholders,’
1193
 the report stated. In light of these concerns, the Interim Report 
included several proposed reforms addressing the issue of auditor liability: 
 
a. Create a safe harbor for certain defined auditing practices; 
 
b. Set a cap on auditor liability in certain circumstances; 
 
c. Grant regulators specific powers to appoint “monitors” to oversee 
operations of audit firms found to have engaged in systemic failures 
in process, management or personnel; 
 
d. Clarify and limit an auditor’s duties under Section 10A; and 
 
e. Restrict criminal indictments against firms, as opposed to individual 
audit partners. 
 
Following release of the Interim Report, the U.S. Treasury Department announced on 
May 17, 2007 that it was appointing a “Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession,” headed by Arthur LEVITT, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and former SEC Chief Accountant Donald NICOLAISEN, to consider 
possible reforms relating to the accounting profession. 
 
On Sept. 26, the Advisory Committee released a draft of its final report. The report 
succinctly stated that “no audit firm is too big to fail,” and that any such failure would 
have “systemic repercussions throughout the global capital markets.” Nevertheless, the 
Committee could not reach a consensus recommendation on private litigation. The 
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Committee acknowledged, however, that it is “desirable to continue that debate,” and 
that “policy makers and the legal system should consider progressively moving towards 
a structure that at least for the most part embodies a common national set of standards,” 
and perhaps a “national professional liability regime for public company auditing 
firms.” The Committee also observed that “Congress may in fact wish to consider 
creation of a federally chartered audit structure for firms which choose to operate as 
such.” Within such a structure, the Committee states, one characteristic might be “limits 
of liability for audits of public companies.” 
 
Unsurprisingly, after almost two years of work, the Paulson Committee’s “non-
recommendations” were not satisfying to some of the participants in that effort. Former 
SEC Chief Accountant Lynn TURNER, who was the sole dissenter on the Committee’s 
14-1 vote to approve the final report, was more vocal, saying that it might have been 
better for the audit profession if the Committee had simply left the issue of catastrophic 
liability unaddressed in the final report. “Right now, I don’t see any chance whatsoever 
of any litigation reform in light of what happened with this group,” Turner is quoted as 
saying.
1194
 The head of the Center for Audit Quality, Cynthia FORNELLI, who had 
strongly advocated that the Committee should address the issue of catastrophic liability 
“comprehensively,” was more hopeful, saying that “we encourage those in the 
policymaking community to use this report’s acknowledgement of catastrophic liability 




8.2.2 THE BLOOMBERG-SCHUMER REPORT 
This is another important report with same term of reference. It was issued in early 2007 
by New York City Mayor MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG and Senator CHARLES E. SCHUMER 
(D-N.Y.). The comprehensive report was entitled “Sustaining New York’s and the US’ 
Global Financial Services Leadership.” The Bloomberg-Schumer Report made a 
number of recommendations to increase the competitiveness of the U.S. capital markets, 
a few of which are pertinent to the protection of audit firms, echoing the Paulson 
Committee report. The Specific Bloomberg-Schumer report proposals are reproduced 
here below:  
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The rising cost of the US legal system is well-documented and extends far 
beyond financial services and the scope of this report. Any comprehensive legal 
reform effort would require long-term energy and attention by policy makers at 
the highest level, as well as significant legislative change. It would also require 
careful balancing of the respective interests of investors, consumers, businesses, 
and other parties. The outcome of any legal reform should not be to undermine 
the ability of plaintiffs with valid claims to recover appropriate damages. 
Instead, such reform should seek to eliminate those suits filed to pressure 
companies into settlement rather than to redress legitimate wrongs, as these suits 
dampen the business environment without providing a commensurate social 
benefit.  
 
While it is clear that coordinated legislative and enforcement-level efforts will 
be required to bring about many of the desired improvements in the legal 
environment surrounding financial services, regulatory agencies are well 
positioned to have a positive impact in the near-term. The SEC, in particular, has 
broad powers that it could proactively use to deter the most problematic 
securities-related suits. For example, Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 effectively allows the SEC to conditionally or unconditionally exempt 
persons or transactions from most provisions of the Act, so long as doing so is in 
the public interest and consistent with investor protection requirements. In using 
Section 36 to improve market conditions for both companies and investors, the 
SEC would merely be invoking authority that Congress has already bestowed 
upon it. Furthermore, the agency would be doing so within a clear statutory 
cost/benefit framework, in harmony with the principles of good regulation 
proposed in Recommendation 3 below, and with investor protection remaining a 
paramount consideration. 
 
Among proactive enforcement strategies that regulators could consider, pursuant 
to a thorough cost/benefit analysis, as they seek to improve the legal climate in 
the securities industry, three in particular need to be considered. First, limiting 
the liability of foreign companies with US listings to securities-related damages 
that are proportional to their degree of exposure to the US markets would serve 
to more adequately align the costs and benefits to foreign issuers of a US listing. 
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Second, imposing a cap on auditors’ damages for securities-related infractions 
that is sufficient to deter wrongdoing in accounting would also lessen 
unnecessary and costly risk-averse behavior on the part of auditing firms. It 
would do so by making auditing firms once again insurable, which would have 
the added benefit of reducing the likelihood that the highly concentrated US 
auditing industry will lose another major player. Finally, granting smaller public 
companies the ability to “opt-out” of particularly onerous regulatory 
requirements, provided that they conspicuously disclose the fact to investors and 
assuming the SEC is satisfied that shareholders will remain adequately 
protected, would help increase the appeal of a US listing to small companies 
both domestically and abroad. 
 
8.2.3 COMMISSION ON REGULATION OF THE U.S. CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
This committee’s report came out in March 2007 and recommended several broad 
litigation reforms, and specifically called upon the SEC to undertake a thorough review 
of how the PSLRA has addressed the problem of frivolous shareholder litigation since 
its passage by Congress. This Commission recommended that domestic and 
international policy makers “seriously consider proposals … to address the significant 
risks faced by the public audit profession from catastrophic litigation.” Among other 
findings, the report stated that “sustaining a strong, economically viable, public 
company audit profession is vital to domestic and global capital markets,” and that this 
condition is threatened by the current climate of civil litigation and regulatory 
proceedings against accounting firms.
1196
 Specific recommendations of the Commission 
include: 
 
a. Public companies, audit firms, the SEC, PCAOB, and other financial services 
regulators and policy-makers should take affirmative steps toward closing the 
“expectations gap”—that is, work to establish realistic public expectations about 
the degree of precision inherent in financial statements and constraints on those 
auditing these statements. 
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b. The Department of Justice should revise the McNulty Memorandum to address 
the special considerations relating to the consequences of criminally indicting an 
audit firm (i.e., the overarching public policy concern that a criminal indictment 
of a Big Four firm would have severe consequences for public company clients 
of that firm and for the U.S. economy).  
 
c. The Commission recognizes that addressing the risk of catastrophic loss is 
complicated and that many of the proposals offered are politically charged. 
Given the significant public policy ramifications in the event of a catastrophic 
loss of a large public company audit firm, the Commission calls on domestic and 
international market participants and policymakers to engage immediately in a 
serious evaluation and discussion of possible means to address this risk of 
catastrophic loss, including this Commission’s recommendation regarding 
backup insurance sponsored by G-8 governments or international financial 
organizations, and various proposals of others regarding safe harbors or damage 
limits in specified circumstances.  
 
d. The SEC should work with the U.S. Department of the Treasury to place the 
issue of developing a framework for support of multinational accounting firms 
on the agenda of the G-8. This framework could take many forms, including 
backup insurance sponsored by G-8 countries or international financial 
organizations.  
 
e. Congress should consider enacting legislation to create the option of a federal 
charter for no more than 10 to 15 of the largest national audit firms, which 
would include the ability of audit firms with federal charters to raise capital from 
shareholders other than audit partners of such firms (subject to addressing 
relevant concerns about audit independence and potential conflicts of interest). 
 
The Commission is also of a considered view “that audit firms and their clients should 
be encouraged to explore arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
agreements as a way of managing the costs of civil liability and audit practice 
307 
 





In the end, despite the constructive debate and proposals that the issue of auditor 
liability has generated over the years, there seem to be no clear consensus reached on 
the best way to tackle it. All of the above commissions have in some way expressed 
concern about liability and litigation cost, which may overwhelm auditors and 
ultimately push them out of business. They have also acknowledged the important of 
litigation as a driver of quality in the capital markets. The push and the debate of its 
appropriateness still continue in the US. 
 
 
9. SPAIN: IN PURSUIT OF LIABILITY REFORMS 
Over the years, relations between the socialist government and the auditing profession 
have deteriorated due to what the auditors came to regard as an interventionist attitude 
of the ICAC. In particular, the sanction imposed by the ICAC on a number of firms in 
the follow up to the Banesto financial scandal.
1198
 So when the socialist government 
was defeated in the 1996 general elections by the conservative, “Partido Popular” (PP), 
the audit profession saw a great opportunity to launch its campaign for reform in the 
audit law. The entrant government is known for its pro-market stance as evidenced in its 
support for self-regulated auditing profession in the parliamentary debates on the 1988 
Audit Law. 
 
The new government quickly moved to improve relations with the audit profession and 
to implement some changes earlier requested of the socialist government by the 
profession to no avail, like the non-publication of sanctions in the official bulletin 
(BOICAC).  Whereas the new government was inclined to the changes being proposed 
by the accounting profession and is intent in reviewing the 1988 audit law, it first wants 
to see a more unified accounting profession. These changes included the introduction of 
a self-regulatory regime and the reductions in auditors’ liability. This condition set out 
by the government and the great prospect that it represented for the profession propelled 








the professional bodies to close ranks, including the talks of unification. But it was in 
the area of auditor liability that the profession has demonstrated that it most keenly 
wants a reform. 
 
Pursuant to the above, the accounting profession commissioned PANTALEÓN, a 
prominent civil law professor to review the civil liability of auditors drawing from state 
of the law in other countries like Germany and the UK. According to the learned author 
the reading of the 1988 Audit Law permits placing liability limits clauses on auditors’ 
liability.
1199
 With regard to third party liability, he reviewed the position in Germany, 
UK and US, and strengthened by the decisions in Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman and 
others and Bily v. Arthur Andersen, he concluded citing with approval the celebrated 
dictum of CARDOZO J. in Ultramares Corp. v. Niven & Co. case: 
 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to 
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose 
accountants to liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time, to 
an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are 
so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may to exist in the implication of 




However, when finally a change was proposed to articles 11 and 12 of the 1988 Audit 
Law,
1201
 the parliament rejected it preferring instead to a global reform of the law. But 
this did not deter the quest for change. Thus in 1997 the ICJCE prepared and published 
a White book, which contained articles by some professors, important politicians and an 
auditor. But most significantly, a section in it was dedicated to promoting the ICJCE’s 
policy. This section called for fundamental changes to existing auditing legislation. 
These included the: 
 
1. need for a more precise definition of the auditor’s responsibility to third 
parties; 
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2. substitution of the current system of limitless auditor responsibility to one 
proportional to the damage caused by any negligent audit work (subject to an 









Writing in the White Book, PANTALEÓN reiterated his stance on limitation of auditors’ 
liability. He went further to draft two new clauses to replace articles 11 and 12 of the 
1988 Audit Law.
1204
 Other expert contributors to the White Book also tilted toward 
reduction in audit liability. The only dissenting view came from FERNÁNDEZ-ARNESTO, 
the President of the Spanish Stock Exchange Commission “Comisión Nacional del 
Mercado de Valores”,
1205
 who was opposed to any reform which sought to treat auditors 
in a privileged manner in comparison with other professional groups. He stressed that 
Spain was at the very beginnings of audit experiment and should not be compared with 
much experienced countries like the USA and that the imposition of a liability cap, as in 
Germany, was not an attractive solution: 
 
I see no reason in the Spanish legal context for auditors to be the only 
professionals able to enjoy an exceptional and privileged responsibility regime. 
Furthermore, to limit responsibility is a measure that goes radically against the 
evolutionary tendencies of our mercantile law, and could be a measure that 
undermines the confidence of the public in the value of the audit report. Don’t 
forget that the audit is a transaction cost like any other and can only be justified 
in the sense that the protection given to investors and creditors represents greater 
value than the audit fee. If such confidence reduces, people will increasingly 
connect the audit with other professional costs which could be sacrificed in the 
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The White Book in its conclusion emphasized once again the core issues in the reform 
debate, the importance of unifying the accounting profession; introduction of self-
regulatory regime; sanction regime of the ICAC; and reduction in audit liability as 
crucial in any future legislative reform. 
 
Contrary to the vast majority impression given in the White Book, the result of a 
commissioned market research detailed in the White Book itself showed that the 
majority of the respondent auditors were much more preoccupied with the vaunted 




The liability campaign motives on the part of the profession’s leaders that informed the 
White Book was manifested in the contrast between the empirical findings and the 
alarmist general tone of the White Book. According to GARCÍA BENAU et al., the White 
Book was selective in its use of references, in that some articles in its bibliography that 
blamed the profession for the rise of audit expectation gap in Spain and another that 
criticized the manner they responded to major audit failures were not cited anywhere, or 
were the issues they raised countered in the development of the proposals put forward 
by the Book. The Book seemed more intent on establishing a case for liability reduction 
than debating the issues advanced by those articles. As reflected by GARCÍA BENAU et 
al: 
 
In line with this intention, PANTALEÓN’s work on auditor liability (paid for and 
promoted by the profession and clearly central to its policy determinations) took 
a very selective view of the auditor’s responsibility to third parties. While 
PANTALEÓN provided an extensive review of the then current legal position in 
different countries, he devoted limited attention to the reasoning underlying 
some of the earlier case law. This had taken a more open view of the extent of an 
auditor’s liability to third parties, exemplified by the judgments in cases such as 
J.E.B. Fasteners v. Marks, Bloom & Co. (1981), Twomax v Dickson, McFarlane 
& Robinson (1982) or Rosenblum, Inc. v Adler (1983). PANTALEÓN also 
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presented the case law position in more fixed and determined terms than reviews 




Finally, the reform that the White Book sought to inspire failed to materialize. In what 
many believed to be the government’s dissatisfaction with the profession for its failure 
to unite. Moreover, the government thought it wise to wait to the end of the European 




Despite the initial lack of progress as seen above, the reform campaigns continued, 
albeit with a renewed strategy. This time the profession embarked on organizing special 
conferences involving politicians from the governing, conservative party PP and the 
Basque Nationalist Party “Partido Nacionalista Vasco” (PNV) who were called to make 
presentation. A rare occurrence in the past, together with press interviews essentially 
preparing the stage for the reform agenda. 
 
Their effort began to yield fruits when in May 1998 the Basque party presented a 
proposition in Parliament “Congreso de los Diputados” for a review and modification of 
the 1988 Audit Law. The review was to examine the audit function in Spain, and also 
take cognizance of the EU’s recent Green Paper on the future of auditing profession. 
Then in June 1998 came the groundbreaking judgment on auditor’s liability, the first in 
Spain, when a lower Spanish court (“un juzgado de primera instancia”) found against 
Ernst & Young for its audit of “Promoción Social de Viviendas” (PSV), and ruled in 
favor of the demand brought by the partners of this housing cooperative.
1210
 The court 
found adequate evidence of a causal relationship between the negligent behavior of the 
auditor and the losses suffered by the partners of PSV and duly ordered Ernst & Young 
to pay Pta 2,300mn in damages.
1211
 In arriving at this decision, the court reiterated the 
basic principles of the Spanish civil code (negligence, damage and a causal relationship 
between the two), and held that the literal reading of article 1902 of the Civil Code is 
clear as to the responsibility an auditor has not only to the audited company but to third 
parties as well. The court deliberately referred to PANTALEÓN’s thesis and his support 
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for the Caparo’s judgment – but held that this was not an adequate representation of the 




The liability campaign push finally led to the establishment of a subcommittee by the 
Spanish Parliament to look into the possibility of modifying the 1988 Audit Law. The 
subcommittee got on to work, holding a public session, at which the three professional 
associations together with the ICAC were heard making their presentations. At the 
beginning of his presentation the president of REA, announced to the delight of 
members of the subcommittee the agreement reached by the professional bodies on 
presenting a unified proposal on the anticipated audit legislation reform. Although the 
agreement was confirmed by the other presidents, the transcripts of their various 
presentations revealed some areas of differences. 
 
Each President presented the position of his association ranging from the existence of an 
audit expectations gap; damaging implications of various financial scandals; litigation 
crisis; loss of professional reputation being caused by an inadequately specified auditing 
legislation,
1213
 to the necessity of unifying of the three professional bodies, improving 
access to the profession, changing the rules governing independence and other ethical 
matters, and developing the profession’s disciplinary powers and its capacity to control 
audit quality and quality control. One area where all the three bodies were all in 




The President of REA (Registro de Economistas) in his presentation noted that the 
liability of auditors did not reflect their level of blame and concluded in the following 
terms: 
 
We suggest that one should introduce the recommendations that you already 
know about on this matter, having been exposed to them in a multitude of public 
and private functions … to limit, but never eliminate, responsibility, to introduce 
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proportional responsibility, demonstrate effective damage, fix legal ceilings as 




On his part, the President of ICJCE emphasized the need to develop the notion of 
proportionate liability in Spain, delimit the notion of third party which he claimed was 
abused in Spain and adopt the criteria obtained in other European countries. 
 
In their discussions on auditors’ liability, all the Presidents complained about the 
interventionist actions of the ICAC which they felt serves as a fodder for third party 
claims. However there was no recognition whatsoever of any responsibility on their part 
for the widening of audit expectation gap or was there any suggestion that the “crisis” 
facing the auditor was a result of poor quality audit work.  
 
In the presentation of the head of ICAC, GÓMEZ CIRIA, a different version to the above 
claims was presented. He questioned the effectiveness of the existing regulatory 
procedures of the professional auditing bodies, noting that between 1997- 99, they had 
only detected one auditor failing to comply with existing auditing standards and 
guidelines. This compared with the fact that 45% of ICAC’s quality control inspections 
had resulted in proceedings against the auditors concerned.
1216
 He further emphasized 
the fact that all sanctions issued by ICAC for breaches of auditing standards and 
guidelines had been vindicated and ratified on appeal.  
 
The ICAC President found no reason for legal liability reform given the ongoing review 
undertaken by the European Commission regarding the possible harmonization of 
legislative requirements governing the auditing function in each Member State. He is 
also of the view that whatever audit reform is pursued must take into consideration not 
only the auditors’ interest but that of interested third parties as well. He went on to 
stress that should Spain contemplate any changes in its laws, the underlying principle of 
the audit law must be preserved: 
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The work of the auditor produces effects on third parties and I cannot see 
singularities in the work of the auditor that can justify them having a 
responsibility different to any other professional. The responsibility of the 




In the end, the committee could not complete its work and did not report its findings at 
the end of the Spanish legislature, which ended in March 2000. The subcommittee by 
Spanish law therefore expired with the Parliament. However it is pertinent to point out 
that finally the audit law suffered several amendments. The last being the newly passed 
“Ley 22/2015, de 20 de julio, de Auditoría de Cuentas” incorporating the provisions of 
Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014. 
 
 
10. GLOBAL DIMENSION OF THE LIABILITY CRISIS: LIABILITY 
LIMITATION CLAUSES 
Over the years, the debate for reduction in auditors’ liability exposure has taken a global 
center stage, and was only reinforced by the large corporate fraud scandals in the 
beginning of the twenty-first century in Europe such as Ahold in Holland, Nordisk Fjer 
in Denmark, and Parmalat in Italy and the U.S. most famously, Enron.
1218
 This 
conspiracy of problems has caused great anxiety over the scope of auditor liability 
which led to declaration in some quarters, at various times, to ‘an epidemic of 
litigation’
1219
, an ‘outrageous level of current claims’
1220
 and even a possibility that 




This fear coupled with the common believe within the accounting profession that 
liability claims against them is disproportionate to their fair share of the blame led to the 
introduction of liability limitation clauses in audit contract by auditors to protect 
themselves. As indicated above, in the US, the profession had successfully lobbied and 
secured the passage of LLP. The British government also legislated for the LLP option 
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in the Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000. In Spain liability limitation through 
contract is not a novelty. 
 
The industry’s concern for liability ‘epidemic’ was echoed through a number of 
pronouncements by influential professional bodies. In 1995, the International Federation 
of Accountants,
1222
 for instance, issued a report which presented results of a 
comprehensive survey involving member organizations in 36 nations. The report 
provided a summary of the members’ views on the legal liability regimes adopted in 
their countries and used these to make a case for international regulatory action to 
establish clear and consistent limits on auditor liability.
1223
 It was argued that in those 
countries with unlimited liability regimes, such as US or Australia, the public 
conceptions of the roles of an auditor were distorted and often unrealistic, fuelling 
excessive litigation activity against auditors. In contrast, limited liability environments 
maintained in other countries were seen to facilitate greater efficiency in auditors’ work, 






11. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU 
Although individual EU countries’ positions vis-à-vis auditor liability has been diverse, 
the Eighth Company Law Directive on Statutory Audit did not deem it necessary to 
intervene.  The Directive, designed to promote the Single Market principle by providing 
a uniform framework for the delivery of audit services, made no specific reference to 
auditors’ responsibilities, nor did it define the circumstances under which auditors could 
be held liable. Member states were left to determine to an adequate degree, liability for 
a failure to act in an honest and independent manner.  
 
Concerns about the EU Member States’ divergent liability regimes came to the fore in 
the 1990s when the EC-commissioned study entitled “The role, position and liability of 
the statutory auditor within the European Union”
1225
 concluded that the diversity was 
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likely to have an adverse effect on the development of auditing. Following the 
publication of the said study, the EC issued a Green Paper
1226
 in the same year in order 
to foster further debate and consultation.
1227
 The Paper stressed that the liability 
problem had become a principal issue facing the auditing profession. It highlighted 
differences in the statutory auditors’ liability regimes across the EU as an impediment to 
the viability of the EU market. These conditions, it concluded, might lead to a greater 
audit market concentration. Although the paper acknowledged that ‘the liability of the 
auditor should be limited to amounts which reflect his degree of negligence’,
1228
 it 
ultimately, suggested that the capacity for such action should rest with member states in 
the following words: 
 
Action at EU level in this field is likely to be difficult. The audit profession is 
not the only profession which is struggling with problems of liability. 
Furthermore, the legal traditions in member states in the area of civil liability are 
quite different. It is for consideration whether the negative effects of a 
continuation of differences in the regulation of audit liability are significant 
enough to justify EU action, considering the difficulties which such action is 
likely to face and the possible discrimination which action specific to the audit 




Thereafter a conference involving the stakeholders coordinated at the EU level was held 
in December 1996. The conference brought together European audit regulatory 
community, academics, preparers as well as auditors.
1230
 The opening note to the 
section of the conference on the issue of auditor liability stated the following: 
 
We have saved probably the most difficult issue to the end of this Conference. 
Litigation against auditors is increasing. It is difficult to get an accurate picture 
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of the extent of the problem because most cases are settled out of court. The 
situation is not the same in all member states. Rules on professional liability are 
not harmonized at EU level. The professional liability of auditors is dealt with 
differently at national level. There are systems of proportional liability, joint-
and-several liability and indeed of limited liability. Is there a reason to limit the 
professional liability of the statutory auditor by law? Should this not be left to 
the parties concerned? To whom should the statutory auditor be held liable? Is 
there a reason for action at EU level? Is there a reason why the EU should take 
the initiative, as opposed to member states? Is it realistic to believe that one can 
deal with professional liability of auditors at EU level without at the same time 
tackling the liability regime of other professions? There is no doubt that we 




The conference was at a consensus in its conclusions that the EU legislative framework 
on auditing was in need of improvement which should derive from the IFAC’s 
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs). On the possible EU action on auditors 
liability however, opinions varied. The audit industry and FEE voiced their support for 
liability limitation. Others on the hand expressed concerns that such limitation would 
cause inferior audit quality and shift liability to other parties. The relative scarcity of 
actual court cases against auditors was also cited as an indication that existing liability 
regimes were not as harsh as claimed.
1232
 Karel van HULLE, the then Head of the EC’s 
Financial Information Unit, in his overview of the comments received on the Green 
Paper noted that:  
 
The commentators from the accounting profession regret the absence of a clear 
message in the Green Paper that a limitation of liability should be organized at 
EU level. Most other respondents think that there is no justification for reducing 
the professional liability of auditors as opposed to other professionals. These 
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All this while, the EU’s policy was based on a relatively ‘non-invasive’ strategy of 
coordination and collaborative encouragement of uniformity among member states to a 
more direct ‘hands-on’ approach to harmonization through legislative activity at the EU 
level. However, with respect to the issue of audit liability, the Commission continued to 
insist that liability limitation was unnecessary and considered auditor liability as a 




However, a combination of factors that followed the demise of Enron in 2001, and the 
subsequent fall of Arthur Andersen together with a strong reaction from auditors 
themselves provoked a rethink on the part of the EU. The profession’s forceful rhetoric 
following the collapse of Arthur Andersen, one of the Big Five audit firms then, 
resurrected earlier claims of ‘cataclysmic’ litigation and portrayals of auditors as 
ultimate victims of an unfair litigation battle that could potentially lead to another ‘Big’ 
firm failure with disastrous consequences for the longevity of the profession as a 
whole.
1235
 These claims were further reinforced by an evidence of increased litigation in 





Following intense lobby by advocates of liability reform especially the European 
Contact Group (ECG), i.e. a lobbying body set up in 1993 by the Big Four and medium-
sized auditors BDO and Grant Thornton to generate a united front for the larger firms in 
Europe.
1237
 Charles MCGREEVY, who succeeded Fritts BOLKESTEIN as a European 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services in November 2004, took the bait 
together with Dutch MEP Bert DOORN. The two politicians contributed in a significant 
way to have the matter addressed by the European Parliament. 
 
The outcome of these developments caused the launch, in November 2005, of European 
Forum on Auditors’ Liability. The forum consisted of representatives of auditors, 
businesses, insurers, bankers, investors, among other interest groups. It was charged 
with the task of assessing potential solutions that would moderate auditors’ litigation 
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risk. Later on in 2006, the Commission duly appointed the consultancy firm London 
Economics to undertake this study. It has been widely argued that it was the outcomes 
of this research project that became a major catalyst for the subsequent change in 
European policy on audit liability. 
 
The London Economics report came out in October 2006 with findings that the market 
for international audits was highly concentrated and effectively controlled by the ‘Big 
Four’ networks, which significantly reduced the likelihood of any middle-tier auditor 
becoming an alternative to the Big Four firms. It also found that audit market 
concentration has been aggravated by auditors’ inability to find insurance that will cover 
their total risk and thereby putting personal assets of partners at risk. It was, therefore, 
suggested that unlimited auditor liability combined with only limited availability of 
liability insurance left auditors unprotected against the ‘catastrophic’ consequences of 
growing litigation, increasing the likelihood of another large auditor’s failure, and even 
endangering the effective functioning of a broader economy.
1238
 The report in this 
regard stated: 
 
A failure of one of the Big-4 networks may result in a significant reduction in 
large company statutory audit capacity if partners and other senior staff at the 
failed firm, the remaining Big-3 firms, and possibly even some middle-tier 
firms, were to decide that auditing is a too risky activity and therefore shift to 
other business lines. This would obviously create very serious problems for 
companies whose financial statements need to be audited. In such circumstances, 
a major increase in the price of statutory audits would be required to restore the 




The publication of the London Economics’ report was soon followed by a public 
consultation on auditor liability launched by the European Commission in January 
2007. The specific ideas that have been considered by the forum included: 
 
1. A single monetary cap at EU level; 
2. A cap based on the company’s size as a function of its market capitalization; 
                                                     
1238
 SAMSONOVA, A., Re-thinking auditor liability…, op. cit., p. 15. 
1239
 London Economics (2006, p. 134).  
320 
 
3. A cap based on a multiple of the audit fees charged by the company; or 
4. Limiting the contribution of the audit firm to the damages suffered by the 




Charles MCGREEVY, an EU Internal Market Commissioner, praised the timeliness of 
these ideas: “there is a real danger of one of the Big Four being faced with a claim that 
could threaten its existence,” he said.
1241
 The European Commission established an 
“Auditors Liability Forum” to consider the issues, comprised of representatives from the 
Big Four firms, as well as other constituencies. In January 2007, the European 
Commission issued a Staff Working Paper on “Auditors Liability and Its Impact on the 
European Capital Markets,” in which it noted an array of potentially adverse 
consequences if another Big Four audit firm were to fail, and also the challenges to 
attracting new audit firms to step forward. The Commission’s Working Paper was 
largely based upon the study by London Economics.
1242
 In a January 2008 talk, 





On June 5, 2008, European Commission came out with a proposal to limit liability 
awards against accounting firms where the civil claims arise out of audit work for listed 
companies. The recommendation, principally “aims to protect European capital markets 
by ensuring that audit firms remain available to carry out audits on companies listed in 
the EU.” 
 
The EC explained its rationale as follows: 
 
Liability reform is an international issue where member states should take 
action. It is in the public interest to ensure sustainable audit capacities and a 
competitive market for audit firms at international level. In the light of the 
current audit market structure, liability risks arising from the increasing 
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litigation trend combined with insufficient insurance cover may deter auditors 
from providing audit services for listed companies. If these structural obstacles 
(liability risks/lack of insurance) persist, mid-tier audit firms are unlikely to 
become a major alternative to the “Big 4” audit networks on European capital 
markets. But there is also a risk of losing some of the existing players. One of 
the reasons might be that catastrophic claims cause the collapse of one of the 
major audit networks. 
 
The EC believes that strengthening regulatory supervision diminishes the need for 
private litigation as a means of maintaining audit quality: 
 
[A]udit regulators—not judges or courts—will in future play a pivotal role in 
maintaining the high audit quality which companies and investors deserve. In 
this regard, in addition to the requirements of the recent Directive on Statutory 
Audit, the Commission adopted on 6 May 2008 a Recommendation 
strengthening the robustness and independence of inspections of firms auditing 
listed companies. Such regular inspections provide better guarantees for the 
quality of the audits compared to unlimited civil liability rules which constrain 
access to this highly concentrated market. Audit quality should be driven more 
by sound regular inspections whilst liability should complement such efforts but 
not make the audit business unattractive. 
 
The EC also noted there are practical limits on liability that are based on a firm’s ability 
to pay: 
 
Even without any existing method of limiting liability, the expectations of third 
parties to obtain compensation face practical limits, corresponding to the 
financial capacities of the audit firms. In this respect, the advantage of limiting 
auditors' liability would be that the rules are fixed in advance and hence 
potential plaintiffs would not expect audit firms to be able to compensate them 
for unlimited amounts. 
 
Among other details of the proposal, the limited liability scheme would not apply if 
there was intentional misconduct by an auditor. The EU is of the view that this proposal 
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would encourage new entrants into the field, especially for smaller audit firms and an 
optimal solution for improving the operation of the audit market as a result of increased 
fairness and predictability of auditors’ risk exposure. Almost immediately, the European 
Commission’s proposal was met with criticism from certain quarters, including the 
European lobbying group representing the insurance and reinsurance industries. And in 
August, 2008, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) attacked the 
European Commission’s efforts to allow EU member states to impose auditor liability 
limits, arguing that the proposal would favor auditors “to the detriment of other 
stakeholders and especially shareholders.”
1244
 These negative commentaries were 
countered by positive praise from other organizations, such as the Federation of 
European Accountants (FEA). All said and done, the recommendations represent a great 
feat by the audit firms with their campaign in the European regulatory arena than at 




















                                                     
1244





I:  Chapter I have served to provide a historical background to evolution of 
corporate government to its current standing. Former World Bank President, James 
WOLFENSOHN, once noted that “the proper governance of companies will become as 
crucial to the world as the proper governing of countries.”
1245
 If this sounds like an 
exaggeration think of the desolation and the tidal wave of panic provoked across the 
globe by the recent financial crises! Even governments had been caught in a slumber. 
They woke up with their hands tied. In the sense that, they will either have to save these 
ailing companies or wait for the collapse of their country’s economy. Thus, some 
companies are so crucial to a country’s economy to the extent that they have a 
stranglehold on its government; hence leaving them to fail is never an option. This has 
been the experiences of both the United States and Spain. Both countries had to step in 
and rescue some banks and in case of the United States the auto industry as well, a 
move that saved the two economies from a brink collapse. At the centre of this 
malfeasance was the failure of corporate governance and the effective checks offered by 
audit. Moreover, a 2011 House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee investigation 
blamed the recent financial crisis on auditors’ dereliction of duty and called for the 
oligopoly of the four auditing firms to be broken. So now more than ever, the single 




II:  It has also been highlighted in this chapter that corporate governance and 
auditing serve two different functions, but they are by no means mutually exclusive. 
The two must reinforce each other if the ultimate aim of the corporate governance, of 
efficient application of company capital for the benefit of the shareholders, is to be 
achieved. To complement each other, however, does not give room for overlap of 
functions. Auditors by law and professional ethics are prohibited from any managerial 
functions, because whereas their term of reference is economic actions of the company, 
corporate governance covers a wide range of managerial functions. Moreover to 
preserve their independence and objectivity, they must not be mired into management 
decision table. Thus, the view that auditors should play a more direct role in bringing 
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about good corporate governance is stretching the string too far. On the alternative, the 
same objective can be achieved through a collaborative effort of directors being more 
responsive to auditors and making auditors feel more conscientious and therefore be 
more effective without the necessity of abandoning their term of reference. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that withholding of information to auditors by company 
directors in Spain should as well attract some legal consequence, apart from the penal 
code, like in the United States. 
 
III:  For easy comparison, the Spanish corporate law is discussed here as a 
component of the Single European Market. While it is true that the EU and the US had a 
different corporate constitutional history and admittedly their two models of corporate 
governance may have deep-rooted cultural and structural differences, they still share 
some significant commonalities. Both systems have deferred to its constituents 
members the right to regulate their internal affairs. Accordingly, corporate laws 
differences between the two models had led to what is commonly referred as ‘company 
law shopping’ where the competing states or member states as the case may be, are free 
to compete for company incorporation through their individual tax policies.  In this 
same regard, goes the argument of the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court, where both 
courts emphasize that companies are creatures of the law and owe their existence to the 
sovereignty by which they are created. It follows, therefore, that the sovereign state is at 
liberty to determine their functioning. Notwithstanding this discretion, member states 
may not make laws to restrict free movement of goods, person, services and capital as 
assured under the EU treaty but may require companies to keep their head office at the 
place of their incorporation. Similar situation apply in the United States, where states 
are prohibited from interfering with Interstate Commerce Clause yet may enact laws to 
prohibit take-over of companies located in their States. 
 
IV:  Efficient market systems rely upon the availability of high quality and 
transparent information. Although Spain and the US have their own individual and 
unique systems of corporate governance reflecting different economic cultural and legal 
circumstances, they are both successful economies built upon a regulatory framework 
geared towards safeguarding their financial stability and investor interests. Apart from 
this safeguard, auditors are still employed to serve the private interests of the 
shareholders of a company. The financial audit remains an important aspect of corporate 
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governance that makes management accountable to shareholders for its stewardship of a 
company. That is why his or her role in the supervisory process requires standards such 
as independence, objectivity and integrity to be achieved. Auditors are not involved in 
the decision-making process of the company and therefore cannot be the primary causes 
of the recent financial crises. These are caused by bad lending and investing decisions, 
unwarranted risk-taking and perhaps some flaws in the credit-rating system. But the 
least required of auditing is that when companies make bad decisions that affect their 
standing, their report should properly disclose it.  
 
V:  There have been concerns even well before the financial crisis that proper 
attention was not given to regulation and the audit function as the audit expectation gap 
debate failed to challenge the presumed potential of the audit function. Instead of 
questions being asked about the audit practice, these have been ignored at the expense 
of the eagerness to bring out new rules for auditors to comply with. With the enactment 
of the Sox and the regulatory framework it established through the board, the traditional 
wisdom of self-regulation has been replaced with now largely accepted conviction that 
‘auditing can be made to work in an appropriate fashion and can satisfy the demands of 
recipients of audit services – ‘if only’ a suitable form of audit regulation could be 
provided.’ As rightly observed by MITCHELL et al., “Consumers, shareholders, 
government and the public should not have to wait for scandals to float to the surface, 
posthumously, to know what is going on. Only proper accounting can tell them. Only 




VI:  Even before the scandals that provoked the divorce from self-regulated 
framework to combined regulatory structure, some countries like Spain have shown a 
good promise in that direction. As noted by GARCÍA & HUMPHREY,
1247
 while the 
emerging literature questioning the nature of audit practice has made a worthy start, 
there is a need for Anglo-Saxon ‘critical’ researchers to be less Anglo-centric in their 
analysis – to make more concerted efforts to recognize the diverse international contexts 
in which the auditing function is practiced, rather than presuming that discussions based 
in the context of an often unnamed British or American accounting profession have an 
unconditional international applicability. A reminder perhaps expressed more forcefully 
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in the shift by the US to a quasi-official regulatory structure, and in the Latin axiom, 
audi alteram partem, unless you hear other side, you cannot know the whole truth. 
Unsurprisingly, the EU has just embraced independent public oversight function as the 




VII:  The concept of an audit expectation gap presupposes that the public’s 
expectation of auditors duties is different from what auditors believe is their function. 
This has created an environment of suspicion between auditors and the public as well as 
increased the frequency of litigation against auditors. As seen above, the prevalence of 
the audit expectation gap is owed to a number of diverse factors like complicated nature 
of an audit function, self-regulation of the audit profession, the unreasonable nature of 
the expectation gap and the ambiguity of some auditing terms among others. Given the 
diversity of factors responsible for the expectation gap, the problem needs to be 
addressed from a number of different perspectives as well. One of such measures 
undertaken by regulators and professional bodies in Spain as well as the US to address 
the auditing expectations gap is the codification of auditing knowledge through the 
issuance of auditing standards. In the USA, for example, the profession attempted to 
narrow the gap by adopting the auditing standards of 1988. In the case of Spain, a 
similar effort was made with the adoption and publishing of the NTA-May/1993 
auditing standard on the going concern assumption by ICAC. However, there is a 
growing sentiment within the academics that the development and eventual 
promulgation of an auditing standard is not more than an exercise of power by the audit 
profession to promote its own view regarding ethical behavior of its members over what 
the public may perceive. This can be seen in the US standard-setting procedure 
delicately designed to promote the interest of auditors rather than public interest. 
 
VIII:  This thesis can be sustained by the fact that the auditing standard had not 
affected auditors’ behavior at the time of issuing a going concern opinion as evidenced 
in the above studies. Moreover, given the auditing profession’s inability to at least 
forewarn on the pending bankruptcies that have supposed the financial scandals like 
Enron and WorldCom in the USA, the US Congress has concluded that the self-
regulatory model had failed, and created a new regulatory model that mirrors that of 
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Spain. However, this change is not a guarantee. As evidenced in the above results, in 
Spain, where audit is state regulated, auditors’ reaction to the auditing standards 
adopted has been the same as their American counterparts. Therefore stakeholders in the 
audit industry might wish to reflect more on the extent of state controlled regulation’s 
ability to enhance audit function. 
 
IX:  We have presented here the application of the doctrine of pure economic 
in Spain as well as in the United States. Although the doctrine is not well covered in the 
United States, especially, in academics and scholarship as in Europe and other places, it 
still forms part of the country’s judicial heritage. Historically common law has been 
applied across and beyond jurisdictions. In fact, judgments of common law 
jurisdictions, although not binding on other jurisdictions, are still cited as sources of 
persuasive influence. Moreover economic loss is of wide application in the American 
common law as seen in cases of product defects and auditor’s liability. In Spain, on the 
other hand, the doctrine has just been introduced in reference to the coverage the 
doctrine is receiving in Europe. In fact, some principles of the doctrine have been 
incorporated into the Principles of European Tort Law, a soft law, which by design is 
now part of Spain’s law.  However, it is in academics that the doctrine is making 
important inroad in Spain, where terms like deep pockets, floodgate, and negligence as 
well as private and social loss are now a common place. Thus, even though liability in 
Spain is of general application without any restrictions whatsoever, the economic loss 
has become a useful tool for interpretation and understanding of tort law. 
 
X:  As illustrated here pure economic loss is a substantive as well as 
contentious area of law. Moreover, it is an area where increasing numbers of litigants 
seeking a remedy fall foul of a legal requirement not clearly defined. Whilst general 
principles have developed in many areas of tort, pure economic loss is one of those 
areas which have failed to produce a coherent and sustained set of rules. It is perhaps 
not surprising that the outcome of a particular case is dependent more upon the facts 
rather than an established principle. More often than not, the courts have offered 
differing views as to the reason for their decisions and thereby created more uncertainty. 
But given the importance of the tort of negligence and the magnitude of the pure 
economic loss question, it is perhaps surprising that there is still no agreement as to the 
basis upon which to restrict or allow recovery, and whether or not to hold a careless 
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defendant liable for harm. This, in a sense, should be expected given the complex and 
varied nature of economic loss cases in a fast changing economic and risk 
environments. 
 
XI:  In principle, pure economic loss may be recoverable on the basis that 
there is foreseeability, proximity and it is fair just and reasonable, or on the basis of 
voluntary assumption of responsibility. Yet in America, the traditional application of 
remoteness of damage or lack of duty seems to mask the real policy behind the pure 
economic loss rule, namely, a refusal to recognize liability without intelligible limits, 
which seems to be the common policy resonating in several of the cases. The simple 
explanation for this policy is perhaps the abhorrence of excessive and disproportionate 
punishment that Anglo-American tradition maintains. As such, even, the notion of 
proximate cause of harm in negligence law only serves to strike a balance of 
proportionality between a wrongful act and its consequent punishment. This has been 
the ever-present and continuing philosophy that has accompanied and sustained the pure 




XII:  It is my contention that the argument behind the reluctance by the courts 
to extend exclusionary or economic rule for the fear of disproportionate liability is 
consistent with logic and common sense. As observed by RABIN, “it would make no 
sense to hold a careless driver responsible for the massive pure economic losses 
suffered when he brings traffic to a standstill in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during the 
rush hour. Although the harm he causes might properly be regarded as a cost of driving, 
it is not the kind of loss that is sufficiently predictable in magnitude to make preventive 
measures feasible. The type of catastrophic loss that involves an exceedingly low risk of 





XIII:  Arguably, in a competitive economic society the conduct of one person is 
always liable to have economic consequences for another. The golden rule is one man’s 
loss is another’s gain. As TOULSON J posited “every day countless people suffer pure 
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economic loss of one kind or another through acts or omissions of others, and to seek to 
apportion blame and redistribute such losses would involve massively cumbersome and 
expensive legal machinery. However, the courts have departed from that general 
approach in certain cases where such a special relationship exists between the injured 





XIV:  Perhaps, the most instructive view on the policy reasoning behind 
whether a person is liable to another is found in the dictum of DENNING MR in the case 
Lamb v. Camden LBC
1252
, where his Lordship laid bare the judicial policy and 
expounded that “the truth is that all these three – duty, remoteness and causation – are 
all devices by which the courts limit the range of liability for negligence or nuisance. As 
I said recently ‘…it is not every consequence of a wrongful act which is the subject of 
compensation. The law has to draw a line somewhere’. Sometimes it is done by limiting 
the range of the persons to whom duty is owed. Sometimes it is done by saying that 
there is a break in the chain of causation. At other times it is done by saying that the 
consequence is too remote to be a head of damage. All these devices are useful in their 




XV:  In the end, it is to the law of tort’s credit that it was able to use the 
instrument provided by the common law to implement and adapt to any challenges that 
the changes of cultural and economic shifts may assign to it. It is logical and healthy to 
debate the propriety or otherwise of the economic loss rule, but it is undeniable that 
over the course of time, the courts have found the means to extend the scope of the law 
in response to a changing socio-economic context. The economic loss rule is 
understandable in the context of natural evolution of the law to address a social need at 
a given time and place, like substitution of comparative negligence for contributory 
negligence.  
 
XVI:  Thus, even the economic rule is evolving with time as seen in cases of 
consequential loss and liability for negligent statements, like the case auditor. In all 
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these cases the courts have demonstrated the necessary pragmatism required in 
expanding the long arm of the law in resolving a pressing need. “Tort law often expands 
as a means of deterring undesirable behavior and as a means of providing compensation 
to victims. However, the scope of tort law can sometimes be restricted when public 





XVII:  The array of doctrines and their various interpretations suggest that, 
despite the expansion of grounds for liability, economic loss caused by words was still 
viewed with particular suspicion. In addition to finding an adequate approach to 
evaluate the existence of a duty of care, the courts also had to ensure that, once this duty 
was found, its scope would be adequately controlled. The United States’ common law 
courts presented with an auditor liability case are faced with problems of choice among 
array of doctrines as well as how to apply their preferred doctrine when selected. This 
process involves more than simple application of law to facts. The doctrines are 
imprecise and not so clearly defined that they can hardly be applied without 
considerably more thought by the courts. As is evident in the auditor liability cases, 
doctrine does not dictate which rule or which interpretation of an adopted rule is 
authoritative. Instead, the controlling doctrine is, in the first instance, prescribed by and 
then interpreted through policy analysis.  
 
XVIII: The variations in application of the Restatement test make this point 
more clearly. The same doctrinal formulation that is applied to require the functional 
equivalent of a third-party beneficiary relationship by the California court in Bily,
1255
 
approaches a broad negligence standard grounded in foreseeability when applied by the 
North Carolina court in Raritan I.
1256
 The importance of policy factors in the analysis of 
liability considerations ultimately depends on the courts’ assessment of the demands of 
society about the desirability of a rule or outcome in terms of the social values of utility, 
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XIX:  The threat of imposing open-ended liability on a defendant has been one 
of the central policy factor concerns of courts in accountant liability cases since the 
beginning, receiving its authoritative expression in Ultramares.
1258
 In that case, 
CARDOZO argued that liability for negligence “may expose accountants to a liability in 
an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
1259
The 
threat of indeterminate liability is particularly acute in accountant liability cases because 
the consequences of a negligent audit report can extend very far, unlike the 
consequences of a negligent act causing physical injury.
1260
 The consequences of a 
physical accident can be catastrophic, but they tend to be limited in space and time to 
the immediate victims.
1261
 The economic consequences of a negligent audit, on the 
other hand, can extend along chains of causation to many persons far removed in time 




XX:  Once an audit report is issued, it can be disseminated widely and relied 
on by members of the general public. The rippling of consequences is particularly likely 
to occur today since information can be passed quickly and costless from person to 
person (and often many persons at once) in ways over which the accountant has no 
control.
1263
 As brilliantly adumbrated by Judge Cardozo “liability for negligence if 
adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other than an auditor’s. Lawyers who 
certify their opinion as to the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge 
that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the 
investors.... Title companies insuring titles to a tract of land... will become liable to 




XXI:  However, the main policy factor, which has preoccupied the United 
States’ common law courts, is the fear of opening the floodgates of litigation. On the 
one hand, such factors as the fear that an open-ended liability might seriously injure the 
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profession or burden social and commercial life have also been assessed. On the other 
hand , these arguments have been balanced against, inter alia, the need to deter 
negligent conduct and to furnish incentives to caution, as well as the fact that auditors 
are in a better position to protect themselves by getting insurance and passing on its 
costs to their clients. 
 
XXII:  We have discussed here that in Spain as well, auditors’ work may lead to 
liability under both contract and tort law. Auditor liability in Spain is found under the 
Civil Code and company law as well as the audit law. Compensation under this system 
is, however, not for pure financial loss but under the general principles of liability 
enshrined under Civil Code. While liability for contract is ipso facto without 
controversy, liability to third parties has been controversial both in its essence and its 
reach. The figure of third party (tercero) is well recognized under Spanish law. 
Moreover it is clearly stated under the audit law that auditors are liable not only to their 
clients but to third parties, like investors and creditors, who suffered loss as result of 
their audit. Moreover, investors as consumers are entitled to the protection of the law 
 
XXIII: Notwithstanding this provision, some legal experts like PANTALEÓN do 
not believe that the third party referred to both under the Civil Code and the audit law is 
of unlimited application. The learned author argued that both the audit law and the civil 
code refer to third parties within the contemplation of the auditor and his client 
company at the time of entering into audit contract, someone to whom the audit report is 
submitted or someone directly induced by the auditor. PANTALEÓN further argues that 
subjecting an auditor or auditing firm to potentially massive liability would be 
tantamount to violating their constitutional rights enshrined under articles 38 and 53 of 
the Spanish Constitution.  According to PANTALEÓN, auditors cannot be liable to the 
world at large or be made the insurers of their clients by default. 
 
XXIV: The above arguments by Mr. PANTALEÓN were answered by none other 
than the Spanish supreme court in cases “SSTS, 1ª, núm. 798/2008, de 9 de octubre, 
869/2008, de 14 octubre, 115/2009, de 5 marzo and 355/2009 de 27 mayo”, where the 
court held that auditor’s report is a document made not only for the audited company 
but also for the purpose of exhibiting it to third parties, and has been so recognized by 
Spanish law. Accordingly the law has required that the said document be deposited at 
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the mercantile registry. When so deposited it becomes a public document at the disposal 
of all. Therefore, under Spanish law auditors are liable to third parties under the general 
principles of liability with no limitation or restriction. This does not in any way means a 
carte blanche for the claimant. The claimant must show the damage suffered and also 
establish a causal relationship between the damage and the fault of the auditor. Then the 
court will look at the circumstances of the case to determine whether the claimant has 
been diligent at the time of relying on the audit. The court will then evaluate the 
circumstances of the case and come to judicial conclusion on whether the claimant’s 
case should succeed.  
 
XXV:  It must be noted, however, that this liability does not make the auditor a 
bloodhound. The auditor is not required by law to substitute the managers or correct all 
their errors or irregularities; he or she is only required to comply with professional 
standards and obligations. Once that is done the auditor is absolved from liability. The 
auditor may only be judged in accordance with the standard of his or her peers. 
 
XXVI: This analysis shows that the common law system of the US used its 
various interpretations of the duty concept in keeping audit liability within a reasonable 
limit, while the civil law of Spain achieved that through the flexible use of the concept 
of causation. “But since we all live in the same social and economic environment, and 
since the judicial function can, [I believe], be epitomized as an educated reflex to facts, 
find that, in civil law countries as in common law countries, not only are we beset with 
the same practical problems, but broadly speaking we reach the same practical 
solutions. Our legal concepts may be different, and may cause us sometimes to diverge; 
but we have much to learn from each other in our common efforts to achieve practical 




XXVII: Chapter IV has highlighted the birth and growth of audit accounting over 
the years into an indispensable player in the financial market. While it is true that 
beginning of the 21st century has been marked by corporate and accounting scandals, 
and these scandals, can exact a terrible toll in terms of human suffering (e.g., 
unemployment and lost retirement savings).” They had also served as an opportunity to 
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inquire into their causes with a view to prevent their occurrence in the future, at least on 
a similar scale. As noted earlier, the most important corporate reforms historically had 
come about as a result of financial scandals. But unlike the antecedent reforms, the 
recent reforms are more comprehensive and far reaching. In covering the same ground, 
the SOX and the 8
th
 Directive represented the convergence of audit oversight on a 
global scale. The SOX, for example, has made dramatic changes to some of the 
fundamental institutions that define auditing in the US, like the transformation of the 
self-regulated accounting industry into a semi-governmental agency called the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board.  
 
XVIII: The EU on the other hand, apart from the Ahold and Parmalat scandals, 
had to grapple with other pending reasons that played significant role in the 
modernization of the 8
th
 Directive. First, in Europe there was a necessity to adjust the 
EU regulatory framework to the demands of an increasingly globalised audit practice. 
Secondly, the EU even before the onset of the crisis has been in the process of 
harmonizing the European audit market, the crisis only made it more urgent. In the end, 
the European Union and the U.S. took a different path in their response to the corporate 
scandals and their respective efforts to improve corporate governance and restore public 
and investor confidence to the financial sector. The European Union chose a mix path of 
binding directives together with non-binding recommendations. The US, on the other 
hand took a heavy regulation through the SOX. 
 
XXIX: Apart from its positive transformation of audit practice and corporate 
governance, SOX has been widely criticized for centralization of corporate governance 
in the United States. This approach of varied company law practice across the United 
States gave companies the opportunity “forum shopping” to choose a state best suited 
for their interest. The same scenario is playing out in the European where the issue is 
centralized corporate legislation is sensitive to the constituting member states that 
jealously guard their national identities and peculiarities. On this issue, the European 
Commission has made it clear that when a federal legislation become necessary by way 
of directives, the directives should be based on general principles, leaving member 
states to fill in the details in accordance with their peculiarities and needs. The practice 
of subsidiarity has worked with great success in the European Union, especially, in the 
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area of corporate governance, where member states are given the flexibility of adapting 
the directives over a period of time. 
 
XXX:  With regards to financial statements responsibility, the EU chose to place 
a collective responsibility on the board. The US, on the other hand, puts the emphasis 
on the executives and officers of the company. In addition, while the US has made the 
responsibilities of the audit committee a matter of federal law, the European Union 
stops at issuing a non-binding recommendation. The EU also has its peculiar problem 
and need to tackle the recurring problem of audit expectation gap which seems to be 
widening by the day. The combined effect of all these concerns was the issuance of 
Statutory Audit Directive of 2006. In the end it is only hoped that the combined and 
broad reach of the SOX and the 8
th
 Directive will provides the necessary safeguard in 
ensuring that audits are carried out in an atmosphere of integrity, objectivity and 
independence. However, it must be understood that both efforts are work in progress 
because a perfect corporate regulation does not exist in human institutions. 
 
XXXI: The consistent and continued global campaign by the important audit 
firms has succeeded in making the issue of liability reform a subject of judicial and 
legislative inquiries internationally. Generally, the campaign has achieved considerable 
success but auditors think it is insufficient. Several countries have taken measures over 
the years to limit auditor liability in some form. This can be seen in the case of the US, 
where the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of (PSLRA) was enacted in 1995 
and later in 1998 the related Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA). 
Both laws have to some extent altered the liability of audit firms from joint-and-several 
to proportional liability in an effort to curb meritless claims by “deep pockets” plaintiffs 
against audit firms. Some European countries, on the other hand have chosen to place 
cap on the limit of audit firms liability exposure, and most importantly, member states 
of the European have just completed adapting their laws to the European Commission 
recommendation that European Union member states should take measures to limit 
auditor liability. 
 
XXXII: Conceivably, given the initial attitude of European Commission of not 
tampering with the liability regimes of member states, the caps recommendation, marks 
a dramatic turnaround. But if one thinks that the audit profession has finally nailed a 
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victory. Then it worth pondering on the approach adopted by the Commission, 
according to SAMSONOVA, “as opposed to a blanket law approach, the Commission 
opted for a softer country-to-country option solution giving discretion to individual 
nations in terms of selecting a suitable limitation method. This is effectively an 
indication that the EU has refrained from fully addressing the very complexity of the 
liability debate evident in the national differences of liability regimes across Europe.” 
Therefore, although a milestone, it is by no means the end of the road for the proponents 
of liability reform. 
 
XXXIII: In the US tide for liability reform is also gathering pace as the support for 
reform continue to grow, albeit with political fears from the public that is yet recover 
from the aftershock of the Enron and WorldCom debacle. There seem to be the feeling 
in the US that now is not the appropriate time to temper with the status quo. In fact, 
there are voices in the Democratic Party, like Senator Elizabeth Warren of 
Massachusetts, who argue that those responsible for the financial crisis should be held 
accountable. Meanwhile, it is feared that decreasing liability may decrease the incentive 
auditors have to do thorough and accurate work, once the potential cost of their mistake 
is lessened or removed. Apart from that, auditor liability threat is also a necessary 
regulatory tool used by the SEC to increase accuracy and investor confidence. Investor 
confidence is the foundation of any financial market and auditor liability helps to 
strengthen it. Given the devastating effect the recent crisis had on investor and public 
confidence, the US capital markets cannot afford any more crisis of confidence that 
liability cap may generate. 
 
XXXIV: Finally, if eventually the US decides to follow the lead of Europe in 
capping auditors’ liability, it is hoped that such reform would be sensitive to investors’ 
needs and look at policies that best serve their interests as well as generate confidence in 
the market. The reforms must also take cognizance of the fact that auditors play the role 
of engendering confidence of investors in the capital markets, and this confidence 
should not be taken for granted. In light of a recalcitrant global financial crisis, and the 
continued effects it has on the U.S., and on the global capital markets as a whole, it is 
vital that any reform adventure should be geared towards promoting investor confidence 
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